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Abstract
Throughout the 1990s, Western states, either as part of a UN force, a multinational 
coalition under UN authority, or a coalition of states operating without UN approval, 
intervened militarily in intrastate conflicts, ostensibly to protect endangered non- 
combatants. In spite of their military superiority and vast resources, the Western 
interveners were largely unsuccessful at providing protection to the populations. This 
thesis seeks to explain why Western states intervened in humanitarian crises throughout 
the 1990s in a way that failed to protect populations.
Using the protection interventions in northern Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo as case 
studies, this thesis demonstrates that the interveners prioritised the protection of their self- 
interests over the protection of the endangered populations. As a result, and in spite of 
their humanitarian rhetoric, Western interveners protected populations only when doing 
so coincided with the pursuit of their self-interests.
Furthermore, this thesis argues that by utilising concepts from risk theory, it is possible to 
reconcile the willingness of Western states to intervene in humanitarian crises with their 
refusal to provide adequate protection to vulnerable civilian populations. Rather than 
viewing these inadequate protection interventions as anomalous occurrences that defy an 
overarching explanatory framework, it argues that they were the logical results of the 
West’s post-Cold War “risk” perspective.
By applying key concepts derived largely from Ulrich Beck’s sociological conception of 
a Risk Society to the population protection interventions of the 1990s, this thesis develops 
an explanatory framework for understanding the complex and seemingly 
counterproductive strategies employed by Western states.
The thesis concludes that Western states were acting as risk societies and approached the 
interventions of the 1990s as exercises in “risk management” in which the costs required 
to protect populations were deemed to be disproportionately high when compared to the 
risks posed to Western self-interests.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
Throughout the 1990s, Western states, acting within coalitions or as part of the United 
Nations, launched elaborate interventions into dangerous intrastate conflicts purportedly 
to protect endangered non-combatant populations. Though lives were saved as a result of 
these efforts and “success” was proclaimed by the interveners, over a million non- 
combatants were killed and millions more were displaced from their homes while under 
the “protection” of intervening forces. Moreover, many recipients of these protection 
efforts were still suffering abuse in refugee villages or internally displaced persons (IDP) 
camps years after the interventions ended. Mary Kaldor described these interventions as 
“disappointing” and “shameful” and declared that “it is hard to find a single example of 
humanitarian action during the 1990s that can be unequivocally declared a success”.1 
Similarly, Adam Roberts described the interventions as “flawed”, “shameful”, and 
“dishonest” and urged the West to cease its “bland statements, half-promises and 
betrayals”.2 The fact that the wealthiest states with the most powerful militaries in the 
world, backed by large segments of the international community, were unable to provide 
effective protection to vulnerable civilians warrants further investigation. What is 
perhaps even more interesting is that despite the variances in their times and locations, 
these Western interventions shared a number of commonalities. In all the interventions, 
Western states emphasised humanitarian justifications and objectives for their actions, 
acted within a coalition or similar multinational arrangement, prioritised the safety of 
intervention forces over that of the endangered populace, and implemented minimalist
1 Mary Kaldor, “A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention: The Role of Global Civil Society”, in Helmut 
Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor (eds.), Global Civil Society 2001, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 110.
2 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in a policy vacuum,
Adelphi Paper 305, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1996), 9 79, and 88.
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strategies designed to contain or manage the humanitarian crises rather than end them 
altogether. Indeed, in many cases, the West took actions that seemed to thwart its stated 
protection objective.
Numerous authors, independent panels, and specially-appointed investigative 
commissions have repeatedly concluded that the West’s failure to protect populations did 
not originate from a lack of capabilities or technical expertise. To be sure, Western 
military forces have learned “lessons” from their experiences and have attempted to 
incorporate them into workable doctrines for the future. Nevertheless, their failure to 
provide adequate protection is widely accepted by academics and practitioners alike to 
have resulted from a lack of will.3 Beyond this general observation, the analysts either 
differ substantially or else choose not to pursue the issue further. This thesis takes the 
West’s “lack of will” as its starting point and endeavours to provide an explanatory 
framework by which the West’s “will” regarding endangered populations, and the 
seemingly self-defeating actions it took on their behalf, can be understood. To 
accomplish this, the thesis seeks to answer one primary question: Given its
overwhelming military capabilities, why did the West intervene in humanitarian 
crises throughout the 1990s in a way that failed to protect populations? This 
question can best be answered incrementally by resolving several secondary questions:
a.) Was population protection the West’s primary purpose for launching the 
interventions?
b.) If not, what was the primary purpose?
c.) How did the West go about pursuing this purpose?
3 For example, see A/54/549, 15 November 1991, “Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General 
Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica”, para 490, page 108, and A/55/305— S/2000/809,
21 August 2000, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”, paras 52,265, and 266, pages 9 
and 44, and S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, Report o f the Independent Inquiry into the Actions o f the 
United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 15 December 1999, Accessed 21 July 2003. 
http://ods-dds-nv.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf70penElement. Conclusions 1 
and 10.
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Prior to discussing the specific manner in which this thesis goes about answering these 
questions, it is necessary to give a brief description of the post-Cold War security 
environment in which the interventions took place.
1.1 POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Western protection interventions in the 1990s occurred in an environment characterised 
by two contradictory pressures. On the one hand, Western states were pressured to 
intervene on behalf of endangered populations as a result of their increased ability, 
opportunity, awareness, and acceptance of the population protection mission. On the 
other hand, they were reluctant to undertake dangerous military missions for issues that 
did not clearly affect their more traditional notions of national interest. Factors such as 
casualty aversion, fickle public support, and the complexity of the protection mission all 
argued against an interventionist approach. Faced with these conflicting pressures, 
Western states seemed simultaneously to advocate and eschew the protection mission in 
the 1990s.
1.1.1 Pressures to Protect
Numerous factors existed throughout the 1990s which provided a basis for hope to 
endangered populations who sought external protection from intrastate belligerents. First, 
there existed an increased ability among Western states to intervene on behalf of 
populations as the Permanent Members of the Security Council were inclined to put aside 
ideological differences and co-operate, at least passively, to stop instances of egregious 
humanitarian abuse. Second, there was an increased opportunity for protection 
interventions as anti-population intrastate conflict abounded in the volatile and weapons- 
saturated post-Cold War environment. Third, the Western public’s awareness of the
8
crises increased as the effect of globalisation and the growth of global civil society 
increased the information available. The media transmitted real-time footage of the plight 
of populations from formerly inaccessible regions of the world and humanitarian 
organisations became more adept at influencing public opinion. As public awareness of 
the crises grew, Western publics generally became more willing to respond to 
humanitarian needs and to pressure Western decision-makers to act on the victims’ 
behalf. Finally, as a result of the relaxed survival threat and the increased public demand 
for humanitarian action, Western leaders conveyed an increased acceptance of protection 
interventions. They responded with strong humanitarian rhetoric and forceful 
condemnation of population abuse. Some Western states even expanded their concept of 
security to include the individual human being. The Security Council’s frequent ruling 
that serious humanitarian crises constituted threats to international peace and security 
further reinforced acceptance of the protection mission. This interpretation legitimised 
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and, in so doing, challenged the 
prevailing understanding of state sovereignty with respect to a state’s treatment of its own 
population.
Ability. The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s4 had a profound effect on the West’s 
ability to protect endangered populations. Not only did it usher in a period of extreme 
optimism within the international community, but it also left the West in an indisputably 
predominant position. Freed from the superpower stalemate that had blocked effective 
action for the previous forty-five years, the international community was optimistic that
4 Though the date of the Cold War’s end is disputable, many scholars recognise two key dates as marking 
its termination. The first was Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s speech to the General Assembly on 7 
December 1988 announcing the restructuring o f the Soviet military and the drastic cuts to its military 
presence in Eastern Europe. The second was the Malta Summit between Gorbachev and US President 
George Bush in December 1989 in which both leaders recognised the lessening of tensions between the two 
countries.
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the Security Council would finally be able to carry out its intended purpose of 
safeguarding international peace and security. As the superpowers withdrew their support 
from various Cold-War conflicts around the globe and exerted pressure on their former 
clients to end the fighting, many combatants found themselves physically, technically, or 
financially unable to continue fighting and looked to the UN for help in bringing about a 
durable peace. Optimistic of success, the UN Security Council authorised a number of 
new peacekeeping missions of a substantially different magnitude from those of the Cold 
War era. Rather than merely interposing peacekeeping forces to support an already 
agreed-upon cease-fire as it had done in the past, the Security Council mandated these 
new operations to perform a variety of tasks including electoral support, repatriation of 
refugees, provision of humanitarian assistance, and disarmament.5
Optimism was further increased as a result of the Chapter VII action taken against Iraq
after its invasion of Kuwait in 1990-91. In response to Iraq’s aggression, the Security
Council Member States co-operated enough to pass relevant Security Council resolutions
and fight together in an international coalition to reverse the Iraqi occupation. In 1991,
US President George Bush confidently proclaimed that a New World Order had begun.
In 1992, the Security Council had its first meeting composed entirely of heads of state.
British Prime Minister John Major, who chaired the meeting, captured the Security
Council’s spirit of optimism with these words:
The world now has the best chance for peace, security and development since the 
founding of the United Nations. I hope, like the founders of the United Nations 
themselves, that we can today renew the resolve enshrined in the Charter—the 
resolve to combine our efforts to accomplish the aims of the Charter in the 
interests of all the people we are privileged to represent.6
5 See Mats Berdal, Whither UN Peacekeeping?, Adelphi Paper 281 (London: Brasseys/IISS, 1993), 12-25.
6 S/PV.3046, 31 January 1992, 7.
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Fresh from its success in the 1991 Gulf War and the multidimensional operations of the 
late 1980s, the Security Council commissioned the UN Secretary-General, Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali, to report on how the UN could be made more effective in its “capacity ... 
for preventive diplomacy, for peacemaking and for peace-keeping”.7 The resultant report, 
entitled An Agenda for Peace, was a ground-breaking document founded squarely on 
post-Cold War optimism. Among other things, Boutros-Ghali proposed a new mission, 
coined “Peace Enforcement”, in which UN troops would take “coercive action” to
Q
enforce cease-fires. Such a mission was particularly novel for the UN because it 
suggested deploying troops to intrastate conflicts in which the peacekeeping norm of 
consent was weak or lacking altogether. Boutros-Ghali’s proposition was significant for 
Western states, particularly those who held permanent seats on the Security Council, 
because it offered them a way to address difficult humanitarian missions without 
necessitating large deployments of their own forces. Acting through the Security 
Council, they could reap the benefits of responding to difficult conflicts without 
shouldering all of the costs and responsibilities. More importantly, if the intervention 
went awry, they could hold the UN responsible. The large number of UN missions which 
followed Boutros-Ghali’s report attested to the West’s approval. For example, in 1992, 
10,000 UN forces were deployed in support of 8 traditional peacekeeping and observation 
missions. By 1993, the numbers had risen to 80,000 personnel across 18 separate 
operations that covered a wide range of multivariate missions.9
7 S/23500, 31 January 1992.
8 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement 
adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 
1992. Boutros-Ghali expounded on the definition of peace enforcement in his article, “Empowering the 
UN,” Foreign Affairs, (Winter 1992-1993), 93.
9 John Hillen, Blue Helmets: The Strategy o f UN Military Operations, 2nd ed., (Washington D.C.: 
Brassey’s, 2000), 146.
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Western states were also more able to protect populations in the post-Cold War period 
because of the permissive environment in which they operated. They could embark on 
protection interventions without the fear of inciting the Soviet Union into a larger, more 
dangerous conflict. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and Russia in 
economic turmoil, the West was economically and militarily predominant. There was no 
challenger that possessed anything comparable to the West’s range of capabilities. 
Consequently, the West wielded a great deal of influence in the international community 
and was able to pursue its humanitarian agenda with very few external constraints. The 
West’s ability to launch protection interventions was further enhanced by the fact that 
most states did not want to be seen as supporters of openly abusive regimes. Therefore, 
even when states were uncomfortable with the West’s humanitarian agenda, they were 
rarely willing to oppose it openly in cases of egregious population abuse.
Opportunity. The instability and upheaval of the post-Cold War period meant that 
intrastate conflicts proliferated. Moreover, as non-combatant populations were often 
intentionally targeted by combatants in these conflicts, the West’s opportunity to 
intervene on the populations’ behalf increased accordingly. In 1994, the UN 
Development Programme reckoned that 79 of the 82 conflicts that occurred between 1989 
and 1992 were intrastate in nature.10 In a similar finding, Cherif Bassiouni reported that, 
of the 100 conflicts in the 1990s, only 10 were interstate in nature.11 The point of these 
statistics is not to assert that post-Cold War intrastate conflicts vastly increased in number 
or even that the manner in which they were fought was markedly different from earlier 
conflicts; both of these assertions can, and have been, hotly disputed. The point is that
10 UNDP, UN Development Report, 1994. Quoted in John Harriss, “Introduction: a time of troubles—  
problems of international humanitarian assistance in the 1990s,” in The Politics o f Humanitarian 
Intervention, John Harriss, ed., (London: Pinter, 1995), 1.
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the intrastate conflicts, within the context of the post-Cold War security environment, 
took on new dynamics which increased the West’s opportunity to protect populations.
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and other formerly communist states, many 
newly recognised states experienced internal turmoil as various factions struggled for 
political control. As superpower support was withdrawn and state control weakened, 
disaffected groups and ethnicities, motivated by successful independence movements 
across the globe, the international isolation of their governments, or simply the injustice 
of their own circumstances, forcefully challenged their state authorities. In many cases, 
the recognised governments of these new states sought external military assistance from 
the international community. In other cases, states that had once been strategically 
important in the zero-sum game of bi-polar confrontation were now viewed by their 
former patrons as remote, costly, and strategically unimportant. Consequently, favoured 
leaders and regimes that had maintained power through their patrons’ financial and 
military sponsorship were now left to fend for themselves. Faced with these 
circumstances, many states fell into economic ruin and near (or actual) collapse. Whether 
the interventions occurred as a result of a request from the legitimate government or in 
the absence of a viable state structure, in many cases, the West was able to intervene on 
the populations’ behalf without posing a direct challenge to the norms of state sovereignty 
and non-intervention.
Without the Cold War threat to stay the hand of would-be Western humanitarians or to 
provide decision-makers with an excuse for inaction, Western states were forced to 
consider intervention in humanitarian crises more seriously than before. For the Western
11 Cherif Bassiouni, “Organized Crime and New Wars”, in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), 
Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume I, New Wars, (London: Pinter, 1997), 35.
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states that had long championed human rights but had excused themselves from action 
because of the possibility of sparking a superpower confrontation, these humanitarian 
crises tested the credibility of their humanitarian commitment. In the fairly co-operative 
international environment of the 1990s, Western inaction in the face of serious 
humanitarian atrocities required convincing justifications from Western decision-makers.
The nature of the intrastate fighting further increased the West’s opportunity to intervene 
on behalf of endangered populations. Since intrastate wars were often fought along 
ethnic or religious lines, people were often targeted because of their identity rather than 
their politics or combatant status. In these wars, “otherness” was the enemy. In an effort 
to “purify” or “cleanse” a piece of territory for self-rule, belligerents frequently launched 
terror campaigns against non-combatant populations. These campaigns resulted in 
genocidal purges and intentional mass expulsions of populations, either across borders or 
into other areas within their own borders. One study estimated that civilians made up
1 9ninety percent of all casualties in civil wars during this period. The US Committee for
Refugees claimed that “the number of people forced from their homes by violence and
repression stood at more than 35 million at the end of 1999, compared to 29 million
uprooted people in 1990”.13 According to Mary Kaldor, in the 1990s, civilians went from
being the unintentional victims of the conflicts to being the objective. She describes the
terror tactics used against populations as follows:
Conspicuous atrocity, systematic rape, hostage-taking, forced starvation and siege, 
destruction of religious and historic monuments, the use of shells and rockets 
against civilian targets, the use of land-mines to make large areas uninhabitable, 
are all deliberate components of military strategy. The aim is to sow fear and
12 Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis o f Internal Displacement, 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), 6.
13 “Review of a Dismal Decade: 1990s Ended with a larger Population Uprooted,”, Press Release, US 
Committee for Refugees, Washington, DC: USCR, 13 June 2000, 1. Quoted in Carola Weil, “The 
Protection-Neutrality Dilemma in Humanitarian Emergencies: Why the Need for Military Intervention?”, 
International Migration Review, Volume 35, Number 1, (Spring 2001), 79.
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discord, to instill unbearable memories of what was once home, to desecrate 
whatever has social meaning.14
Not only were civilians endangered by an opposing identity group, they were often
intentionally kept vulnerable by their own leadership. Since ethnic cleansing translated
into a victory of sorts for the opponent, the leaders of targeted groups often sought to
keep their populations in place, regardless of the danger. Moreover, civilian atrocities,
regrettable though they were, often served as a catalyst for international involvement and
were, therefore, quite useful. In this way, populations became both the targets of the
conflicts and the “trip wires” for international military assistance. In some conflicts, rival
combatants even co-operated with one another to avoid direct battle, and chose to confine
their “campaigns” to rival populations.15
The well-armed and loosely organised nature of combatants in these conflicts made a 
negotiated end to the atrocities, short of military intervention, difficult to achieve. The 
availability of weaponry in the aftermath of the Cold War made the combatants 
particularly resistant to international attempts at mediation. Armed with modem 
weapons, these challengers were able to fight against their state-supported adversaries or 
international forces on a more even (and in some cases superior) footing. Though these 
groups were better armed than Cold War rebels had been, they were not necessarily better 
organised. Typical of many intrastate conflicts, post-Cold War belligerents were 
frequently composed of “loosely knit groups of regulars, irregulars, and locally based 
warlords under little or no central authority”.16 Moreover, fragmented state structures,
14 Mary Kaldor, “Introduction”, in Mary Kaldor and Basker Vashee (eds.), Restructuring the Global 
Military Sector. Volume I. New Wars, Volume I, (London: Pinter, 1997), 16.
15 Mary Kaldor, “Introduction”, Mary Kaldor (ed.), Restructuring the Global Military Sector. Volume III, 
Global Insecurity, (London: Pinter, 2000), 5-6. See also Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, 10- 
11, and Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects, 
(Copenhagen, Danish Institute of International Affairs, 1999), 32.
16 Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention, 32.
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economic ruin, general dissatisfaction and desperation, combined with high weapons 
availability, meant that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants was often 
blurred. Though various groups may have been united in their desire to overthrow the 
existing system, they often disagreed over their vision of the post-conflict situation. In 
these cases, there was very little co-operation among the various bands of fighters. Even 
in cases where there was some semblance of central authority over the rebel movement, 
control over the disparate groups was often so weak that elements of the force were 
virtually independent of each other. These characteristics of post-Cold War intrastate 
conflict made it very difficult for peace negotiators to reach compromise agreements that 
would be honoured throughout the land, thus increasing the need and the opportunity for 
Western states to intervene on behalf of endangered populations.
Awareness. In addition to increased ability and opportunity for Western intervention, 
Western publics were more aware of the humanitarian crises, which led to their increased 
willingness to support action on behalf of endangered populations. One of the principle 
reasons for this greater awareness was the growth of what some have called the global
1 7civil society. While there are many definitions for this term, it is basically “the sphere 
of ideas, values, institutions, organisations, networks, and individuals located between the 
family, the state, and the market and operating beyond the confines of national societies,
1 ftpolities, and economies”. The interplay between the media, humanitarian non­
governmental organisations (NGOs), think tanks, and commissions increased pressure on 
state governments to intervene on behalf of endangered populations primarily by raising
17 See Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the 
Management o f Risk, Adelphi Paper 345, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, 2002), 28-32.
18 Helmut Anheier, Marlies Glasius, and Mary Kaldor, “Introducing Global Civil Society”, in Anheier, 
Glasius, and Kaldor (eds.), Global Civil Society 2001, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 17.
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public awareness.19 The end of the Cold War meant that the media gained access to 
formerly restricted parts of the world. Moreover, the use of satellite technology enabled 
news stories to be transmitted to publics around the world as events took place. Twenty- 
four-hour news stations and Internet news sites sprang up and proved hugely popular with 
the public, especially in times of crisis. Around-the-clock news coverage of the 1991 
Gulf War whet the public appetite for instant news and allowed viewers to watch the 
story unfold. One study estimated that 600 million viewers watched reports of the Gulf 
War every day.20
Television images were particularly influential when it came to humanitarian 
emergencies. Images had the ability to move audiences to empathise with the victims of 
anti-population warfare in a way that printed media did not. Arousing viewers’ empathy 
as opposed to their sympathy meant that they were moved to identify with the victims and 
were essentially transformed into vicarious participants. According to Christopher Coker, 
television images of victims “show us ourselves, at the same time denying us an alibi for
91indifference”. The media’s impact on shaping public perceptions and driving 
government policy has been widely debated and addressed, but there is, nevertheless, 
widespread agreement that the media is a powerful force in increasing public awareness
99and unease when it comes to humanitarian emergencies. A former US Secretary of
State made the following comment regarding the effect of the media on policy-making:
We have yet to understand how profoundly the impact of CNN has changed 
things. The public hears of an event now in real time, before the State Department
19 Kaldor, “A Decade of Humanitarian Intervention”, 110.
20 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, (London: Routledge, 2001), 13.
21 Ibid., 38.
22 For more on the effects o f the media on foreign policy, see Fred H. Cate, “Through a Glass Darkly” 
[DRAFT], Harvard University’s Asia Center, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/fs cate2.htm. 
Accessed 17 July 2003. Also Nik Gowing, “Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break 
Government Policy?”, in James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.), Bosnia By Television, 
(London: British Film Institute, 1996), 87. (81-91), Larry Minear, Colin Scott, Thomas G. Weiss, The 
News Media, Civil, War, & Humanitarian Action, (Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1996).
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has had time to think about it. Consequently, we find ourselves reacting before 
we’ve had time to think. This is now the way we determine foreign policy—it’s 
driven more by the daily events reported on TV than it used to be.23
Media accessibility was not the only factor that increased public awareness of
humanitarian catastrophes. According to Coker, over 40,000 non-profit international
NGOs currently exist, disbursing more money than the UN (excluding the World Bank
and the IMF).24 Armed with media images and an empathetic audience, humanitarian
NGOs were increasingly enabled to affect Western policy. Moreover, the media often
relied on spokespersons from humanitarian NGOs to interpret the images they showed.
The more public empathy an NGO was able to generate, the more funds it was able to
raise and, hence, the more pressure it was able to exert on decision-makers. As
humanitarian NGOs grew in number, so did their competition for scarce resources. This
need for funds further increased the motivation for NGOs to find and publicise
newsworthy catastrophes. Only by doing so could they generate the necessary resources
to survive.25
Media influence and NGO growth increased the Western public’s awareness of intrastate 
barbarity. Once aware, viewers were often moved to action on behalf of the endangered 
populations. Free from any obvious threats to their own survival and confronted with the 
daily barrage of civilian atrocities, they often demanded that something be done on behalf 
of the victims. As a result of information availability, “the informed citizen is [now] 
debating how, when and where to use force...”. Democratic governments had little 
choice but to take public sentiment into consideration during the 1990s. Bruno Delhaye,
23 Quoted in Dennis C. Jett. Why Peacekeeping Fails. (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1999) 29.
24 Coker, Globalisation, 29.
25 For example, see “Sins of the Secular Missionaries”, The Economist, 29 Jan 2000 on Global Policy 
Forum website, http://www.globalpolicv.org/ngos/role/globdem/credib/2001/sins0329.htm. Accessed 17 
July 2003.
26 Coker, Globalisation, 30.
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head of France’s Africa Unit in the president’s office in 1992, expressed with 
uncharacteristic bluntness for a government official the effect that public pressure had on 
the French government’s decision to join the aid effort in Somalia: “You see, it is soon 
going to be Christmas and it would be unthinkable to have the French public eat its 
Christmas dinner while seeing on TV all those starving kids. It would be politically 
disastrous”.27
Acceptance. As awareness of endangered non-combatants increased among Western
audiences, Western decision-makers demonstrated a growing acceptance of the
legitimacy of population protection interventions. In response to public pressure, and in
some cases leading the outcry, leaders of international organisations as well as Western
democratic officials grew ever more likely to make strong statements of support for
population protection missions. For example, Kofi Annan spoke of a
.. .growing recognition that our first duty in any conflict is to protect the innocent 
civilians -  who have no part in the fighting, who have nothing to gain from its 
persistence, and who have no choice but to rely on the international community to 
help them in their most desperate hour of need. To answer their call is our most 
important obligation under the Charter.. ..28
Similarly, when US President Bill Clinton announced the end of the war in Kosovo, he
claimed that as a result of NATO’s effort to protect the endangered Kosovars, the
9Q“demands of an outraged and united international community have been met”. In 1998, 
President Jacques Chirac stated his belief that humanitarian concerns overrode the norm 
of state sovereignty:
27 Statement made to Gerard Prunier, 12 Dec 1992. Quoted in Prunier, “The Experience of European 
armies in Operation Restore Hope’, in Walter Clarke and Jeffrey Herbst, (eds.), Learning from Somalia: 
The Lessons o f Armed Humanitarian Intervention, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 135.
28 Kofi Annan, Press Release SG/SM/7364 SC/6848, 19 April 2000, “Secretary-General, Addressing 
Security Council on Protection of Civilians in Conflict, Reviews Past Progress, Recommends Future 
Approaches”. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000419.sgsm7364.doc.html. Accessed 17 July 
2003.
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... the humanitarian situation constitutes a ground that can justify an exception to 
a rule, however strong and firm it is. And if it appeared that the situation required 
it, then France would not hesitate to join those who would like to intervene in 
order to assist those that are in danger.30
In their apparent acceptance of the protection mission, Western leaders expanded and
challenged the norm of state sovereignty. British Prime Minister Tony Blair announced
in his “international community’ speech in Chicago that
[w]hen oppression produces massive flows of refugees which unsettle 
neighbouring countries, then they can properly be described as ‘threats to 
international peace and security’. When regimes are based on minority rule they 
lose legitimacy....31
Some states even shifted their conception of security from being state-based to individual-
based. This concept, known as “human security”, was first used in the UN Human
Development Reports of 1994 and 1998. Canada, seeking a new post-Cold War security
paradigm, proposed the concept within the UN General Assembly in 1996 and gave it
additional prominence when holding the presidency of the Security Council in 2000.
Though not a replacement for national security, the concept gave endangered populations
reason for hope. Paul Heinbecker, Assistant Deputy Minister in Canada’s Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade, described human security this way:
The concept establishes a new standard for judging the success of international 
security policies: the ability to protect people, not just safeguard states. It may 
even require protecting people from their states. It considers both military and 
non-military threats to safety and well-being; and it points to human rights; 
democracy; and human development as key building blocks of security.33
29 William Jefferson Clinton, Text of speech on 10 June 1999, Cited in “Clinton Announces the End of the 
War in Kosovo”, http://www.australianpolitics.com/usa/clinton/speeches/990610kosovo.shtml. Accessed 17 
July 2003.
30 Quoted in Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 44-5.
31 Prime Minister Tony Blair, “Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to the Economic Club of 
Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, Thursday 22 April 1999. Accessed 17 July 2003. 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/speechtext.asp72316.
32 See “Canada’s Human Security Website”, Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, Accessed 17 July 2003.
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecuritv/HumansecuritvBooklet-e.asp
33 Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security”, http://www.peacemagazine.org/9907/humsecur.htm. Accessed 
2002.
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Twelve states were part of the human security network in 2002.
As the 1990s progressed and protection interventions were repeatedly launched or 
advocated, the norm of state sovereignty and its corollary of non-intervention in internal 
affairs evolved considerably. Although there were no formal changes made to the UN 
Charter and many states continued to advocate the pre-eminence of state sovereignty, the 
Security Council began interpreting its purview more expansively than it had during the 
Cold War. In 1993, Louis Frechette, Canada’s Permanent Representative to the UN, 
observed that the
the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs of states no 
longer reign supreme in the UN. Indeed the pressure felt in the UN is for more 
intervention, not less and the debate of the fiiture may revolve less around the 
question of whether the UN has the right to intervene than whether it has a duty to 
do so.34
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, writing as Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1992, 
declared that “the centuries old doctrine of absolute and exclusive sovereignty no longer
-1C
stands”. Humanitarian concerns, once deemed to be the sole jurisdiction of the 
sovereign state and, therefore, off-limits to outsiders prior to 1991, were increasingly 
judged by the Security Council to be threats to peace and security. By re-defining what 
constituted such threats, the Security Council was able to legally justify interventions on 
humanitarian grounds. Such a shift was labelled by Nicholas Wheeler as “the key 
normative change in the 1990s”.
Although there is still resistance to formally codifying a humanitarian exception to the 
non-intervention rule, UN Member States, and particularly the permanent members, are
34 Louis Frechette, Quoted in Thomas G. Weiss, “Intervention: Whither the United Nations?”, The 
Washington Quarterly (17), no. 1, (Winter, 1994), 124.
35 Boutros-Ghali, “Empowering the United Nations”, 98-99.
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unlikely to go on record defending a state’s “right” to commit egregious humanitarian 
atrocities on the grounds of state sovereignty. Unlike the Cold War objections to 
humanitarian intervention for any reason, the post-Cold War debate in the 1990s centred 
on the determination of when a particular action moved from legitimate state control to 
state-sponsored abuse. Several times in the 1990s, the non-intervention norm was 
stretched even further when regional security organisations launched interventions 
without prior Security Council approval. For example, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) launched its military force, ECOMOG, into Liberia in 
1990, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) initiated airstrikes against 
Kosovo in 1999, both without Security Council approval. In spite of their unilateral 
actions, ECOWAS was eventually commended by the Security Council for its work and 
given post-intervention approval, and NATO’s intervention was tacitly approved by the 
overwhelming defeat of a draft resolution introduced in the UN that called its actions 
illegal.
It would seem that the combination of greater ability, opportunity, awareness, and 
acceptance of protection interventions would have led to a host of successful protection 
efforts. Unfortunately for the endangered populations, these factors were countered by a 
host of others which weakened any serious resolve to protect them.
1.1.2 Pressures to Abstain from Intervention
Although Western states were often advocates of population protection, they were, 
nevertheless, constrained from intervening themselves because of their traditional notions 
of what constituted a threat to their national interests. As horrific and shocking as these
36 Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000), 289.
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population crises were, they rarely presented an unambiguous threat to Western interests. 
Instead, the crises typically produced discomfort, unease, or anxiety. The television 
images of suffering humanity might make the Western public feel ashamed or morally 
uneasy; the prospect of large numbers of refugees might put a strain on Western 
economies or endangered regional stability; and the well-publicised atrocities might 
challenge the West’s credibility and reputation in the post-Cold World environment. 
While all of these potential effects struck chords of legitimate concern within the West, 
they rarely had the ability to move Western decision-makers or their publics to expend the 
lives and resources necessary to protect foreign populations adequately. In the absence of 
significant, unambiguous threats to national interests, Western states hesitated to 
intervene in a robust manner. Casualty aversion, fickle public support, and the 
complexity of the protection missions caused Western decision-makers to avoid robust 
interventions on behalf of endangered foreigners.
Casualty Aversion. Although Western publics often demanded action on behalf of 
endangered populations and influential leaders responded with positive humanitarian 
rhetoric, decision-makers, strongly influenced by past experience, were doubtful that the 
public would be willing to suffer friendly casualties in order to save the lives of distant 
strangers, especially if that sacrifice was made in the absence of a threat to traditional 
security interests. Providing assistance to hurting people and delivering food to starving 
children was one thing; doing so in a hostile environment where rescuers could be forced 
to jeopardise their own safety was quite another.
Casualty aversion did not originate in the post-Cold War era. It was certainly evident in 
the American experience in Vietnam when thousands of American servicemen and
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women were killed or wounded for what many Americans believed were insufficient 
national interests. US casualty aversion was also evident in Beirut, Lebanon, in 1983 
when the US expeditiously withdrew its Marines after 241 of them were killed by a 
suicidal car bomber. Though casualty aversion was not a new phenomenon, its effect on 
Western states in the post-Cold War environment intensified for a number of reasons.
First of all, humanitarian crises did not pose any direct or indirect threats to the survival
of Western states. Hence, it was difficult for Western publics to justify paying the
“ultimate price” for what they saw as tertiary interests. Protection interventions were
viewed by the public as wars of choice, not survival. As such, the public was moved to
action, but the action was to assist, not to sacrifice.37 As previously mentioned, the
viewing public could be moved to demand action on behalf of non-combatant victims, but
they could not necessarily be moved to the point of personal suffering (or the suffering of
their military representatives). Colin Mclnnes compared the public to sports spectators
and concluded that, though they look on with pity,
they do not expect to suffer unduly themselves. Nor do they expect substantial
numbers of their representatives on the field of battle to suffer either  The
West does not wish to participate in the suffering but to spectate while its 
representatives act as a force for good in the world.38
Throughout the 1990’s, Western states and individual citizens sent enormous quantities of
money, resources, food, and medicine out of genuine concern and goodwill toward
suffering populations. Nevertheless, many considered the lives of the their armed forces
to be reserved for those operations that challenged clearly-defined and significant national
interests.
37 Colin Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict, (Boulder, Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 2002) 93.
38 Ibid.
24
Second, technology made it possible to conduct limited interventions with minimal risk to 
intervening forces. Unlike in the past, new weapons were available that incorporated 
“smart” and “stealth” technology. Munitions could be launched miles away from the 
hostilities and guided with tremendous accuracy to the target. With such advanced 
technological capabilities, the shooter was able to accomplish his or her mission and 
remain largely out of danger. The cruise missile became the weapon of choice for the 
US. In fact, use of these weapons became so prevalent in the 1990s that critics accused 
US leaders of engaging in “cruise missile diplomacy”.
Third, the success of advanced technology and risk-reduction tactics created an 
expectation among the public that armed protection interventions could and would be 
conducted virtually casualty-free, especially when the intervention was, in a sense, 
optional. This expectation caused public support for military action to be tied (or 
perceived by decision-makers to be tied) to near-zero casualty rates. Therefore, when 
decision-makers considered if and how a protection mission should be conducted, they 
had to take into account the risk to friendly forces posed by the opposition, as well as the 
risk to their public support should they fail to assess and manage the risks effectively.
Weak Public Commitment. Because the Western public was often moved by media 
images, sound bites, and desperate tales from humanitarian organisations, its commitment 
to the endangered population was often based on a shallow understanding of the conflict. 
Consequently, its support for the intervention frequently waned as soon as the media 
shifted its focus or the intervention proved more difficult to resolve than was first 
supposed. In some cases, the same people who demanded intervention on one day were 
screaming for a withdrawal on the next. In an effort to take this shifting public support
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into account, Western decision-makers demonstrated a propensity to dilute the protection 
mandate, either by formal decree or by their interpretation of the mandate, in order to 
maintain a degree of flexibility over the mission. They crafted the mandate in a way that 
left the objective ambiguous and which enabled them to terminate the mission and declare 
success almost regardless of the protection results.
Weak public commitment also led to a high degree of selectivity regarding which 
populations Western states would protect. Endangered populations in some crises were 
protected by the relatively quick, almost pre-emptive actions of interveners, while other 
vulnerable populations had to wait for the necessary momentum to build. In some cases, 
this momentum never did build, and the populations were left completely unprotected. 
The threshold for intervention during this period was difficult to define because it did not 
correlate with the number of civilians being killed or the complexity of the intrastate 
conflict in which the tragedy was occurring. In Rwanda, Western states virtually stood by 
and watched for over a month while close to a million Tutsi and moderate Hutu civilians 
were massacred. In the case of Sudan, where it is estimated that over 2 million people 
have been killed and 4 million internally displaced in a 17-year civil war, Western states 
have never seriously considered intervening on their behalf.39 In contrast, NATO forces 
intervened in Kosovo even though the number of civilian fatalities was comparatively 
low.
Mission Complexity. The difficult nature of the protection mission also discouraged 
Western states from intervening on behalf of populations unless their national interests 
were at stake. The very characteristics of intrastate conflict that provided an increased
39 See U.S. Committee for Refugees, “Seventeen Years o f Crisis in Sudan”, Refugee Reports, Vol. 22, No. 4 
(2001), http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/17vears rrOl 4.htm. Accessed 17 July 2003.
26
opportunity for protection missions also served to dissuade Western decision-makers 
from committing their forces. Because control of the populations was often the goal of 
the combatants, any force sent to protect populations would likely find itself opposed by 
the warring sides. Moreover, as the combatants were often composed of irregular forces 
who blended in with the civilian populace, or who engaged in combat only on some 
occasions, it was difficult for the interveners to distinguish whom to protect.
Another factor that made the mission so complex was the fact that irregular forces were 
often impervious to the Western military’s technological dominance. Usually, they were 
loosely organised, operated very cheaply, and had little in the way of a rigid command 
structure. These factors made it very difficult for Western forces to target them 
effectively and, perhaps more importantly from the Western perspective, safely.
Finally, the combatants in post-Cold War intrastate conflicts showed themselves to be 
much more willing to suffer and inflict casualties than Western states. In contrast to the 
West’s preoccupation with limiting casualties, both friendly and enemy, these combatants 
intentionally utilised methods that were chosen for their barbarity and shock value.
All of these factors meant that would-be Western protectors would have to deploy a very 
large, heavily equipped, and highly trained force. Additionally, they would have to 
prepare for long and dangerous missions that would be difficult to sell to a Western 
public who expected quick results and limited casualties. For these reasons, Western 
states were particularly reticent to engage in protection missions when national interests 
were not at stake, regardless of the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe.
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As a result of these counteracting pressures, Western decision-makers faced extremely 
complex choices regarding the appropriate actions to take in the humanitarian crises of 
the 1990s. In spite of the West’s unambiguous humanitarian rhetoric, endangered 
populations rarely received unambiguous protection. In some cases where protection 
interventions took place, the populations may have been placed in more danger than if 
they had been left to fend for themselves.
1.2 CONTENTION
This thesis argues that, by utilising concepts from risk theory, it is possible to reconcile 
the willingness of Western states to intervene in humanitarian crises with their refusal to 
provide adequate protection to vulnerable civilian populations. Rather than viewing these 
inadequate protection interventions as anomalous occurrences that defy an overarching 
explanatory framework, it argues that they were the logical results of the West’s post- 
Cold War “risk” perspective. It contends that Western states intervened in humanitarian 
crises, whether as part of a UN force, a multinational coalition under UN authority, or a 
coalition of states operating without UN approval, primarily to protect their own self- 
interests, and not to provide protection to endangered populations.
What makes these self-interested interventions different from those which occurred 
during the Cold War is that the humanitarian crises to which they were responding and 
the security environment in which they were acting were characterised by a high degree 
of uncertainty that made it difficult for Western interveners to determine what actions 
would promote their self-interests and what actions would harm them. Faced with this 
uncertainty and the anxiety which it produced, Western states acted as “risk societies”.
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They utilised protection interventions as a means of managing the risk to themselves 
generated by the humanitarian crises. In other words, they sought to protect populations 
only as long as doing so managed more risk than it generated.
1.3 ORGANISATION
The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapter Two focuses on the methodology of the 
work, including basic definitions, literature reviews, and theoretical concepts applicable 
to the thesis. Chapters Three through Six provide an in-depth examination of protection 
interventions in northern Iraq, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo respectively. The purpose of 
these case studies is to answer the first two secondary questions set out in the beginning 
of this chapter. By contrasting the West’s official justifications and objections for the 
interventions with the methods and means it utilised to carry them out, the case studies 
show that the West was not primarily seeking to protect endangered non-combatants, 
regardless of the tone of its pre-mission rhetoric or post-mission analyses. Instead, the 
West primarily sought to safeguard its own self-interests. While these self-interests 
stayed fairly constant in the post-Cold War security environment, the potential hazards to 
them were often highly ambiguous and difficult to identify. Consequently, their 
uncertainty over the hazards was reflected in the apparently inconsistent strategies with 
which they approached the humanitarian crises. By exposing this inconsistency, the case 
studies reveal the need for an explanatory framework that accounts for the West’s actions.
Each case study is divided into four sections. The first section examines the background 
of the humanitarian crisis leading up to the West’s decision to intervene. Section two 
analyses the Western states’ official and unofficial motives, as well as their official
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objectives. This section takes into account verbal and written statements, as well as 
implied or unspoken ones, in an effort to develop an accurate picture of what the 
intervention was primarily designed to accomplish. Next, in order to shed light on which 
objectives were prioritised in practice and to expose the complexities and inconsistencies 
that permeated this prioritisation process, the third section focuses on how the 
intervention was actually conducted. Factors such as the types and numbers of troops and 
equipment that were used, the general strategies that were employed, and the rules of 
engagement that governed the operation are discussed in this section. The final section 
examines the results of the intervention in light of the interveners’ stated objectives. Its 
purpose is to demonstrate that, while the methods used by the interveners accomplished 
questionable results in terms of population protection, they achieved many positive results 
in terms of Western self-interest.
While it is unreasonable to expect a decision as serious as foreign military intervention to 
be motivated by a single factor or conducted with a solitary objective in mind, it is 
reasonable to draw conclusions as to the interveners’ priority objectives based on the 
methods they used and the results they achieved. If Western states were primarily 
motivated to protect populations, as was repeatedly claimed throughout the interventions, 
their actions should have been consistent with that end, regardless of any other objectives 
they sought to accomplish.
The four protection interventions addressed in this thesis were chosen for several reasons. 
First, they were the most obvious examples of population protection efforts (in 
designation if not in practice). In each of the first three cases, the interveners utilised 
specially designated humanitarian protection areas which, implicitly or explicitly, created
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an expectation of physical protection within the endangered population, as well as among 
the interveners’ domestic publics.
In the Kosovo case (Chapter 6), NATO did not designate a specific ‘in-country’ area for 
the protection of endangered non-combatants; however, it continually justified its 
intervention as a necessary measure to protect the endangered Kosovar population from 
the Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces. NATO’s action in Kosovo was so 
connected with the idea of population protection that it was colloquially billed as a 
“humanitarian war”.40 Rather than being a weakness in the argument of this thesis, the 
absence of safe zones in Kosovo actually strengthens the conclusions and broadens the 
applicability of the study. The lack of safe zones in Kosovo reveals that the problem with 
population protection in the 1990s was bigger than a flawed method or an inadequate 
technique.
Analysing NATO’s operation in Kosovo is also useful because it occurred at the end of 
the 1990s, after the initial heyday of UN optimism had given way to cautious scepticism. 
Finally, occurring as it did at the end of the decade, the Kosovo intervention dispels the 
notion that protection interventions failed simply because interveners were unfamiliar 
with the post-Cold War environment or inexperienced with the protection mission.
The selection of these four interventions is advantageous for a number of other reasons as 
well. The fact that they took place in geographically diverse areas broadens the 
applicability of the conclusions. Additionally, each of the four protection interventions 
were conducted by different groupings of Western interveners. In northern Iraq, the
40 Adam Roberts, “NATO’s ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo”, Survival, vol. 41, no. 3, Autumn 1999, 102. 
(102-23)
effort to protect the Kurds from Iraqi attacks was enforced by a thirteen-state coalition 
acting without specific authorisation from the UN Security Council but with its tacit 
acceptance. In Bosnia, the safe areas were initially protected by UN peacekeepers under 
a UN chain of command. Later, this UN force was augmented by a UN-authorised 
NATO air contingent. In Rwanda, the UN Security Council authorised a French-led 
multinational coalition to undertake an interim protection mission on its behalf until a UN 
peacekeeping force could be assembled to replace it. In Kosovo, the intervention was 
conducted by the NATO alliance without specific UN approval, though the UN was 
involved in the settlement and post-war administration. In short, the different actors and 
decision-making structures represented in the four case studies provide a complete picture 
of Western population protection in the 1990s.
While Chapters Three through Six conclude that the primary objective of the interveners 
was the pursuit of their self-interests and not the protection of endangered populations, 
Chapter Seven answers the third and final secondary question of the thesis by arguing that 
Western states, faced with the uncertainty that characterised the post-Cold War security 
environment, approached the humanitarian crises of the 1990s from a risk perspective and 
pursued their self-interests as risk societies. Their primary objective was the management 
of their own risks at the lowest possible expense. To support this argument, the chapter 
re-addresses the four interventions in light of risk theory. It demonstrates that Western 
states, in each of the interventions, displayed five key characteristics of risk societies, and 
implemented strategies that were consistent with risk management techniques.
Chapter Eight concludes the work. In addition to summarising the key points of the thesis 
and clearly answering the primary question, this chapter discusses a number of
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observations and implications for Western risk societies, the international community, 
and endangered populations. Finally, it makes several recommendations for potential 
“protectors” in the future and highlights some key principles and warnings for the 
representatives of endangered non-combatant populations who might be seeking or 
receiving outside protection.
Included as an appendix to this work is a short case study on the 1999 Australian-led 
intervention in East Timor. This brief examination of International Force East Timor, or 
INTERFET as it was called, is intended to answer those critics who might view its 
apparent success as invalidating the conclusions reached in this work. It is thus written to 
show how the intervention in East Timor further demonstrates the suitability and 
applicability of utilising risk concepts as explanatory tools for Western actions in the 
1990s.
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CHAPTER 2 METHODOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to lay the conceptual foundation for the rest of the thesis. It 
is divided into five primary sections, each designed to help demonstrate the explanatory 
potential of applying concepts from risk theory to the Western protection interventions of 
the 1990s. The first section defines several key terms as they are used in this thesis. 
Section two presents a brief survey of some of the literature on humanitarian intervention, 
paying special attention to recent works that emphasise aspects of population protection. 
The third section, which makes up the bulk of the chapter, focuses on different aspects of 
risk. In order to demonstrate that risk has a central place in the contemporary political 
lexicon, this section first gives examples of how politicians have increasingly used risk 
terminology to describe the post-Cold War security environment. Next, it gives a brief 
background into the sociological theory of risk and lists five key risk concepts, drawn 
from a variety of sources, which characterise societies dominated by a risk mentality. 
The fourth section draws parallels between these characteristics and those that defined the 
security environment of the 1990s. Finally, in order to show how risk concepts are 
increasingly being applied within the fields of International Relations and International 
Security, the fifth section reviews several recent works that utilise risk theory to describe 
various aspects of the post-Cold War period.
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2.1 DEFINITIONS
Many of the key terms used in this thesis have a wide range of definitions and 
connotations associated with them. In an effort to avoid the misunderstandings which 
often result from such ambiguity, this section defines some of these terms as they are used 
throughout the thesis. An effort has been made to simplify the definitions as much as 
possible with the realisation that further clarification will often be necessary within the 
context of the work.
2.1.1 Humanitarian Intervention
As mentioned in Chapter One, the focus of this thesis is on Western military interventions 
that were ostensibly undertaken to protect endangered populations in the 1990s. Most of 
the literature that deals with this subject uses the broad term humanitarian intervention to 
classify these operations, though there is little agreement as to what this term actually 
means. It has been applied to a wide range of humanitarian activities, from diplomatic, 
economic, and humanitarian assistance measures to full-scale combat operations. 
Humanitarian intervention has also been used to signify both consensual and non- 
consensual activities, with little agreement as to whose consent is required. Finally, some 
commentators qualify a humanitarian intervention as one motivated primarily by 
humanitarian concerns while others ignore the motive altogether and focus exclusively on 
the results. In an effort to avoid the confusion that could result from using this term, and 
to limit the scope of the thesis more explicitly, this thesis uses the term population 
protection interventions (or simply protection interventions) to refer to non-consensual, 
third-party military operations conducted for the stated purpose of protecting endangered
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populations. In an effort to clarify this definition further, some related terms are 
addressed in greater detail below.
2.1.2 Population
A population refers to a group of non-combatants living within the borders of their home 
country whose physical security is directly endangered by armed conflict. Though the 
nature of many contemporary conflicts blurs the distinction between combatant and non- 
combatant, this thesis defines a non-combatant (or civilian) as any person who chooses 
not to take up armed struggle, regardless of age, sex, or fitness for military duty. 
Population is restricted to non-combatants because those who engage in armed conflict 
forfeit the right to any special degree of protection other than that stipulated for 
combatants under international humanitarian law. Population is further limited to people 
within their own country because once endangered people cross a border, they are viewed 
as refugees and are afforded special rights and protections as such. Additionally, refugees 
usually do not pose the same dilemma to the international community in terms of 
sovereign jurisdiction and accessibility as those confined within their own borders. In 
some cases, a population consists of people living within their own communities; in 
others, it is composed of internally displaced people (IDPs) who have been forced to flee 
their homes, but who have not crossed an international border. It is the vulnerability and 
inaccessibility of these IDPs that makes protection interventions on their behalf so 
necessary. Finally, the population addressed here encompasses only those people who are 
in need of protection as a result of armed conflict. This need could arise either from 
direct military attack, intentional endangerment for political purposes, or indirect 
manipulation through the withholding of basic necessities.
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2.1.3 Protection
Protection is a widely disputed term within the humanitarian community. Adam Roberts 
distinguishes between two types of protection.1 The first is a legal entitlement which 
signifies protection under the law, such as non-combatant immunity under the Geneva 
Conventions. The second is “physical protection from attack”. Others would add a third 
category to encompass a full range of activities, such as protection from hunger, disease, 
poverty, or oppression. While there are certainly different levels of protection, this thesis 
is chiefly concerned with efforts to provide physical protection from attack. It is arguably 
this interpretation of the term which shapes the expectations of most endangered people. 
While the standard connotation of protection goes beyond the mere provision of food and 
healthcare, it stops short of all-encompassing security. While physical protection from 
attack is the standard that will be used to judge the success of the four interventions 
examined in this thesis, it is important to note that various interveners defined the term 
differently (or left the definition intentionally ambiguous) throughout the 1990s. 
Consequently, some interveners may dispute this standard and claim that protection, in 
the sense of “physical protection from attack”, was never promised and, therefore, not 
their responsibility to provide. However, this thesis argues that by using terms such as 
“Safe Areas”, “Safe Havens”, “Humanitarian Zones”, “humanitarian space”, and “safe 
corridors”, the interveners created an expectation of physical protection among the 
endangered populations as well as among their own domestic publics.
1 Adam Roberts, “The Exceptional Role of Humanitarian Issues in International Politics Since 1989”, 3rd 
International Security Forum and 1st Conference of the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security 
Studies Institutes, “Networking the Security Community in the Information Age”, 19-21 October 1998, 
http://www.isn.ethz.ch/securityforum/Online Publications/WS5/WS 5C/Roberts.htm. Accessed 17 July 
2003.
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2.1.4 Consent
The meaning of consent, as it applies to this thesis, includes both the permission and the 
corresponding permissive action for an intervention to take place. Verbal acquiescence 
alone does not constitute consent. In the intrastate conflicts of the 1990s, combatants 
frequently gave their assurances of consent and then, once the interveners were on site, 
acted in a non-consensual manner or tried to manipulate their degree of consent in a way 
that benefited themselves. Moreover, the term is not used in the juridical sense of the 
word, which restricts the ability to grant and withhold consent to governments of 
sovereign states. The legal distinction simply is not useful for this thesis, given that the 
conflicts addressed here were intrastate in nature and always had at least one non-state 
combatant. Although few of the combatants were sovereign entities, and though their 
consent may have been insignificant in regards to international law, their toleration of the 
intervening force was often a matter of life and death to those who were engaged in the 
mission.
2.1.5 The West
Though protection interventions involved a host of states from various geographical areas 
and economic strata, this thesis is primarily concerned with the group of states often 
referred to as the West. The precise composition of the West is difficult to define because 
it is not strictly based on objective criteria such as geographical position or economic 
wealth. The definition is further complicated by the fact that the constituent states are not 
as unified as the collective term connotes. In an effort to give some structure to the term, 
however, this thesis utilises Colin Mclnnes’ rather ambiguous definition which suggests 
that, while the “core” of the West includes the United States, Canada, and Western 
Europe, its composition can be more broadly defined as the “established liberal
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democracies”.2 According to Mclnnes, “the less well-established a liberal democracy is, 
the less that state may be considered to be part of the West”. In spite of the differences 
that exist among the states in the West, the use of the term is helpful because it allows 
broader generalities to be drawn and conveys the general expression, feeling, or opinion 
of this group of relatively like-minded states. While the term is difficult to define 
precisely, its use is broadly employed and accepted by academics and practitioners.
The West is an appropriate focus for the subject of protection interventions because, as 
Spyros Economides observed recently, “It is the Western world, with as its mainstay the 
Atlantic alliance, which is the flag-bearer, framer, and enforcer of the so-called 
‘international community’”.4 Western states were especially influential in the majority 
of the interventions in the 1990s. Though not every so-called protection intervention 
involved the deployment of Western troops, the West’s influence, sanction, 
encouragement, and resources were generally critical to the effort. As for UN missions, 
Western states wielded three of the five vetoes on the Security Council, any one of which 
could have prevented the missions from occurring. Moreover, as Russia and China 
frequently abstained from the voting so as not to condone any action that would signal 
their support for a diminution of state sovereignty, Western states were frequently the 
primary drivers behind the scope, pace, and conduct of the operations. Additionally, 
Western states were responsible for providing the majority of the resources that made 
executing the missions possible. In non-UN missions, Western states frequently led the 
“coalitions of the willing”. Overall, had the West not pushed, or at least acquiesced in the 
population protection mission, very few protection interventions would have occurred.
2 Colin Mclnnes, Spectator-Sport War: The West and Contemporary Conflict, (Boulder, Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 2002), 3.
3 Ibid.
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2.1.6 Risk
Finally, the term risk deserves considerable attention. Because risk is discussed more 
fully in section four of this chapter, its treatment here is somewhat brief. Though the term 
risk has been in existence for years, its meaning has taken on new significance over time. 
Deborah Lupton devotes an entire chapter of her book, Risk, to the evolution of the term’s 
meaning.5 Rather than go into the word’s etymology or list a number of its definitions 
from a variety of sources, this thesis simply defines risk as the possible occurrence of a 
negative outcome or hazard. Two points from this definition are worth emphasising. 
First, risk is associated with an undesirable consequence, a potential harm, or an ill effect. 
Second, risk is based on uncertainty. The degree or intensity of a risk is determined by 
combining the perceived magnitude of the undesirable consequence with the probability 
of its occurrence. Thus, the more likely an event is to occur and the more damaging its 
potential effect, the greater the risk is said to be. The problem with such a determination 
is that risk, dealing as it does in uncertainties, makes the measurement of probability and 
magnitude extremely difficult and leaves the result open to dispute.
Risk Versus Threat. In the academic discourse, much has been made about the 
difference between risk and threat. For the sake of clarity, this thesis maintains a 
distinction between the two terms, even though politicians and practitioners often use 
them interchangeably. Some writers differentiate the terms according to the degree of the 
hazard they represent. For example, issues that jeopardise the survival of the state are
4 Spyros Economides, “Western Security: What Security? Whose Security?”, Unpublished article in 
author’s possession.
5 See Deborah Lupton, Risk, (London: Routledge, 1999) and Lennart Sjoberg, “Risk perceptions: taking on 
societal salience”, in Johan Erikson (ed), Threat politics: new perspectives on security, risk and crisis 
management, (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing, 2001), 21-2, Carlos C. Jaeger, Ortwin Renn, Eugene 
A. Rosa, and Thomas Webler, Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action, (London: Earthscan Publications,
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threats, while those that merely affect its quality of life are risks. Others find in the terms 
a useful way of distinguishing the hazards associated with the Cold War (threats) from 
those of the post-Cold War (risks). For this thesis, the key distinction between the two 
terms is the level of certainty that accompanies the associated ill-effect. Hazards 
associated with risks are highly uncertain, the results of speculation. Hazards associated 
with threats are based on more precise information. For example, the Soviet Union’s 
nuclear arsenal presented a threat to the West because Western leaders knew a great deal 
about the capability of the nuclear warheads. They also knew that the warheads were 
aimed at them. This perceived knowledge of the Soviet Union’s intent and capability 
formed the basis of the Mutual Assured Destruction deterrent strategy. In contrast, Iraq’s 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability prior to the US-led war in 2003 was a 
subject of wide debate among Western states, leading some to view it as a threat and 
others as a risk.6
As the above distinction implies, risks and threats are not exclusive of one another but 
exist simultaneously at either end of a continuum. Potential hazards are loosely 
categorised as one or the other depending on the degree of uncertainty that accompanies 
them. In this way, risks can become threats as uncertainty decreases and vice versa. 
Though risks and threats can be present simultaneously, the West’s security environment 
in the 1990s was characterised more by risks than by threats. Rather than facing certain, 
impending perils, the West faced a host of uncertain, potential hazards that required 
constant monitoring and reassessment. The horrific effects of intrastate wars on non- 
combatant populations presented only one risk among a host of others. Moreover, the
Ltd, 2001), 17, Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1999), 135, and John Adams, 
Risk, (London: UCL Press Limited, 1995), 69 for some of the different meanings of risk.
6 Yee-Kuang Heng, “Policing Iraq : A ‘risk-management exercise’ in international security?”, unpublished 
paper.
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risks did not jeopardise the state’s survival, but its quality of life. These comparatively 
low risk, non-survival hazards created an environment in which Western states were in a 
position to choose which hazards they would confront and which they would ignore.
The final distinction discussed here relates to the different ways in which decision-makers 
respond to threats versus risks. The more knowledge a person has about a particular 
hazard, the more effectively that person can develop a specific strategy to confront it. 
Because threats are based on a greater degree of certainty than risks, decision-makers 
generally react to the specific hazard by developing a focused strategy with which to 
counter it. Risks, however, are based on highly uncertain hazards that defy such focused 
reactions. Instead of reacting based on what is already known, decision-makers must 
anticipate the unknown in an attempt to select the means most likely to prevent its 
occurrence. This proactive response to risks is discussed more fully in section four.
2.2 POPULATION PROTECTION LITERATURE SURVEY
In response to the frequent military interventions in humanitarian crises which occurred 
throughout the 1990s, academics and practitioners addressed the subject of population 
protection from a variety of different perspectives. Many writers viewed the protection 
interventions as signalling a major shift in international relations. Some saw them as the 
beginning of the end for Westphalian sovereignty and rejoiced at the future prospect of 
the state being replaced by the individual as the primary unit of analysis. Others 
tempered their optimism and proclaimed that the interventions merely indicated the 
beginnings of a shift toward a more solidarist conception of international society. Not 
everyone was pleased with the possibility of such a shift. Some viewed the interventions
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with alarm, warning that a norm of humanitarian intervention could lead to the 
disintegration of international order. Others rejected the idea that the interventions 
signalled a major shift in state behaviour. Instead, they relied on explanations of state 
self-interest or contextual exceptionalism to account for the increased number of 
interventions.
The following brief literature survey examines some of these works, emphasising those 
that focus on the issue of non-combatant protection. Although there are a host of 
examples that could have been reviewed, this survey relies on a small representative 
sample to speak for the many whose writings followed similar lines of reasoning.
2.2.1 Solidarism
Because the protection interventions of the 1990s are viewed by many to represent a shift 
or weakening in the traditional notion of state sovereignty, a large percentage of the 
literature on the subject is written from a solidarist perspective. Solidarists generally feel 
that states can, or at least should, co-operate to enforce humanitarian norms in cases of 
severe humanitarian catastrophes, even if that means overriding the traditional norm of 
state sovereignty.
Sovereignty with Responsibility. One of the most common solidarist themes argues that 
state sovereignty should be redefined to incorporate a state’s responsibility to its citizens.7 
The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) is one of 
the most recent bodies to promote this position. The goal of the commission, which
7 For instance, Roberta Cohen and Francis M. Deng, Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis o f  Internal 
Displacement, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian 
Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality, (Dobbs Ferry: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1988), and
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concluded its report entitled The Responsibility to Protect in December 2001, was to 
determine a minimum standard of acceptable state protection which the international 
community could agree upon and enforce in future crises.8
The basic premise of the report is that states have a responsibility to protect their citizens, 
and that this responsibility is “sufficiently accepted in practice to be regarded as a de 
facto emerging norm...”.9 Sovereignty, according to co-chairs Gareth Evans and 
Mohamed Sahnoun, implies a dual responsibility: “externally, to respect the sovereignty 
of other states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people 
within the state”.10 When the state is unable or chooses not to uphold its responsibility 
(or perhaps is itself guilty of endangering the population), “the principle of non­
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”. In other words, the state 
forfeits its sovereign immunity to intervention and the obligation to protect the population 
falls to the community of states.
Adherents to this approach do not attempt to explain why Western states intervened in the 
manner they did in the 1990s except to infer that the absence of international consensus 
on a state’s responsibilities led to the West’s hesitant response. Instead, their focus is on 
improving future international responses through the formulation of minimal principles 
for acceptable state conduct. As with other efforts to “legalise” or justify intervention to 
protect populations, the ICISS report is largely based on particular legal interpretations
Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (London: Allen 
Lane, 1978).
8 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Report of 
the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, December 2001, http://www.dfait- 
maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/report-en.asp. Accessed 7 July 2003. All quotes in conjunction with this section can 
be found in the synopsis of the report unless otherwise noted.
9 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 6, 
Nov/Dec 2002, 102.
10 Ibid., 102.
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and conversations with decision-makers regarding hypothetical circumstances. The 
problem with such an approach is that rhetorical agreement on such hypothetical rarely 
translates into agreement and commitment in actual crises. This weakness is freely 
acknowledged by Evans and Sahnoun.11
Saving Strangers. Nicholas Wheeler’s book entitled Saving Strangers: Humanitarian 
Intervention in International Society, is particularly relevant to this thesis because it 
provides a comprehensive analysis of numerous Cold War and post-Cold War protection 
interventions.12 In addition to agreeing with the “sovereignty with responsibility” 
position mentioned previously, Wheeler argues that humanitarian intervention has 
become “a legitimate exception to the rules o f sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use 
o f force” in the post-Cold War era.13
Key to his argument is the dual nature of legitimacy. He makes the argument that a 
state’s need for legitimacy both restricts and liberates its behaviour in international 
society.14 Thus, when a state justifies its actions as humanitarian, regardless of its self- 
interested motives, it is constrained to act in ways which can be defended as 
humanitarian, or else be judged by the court of world opinion. By comparing Cold War 
cases of humanitarian intervention with post-Cold War cases, Wheeler argues that “a new 
norm of UN-authorized humanitarian intervention developed in the 1990s.”15 He notes 
that though grave human rights abuses were alleviated by Cold War interventions in 
Uganda, East Pakistan, and Cambodia, none of the interveners appealed to humanitarian
“ Ibid., 110.
12 He uses the term humanitarian intervention, but he is primarily concerned with the protection of 
“strangers”. Nicholas Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
13 Ibid., 2.
14 Ibid., 8.
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norms to justify their actions because, at the time, humanitarianism was not considered a 
legitimate justification for intervention. In spite of their positive humanitarian results, the 
international community condemned the Cold War interventions as violations of state 
sovereignty. In contrast, Wheeler concludes from his analyses of northern Iraq, Somalia, 
Rwanda, and Bosnia/Kosovo that post-Cold War interventions were usually justified on 
humanitarian grounds and were formally or tacitly authorised by the international 
community. He considers the shift in Western public thinking that led to the Security 
Council’s incorporation of humanitarian protection under Chapter VII of the Charter to be 
the most significant normative change of the 1990s.16
Joining a number of other academics on the subject, Wheeler puts forth his own criteria 
forjudging whether or not an intervention qualifies as “humanitarian”. These include the 
presence of a supreme humanitarian emergency, the use of force as a last resort,
17proportionality of means, and a high probability of a humanitarian result. All of these
criteria are highly subjective and, as such, leave ample room for outside states to justify
self-interested action or inaction. Ironically, Wheeler concludes that most post-Cold War
interventions to “save strangers” were far from successful and did not pass his
humanitarian test. He acknowledges that the majority of interventions were conducted by
casualty-averse, mission-selective interveners whose inadequate methods reflected their
pursuit of self-interests.18 In his conclusion, Wheeler admits what most solidarists are
forced to admit at the end of the day:
How to persuade state leaders that they have a moral responsibility to ‘pay the 
human’ costs of intervention in cases of genocide, mass murder, and ethnic 
cleansing is the challenge for a solidarist theory of international society. The fact
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., 289.
17 Ibid., 34-37.
18 Ibid., 301.
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is that no Western government has intervened to defend human rights in the 1990s 
unless it has been very confident that the risks of casualties were almost zero.19
His explanation for the inconsistencies between his solidarist conclusion and the self-
interested behaviour of states in the 1990s is that state practice has not yet caught up to
the newly accepted solidarist norm of humanitarian intervention.20 In other words,
international society is in a transition phase in which solidarist behaviour lags behind
solidarist thought. It is this inconsistency between Wheeler’s solidarist explanation and
the actual behaviour of states in the 1990s which suggests that solidarism is not the most
helpful tool for understanding why the West intervened in the manner it did.
2.2.2 Pluralism
In his book, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World o f States, Robert Jackson 
counters the solidarist contention and concludes that international society is still primarily 
driven by pluralist concerns.21 As an advocate of pluralism, Jackson defends the 
prioritisation of international order and state sovereignty over international justice and 
humanitarian intervention on the grounds that order is a necessary precondition for 
justice. Because of this belief, Jackson expresses concern over the claims that state 
sovereignty has been weakened by the acceptance of humanitarian intervention as a new 
norm in international society. He particularly disagrees with any attempt to make 
humanitarian intervention a requirement or obligation. Any attempt to “require” an 
international response, according to Jackson, would not only be unenforceable and 
stringently opposed by a host of states, but it would also jeopardise the current
19 Ibid., 300.
20 Ibid., 308.
21 Robert Jackson, The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in World o f States, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000).
22 Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report o f the Commission on Global Governance, (Oxford: OUP, 
1995), 90, Quoted in Ibid., 212.
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international system which was designed to limit the possibility of war among the great 
powers.
He recognises the ethical dilemma aroused by his emphasis on order, yet he declares that
unless protection interventions are conducted with the consent of the sovereign
government, they constitute far more danger to humanity by jeopardising international
order. According to Jackson,
the stability of international society, especially the unity of the great powers, is 
more important, indeed far more important, than minority rights and humanitarian 
protections in Yugoslavia or an other [sic] country—if we have to choose between 
those two sets of values.23
As evidence for his position, Jackson analyses four of the post-Cold War humanitarian
interventions examined by Wheeler (Somalia is excluded from Wheeler’s analysis).
Although his analysis of the cases is not as detailed as Wheeler’s, his conclusions are as
firmly drawn. His primary purpose for analysing the case studies is to evaluate the claims
and consequences of an emerging solidarist shift in international society. He sums up his
analysis with the following statement: “Pluralist ethics of state sovereignty were clearly
evident in all these cases”.24 The Kosovo case was more worrying for Jackson than the
others. NATO’s non-consensual and unauthorised intervention against Yugoslavia was a
violation of pluralist norms that unwisely jeopardised international order (though he
consoles himself with the fact that NATO’s “regional stability” motive was a pluralist
justification). Rather than seeing Kosovo as evidence of a solidarist shift for all of
international society, he views it more as Europe’s reversion to past “standards of
civilisation” behaviour within its sphere of influence. By “attempting to impose
23 Ibid., 291.
24 Ibid., 288.
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‘civilized’ policies by force”, he reasons, NATO could be accused of implementing a 
secular and modem version of respublica Christiana within Europe.
Jackson recognises the existence of humanitarian motives, particularly in the West, but 
considers them to be of secondary importance to pluralist considerations in state practice. 
In his analysis of the case studies, he finds that “all the cases disclosed a humanitarian 
concern on the part of international society, but military risk and particularly the danger
9 6of casualties to intervention soldiers were the cmcial consideration”. In other words, 
the gap between states’ humanitarian rhetoric and their willingness to suffer casualties for 
humanitarian values disproved the solidarist claim.
In his vigorous defence of pluralism, Jackson does not give adequate consideration to the 
nature of the post-Cold War security environment with regard to humanitarian 
intervention. He does not consider that, in an international environment characterised by 
the “hyper-dominance” of Western power and the absence of survival threats to Western 
states, the threat to international order resulting from intervention appears to be far less of 
a probability to Western decision-makers than the negative effects resulting from 
humanitarian crises. The weakness of Jackson’s pluralist explanation for the 
humanitarian intervention in the 1990s is exposed in his explanation of the Kosovo 
intervention. As Jackson is forced to admit, NATO violated the sovereignty of a 
functioning state without the authorisation of the UN Security Council, and in direct 
opposition to the wishes of two permanent members of the Security Council. Though 
Jackson explains these actions as a reversion to the past rather than a shift to a solidarist
25 Ibid., 290.
26 Ibid., 289.
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future, he is unable to dismiss NATO’s actions as something other than a defiance of the 
ordering principles he so resolutely defends.
2.2.3 Realism
Realist approaches to the protection interventions of the 1990s generally fall into one of 
two primary categories. The first views protection interventions as acceptable as long as 
they do not harm the state’s self-interests. Realists of this school do not deny the 
legitimacy of moral concern in foreign policy or the duty of assisting those in need if they
9 7can be assisted at an acceptable cost. While they are not “principally opposed to 
principle”, they recognise that moral interests alone are frequently insufficient to sustain 
the long-term, dangerous commitments that protection interventions often require.28 
Therefore, like the pluralists, they prioritise order over justice and emphasise prudence 
when making decisions about intervention. They claim that a state has no right to 
endanger the lives of its citizens for strictly humanitarian purposes.29 Henry Kissinger 
stated in his book, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?, that the difficulty with recent 
humanitarian interventions and the push to carve out an exception to the non-intervention 
rule is that moral interests and values can actually relegate more traditional strategic 
interests to a secondary position.30 The preoccupation with non-strategic concerns at the 
expense of strategic self-interests is precisely what former US Secretary of Defense 
William Perry and Ashton Carter cautioned against in their book, Preventive Defense. 
They were concerned about the US preoccupation with the conflicts in Bosnia and Africa 
at the expense of North Korea, Weimar Russia, and China. They were eager to encourage
27 David C. Hendrickson, “In Defense of Realism: A Commentary on Just and Unjust Wars”, Ethics and 
International Affairs, 1997, vol. 11,43.
28 Ibid., 35.
29 Ibid., 46.
30 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 271-2.
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policy-makers to prioritise the prevention of those issues that could eventually develop 
into survival threats over the lesser conflicts that were dominating the international 
environment at the time.31
The second school of realist thought argues that protection interventions only occur, or 
should only occur, when they are within the interest of the intervener. In other words, 
moral considerations and concern for endangered populations should have no place in the
* • ' l ' )calculation of a state’s self-interest. While not advocating a realist position with regard 
to intervention, S. Neil MacFarlane, in his analysis of population protection interventions 
in the 1990s, reaches a conclusion with which many realists would agree. In his Adelphi 
Paper entitled Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, MacFarlane concludes that 
intervention in the immediate post-Cold War period was primarily motivated by state 
interest, though his definition of state interest is more encompassing than those of classic 
realists. “Where such interest is not perceived to be present,” he summarises, 
“intervention tends not to occur, whatever the prevailing humanitarian situation”.34
Critics of Western actions such as Noam Chomsky, John Pilger, and Ted Galen Carpenter 
base their criticisms on their perceptions of the West’s extreme self-interested approach. 
While certainly not realists themselves, they argue that the humanitarian justifications put 
forth in the 1990s were merely legitimising excuses for the West’s self-interested quest 
for power. Sceptics such as these point to the West’s selectivity in intervening only in
31 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America, 
(Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 11-14.
32 See, for example, Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 2nd 
ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1954), 9, George F. Kennan, Realities o f American Foreign Policy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), 48, and Nicholas J. Spykeman, America’s Strategy in World 
Politics: The United States and the Balance o f Power, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942,
18.
33 S. Neil MacFarlane, Intervention in Contemporary World Politics, Adelphi Paper 350, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002).
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those situations that further their self-interests and ignoring those that do not. They also 
emphasise that when the West does intervene, it frequently does so in a manner that 
maximises its publicity rather than its effectiveness at protecting populations. 
Furthermore, as evidence of the West’s “hypocritical humanitarianism”, 35 critics point to 
the priority attached to the safety of Western interveners over the lives of the endangered 
populations they are sent to protect, and the abandonment of populations through early 
withdrawal. These apparently self-interested motives and double standards cause Mary 
Kaldor to categorise the Western protection efforts as “spectacle wars”. Noam 
Chomsky sums up the Western interventions of the 1990s as “the powerful states [doing] 
as they wish unless constrained from within guided by interests of power and profit”.37
In the context of this thesis, the advantage of the first realist position over the solidarist or 
pluralist positions is its unabashed pursuit of self-interest. When the solidarists and 
pluralists are scrambling to make sense of the West’s inconsistent ways, the realists’ 
primary concern with self-interest provides an explanation that can be consistently 
applied to all the interventions. To say, however, that the West’s pursuit of self-interest 
answers all of the questions raised by the interventions of the 1990s is overly simplistic, 
incomplete, and “profoundly unilluminating”.38
34 Ibid., 10. See also pages 61-67.
35 This term comes from Doug Bandow, “NATO’s Hypocritical Humanitarianism” in Ted Galen Carpenter 
(ed.), NATO’s Empty Victory: A Postmortem on the Balkan War.
36 Mary Kaldor, “Introduction”, in Mary Kaldor (ed.), Global Insecurity: Restructuring the Global Military 
Sector, vol. Ill, (London: Pinter, 2000), 21.
37 Noam Chomsky, A New Generation Draws The Line: Kosovo, East Timor and the Standards o f the West, 
(London: Verso, 2000), 141.
38 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
45.
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2.2.4 Humanitarianism AND Self Interest
Adam Roberts would probably object to being categorised in any of the three
aforementioned schools of thought. His writings are more pragmatic than theoretical and
so urge a blending of the traditions. In his Adelphi Paper entitled Humanitarian Action in
War: Aid, protection, and partiality in a policy vacuum, he admits that “there is
absolutely no possibility of securing general agreement among states about the legitimacy
of humanitarian intervention”.39 Nevertheless, he principally agrees with the legitimacy
of protecting populations by force if necessary. He contends that the
leading Western powers, which are the ones that have been principally involved in 
humanitarian action, have a particular obligation to develop coherent and 
defensible policies regarding humanitarian crises, which will not disappear just 
because responding to them has created difficulties.40
Using examples from key interventions, Roberts makes a number of valuable
observations regarding protection efforts in the 1990s. First, he recognises that though
protection is “a key aspect” of humanitarian operations, the difficulty of providing it
cheaply has led to its being “handled repeatedly in a short-term and half-hearted manner,
often with elements of dishonesty and buck-passing”.41 These minimalist efforts,
according to Roberts, have serious consequences for the population and the intervener
alike. Second, he points out that Western states are far more likely to intervene when
they perceive their risks to be low, regardless of the ongoing humanitarian crisis.42 Third,
he acknowledges that Western efforts to protect populations are frequently substitutionary
efforts, or “lowest common denominator” agreements to avoid riskier activities.43 In spite
of the ineffectiveness of past interventions, he foresees the West’s reliance on air-power
39 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and impartiality in policy vacuum, Adelphi 
Paper 305, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), 30.
40 Ibid., 9, See also Adam Roberts’ “Exceptional Role.
41 Roberts, Humanitarian Action, 9 and 86.
42 Ibid., 86.
43 Ibid. 80 and 15.
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and its aversion to ground troops as “tendencies unlikely to change suddenly”.44 Finally, 
he contends that when interventions do occur, they are much more likely to succeed when 
the intervening force is motivated by traditional self-interests in addition to humanitarian 
concern 45
While Roberts’ observations are astute and his analysis helpful, he is unable to bridge the 
gap between “what is” and “what ought to be”. He points out the weaknesses of past 
interventions and makes recommendations to improve future protection missions, but he 
gives no indication that the tensions which led to the West’s policy choices in the 1990s 
have been resolved sufficiently enough to facilitate the implementation of his 
recommendations.
2.2.5 Humanitarianism AS Self Interest
Several other writers have attempted to blend the above three traditions by suggesting that 
humanitarian concerns have, in themselves, become national self-interests. Joseph Nye, 
in a Foreign Affairs article entitled “Redefining the National Interest”, points out that the 
national interest is
broader than strategic interests, though they are part of it. It can include values 
such as human rights and democracy if the public feels that those values are so 
important to its identity that it is willing to pay a price to promote them.46
Consequently, Nye encourages US leaders (and by implication Western leaders) to
broaden their definition of national interest to include any issue that jeopardises
international order and to be willing to pay the necessary price to pursue it.47 He argues
that in democracies, there is no distinction between a morality-based foreign policy and
44 Ibid., 86.
45 Ibid., 86-7.
46 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Redefining the National Interest”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 4, July/August 1999, 
23.
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an interest-based foreign policy. “Moral values”, he says, are “simply intangible
• 48interests”. As such, he recognises that stopping serious humanitarian abuse has a place 
in the Western national interest and should be carefully considered. That said, he then 
emphasises the importance of prudence in the pursuit of human rights. A human rights 
policy is merely “an important part of a foreign policy” and, as such, often requires 
difficult choices to be made.49 The last part of his article is filled with strong pluralist 
caveats. Though he acknowledges that humanitarian crises are legitimate interests, Nye 
cautions against intervening militarily unless humanitarian concerns are “reinforced by 
the existence of other strong national interests”.50
While Nye makes an interesting case for viewing population crises differently in the 
future, his approach is not intended to describe previous cases. He limits his aim to 
influencing policy-makers faced with future difficulties regarding national or Western 
self-interest. Furthermore, Nye’s pluralist qualifier limiting the use of force at the end of 
the article exposes one of the key problems with the “humanitarianism as self-interest” 
explanation. It has been difficult for proponents of this stance to demonstrate 
convincingly that endangered civilians in distant lands pose a significant enough threat to 
the West’s self-interests to move Western societies to support casualty-producing military 
operations. As Nicholas Wheeler remarked with regard to Stephen A. Garret’s attempt to 
conjoin humanitarian concern with national self-interest in Doing Good and Doing Well, 
“The reader waits in vain for a robust defence of the contention that the US had a 
compelling security interest in intervening in Rwanda”.51
47 Ibid., 27-8.
48 Ibid, 24.
49 Ibid, 31.
50 Ibid, 32.
51 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian intervention after Kosovo: emergent norm, moral duty or the 
coming anarchy?”, Review article in International Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 1, 123.
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Summary
While all of the above approaches are useful for evaluating aspects of population 
protection interventions, none of them provide an adequate analytical framework that can 
be convincingly applied to all the protection operations that occurred in the 1990s as well 
as to those that did not occur in spite of the humanitarian need. Although they recognise 
the tension that existed between the West’s humanitarian impulses and its more 
traditionally defined self-interests, they do not provide a framework for understanding 
how that tension played itself out in the post-Cold War security environment. This thesis, 
in its attempt to provide such a framework, does not completely discount the emerging 
solidarist impulse, especially the relatively benign version put forth by Wheeler, or the 
pluralist emphasis on the West’s general abidance with the international norms of 
sovereignty and non-intervention. It agrees with S. Neil MacFarlane’s observation that 
“solidarist and pluralist perspectives coexisted uneasily in this realm”52. Nevertheless, it 
principally views the pursuit of self-interest as the driving motivation behind the West’s 
interventionist practices in the 1990s. The shortcoming with this extremely diluted and 
qualified realist explanation is that it does not explain the complexities that went into the 
West’s identification of the potential hazards to their self-interests or the formulation of 
effective strategies to safeguard those interests in the post-Cold War security 
environment. Rather than simply accept MacFarlane’s conclusion that there was no
r - i
“overarching strategic logic” behind Western interests, this thesis seeks to develop an 
applicable framework for understanding these past interventions with all their 
complexities, and for shedding light on future Western interventions. In order to establish 
the foundation on which the framework will be built, the thesis now turns to risk theory.
52 MacFarlane, 66.
53 Ibid., 66-7.
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2.3 RISK
This section is divided into two parts. In the first, it demonstrates the relevance of 
exploring risk theory as a possible framework for analysis in the post-Cold War security 
environment. It does this by showing how “the language of risk” has made its way into 
the post-Cold War security discourse and become a regular theme among many 
contemporary Western policymakers.
The second part provides a theoretical overview of the basic principles of risk theory as 
they have been discussed and popularised by the sociologist Ulrich Beck. This section 
discusses the five common identifiers of a risk society that will later be adapted and used 
as an explanatory framework for the population protection interventions of the 1990s.
2.3.1 Risk in the Security Discourse
In the 1990s, governments, security organisations, IGOs, and NGOs, particularly in the 
West, began using the language of risk to describe the uncertain nature of the post-Cold 
War security environment. NATO’s 1991 “Security Concept” described its “new security 
environment” as a composition of largely unnamed “security challenges and risks”.54 Its 
revised 1999 “Security Concept” listed terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, and massive 
refugee flows as part of “a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are 
multi-directional and often difficult to predict”.55 Similarly, the UK’s 1998 Strategic
54 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept” 1991, http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c911107a.htm. 
Accessed 14 July 2003.
55 NATO, “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept”, Press Release, Paragraphs 20 and 24, April 1999, 
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm. Accessed 14 July 2003.
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Defence Review (SDR) referred to security “risks and challenges” rather than threats.56 
These risks included regional instability, massive humanitarian suffering, dangerous 
regimes, illicit drugs, and organised crime. According to the SDR, the “challenge ... 
[was] to move from stability based on fear to stability based on the active management of 
these risks, seeking to prevent conflicts rather than suppress them”. The language of 
risk has also been used in the United States. In 2001, the Quadrennial Defense Review, 
which lays out future plans for the US military, listed “Managing Risks” as one of its 
“Strategic Tenets” and devoted an entire chapter to the subject.58 Clearly, the language of 
risk has become accepted terminology within Western security policy. The rest of the 
thesis looks beyond the language of risk to the underlying concepts of risk theory in an 
effort to develop an effective framework for analysing the protection interventions of the 
1990s.
2.3.2 Risk Theory
In one sense, risk is nothing new. Businesses, insurance companies, and gambling 
establishments have always succeeded or failed according to their ability to analyse and 
confront risk. So, too, life-threatening risks have always been present, whether in the 
form of disease, natural disasters, warfare, or some other potentially dangerous hazard. 
Contemporary risk, however, is categorically unique in its nature and scope. People 
living in advanced industrial societies are faced with man-made risks that spring from 
“advances” in technology. These risks are different from previous risks because they are 
limitless in time and space and are of a non-actuarial nature. Moreover, as the long-term
56 UK Ministry of Defence, 1998 Strategic Defence Review, Chapter 1, “A Strategic Approach to Defence”, 
http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/priorities.htm. Accessed 14 July 2003.
57Ibid.
58 US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 30 Sept 2001, 13, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001 .pdf. Accessed 14 July 2003. Specifically see Chapter VII, 
“Managing Risks”, 57-65.
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effects of technology are understood and scientific advancements reveal previously 
unknown dangers, people are increasingly aware of the potential perils that confront 
them. While the expanding nature of risk has captivated scholars from various fields, the 
German sociologist, Ulrich Beck, has articulated the phenomenon, which he labels “risk 
society”, in a way that has resounded with the public and profoundly affected various 
social sciences. His German publication, Risikogesellschaft, was published in 1986 and 
sold over 60,000 copies in its first five years.59 It was then translated into English and 
published under the title of Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity in 1992.
Beck applies his “risk society” label only to those communities that are in the late stages 
of industrialisation (also known as “late” or “advanced” modernity). While he concedes 
that science and technology have resulted in improvements to people’s lives, he argues 
that scientific attempts to control the future have also produced environmental risks that 
threaten global survival.60 Global warming, radioactive fall-out, genetically-modified 
foods, and various life-threatening diseases are examples of technology-induced or 
“manufactured” hazards which have the potential of permanently altering the global 
environment. According to Beck, there is no escaping contemporary risk. Even unborn 
generations and people living in pre-industrial societies are affected by hazards resulting 
from technology. Not only are the risks unlimited by time and place, but they are also 
“not accountable according to the rules of causality”, which means that it is also 
impossible to insure against them.61
59 Scott Lash and Brian Wynne, “Introduction”, in Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, 
Mark Ritter, (trans.), (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 1.
60 Beck, Risk Society, 21.
61 Ulrich Beck, “Risk Society and the Provident State”, Martin Chalmers, (trans.), Scott Lash, Bronislaw 
Szerszynski, and Brian Wynne, (eds.), Risk Environment and Modernity: Towards a New Modernity, 
(London: Sage Publications, 1996), 31.
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The proliferation and awareness of contemporary risks among populations in late 
industrial societies ultimately leads to the emergence of a risk society. Beck defines this 
emergence as a “phase of development of modem society in which the social, political, 
ecological and individual risks created by the momentum of innovation increasingly elude 
the control and protective institutions of industrial society”. In other words, a risk 
society emerges when people recognise that their attempts to increase their security 
through technological advances actually produce more dangers from which there is no 
escape. Their Enlightenment-based optimism in their ability to control the future 
evaporates, and they are left feeling powerless, sceptical, and vulnerable. Having lost 
faith in their ability to control the future, they grow increasingly preoccupied and wary of 
lurking dangers that have yet to be discovered. As Beck states, “... in the risk society the 
unknown and unintended consequences come to be a dominant force in history and 
society”.63
In addition to the insecurity that comes from technological uncertainty, many sociologists 
agree that “late modem” people are characterised by a host of transformations that add to 
their sense of isolation. The influence of feminism, changing gender roles, alternate 
“family” structures, and non-traditional employment options are some of the factors 
which have exacerbated a “growing sense of disorientation in face [sic] of the fact that 
nothing is immutable, there are no permanent alliances and no eternal verities; more than 
ever before the future appears to be riven with uncertainty”.64 As a result of this 
uncertainty, people within these societies are more anxious about their role in the future 
and more doubtful about their ability to control that future than ever before. As Ian
62 Ibid., 27.
63 Beck, Risk Society, 22.
64 Lennart Sjoberg, “Risk perceptions”, 29.
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Wilkinson put it, “It is now a matter of sociological common sense to identify ourselves 
as living through a period of acute insecurity and high anxiety.”65
In short, risk societies can be recognised by the way in which they identify potential 
hazards, the strategies and methods they adopt to deal with those hazards, and the 
consequences they suffer as a result of their risk-based approach. Each of these 
characteristics is dealt with more extensively below and is further broken down into five 
key identifiers of risk societies.
Risk Identification.
Uncertainty and the Role o f Experts. In a technologically complex environment
characterised by uncertainty and littered with potential hazards, people desire to know
exactly what risks they face. Indefinite hazards generate feelings of anxiety and
vulnerability since people are unable to prepare physically or mentally for catastrophes
which they cannot comprehend. Thus, assessing contemporary risk requires technical
expertise. It is for this reason that so-called “experts” have a paradoxical role to play in
the risk society. In the words of Christopher Coker,
We are made aware of risks from non-cognitive sources such as expert reports, 
commissions set up by governments, or even newspaper articles. We do not see 
the risks we run, we read about them. We are becoming dependent on external 
knowledge. In the process we are losing part of our cognitive sovereignty: we 
can no longer judge for ourselves the risks we run. In the language of the hour, 
we feel increasingly disempowered.66
Disempowered people are forced to rely on others for risk information. Because of their
innate scepticism, people living within late modernity no longer believe in an exclusive
source of “formulaic truth” such as a priest, chief, or divinely-enlightened ruler. Instead,
they rely on specialists, or experts, who supposedly have the technical understanding to
65 Iain Wilkinson, Anxiety in a Risk Society, (London: Routledge, 2001), 42.
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accurately declare what constitutes risk and what does not.67 The problem is that experts 
rarely agree. Because expertise is based on competence, and not on “formulaic truth”, 
experts attempt to distinguish their competence by challenging the findings of their rivals. 
The “risk society”, according to Beck, “is tendentially a self-critical society” where 
“[ejxperts are relativised or dethroned by counterexperts”.68 In this sense, expertise is 
fuelled by doubt.69 The paradox is that, while experts rely on scepticism to distinguish 
their conclusions from others, they make claims that are intended to be universally
• 7 0applicable. This combination of universal claims and perpetual doubt results in 
continuous and widespread disagreement among competing experts which, in turn, adds 
to the uncertainty of disempowered people. The result is that, in advanced modernity, 
there is no final authority—no objective, knowable truth. Instead, there is only a range of 
contested expert opinion that generates very little confidence among the populace.
In spite of this conflicting expertise and low public confidence, individuals must 
eventually choose which expert to believe and then act on that choice. As groups of like- 
minded individuals gather together, a dominant risk conception emerges within a culture. 
In this sense, risk is culturally constructed. “Ultimately,” writes Beck, “fr is cultural 
perception and definition that constitute risk. ‘Risk’ and the ‘(public) definition of risk’ 
are one and the same”.71
66 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, (London: Routledge, 2001), 54.
67 Anthony Giddens, “Living in a Post-Traditional Society”, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott 
Lash, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modem Social Order,
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994), 84. Also Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, Self and Society 
in the Late Modern Age, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 195.
68 Beck, “Risk Society and the Provident State”, 33.
69 Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, 195.
70 Giddens, “Post-Traditional Society”, 86.
71 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 135. See also Beck, Risk Society, 23.
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Since individuals ultimately determine what constitutes risk in an environment of 
limitless possibilities, politics are increasingly shaped from the bottom up by sub-political
noforces. Entities such as NGOs, special interest groups, and political action committees 
wield influence and mobilise public support for their agendas by influencing the public’s 
perception of risk. They accomplish this by employing experts who agree with their 
assessment of the current crisis. Similarly, governments in these societies, in an effort to 
maintain public support as well as their own legitimacy, are forced either to act on the 
public’s risk perceptions or attempt to influence them with their own presentation of 
expert testimony.
The media also plays a considerable role in shaping the public’s risk perception. By 
bringing together “science, politics, and popular consumer culture”, the media “renders 
the invisibility of risk ... visible.”73 The media makes it practically impossible to avoid 
the risk debate. As the media has become particularly adept at packaging these stories in 
fifteen-second sound bites, the public is made aware of a host of risk-potentials in a very 
short period of time.74 Media packaging, combined with the public’s increased 
uncertainty, results in a public that is likely to change its risk perception as soon as the 
media moves to a new issue. The public’s short attention span makes it very difficult for 
governments to maintain support for long-term objectives.
All of these factors have profound implications for the consumer of risk expertise. “Trust 
based purely on the assumption of technical competence,” writes Anthony Giddens, “is
72 Beck, World Risk Society, 39.
73 Ibid., 136.
74 For an excellent discussion on the media’s effect on the public, see Fred H. Cate, “Through a Glass 
Darkly” [DRAFT], Harvard University’s Asia Center, 
http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/fs cate2.htm.
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revisable...; it can in principle be withdrawn at a moment’s notice.”75 If it can be 
withdrawn, it can just as easily be “re-invested” in another expert. When there are 
limitless options available, there is no limit to the equivocation possible among those who 
have to choose—especially when their choices exact a price. Because consumers of 
expertise are free to choose from a variety of risk interpretations, “painful” choices can 
easily be discarded for less costly alternatives. In the end, public commitment, based on 
sceptical expertise and a host of alternative options, is far less resolute than commitment 
based upon the unquestionable pronouncement of “formulaic truth” from an exclusive 
group of elites.
Focus on Future Hazards. Because the hazards associated with risks exist in the future,
risk strategies are necessarily future-focused and anticipatory in nature. “[T]he centre of
risk consciousness” writes Coker,
lies not in the present but in the future. In the process, the past loses the power to 
determine the present. Instead, we are always looking forward. We are always 
speculating about something that is Active, non-existent, even invented, but none 
the less very real.76
Oftentimes, intense efforts are made to counter potentialities that may never occur. The 
emphasis of risk societies has shifted away from the distribution of present “goods” to the 
prevention of the distribution of future “bads”. In other words, the nature of the potential 
hazard is considered so serious that addressing it cannot be postponed while additional 
information is collected. In accordance with the “Precautionary Principle” or 
Versorgensprinzip as it was called by the West German government in 1976, avoiding
75 Giddens, “Post-Traditional Society”, 89. See also Anthony Giddens, Modernity and Self Identity, Self 
and Society in the Late Modem Age, 141.
76 Coker, Humane Warfare, 55.
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risk requires taking precautionary action, even when there is “lack of full scientific 
certainty” that a hazard exists.77
While this proactive approach gives the appearance of lessening future dangers, the risks 
themselves remain uncertain and, therefore, the strategies and corresponding preventive 
actions are not guaranteed to produce effective solutions. As a result, in spite of the 
precautionary, proactive actions that are taken to avoid risks, people within risk societies 
continue to feel vulnerable. It is this sense of vulnerability, coupled with the public’s 
increased risk awareness, that exacerbates their insecurity and anxiety. As Beck writes,
Risks only suggest what should not be done, not what should be done. To the 
extent that risks become the all-embracing background for perceiving the world, 
the alarm they provoke creates an atmosphere of powerlessness and paralysis. 
Doing nothing and demanding too much both transform the world into a series of 
indomitable risks. This could be called the risk trap. .. ,78
The strategy by which decision-makers attempt to extricate their societies from this risk
trap, or at least to minimise its effect, is the focus of the following section.
Confronting Risk.
Risk Management. In an effort to avoid doing nothing and demanding too much, 
decision-makers attempt to manage their risks. While specific risk management 
techniques vary among different fields of activity, there is a great deal of agreement as to 
what risk management is intended to accomplish.79 Most definitions take for granted the 
fact that risks can rarely be eliminated—at least not without incurring greater risks. They
77 Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones, “Anticipation in risk management: a stitch in time?” in 
Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones (eds.), Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk 
Management, (London: UCL Press, 1996), 10.
78 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, 141.
79 For various definitions of risk management, see Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones, “Introduction”, 
in Christopher Hood and David K.C. Jones (eds.), Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates in Risk 
Management, (London: UCL Press, 1996), 7. Carlos C. Jaeger, Ortwin Renn, Eugene A. Rosa, and Thomas 
Webler, Risk, Uncertainty, and Rational Action, (London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd, 2001), 18.
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also imply that at some point, a particular risk, while not eliminated, can be controlled, 
limited, or reduced to a tolerable level. Beck contends that risks can never be completely 
removed—at best they can be minimised.80 This being the case, the process of risk 
management can be described as minimalist in its scope and preventive in its approach. 
Its ultimate goal is to lower the likelihood of a future hazard to a tolerable level through 
the expenditure of the least amount of resources possible.81
Because risks change as the information about the hazards change, risk management is 
not a static exercise. Cultural risk perceptions constantly shift due to the uncertain nature 
of risk and an ever-expanding revelation of new risks. Thus, a diligent risk manager 
constantly reassesses the potential harm associated with a particular scenario in light of 
new risks. By constantly reassessing the risks, the effective risk manager strives to 
address the potential hazards by dedicating resources in proportion to the risks he or she 
faces. The greater the risk is perceived to be, the higher the priority that is assigned to 
confronting it, and the greater the number of resources committed to its management. In 
many ways, risk managers adopt a system of triage. They evaluate the risk, prioritise it, 
and assign the appropriate type and quantity of resources to handle it. As risk perceptions 
change, so do the risk priorities and management strategies. While there are a variety of 
managerial methods, some of the common techniques are risk surveillance, risk 
containment, and risk distribution.
Because risk is based on uncertainty, the more information the manager has about the risk 
potential, the better he or she is able to select an effective strategy for dealing with it. In
80 Ulrich Beck, Ecological Politics in an Age o f Risk, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 76-7.
81 Hood and Jones, “Introduction”, in Hood and Jones (eds.), Accident and Design: Contemporary Debates 
in Risk Management, (London: UCL Press, 1996) 7.
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comparison to more active and costly managerial strategies, surveillance is relatively low- 
cost and allows for a great deal of flexibility in resource commitment.
When risks cannot be avoided through surveillance, efforts are often made to contain 
them to a particular location. If risks can be contained, they can be controlled or avoided 
to some degree because a key element of uncertainty has been removed. By limiting the 
focus of concern, a risk manager is able to concentrate his or her efforts and resources 
more efficiently.
In addition to surveillance and containment, a third common method of managing risk is 
distribution. Risk managers attempt to reduce their vulnerability to a particular risk by 
“sharing” it with others who also benefit from its management. Indeed, risk distribution 
is the whole basis behind the insurance industry. Rather than being solely responsible for 
the management of a particular risk, effective risk managers induce, require, or persuade 
other beneficiaries to accept a portion of the responsibility and the vulnerability in return 
for a portion of the benefit. Thus, if the anticipated harm occurs, the negative effects are 
dispersed. Beck refers to people who share similar risk perceptions as “communities of 
risk” and argues that members of risk communities have a responsibility to share the
O'}
burden of risk management. Since risks are often global in scope, risk communities 
tend to be global in their membership. The presence of international risk communities 
greatly expands the area over which risk can be distributed. Moreover, globalisation 
produces structures that make risk distribution much easier. “Globalisation from above”, 
which Beck defines as international treaties and institutions, and “globalisation from 
below”, such as NGOs and multinational corporations, promote a greater potential for
82 Beck, World Risk Society, 16.
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international buy-in to a host of risks.83 A good risk manager strives to use these 
additional “stakeholders”, either to help overcome the risk, or to deflect the criticism and 
apportion the blame should the potential harm actually occur.
Consequences of a Risk Approach.
Generation o f New Risks. Because risk strategies are formulated on imprecise 
information regarding uncertain hazards, the actions taken to prevent a hazard can 
actually generate “side-effect” risks that are at least as serious as those the manager was 
seeking to alleviate in the first place. As Mikkel Rasmussen has recently observed, 
“There is ... no end to risks. For every attempt to remove a risk, new risks [side effects] 
will proliferate”.84 This development is similar to what Beck calls the “boomerang
o r
effect”. Just as a boomerang returns to its thrower, “side-effect” risks circle back and 
threaten the safety of those who sought to manage them. Since risk elimination is usually 
impossible, the continued presence of a risk, even a so-called “managed” risk, can lead to 
follow-on risks of a completely different type.
The uncertainty that characterises every aspect of risk means that a great deal of 
managerial effort goes into coping with these side-effect risks and trying to undo the 
preventive actions that created them. While managers attempt to use logical risk 
management techniques, in the end, their efforts often more closely resemble trial and 
error. Because the side-effect risks can be more damaging than the risks that spawned 
them, risk communities can grow increasingly apprehensive about implementing 
management strategies.
83 Ibid., 37.
84 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “Reflexive Security: NATO and International Risk Society”, Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies, 2001, Vol. 30, No. 2,292.
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Alteration o f Established Rules. Faced with a barrage of risks and vulnerabilities, Beck 
argues that managers are forced to consider methods that challenge the existing rule 
structure. Old ways of handling risk are increasingly challenged with new, untested ones. 
Because different actors simultaneously operate under different sets of rules, these 
systemic challenges have a dramatic effect on the overall rule structure that governs 
acceptable behaviour. Some actors hold fast to the old rules, some mix the old with the 
new, and some abandon the old altogether. In short, efforts to manage risk often decrease 
systemic stability and increase the potential for conflict until new rule structures are 
formed.
2.4 RISK APPLICATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS LITERATURE
Although the language of Western decision-makers indicates that risk and risk 
management have been guiding principles in Western governments for the last decade, 
risk concepts have only recently been applied to the study of International Relations and
87International Security. The next section briefly summarises some of these works, 
placing special emphasis on the manner in which the authors applied risk concepts to their 
particular subjects.
2.4.1 Reflexive Security
Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, in his article entitled “Reflexive Security: NATO and
International Risk Society”, utilises Beck’s concept of risk as an analytical tool to
85 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Mark Ritter (trans.), (London: Sage Publications, 
1992), 23, 37.
86 Beck, The Reinvention o f Politics, 35-7.
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demonstrate that “risk is becoming the operative concept of Western security”.88 He 
contends that by “constructing a new reflexive conception of security”, NATO has 
reinvented itself and “provided a Western forum for reinventing security”.89 Specifically, 
Rasmussen demonstrates NATO’s reflexive orientation by applying Beck’s risk concepts 
of “management”, “the presence of the future”, and the “boomerang effect” to NATO’s 
actions since 1991.
2.4.2 Humane Warfare
Christopher Coker also applies risk concepts to various security issues in two recent 
works. In his book entitled Humane Warfare, Coker postulates that the risk-filled, post­
modern environment has caused Western publics to re-conceptualise warfare and the 
manner in which it fights.90 According to Coker, risk aversion springs from the public’s 
anxiety of living with risk, its abandonment of metaphysical beliefs, the re-centring of the 
individual (as opposed to the state) in politics, and doubt as to the purity of motives and 
government justifications.91 Consequently, Western governments fight to preserve the 
lives of their own citizens as well as those of the “enemy” by attempting “to humanise 
war, to rob it of those features such as cruelty, hatred and courage”.
Coker highlights a number of risk management characteristics from recent “humane” 
wars. First of all, he stresses that management does not mean eradication. Demanding 
unconditional surrender from an enemy is no longer the objective. Because of the known 
and unknown risks that come with such a pursuit, the West generally seeks to contain the
87 Yaacov Y.I. Vertzberger, Risk Taking and Decisionmaking: Foreign Military Intervention Decisions, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1.
88 Rasmussen, 285.
89 Ibid., 298.
90 Coker, Humane Warfare, 2-3.
91 Ibid., 42-3
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insecurity—to “quarantine the nihilistic regions of the world, to seal them off or at least 
attempt to”. Secondly, he notes that Western risk management efforts are future- 
focused. Western governments apply the precautionary principle to warfare and make the 
prevention of future “bads” their primary objective.94 He contends that war as a risk 
management effort “is fought not to remove regimes from power, or defeat their armies in 
a decisive battle, but to reduce the opportunities for bad behaviour, to prevent them 
posing an even greater risk in the future”.95 Thirdly, Coker argues that risk management 
strategies emphasise the limitation of casualties. An increasingly anxious and 
individualised public does not support casualty-producing efforts for very long. Hence, 
the military is forced to employ ever more precise, non-lethal, and “safe” methods for 
both friendly and hostile forces.96
2.4.3 Globalisation and Insecurity
In his Adelphi Paper, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO 
and the Management o f Risk, Coker argues that globalisation has generated insecurities
07for NATO that must be managed. Referring to NATO as a risk community, he makes 
the case that the new globalised security agenda is composed of issues such as weapons 
of mass destruction, the environment, inequality, migration, organised crime, and 
HIV/AIDS—issues that are too uncertain and too vast to be dealt with as traditional 
security threats.98 In order to counter these uncertain hazards, Coker says that they must 
be managed or “policed”. NATO manages its insecurity through two primary means:
92 Ibid., 5.
93 Ibid., 130.
94 Christopher Coker, “The Risk Community and International Security,” paper presented at Goodenough- 
Chevening Conference on Risk, Goodenough College, London, 12 April 2002.
95 Coker, Humane Warfare, 56.
96 Ibid., 78.
97 Christopher Coker, Globalisation and Insecurity in the Twenty-first Century: NATO and the 
Management o f Risk, Adelphi Paper 345, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute 
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surveillance, which allows for preventive or pre-emptive action, and “dramatic 
campaigns” to confront the hazard such as the “war on terror” or the “war on drugs”.99 
When NATO determines that military force must be used, its goal is the “containment, 
confinement, or dissuasion” of the risk, and airpower is NATO’s instrument of choice to 
accomplish it.100
2.4.4. Risk and Terrorism
Yee-Kuang Heng, in his article entitled “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism”, views the 
“war on terror” as a risk management exercise.101 In fact, he contends that the use of the 
word “war” is a misnomer and argues that “risk management exercise” should be 
substituted in its place. Heng identifies three characteristics of risk management and 
contrasts them with traditional characteristics of war. He then demonstrates how they are 
applicable to the US military efforts in Afghanistan. First, he claims that the war on 
terror is focused on preventing future harm by “minimis[ing] or reducing] the factors 
which lead to the risks occurring”.102 Rather than dealing with an immediate threat, the 
war on terror is driven by a potential terrorist event in the future. Second, the war on 
terror is not meant to completely eradicate the possibility of terrorism, but to “minimize 
or reduce the factors which lead to risks occurring”. The very nature of terrorism makes 
its eradication impossible. Finally, Heng demonstrates that the war on terror is “based 
more on trying to prevent something ‘bad’. .. than on attaining something ‘good’”.
98 Ibid., 60.
99 Ibid., 62.
100 Ibid., 63-4.
101 Yee-Kuang Heng, “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A Risk-Management Exercise in War 
Clothing?”, Security Dialogue, Volume 33, No. 2, June 2002, 227-242.
102 Ibid., 232.
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Summary
Although none of these articles specifically address the issue of population protection, 
their utilisation and adaptation of risk principles to explain the dynamics of the post-Cold 
War security environment reveal a growing academic acceptance of risk’s applicability to 
subjects of International Security. Moreover, the authors’ similar adaptations and 
interpretations of Beck’s risk principles within this field add legitimacy to the adaptations 
and applications made in Chapter 7 of this thesis.
2.5 POST-COLD WAR PARALLELS
Parallels between Beck’s risk society and the West’s post-Cold War security environment 
make risk theory a useful framework for analysing population protection interventions. 
Rather than attempt to apply Beck’s conception of a risk society directly to the protection 
interventions of the 1990s, this thesis simply borrows concepts from the risk literature and 
adapts them to the post-Cold War protection environment for use as an explanatory tool. 
The following section briefly identifies some of these parallels in order to set the stage for 
the analyses that follow.
The security environment of the 1990s differed significantly from the security 
environment of the Cold War period. During the Cold War, the hazards were more 
clearly defined. In the zero-sum struggle between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the 
continued existence of one camp presented a threat to the survival of the other. While 
secondary issues and less-certain security hazards such as humanitarian emergencies,
103 Ibid, 232.
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terrorism, and environmental destruction existed, they were subordinate to, and often 
subsumed within, the bigger Cold War confrontation.
When the Cold War ended, the overarching threat to the West’s survival decreased 
drastically, leaving a “threat vacuum” in its place where less known and less severe perils 
proliferated. Consequently, the security environment of the 1990s, like the environment 
in which Beck’s risk society emerged, was characterised by a host of uncertain hazards. 
Issues such as the environment, terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, humanitarian crises, endangered populations, and economic downturns posed 
potential risks, not to the West’s survivability, but to amorphous factors such as 
credibility, stability, legitimacy, and influence. The ill-defined nature of the hazards, 
combined with the conflicting expertise regarding the degree of risk they posed to society, 
generated feelings of anxiety and vulnerability among the public. Moreover, without the 
Cold War survival threat to obscure these sub-survival sources of risk, Western 
governments were increasingly susceptible to public pressure to “do something” to 
address them. The risk framework developed in this thesis is presented as a tool for 
understanding the behaviour of these “post-survival” Western states as they dealt with the 
uncertain humanitarian crises of the 1990s.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provided the definitions, context, and theoretical basis for an analysis of the 
Western protection interventions of the 1990s. By reviewing several recent works 
relating to the subject of population protection, it demonstrated the need for an analytical 
framework with greater explanatory potential. It then discussed the five key 
characteristics of a risk society, drawn principally from the sociological writings of Ulrich
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Beck. In Chapter 7, these characteristics will be used to analyse Western actions in the 
four instances of population protection addressed in this thesis. The applicability of using 
risk concepts to explain issues of international security was further demonstrated by 
reviewing several articles which utilised risk theory to explain various aspects of the 
West’s post-Cold War behaviour, and by drawing specific parallels between Beck’s risk 
society and the West’s security environment in the 1990s.
In order to make the case that the West’s so-called protection interventions can best be 
analysed and understood as efforts to manage risk using risk principles, the thesis must 
first demonstrate that the Western interveners were not chiefly seeking to accomplish 
their stated humanitarian objectives. Hence, the purpose of the case studies which follow 
is to show that the West was more concerned with preventing the negative effects of the 
humanitarian crises on their self-interests than with protecting the lives of the endangered 
non-combatants. In the course of supporting this claim, the case studies will also 
demonstrate that the uncertainties surrounding the humanitarian crises made it very 
difficult for Western states to determine what actions would safeguard their self-interests 
and what actions would harm them. In fact, the strategies that the West designed and 
implemented within this highly complex environment often seemed to run counter to its 
stated intentions. The case studies will thus fulfil the secondary purpose of exposing the 
need for an explanatory framework through which the West’s seemingly inconsistent and 
counter-productive actions in the interventions of the 1990s can be understood. This 
framework, which is based upon the principles of risk theory and validated by numerous 
examples from the case studies, is the subject of Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 3 NORTHERN IRAQ
INTRODUCTION
The coalition effort to protect the Kurds in Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War was hailed by 
many as a precedent for humanitarian intervention against abusive state governments. 
Between April and July 1991, a Western-led coalition of thirteen states sent military 
forces into Iraq, declared a ‘safe haven’ in Northern Iraq from which Iraqi forces were 
excluded, set up internally displaced persons (IDP) camps, facilitated the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, and resettled the population—all without the consent of the Iraqi 
government or explicit authorisation from the UN Security Council. Because the effort 
took place on Iraqi soil without Iraqi consent, it marked a dramatic shift from past efforts 
to deal with displaced people (DPs).
While the coalition justified its action solely on humanitarian grounds, this chapter 
reveals that it was also pursuing self-interested objectives, the achievement of which 
often took priority over the provision of security to endangered Kurds. Undoubtedly, 
when the interveners withdrew from Iraq, they left behind a Kurdish people whose 
welfare had been dramatically improved. Nevertheless, the methods utilised by the 
interveners, as ambiguous as they often seemed, demonstrated that the West was more 
concerned with managing the future effects of the population crisis on itself than it was 
with providing protection to the Kurds. This self-centred concern resulted in an 
intervention that was characterised by minimalist, self-protective actions designed 
primarily to assuage an outraged populace, maintain alliance unity, and preserve the 
perception of the Gulf War victory. In light of these objectives, this chapter concludes
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that the Kurds were protected only as long as Kurdish protection furthered the West’s 
self-interests.
3.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTION
In early March 1991, between the time of the Gulf War coalition’s unilateral cease-fire 
and the passage of UN Security Council Resolution (SCR) 687 of 3 April 1991 (the UN 
cease-fire agreement), rebel forces within Iraq, encouraged by the words of US President 
George Bush (Sr.) and UK Prime Minister John Major, rose up against Saddam Hussein’s 
Ba’athist regime. The primary rebel movements originated with the Shi’a Muslims in 
southern Iraq and the Kurds in northern Iraq. Although the rebel forces made impressive 
gains for a short time, the Iraqi military dominated the confrontation once it began its 
counterattack in earnest. As Iraqi forces moved from one village to the next using 
helicopters and mortars to attack escaping non-combatants, coalition aircraft circled 
passively overhead waiting for Western decision-makers and military commanders to 
decide whether or not to act on the rebels’ behalf.1 By 3 April, the Shi’ite and Kurdish 
rebellions had effectively been crushed and over a million Kurds and Shi’ites, fearful of 
the retribution that was to follow, fled the advancing Iraqi forces.2 The Shi’ites primarily 
went to Iran and Saudi Arabia while the Kurds either went to Iran or tried to cross the 
border in Turkey.
1 See Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The General’s War: The Inside Story o f the Conflict in 
the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 454-57.
2 Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) John M. Shalikashvili, US Army, Commander Operation Provide Comfort, 
Statement to the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Defence Policy Panel, 
Washington DC, 4 September 1991, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101 /ops/docs/lsn7app 1 .htm. Accessed 8 
July 2003.
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Throughout this period, the UN Security Council was trying to craft a cease-fire 
agreement that would officially end the hostilities between the coalition forces and Iraq. 
France, acting on Austria’s suggestion, had sought to incorporate a clause into the 
agreement which demanded that Iraq cease its repression of its population.3 Fearing a 
Chinese veto based on the grounds that the action violated Iraq’s internal affairs, the US 
and the UK did not support France’s initiative. Consequently, SCR 687 maintained the 
Chapter VII “all necessary means” capacity of previous resolutions, but it did not address 
Iraq’s treatment of its own population.4
Deeply concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq and the displacement of Iraqi 
civilians, France and Turkey requested a meeting of the Security Council to discuss the 
crisis.5 On 5 April, the Security Council adopted SCR 688 which had been submitted by 
France and Belgium and co-sponsored by the UK and the US. Iran and Turkey, in 
separate letters to the Council and in their pre-vote remarks on the resolution, emphasised 
the trans-border effects that the displacement of Iraqi Kurds was having on their 
countries.6
Although most states expressed concern for the civilian populace, they also had 
reservations about interfering in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In fact, had the 
draft resolution sought to authorise force, China would almost certainly have vetoed it. 
Consequently, SCR 688 was not adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter and was only
3 Ian Johnstone, Aftermath o f the Gulf War: An Assessment o f UN Action, (New York: Lynne Reinner for 
the International Peace Academy, 1994), 19.
4 S/RES/687, 3 April 1991.
5 S/22435, 3 April 1991, “Letter dated 2 April 1991 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the 
United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/22442, 4 April 1991, Letter from the 
Charge D ’Affairs A.I. of the Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Addressed to the President 
of the Security Council.
6 Letter from Turkey, S/22435, 3 April 1991. Letters from Iran, S/22436, 3 April 1991 and S/22447 4 April 
1991. See also S/PV.2982, 5 April 1991.
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approved at all by a very narrow margin, with Cuba, Yemen, and Zimbabwe voting 
against, and China and India abstaining. All five of these member states justified their 
votes primarily on the grounds that intervention would constitute internal interference in
n
the affairs of a sovereign state.
Much has been written as to whether or not SCR 688 authorised enforcement actions 
against Iraq. Key to this debate is the fact that 688 was not adopted under Chapter VII 
and did not “recall” the previous Chapter VII resolutions. Its language, however, was the 
language of enforcement. In it, the Council “condemn[ed] the repression of the Iraqi 
civilian population, “demand[edJ that Iraq ... immediately end this repression ..., and 
“insist[ed] that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organisations 
to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq and to make available all necessary 
facilities for their operations”.8
The US signalled its broad interpretation of the mandate immediately upon passage of the 
resolution. After the vote, the American Permanent Representative to the UN announced 
that the US would begin air-dropping essential provisions to the Kurds along the Iraqi- 
Turkish border.9 This effort, which commenced deliveries on 7 April 1991, was 
designated Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and soon expanded into a thirteen-state 
coalition effort to create a non-consensual “safe haven” within Iraq’s borders.10 The 
motivations and objectives for this operation are explored in the next section.
7 S/PV. 2982, 5 April 1991.
8 S/RES/688 (1991) 5 April 1991, Operative Paragraphs (OP) 1, 2, and 3.
9 S/PV. 2982, 5 April 1991.
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3.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES
The leaders of Operation Provide Comfort were adamant in their claim that their single 
motive for the intervention in Iraq was a humanitarian concern for the endangered Kurds. 
Similarly, their official objectives were entirely humanitarian in nature, focusing on 
bringing the Kurds down from the mountains and eventually restoring them to their 
homes in a secure environment. Yet, in spite of the coalition’s claims, there also existed a 
number of unofficial motives such as the high probability of success, the maintenance of 
alliance unity, the preservation of domestic support, and the credibility of Western states 
which affected the decisions and the strategies of the coalition, often to the detriment of 
the endangered Kurds.
3.2.1 Official Motive
The coalition, which was composed almost entirely of Western states, justified its 
intervention solely on humanitarian grounds. The humanitarian justification was easy to 
support as the plight of the displaced Kurds was virtually undisputed. Along the snow- 
covered, mountainous borders, the IDPs formed numerous encampments. Journalists and 
humanitarian organisations estimated the death toll at over 1,000 per day, most of whom 
were women, children, or aged.11
Prior to the operation’s commencement, individual state leaders and representatives 
repeatedly emphasised their humanitarian motive in order to justify their actions. When 
President Bush announced the air-drop operation on 5 April, he stated, “I want to
10 Also designated Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort reflecting the multinational composition 
of the effort, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/provide comfort.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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1 9emphasize that this effort is prompted only by humanitarian concerns”. US Secretary of
State James A. Baker III described the Kurdish plight as “experiences of cruelty and
human anguish that defy description” and urged that “they must be free from the threats,
persecution and harassment that they have been subjected to by the bmtal regime in 
1 ^Baghdad”. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher stated that “it is not a 
question of standing on legal niceties ... The people need help and they need it now”.14 
White House Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater commented that the “refugee tragedy must be 
alleviated”.15
Likewise, once the intervention was underway, humanitarian concerns were again cited as 
the sole reason for creating a safe haven for the Kurds within Iraq. On 16 April, Bush 
publicly announced that because the nature of the region in which the displaced Kurds 
were grouped made it impossible to deliver aid effectively, the US, France, Turkey, and 
the UK would be setting up secure camps inside Iraq. Bush stressed, “I want to 
underscore that all we are doing is motivated by humanitarian concerns”.16 When 
questioned about these actions in regard to Iraq’s sovereignty, he replied, “Some might 
argue that this is an intervention into the internal affairs of Iraq, but I think the 
humanitarian concern, the refugee concern is so overwhelming that there will be a lot of 
understanding about this”.17
11 Lawrence Freedman and David Boren, “ ‘Safe havens’ for the Kurds in post-war Iraq”, in Nigel S.
Rodley (ed.), To Loose the Bands o f Wickedness: International Intervention in Defense o f Human Rights, 
(London: Brassey’s, 1992), 48 and Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
12 George H.W. Bush, “Statement on Aid to Iraqi Refugees”, 5 April 1991, 
http://bushlibrarv.tamu.edu/papers/l991/91040500.html. Accessed 8 July 2003.
13 Quoted in Freedman and Boren, 52.
14 Quoted in Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 149.
15 Ibid., 53.
16 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks on Assistance for Iraqi Refugees and a News Conference”, April 16, 1991. 
http://bushlibrarv.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91041608.html. Accessed 8 July 2003.
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3.2.2 Unofficial Motives
High Probability of Success. The post-Gulf War condition of the Iraqi opponent, the 
geographic isolation of the endangered Kurdish population, and the acquiescence of the 
international community combined to make Western states confident that they could 
intervene successfully on behalf of the Kurds at an acceptably low cost to themselves. An 
intervention under these conditions seemed likely to produce benefits to the West in terms 
of strengthened alliance unity, increased domestic support, and enhanced international 
credibility with little chance of encountering the hazards associated with a failed 
operation. Consequently, the high probability of success was foundational to all the other 
Western motives and influenced not only the West’s decision to intervene but also the 
manner in which it chose to do so.
The Antagonist. Saddam Hussein and the nature of his regime in Iraq formed an 
important dynamic that influenced the development of the safe haven plan and its 
execution. Unlike many of the post-Cold War intrastate conflicts to follow, the situation 
in Iraq presented an easily recognisable victim and perpetrator. The Kurds were not 
being attacked by an elusive guerrilla faction or an unrecognisable militia force that 
operated without an obvious power base. Instead, the perpetrator was the Iraqi regime. 
Its forces wore clearly identifiable military uniforms, and its leadership could be targeted 
directly with international pressure and military threats. Even more important than being 
conspicuous, the Iraqi military was a conventional army that based its tactics on Soviet 
doctrine and supplied its forces with outdated Soviet equipment. These factors, in
17 Freedman and Boren, 55.
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conjunction with the open desert landscape in which they fought, made the Iraqi forces 
especially vulnerable to coalition technology and aerial dominance.
Second, the capability of the Iraqi army was well known. As a result of the Gulf War, 
Western states had very little doubt as to the coalition’s military superiority. They had 
overwhelmed the Iraqi army with air attacks and vastly superior equipment. After the 
one-hundred-hour ground offensive, the Iraqi military had fled in full retreat. The Iraqis 
were technologically inferior, and both they and those planning the intervention knew it.
Thirdly, a factor that cannot be over emphasised was the huge number of coalition troops 
and equipment still in the region from the Gulf War. With these resources already in 
place, decision-makers did not have to consider or justify the deployment costs (both 
political and monetary) which would otherwise have to be expended. Instead, they had 
the immediate capability to respond with overwhelming force.
Additionally, Western decision-makers did not have to spend time building a case against 
Saddam Hussein in order to secure public support. As a result of Saddam Hussein’s 
actions against Kuwait and his defiance of the international community, he was already 
considered a “villain” throughout the West and much of the world. There was, therefore, 
little talk about the need to remain neutral or impartial, or to seek the consent of the Iraqi 
regime. Even though some Member States on the Security Council were unwilling to 
authorise force against Iraq for its treatment of the Kurds, they were also unwilling “to be 
exposed publicly as opposing a rescue mission that was saving lives and they were 
shamed into silence”.18
18 Wheeler, Strangers, 154.
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Geographic Separation. The geographic separation of the Kurds also increased the 
likelihood of a successful protection intervention. The Iraqi Kurds numbered 
approximately three million, but they were largely confined to the north of Iraq, often 
called Iraqi Kurdistan.19 For years the Iraqi Kurds had fought for autonomous rule within 
Iraq, and had, at various times, been granted different levels of autonomy. Unlike the 
perpetrators in Bosnia, Rwanda, or Kosovo, Iraqi forces were not driving the Kurds out 
with the sole intention of occupying or “cleansing” the land, nor was there a large 
percentage of Iraqi Arabs living in the area prior to the Iraqi counterattack in 1991. In 
other words, Iraq’s post-rebellion treatment of the Kurds was not a case of Arab 
neighbours fighting Kurdish neighbours, but rather the Iraqi military fighting an 
ethnically and geographically distinct people. This fact was important for the coalition 
because it simplified the process of demarcating a large section of northern Iraq and 
designating it as a safe haven.
International Approval. Contrary to the statements of many coalition leaders, neither 
Security Council Resolution 687 nor 688 authorised the use of force on behalf of the 
Kurds. The Security Council had already rejected the French suggestion to include a 
proviso in SCR 687 demanding the humane treatment of the Kurds. Moreover, the 
Council’s explicit acknowledgement of Iraq’s “sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
political independence” as well as its referral to Article 2(7) of the Charter were included 
in SCR 688 to mollify Member States that were hesitant to approve a resolution for fear 
that it would set a precedent for future interventions. Nevertheless, the Council declared 
that the refugee flow across Iraq’s borders threatened international peace and security,
19Freedman and Boren, 44.
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demanded an end to Iraqi repression of the Kurds, and insisted on Iraq’s allowance of 
humanitarian assistance. These decrees provided the Western coalition with a pretext for 
international legitimacy on which it frequently defended its action. As Nicholas Wheeler 
argued, Resolution 688 was ambiguous enough to provide the interveners with sufficient 
legitimisation to get involved more deeply, while still allowing the opponents of the
• onintervention to register their disapproval.
Alliance Unity. Of critical importance to the West’s decision to intervene was Turkey’s 
demand for assistance. The Turkish government had many reasons for closing its border 
to the fleeing Kurds and calling on the international community to assist the Kurdish DPs 
on Iraqi soil. Like other states with large Kurdish populations, Turkey was anxious about 
the Kurds within and around its borders. For security reasons, it had consistently refused 
to countenance any strategy that called for the creation of a separate Kurdish state. Not 
only had Turkey been fighting the Kurdish terrorist group known as the Kurdish Workers 
Party (PKK) for many years, but, in hopes of moving toward membership in the European
Community, the government had recently relaxed many anti-Kurdish laws for which it
0 1was enduring heavy criticism from its political opposition. Allowing the influx of so 
many Kurds would have increased the government’s vulnerability to these opposition 
attacks.
In addition to its security concerns, Turkey was unwilling to allow the Kurds refuge 
within its territory because of the lack of international support it had received in the past. 
Turkey’s handling of the Kurdish refugee exodus in 1988 following the Iraqi chemical
20 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 166-8.
21 Nicole and Hugh Pope, Turkey Unveiled: Ataturk and After, (London: John Murray, 1997), 265-6. Also 
see Sheri Laizer, Martyrs, Traitors and Patriots: Kurdistan after the Gulf War, (London: Zed Books, Ltd, 
1996), 26, and Freedman and Boren, 49.
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attacks had been met with very little international assistance and heavy criticism.22 
Moreover, many Kurdish refugees were still living in camps within Turkey.23
Turkey’s position on the matter was quite influential within the West because of Turkey’s 
importance as a NATO ally. Turkey had proven its value throughout the Cold War and 
then again in the 1991 Gulf War. Located on the Europe-Asia divide, the Turkish air base 
in In9 irlik was an important NATO forward staging base for Middle East operations and 
for protecting NATO’s southern flank. Moreover, the coalition knew that the use of 
Turkish bases would be critical in the task of verifying Iraq’s compliance with the cease­
fire requirements set out in SCR 687. Thus, when Turkish President Turgut Ozal called 
for “better land under UN control and to put those people in the Iraqi territory and take 
care of them”,24 the West was forced to take the demand seriously.
Domestic Support. Key Western states were motivated to act on behalf of the Kurds 
because of demands from their domestic publics. The media played a critical role in 
informing and shaping the Western public’s opinion of the humanitarian crisis. Because 
the humanitarian tragedy happened so soon after the cease-fire agreement, the Persian 
Gulf region was inundated with reporters from around the world competing for a new 
story. The humanitarian catastrophe was the perfect opportunity. Unlike in southern Iraq 
where the reporters had difficulty gaining access, or in Iran where reporters had no 
access, reporters in Turkey had much more freedom to cover the unfolding humanitarian
22 Laizer, Martyrs, 26.
23 John Bulloch and Harvey Morris, No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History o f the Kurds, 
(London: Viking, 1992), 28.
24 Donald MacIntyre, “Major gambles for high stakes in the mountains of Kurdistan: The Prime Minister’s 
call for a safe ‘enclave’ for the Kurds may have lasting repercussions”, The Independent, 14 April 1991 
page 10.
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• 25crisis. This accessibility was one of the primary reasons why the plight of the Kurds in 
northern Iraq received so much attention and the refugees in the south received so little.26
The media was fully mobilised by the time the Iraqi forces began suppressing the Kurdish 
and Shi’ite rebellions.27 The story was predictable. The sinister Saddam Hussein, 
mistakenly left in power by the victorious coalition, was brutally crushing the very 
rebellions that Western leaders had incited—and the Western leaders were now washing 
their hands of the tragedy. The media was there with cameras rolling as the Kurds fled to 
the mountains along the border with Turkey. They filmed harrowing pictures of 
unsheltered Kurds hanging onto the sides of snow-covered mountains. Moreover, the 
media was there when Turkish armed guards refused entry to the would-be refugees.
Reporters not only displayed the graphic images, but they provided detailed commentary 
as well. They were quick to assign blame to those Western leaders who had encouraged 
the rebellions and then looked the other way when they failed. Martin Shaw, author of an 
article written five years after the Kurdish refugee crisis on the media’s efforts and 
subsequent effects in post-Gulf War Iraq, entitled the piece, “TV’s finest hour”. 
According to him,
The BBC and ITN developed a sustained campaign over weeks for the Kurdish 
refugees. Each day brought new film, new images—broad-lens canvasses of 
refugee columns, camps and scrambles for food, together with close-ups of a 
suffering child, a pregnant mother, a helpless old person. But what made the 
campaign effective was not just the images. There was a relentless commentary 
pinning responsibility for the victims’ plight on Bush and Major.28
25 Nik Gowing, “The media dimension I: TV and the Kurds,” The World Today, June 1991, 111.
26 Poor Iranian-American relations and lingering memories of Iran’s seizure o f the American embassy were 
also major reasons for the neglect. Bulloch and Morris, 28-29.
27 Martin Shaw, “TVs finest hour,” New Statesman and Society, 19 April 1996, vol. 9, Issue 3, 22-23.
28 Ibid., 22.
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The story was one of betrayal and tragedy thrust in the midst of post-war euphoria. The 
media not only had a story, but it also had a voracious consumer in a public that had been 
feeding on hours of “live” war footage each day. The effect such images and 
commentary had on the international public cannot be overstated. In the words of Nik 
Gowing, “Politicians no longer set the agenda. Television images dictated the agenda for 
them”.29 The coverage put Bush and Major on the defensive. In the early stages, both 
men denied any responsibility for the rebellions and, therefore, any obligation to get 
further involved. As public opinion mounted against them, they changed their minds 
and intervened deeply in the conflict, leaving many to conclude that the media had 
shamed them into action. In a 1994 interview, Major admitted that he was moved to 
action on behalf of the Kurds largely as a result of the media images.31
The political considerations of American, British, UK, and French decision-makers also 
played a major role in determining the size and scope of the intervention. The US, having 
contributed the largest number of troops and equipment to the Gulf War, as well as being 
responsible for its leadership, largely considered the victory its own. American casualties 
had been low and United Nations’ objectives had been met quickly. President Bush was 
determined to withdraw the troops as soon as practicable.32 Americans were proud of 
their dominant victory, and American politicians and military leaders wanted nothing to 
spoil the “success” of the effort. The continuance of Saddam Hussein’s reign within Iraq 
was one of the most controversial aspects of the Gulf War “victory” and, as such, had the 
potential to jeopardise its success. Thus, when the Iraqi military began attacking Kurdish 
non-combatants in compliance with Saddam Hussein’s orders, US decision-makers, and
29 Gowing, “The media dimension,” 111.
30 See Bush, “Remarks on Assistance”, 16 April 1991.
31 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 165, Footnote 130.
32 Ibid.
the West more generally, were pressured to “do something” to salvage the Gulf War 
victory and shift the focus from the decision to leave Saddam in power.
The upcoming 1992 US presidential election further increased the influence of public 
demand on the decision to intervene. For the Bush team, garnering and maintaining every 
ounce of political advantage from the Gulf victory was key to holding off a challenge 
from the democrats. The Bush administration was faced with a dilemma. In contrast to 
their desire for action on behalf of the Kurds, Bush perceived that the American public 
wanted US troops home quickly.33 Having lived with the debilitating legacy of Vietnam 
and the dismal civil-military divide that characterised much of the post-Vietnam period, 
the American public, the military, and the government were determined to limit their 
objectives and minimise their risks.34 Up to this point, the Gulf War had been a success 
and the Bush administration did not want to chance tarnishing that success unnecessarily. 
These factors constrained American objectives, and thereby limited the objectives of the 
allied coalition. For the US to participate in any intervention, the plan had to address the 
humanitarian plight of the Kurds without establishing a Kurdish homeland, and had to do 
so in the shortest possible amount of time.
John Major, who was the first to propose the safe haven concept, also had political 
motives that went beyond mere humanitarian concern for the Kurds. The British 
government was under pressure by its media-informed public to intervene on behalf of 
the Kurds. As already mentioned, the media was quick to assign blame for the Shi’ite and
33 George H.W. Bush, “Remarks at Maxwell Air Force Base War College, Montgomery, AL”, 13 April 
1991, http://bushlibrarv.tamu.edu/papers/1991/91041300.html. Accessed 18 July 2003. Also see Bush, 
“Remarks on Assistance”, 16 April 1991.
34 President Bush often cited the avoidance of a Vietnam-like quagmire as justification for not intervening 
in the Kurds behalf. “All along, I have said that the United States is not going to intervene militarily in
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Kurdish uprisings to Major and Bush. Domestic pressure was reinforced by former Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s pro-Kurd stance. According to Minear, Scott, and Weiss, 
“sources close to the decisionmaking process” revealed that Major “feared criticism from 
his predecessor ... who had taken it upon herself to meet with Kurdish refugee
-J c
leaders...”. Being the first prime minister after eleven and a half years of Thatcher’s 
leadership, Major probably also had a desire to develop a policy that would set him apart 
from her shadow. Consequently, he devised his plan for safe havens (originally called
 ^7“enclaves”) very quickly and largely independent of his foreign policy team.
The French government also had a political motive for assisting the Kurds. The French 
public had been informed of the Iraqi Kurds’ situation prior to the Gulf War. Danielle 
Mitterrand, the French Prime Minister’s wife, had long been campaigning on behalf of 
the Kurds. As a result of her efforts in the late 1980s, the Kurds’ humanitarian plight had 
received domestic and international interest. She lobbied world leaders and American 
Congressmen with some success when the Iraqis began their actions against the Kurds in 
1 9 9 1  38 The French requests to include the Kurdish plight in Resolution 687 and to 
authorise a Chapter VII response in Resolution 688 were ultimately rejected, but Major’s 
safe haven idea had the same protective effect and seemed to appease Mrs. Mitterrand 
and the French public she had worked so hard to influence.
Credibility. The maintenance of international credibility and reputation also motivated 
the West to act. Throughout the Cold War, the West had billed itself as the champion of
Iraq's internal affairs and risk being drawn into a Vietnam-style quagmire.” Bush, “Remarks on 
Assistance”, 16 April 1991.
35 Larry Minear, Colin Scott, Thomas G. Weiss, The News Media, Civil, War, & Humanitarian Action, 
(Boulder: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1996), 51.
36 Bulloch and Morris, 34-5.
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human rights against oppressive dictatorial regimes. Now, in the post-Cold War 
environment, it appeared that the West had very little excuse not to intervene to stop such 
grave abuses, especially when Western leaders were accused of complicity in the tragedy. 
Only a couple of weeks before the decision to intervene in Iraq, President Bush had 
reiterated his vision of a New World Order. Quoting Winston Churchill, Bush spoke of a 
world order where
‘the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong....’ A 
world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill 
the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for 
human rights find a home among all nations.
Iraq’s treatment of the Kurds threatened to shatter this new order before it was allowed to
form and to expose the promises of the West as empty rhetoric.
The European Community’s quest for credibility also influenced the coalition’s decision 
to intervene. The Luxembourg Summit of 8 April 1991 was instigated by France to 
discuss Europe’s lacklustre performance in the Gulf War.40 When John Major arrived 
with his hastily-developed plan (a plan that had not been discussed with the Americans), 
Europeans saw a chance to seize the initiative in an area where the US was perceived to 
be moving too slowly. Major’s plan not only presented an opportunity for Europe to 
regain some international credibility, but it also provided a chance to highlight Major’s 
decision not to pre-brief the Americans—something that was rarely done under the 
Thatcher regime. In the now oft-quoted statement from a European official regarding the
37 Ibid. According to Nik Gowing, Major outlined the plan on the back of an envelope on the way to the 
Luxembourg Summit. Gowing, “The Media Dimension”, 111.
38 Bulloch and Morris, 13.
39 George H.W. Bush, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Cessation of the Persian Gulf 
Conflict”, 6 March 1991.” http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/papers/l991/91030600.html. Accessed 8 July 2003.
40 Freedman and Boren, 52-53.
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Luxembourg Summit, “The Kurds saved the summit so we must save the Kurds”.41 As a 
result of the summit, the EC came out in full support of the safe haven plan.
3.2.3 Official Objective
Despite the wide variety of motives for launching the intervention, the West’s official
objective was to provide humanitarian relief. According to OPC’s coalition commander,
US Army Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) John Shalikashvili, the official mission statement
of the intervention was as follows:
Combined task force Provide Comfort conducts multinational humanitarian 
operations to provide immediate relief to displaced Iraqi civilians until 
international relief agencies and private voluntary organisations can assume 
overall supervision.42
Interestingly, the mission statement did not specify the Kurds in northern Iraq as the chief 
beneficiaries but referred to displaced Iraqi civilians in general. It was also unclear about 
what was to be done about the Kurdish peshmerga combatants that were intermingled 
with the civilian populace. Missing altogether from the statement were provisions for 
disarmament and the division of Kurdish combatants and non-combatants. According to 
USAF General James McCarthy, the Deputy Commander of US European Command at 
the time of the operation, the coalition “just assumed they [the peshmergas] were refugees 
as well”.43 The mission statement also noted the intention to turn the operation over to 
international relief agencies and private organisations by specifying that the coalition 
partners were to continue conducting humanitarian operations until the relief agencies 
could “assume overall supervision”. There was no mention of what criteria would be 
used to evaluate the relief agencies’ readiness to assume control. Did readiness mean 
mere presence, or did it mean the ability to provide a comparable degree of relief and
41 Ibid., 53.
42 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
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protection? Either way, the mission statement made it clear that Operation Provide 
Comfort was never envisioned to be a long-term intervention. Instead, it was designed to 
be an interim measure until international agencies could assume the responsibility.
The temporary nature of the operation was further reinforced by the West’s three-part
objective. According to Shalikashvili, OPC’s humanitarian objective consisted of three
phases; each phase with its own humanitarian aims:
Immediate: Stop the dying and suffering; stabilize the population.
Mid-term: Resettle population at temporary sites; establish sustainable, secure 
environment.
Long-term: Return population to their homes.44
Although these aims were ostensibly motivated solely by humanitarian concerns for the
EDPs, the swift attainment of them would also quell media-induced domestic pressure,
salvage the West’s Gulf War victory, preserve alliance credibility, restore regional
stability, and prevent a long, controversial deployment of Western troops. At no time
prior to the operation did the Western coalition promise to resolve the Kurds’ political
situation or guarantee their long-term security. Restoring the Kurds to their homes was
the longest-term objective the West was willing to set. In fact, Western states, driven
primarily by the US desire to withdraw quickly, intentionally limited the mission to those
objectives that could be accomplished quickly and safely. As will be shown in
succeeding sections, this desire to terminate the operation quickly overrode the West’s
concern for the Kurds’ protection.
In spite of this self-interested limitation, the official objective assigned a comprehensive 
definition to the term “relief’ as it was used in OPC’s mission statement. “Relief’,
43 USAF General (ret.) James P. McCarthy, Deputy CINCEUR, 1989-1992, Interview with author 
interview, 2 October 2001.
44 Ibid.
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according to the operation’s stated aims, was not simply the provision of a blanket and a 
can of beans. The “relief’ that was to be supplied by the coalition involved the provision 
of humanitarian aid to alleviate the physical effects of the Kurdish displacement caused 
by the Iraqi attacks. Food, shelter, and medicine fell into this category. But “relief’ also 
meant the provision of physical security. In order to induce the Kurds to leave their 
mountain hiding places, the coalition had to create an environment in which the DPs were 
safe from physical attack.
3.3 MEANS AND METHODS
The troops and equipment dedicated to OPC were certainly sufficient for the stated 
objective. Moreover the strategy itself was one that seemed to ensure success. However, 
the restrictions applied to their employment coupled with the nature and timing of their 
termination raises questions as to the coalition’s priority aims.
3.3.1 Troops and Equipment
As humanitarian operations go, Operation Provide Comfort was massive. Because of its 
non-consensual nature, the coalition prepared for the possibility of encountering hostile 
Iraqi military forces by deploying a huge force into the area. Over 8,000 troops 
composed of special forces, military police, infantry, engineers, helicopter crews, and 
medical personnel deployed into Iraq with a host of others remaining within Turkey. 
Two aircraft wings composed of a full range of fighter, attack, and reconnaissance aircraft 
provided security and air support. Moreover, a US carrier task force was deployed off the 
coast of Turkey for additional support. In all, over 29,000 troops from 13 countries
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deployed in support of OPC.45 Military troops were not the only contribution to the 
coalition effort. Over a hundred unaffiliated civilians participated in the operation along 
with a UNHCR contingent composed of 88 workers. Thirty nations provided materiel 
support, and over fifty NGOs and private organisations assisted in the provision and 
delivery of humanitarian aid and expertise.
3.3.2 Strategy
The manner in which coalition forces sought to accomplish their goals in Iraq evolved 
over time. Initially, the plan was simply to provide assistance to the IDPs through the use 
of air-drops and no-fly zones. When that plan proved unworkable, the coalition 
implemented the safe haven concept of operations. Finally, after the IDPs had returned to 
their homes and coalition forces had departed Iraq, the coalition transitioned to a rapid 
reaction force in Turkey.
Air-Drops. After SCR 688 insisted that Iraq allow “immediate access by international 
humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of Iraq,” 
Operation Provide Comfort began on 6 April 1991 and focused extensively on the 
refugees along the Iraqi-Turkish border.46 Initially, the US announced that it would begin 
providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds by air-dropping essential supplies to them 
in the mountains. According to General McCarthy, the US Air Force had not even 
determined if air-drops were possible when President Bush announced on television that 
the operation was underway.47 The relief effort was joined the next day by the British
45 All figures taken from Lt Gen Shalikashvili’s “Congressional Testimony”.
46 Ten other nations also participated.
47 McCarthy interview.
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and French. Because of the difficult terrain, the lack of established drop zones, and poor 
weather, the air-drops were extremely inefficient and dangerous.48
No-Fly Zone (NFZ). On 10 April 1991, the coalition imposed a no-fly zone on Iraq 
which prevented Iraq from flying fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft north of the 36th 
parallel.49 With it came an instruction to “the Iraqi government not to send military 
forces north of the 36th parallel”.50 Although the coalition justified the NFZ as a means to 
protect the displaced Kurds, General McCarthy, who helped formulate this strategy, said 
it was primarily designed to protect the coalition forces and humanitarian aid workers 
who were inside Iraq helping with the relief effort.51 Hence, the Kurds were only 
secondary beneficiaries of the coalition’s NFZ protection. In fact, when the coalition 
forces withdrew from Iraq in July 1991, McCarthy tried on several occasions to terminate 
the NFZs because he felt they posed an unnecessary risk to coalition pilots and 
equipment. The US State Department argued for its continuance as it “was useful for 
controlling Saddam”. Instead of terminating the zone, it became the principal activity 
of Operation Provide Comfort II, which began on 24 July 1991, and later Operation 
Northern Watch, which was in effect from 1 Jan 1997 to 1 May 2003.
Safe Haven. When the air-drop strategy failed to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, the 
coalition turned to Major’s safe haven proposal. According to McCarthy, the politicians 
were so desperate to demonstrate to their publics that they were acting on behalf of the
48 Ibid.
49 United States European Command,
http://www.eucom.mi1/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm7http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Operation 
s/onw/Chronologv.htm&2. Accessed, 8 July 2003.
50 Freedman and Boren, 53.
51 McCarthy interview.
52 Ibid.
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Kurds that they implemented the plan 36 hours after it was conceived.53 From the 
beginning, Western leaders tried to minimise their responsibility for the zone. John 
Major sought to utilise the United Nations to carry out the operation, but UN Secretary- 
General Perez de Cuellar balked at such a request in the absence of either another 
Security Council resolution or Iraqi consent, neither of which was a remote possibility.54 
The coalition leaders, therefore, agreed to carry out the operation initially on the strained 
justification of SCRs 687 and 688, but continued to seek ways of transferring the 
operation to the UN at the earliest opportunity. The US, in particular, was anxious to 
relinquish the operation and get its troops home quickly. The initial plan had been to 
complete the transfer of IDPs to their homes by the middle of June.55 To American 
officials, this time frame became the unofficial target for complete withdrawal.
To speed the transition, the coalition constantly emphasised methods that could be easily 
transferred to a replacement organisation. The safe haven plan originally called for the 
demarcation of a large piece of Iraqi territory in which there would be six “zones of 
protection” or temporary camps that could accommodate 60,000 people each. Because 
many IDPs proceeded directly from the mountains to their homes, only two camps ended 
up being completely established. In an effort to create a camp system that could be easily 
transferred to humanitarian organisations or left to the Kurds, coalition planners designed 
the camps on a Kurdish community model based on the input of Kurds.56 Second, 
Kurdish leaders were allowed to govern the camps so that they would remain operational 
after the coalition military structure departed. General McCarthy related that the primary
53 Ibid.
54 As to the possibility of the coalition operating under UN cover, UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar 
said, “If this is to be a military presence under aegis of the UN, consent would have to be obtained from the 
Security Council. If the countries concerned do not require the UN flag, then that is quite different.” “West 
and UN Shamed into Aiding Kurds”, The Independent, 18 April 1991.
55 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
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motive behind these actions was not the Kurds’ protection or comfort, but the coalition’s 
ability to depart in a relatively short period of time.
Key to the success of the plan was the concept of security. If the refugees did not feel 
secure from Iraqi threats, no amount of food or “comfort” could induce them to exchange 
their mountain “sanctuaries” for coalition-built camps. As long as the coalition forces 
remained in Iraq, the Kurds’ security within the safe haven was virtually assured. The 
success of the coalition’s security measures were attested to by the fact that OPC did not 
experience one hostile encounter with Iraqi forces even though five Iraqi divisions were 
estimated to be in northern Iraq immediately prior to the coalition’s deployment into the 
area. With the exception of Dohuk, the Iraqi military forces quickly complied with 
coalition ultimatums to leave the disputed areas, even when the coalition significantly 
expanded the zone.
One way in which the coalition reduced the probability of confrontation was through the 
creation of the Military Co-ordination Committee (MCC).57 The MCC was a liaison unit 
designed to work with Iraqi forces in an effort to reduce the chances of accidental 
confrontations or to mediate them should they occur. The MCC later became a formal 
military mission staffed with American, French, and British soldiers. While the MCC 
was beneficial, the threat of massive coalition firepower was the supreme guarantor of 
security. Coalition aircraft patrolled the skies while ground forces in Iraq ensured that 
Iraqi military forces stayed out of the area. Additionally, there was a large contingent of 
ground forces located just inside the Turkish border in case a military confrontation 
should occur. Though there was ample military capability in the region, its primary
56 Ibid.
57
98
purpose was the protection of the coalition force, not the Kurds. As will be shown, any 
real protection the Kurds received was essentially “spill over” of the protection provided 
to Western troops.
UN Guards. As previously mentioned, the interveners were eager to transfer control of 
the operation to international relief agencies as soon as possible. Consequently, at the 
behest of coalition forces and Iraqi authorities,58 the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) had been preparing to take over the humanitarian dimension of the coalition 
effort and had been working alongside the coalition forces from the beginning of the 
operation. In fact, the UNHCR had actually taken over the humanitarian portion of the 
mission by 7 June 1999.59 The chief obstacle to the coalition’s withdrawal was finding an 
acceptable replacement force to handle the issue of security. The Kurds wanted the 
coalition to guarantee their security and threatened to return to the mountains if adequate 
security was not provided.60 Once again, the coalition looked to the UN and investigated 
the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force or a UN police force. Without Iraqi consent 
or a new Security Council resolution, neither of these options were possible.61 It was 
after this point that the coalition unabashedly prioritised its desire for a quick exit over the 
protection of the Kurds.
The Iraqi and coalition authorities finally agreed that a deployment of UN Guards would 
replace the coalition forces. Because the UN Guards Contingent in Iraq (UNGCI) was 
not a peacekeeping force per se, it did not require separate Security Council authorisation.
58 S/22513, 21 April 1991, “Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary- 
General, 21 April 1991, reproduced in Marc Weller (ed.), Iraq and Kuwait: The Hostilities and their 
Aftermath, (Cambridge: Grotius Publications Limited, 1993), 615.
59 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
60 Hugh Pope, The Independent, 11 June 1991.
61 Peter Riddell, “Iraq rejects LIN police force to protect Kurds,” Financial Times, 10 May 1991.
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The stipulations for the UNGCI were spelled out in an annex to the Memorandum of 
Understanding developed for the UN humanitarian mission which had been operating 
concurrent with OPC throughout the rest of Iraq. The maximum number of guards was 
set at 500, with no more than 150 in any one region. The agreement stipulated that the 
guards could only be armed with a pistol, which would be provided by Iraq.62
Though not explicitly stated in the agreement, the guards were not tasked with providing
physical security to the Kurdish people. Instead, they were to provide security for relief
supplies and humanitarian workers. According to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the
purpose of the Guards was to
protect United Nations personnel and assets as well as non-governmental
organisations working under the umbrella of the United Nations program........
Moreover by their presence, the Guards were able to defuse tensions and greatly 
increase security in the areas in which the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Program is 
being implemented.63
The annex stated that the Guards would be granted freedom of movement between the 
humanitarian centres and would be given adequate communications equipment and 
transportation. Despite the Guards’ limitations, both UN and coalition officials hoped 
that the Guards’ presence and monitoring capability would instil confidence in the Kurds 
and caution in the Iraqi forces. What made these restrictions particularly telling of 
coalition priorities was the fact that the Kurds were not informed of them prior to the 
coalition’s withdrawal. Instead, to avoid another Kurdish exodus which might further 
delay coalition withdrawal, the UN and coalition officials initially told the Kurds that the 
Guards would be capable of providing for their security needs.64
62 S/22663, 22 April 1991, "Letter dated 30 May 1991 from the Secretary-General addressed to the 
President of the Security Council”. See Annex paragraphs 2-7.
63 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Introduction,” The United Nations and the Iraq-Kuwait Conflict: 1990-1996,
UN Blue Book Series, Volume IX, (New York: Department of Public Information, 1996), 57-58.
64 Sadruddin Aga Khan, “Give the United Nations Guards a Chance in Iraq,” International Herald Tribune, 
13 June 1991.
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Rapid Reaction Force. To further allay Kurdish fears in the face of the coalition’s 
approaching withdrawal, and to prevent a rift from developing within the coalition, 
Western leaders decided to deploy a rapid reaction force to Turkey, in addition to 
maintaining the no-fly zone. The coalition had hoped that the Kurds and Iraqis would 
reach an agreement that would facilitate a smooth coalition departure. The various 
Kurdish factions had been meeting with the Iraqi government throughout the coalition 
deployment and had, at various times, been close to a compromise agreement. However, 
as the first coalition troops began withdrawing, the Iraqi government stiffened its 
negotiating posture causing concern among both the Kurds and the coalition. To make 
matters worse, conflicts among the Kurdish factions prevented a unified negotiating 
position.
The UK, France, Italy, and the Netherlands did not want to withdraw forces from Iraq
until the Kurds had worked out an acceptable agreement with the Iraqis. Prime Minister
Major declared that coalition troops would not be withdrawn from Iraq until the Kurds
had the following assurances:
. . .firstly, an effective UN force on the ground; secondly, clear warnings to Iraq 
that any renewed repression will meet the severest response; thirdly, a continuing 
deterrent military presence in the region to back-up those warnings, and the 
maintenance of sanctions against Iraq Without these we will not leave.65
American officials, on the other hand, prioritised getting their forces home. With what
seemed to be an approaching European-American rift over the timing of the withdrawal,
the coalition finally agreed to a compromise solution in which it would withdraw from
Iraq after handing over the camps to the UN and their Guards, but would position a rapid
reaction force, designated Operation Poised Hammer (and later incorporated into
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Operation Provide Comfort II), just inside the Turkish border to maintain a protective 
response capability. Lt Gen Shalikashvili assured the Kurds, “We’ll be just a phone call 
away”.66 A London Foreign Office official echoed this assurance by describing the force 
as being “prepared, if circumstances so demand, to respond swiftly; to go back in, if 
necessary, to protect the safety of the refugees and UN personnel and to take any other
fnaction as may be required”. These assurances mollified the Kurds and enabled the 
coalition to peacefully withdraw. The last OPC member departed Iraq on 15 July 1991, 
and the operation officially ended on 24 July 1991.68 In spite of the coalition’s promises, 
the rapid reaction force was withdrawn from Turkey two months later, even though the 
Kurds were far from secure.
3.3.3 Rules of Engagement
The coalition forces’ rules of engagement (ROE) illustrated the seriousness with which 
the coalition viewed the provision of security to the region. Several of the “rules” and 
definitions which appeared on the “ROE Card” carried by US troops are listed below:69
1. All military operations will be conducted in accordance with the laws of war.
2. The use of armed force will be utilised as a measure of last resort only.
4. US forces will not fire unless fired upon unless there is clear evidence of 
hostile intent.
Hostile Intent -  The threat of imminent use of force by an Iraqi force or other 
foreign force, terrorist group, or individuals against the United States, US forces, 
US citizens, or Kurdish or other refugees located above the 38th parallel or 
otherwise located within a US or allied safe haven refugee area. When the on­
scene commander determines, based on convincing evidence, that hostile intent is 
present, the right exists to use proportional force to deter or neutralize the threat.
65 Cited in David Keen, The Kurds in Iraq: How safe is their haven now?, (London: Save the Children, 
1993), 11.
66 Bulloch and Morris, 43.
67 Ibid, 44-5.
68 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”. Also “Operation Provide Comfort,” 
http ://www. fas. org/man/dod-101 /ops/provide comfort.htm. Accessed 8 July 2003.
69 US Army Field Manual FM 100-23, “Appendix D : Sample Rules of Engagement”, 
http://www.globalsecuritv.org/militarv/librarv/policv/armv/fm/100-23/fml 00 10.htm. Accessed 8 July 
2003.
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Hostile Act -  Includes armed force directly to preclude or impede the missions 
and/or duties of US or allied forces.
6. You may fire into Iraqi territory in response to hostile fire.
7. You may fire into another nation’s territory in response to hostile fire only if 
the cognizant government is unable or unwilling to stop that force’s hostile acts 
effectively or promptly.
11. Use the following guidelines when applying these rules:
a. Use force only to protect lives.
b. Use of minimum force necessary.
d. If necessary and proportional, use all available weapons to deter,
neutralize, or destroy the threat as required.
These ROE clearly attest to the non-consensual nature of the mission. Ironically, the first
rule demanded that the operation conform with the laws of war. Certainly non-combatant
immunity had long been established and accepted in international humanitarian law, as
had demilitarised zones and neutral zones, but the creation of a non-consensual safe
haven in which armed opposition forces were provided sanctuary along with the civilian
population was not.70 Next, the ROE clearly established that American forces were
expected to use deadly force in pursuit of their mission of protecting Kurds and
establishing a secure environment. This stipulation was much different from the
traditional peacekeeping norm of “force only in self-defence”. Finally, the ROE indicated
the manner in which Iraqi sovereignty was perceived in comparison to other states. The
coalition was not attempting to be impartial in Iraq. Iraqi forces were clearly designated
as the opposition. As such, coalition forces required no special permission to respond
forcefully to Iraqi threats. This was further demonstrated by the manner in which
coalition forces dealt with their Iraqi counterparts. On 18 April, prior to moving into Iraq
in force, Lt Gen Shalikashvili met with Iraqi Brigadier General Nashwan. The tone of the
meeting foreshadowed the tone of the entire operation. According to Shalikashvili:
I wanted to make absolutely sure that they [the Iraqi military] understood that we 
were going to move into northern Iraq, that we expected them to move out of the 
area to a distance we set at 30 kilometers from where we were working and that
70 Adam Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, protection and partiality in a policy vacuum, Adelphi 
Paper 305, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996, 40.
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there was going to be absolutely no interference on the part of the Iraqis with what 
we were doing. It was not a negotiating session; it was to inform them and to 
expect compliance from them.71
The non-consensual aspect of this operation as well as the coalition’s view of security
was further demonstrated by the manner in which the coalition expanded the “safe” zone
on two separate occasions. Since many of the refugees came from regions outside the
initial security zone, the coalition expanded the zone significantly on two occasions to
noinclude these areas. On one occasion, the zone was expanded eastward 150 kilometres, 
and on another it was extended southward to incorporate the provisional capital of Dohuk. 
The latter expansion threatened to arouse hostilities when the Iraqis initially refused to 
withdraw their soldiers and did not want to admit coalition forces because of the large 
number of Arabs living in Dohuk. Complicating matters even more was the large 
number of Iraqi forces, armour, and artillery in the area, as well as the coalition’s 
perpetual uncertainty of Iraqi chemical weapons.74 Nevertheless, because an estimated 
150,000 to 180,000 Kurdish refugees came from that area and would need to return there, 
the coalition required Dohuk to accomplish its mission. In the end, the two sides 
compromised. The Iraqis agreed to withdraw their military and secret police to a distance 
of at least four miles from the city, and the coalition agreed to deploy only non-combat
7troops into the area.
Security had to be maintained inside the security zone as well as outside. The presence of 
peshmergas in the zone had the potential of bringing international disfavour on the 
operation as well as retaliation from Iraqi troops, if these Kurdish combatants used the
71 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
72 “Allied forces double size of ‘safe haven’ in northern Iraq,” Financial Times, 3 May 1991.
73 Alec Russell, “Pull-out orders defied by Iraqis,” Daily Telegraph, 7 May 1991.
74 Peter Riddell, “Iraq rejects UN police force to protect Kurds,” Financial Times, 10 May 1991.
75 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
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safe havens as bases for conducting attacks. This possibility was considered prior to the 
intervention but was not adequately addressed. The British government stated that the 
Kurds would not be allowed to use the camps for military activity but did not stipulate 
how they intended to prevent them from doing so.77 The Americans were even less rigid 
on the issue. White House Deputy Press Secretary Roman Popadiuk optimistically 
claimed, “we don’t believe that the Kurdish guerrillas that are still operating in the 
northern sector would endanger the lives of their own countrymen ... by exposing them to 
this kind of attack”.78 General McCarthy related that the coalition told the peshmerga 
fighters, “We’re here to do a humanitarian mission. We’ll give you no support for your 
operations”.79 Nonetheless, the coalition did not disarm the guerrillas and even accepted 
the “security” roles they performed in the safe areas.
3.4 RESULTS
As long as protecting the Kurds coincided with the self-interests of the coalition 
members, OPC was remarkably successful at the protection mission. The death toll was 
normalised and hundreds of thousands of people were returned to their homes within a 
month of the operation’s initiation. When the coalition’s interests diverged from the 
Kurds’ desire for security guarantees, however, the West’s prioritisation of self-interested 
objectives became clearly evident. As will be shown, the coalition’s desire to withdraw 
from Iraq quickly led to a number of self-interested decisions which had negative effects 
on the Kurds’ protection.
76 Hugh Pope, “What when they leave?” Middle East International, 31 May 1991. Also, Michael 
Theodoulou and James Bone, “Refugees return to Dahuk after deal on UN guards,” The Times, 25 May 
1991.
77 Freedman and Boren, 57.
78 Quoted in Ibid, 57.
79 McCarthy interview.
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3.4.1 Population Protection
Following the withdrawal of coalition forces from northern Iraq, the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, judged the coalition’s intervention as “a case
of successful humanitarian intervention”80 as did the Western interveners. On 12 July,
the British Foreign Office made the following assessment of Operation Provide Comfort:
Almost all of the 400,000 refugees who fled to the mountains in the area of the 
safe havens have returned home. The refugee camps have closed and the transit 
stations are almost deserted. Towns and villages are returning to normal. With 
our help water and power supplies have been restored, food distribution and basic 
sanitation systems established and health care brought to those in need. Many 
lives have been saved. The aims of our deployment have been successfully 
achieved.81
Certainly, Operation Provide Comfort succeeded in many humanitarian tasks. As a result 
of the delivery of almost 17,000 short tons of relief supplies, the immense death rate of 
nearly 1,000 people a day was brought back to normal levels.82 Coalition forces built and 
staffed medical centres that performed a range of services from routine procedures to 
complex surgeries. The coalition also succeeded in creating a secure environment long 
enough to persuade over 450,000 DPs along the Turkish border to return to Iraqi territory 
and, in most cases, to their homes. In an effort to return these DPs to a state of normalcy, 
coalition engineers rebuilt the infrastructure of war-torn Kurdish cities to include the 
repair of their electrical grids and water pumping stations. Cars that had been abandoned 
during the Kurds’ flight toward Turkey were either repaired or filled with petrol and
O'!
returned to their owners.
80 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, 170.
81 Bulloch and Morris, 44.
82 Shalikashvili, “Congressional Testimony”.
83 Ibid.,.
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Despite its many noteworthy successes, the coalition failed in several key areas relating to 
the provision of protection. Virtually all of these failures resulted from the coalition’s 
determination to withdraw from Iraq as quickly as possible, regardless of its 
replacement’s ability to assume the protection mission. First of all, the coalition did not 
wait for a political settlement between the Iraqi government and the Kurds. In fact, by 
constantly stating its desire to withdraw its forces as quickly as possible, the coalition 
probably inhibited such a settlement by giving the Iraqi government an incentive to 
dismiss Kurdish negotiating attempts and wait out the coalition’s departure. Similarly, 
the coalition failed to use its influence with the Kurds as a means of pressuring them into 
working together in the negotiations. As a result of this neglect, no firm agreement was 
ever reached that provided any guarantees for long-term Kurdish protection or autonomy.
The manner in which the coalition persuaded the Kurds to return to their homes was also 
questionable. Though the Kurdish departure from the mountains was reported as 
completely voluntary, humanitarian aid workers expressed concern that the repatriations 
were forced. As early as 4 May, the UN High Commissioner of Refugees, Sadako Ogata, 
was concerned about “false assurances being given to the Kurds about their security .... 
The UNHCR is aware that in some of the areas where people are returning there is no 
security”.84 Another UN official commented on these false assurances by recounting the 
following:
Allied generals would tell the Kurds, “The UN will do this and will do that”.
They were saying the security zone will go almost to Mogul . . . The initial
movements were in my opinion forced repatriation. It was dishonest at best. . . .
Don’t forget they were military people, and the military people had an objective.85
The security failure was perhaps most evident in the decision to utilise UN Guards as a 
“security” replacement for the coalition. Over 20,000 coalition troops with their combat
107
equipment were replaced by 500 UN Guards armed with pistols, questionable authority, 
and the operational expertise to secure UN buildings. According to Stefan de Mister, the 
chief UN envoy in Iraq in 1991, even the pistols were for “psychological and traditional
o /r
reasons” because “the UN does not shoot”. The inadequacy of the Guards’ protection 
was quickly evident. Though the UN was authorised to deploy 500 Guards according to 
the MOU, the actual number in Iraq often fell far below that number to include one period 
in October 1992 when only 20 Guards were on duty in Iraq. Even if the Guards had been 
sufficiently armed, they were not tasked with providing security to the Kurds. Their 
protection mandate extended only to UN personnel and supplies. Even this limited task 
proved beyond their capabilities, however, as the Guards were unable to prevent the 
deaths of several relief workers and fellow Guards. Ironically, Kurdish pershmergas 
were sometimes employed to protect the premises of the UN Guards.87 Needless to say, 
the Guards’ presence was ineffective at preventing Iraqi attacks on Kurdish population 
centres. When Iraqi forces shelled the towns of Kalar and Kiffi in 1991 in spite of the 
Guards’ presence, the Guards fled.
As previously discussed, the coalition justified its early departure from Iraq by promising 
a 5,000 strong “residual” force to be situated for rapid response in Turkey. This number 
was halved and then removed altogether in September 1991.88 Significantly, the 
withdrawal of the rapid reaction force occurred at a time when security conditions for the 
Kurds inside Iraq had grown worse. The coalition justified this timing by emphasising 
their continuing enforcement of the no-fly zone north of the 36 parallel, even though the 
no-fly zone proved ineffective at deterring Iraqi ground attacks.
84 Leonard Doyle, “Americans seek autonomous Kurdish region,” The Independent, 4 May 1991.
85 Keen, The Kurds in Iraq, 8.
86 Ibid., 18.
87 Ibid., 18.
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Finally, because the no-fly zone did not extend south of the 36th parallel, it left large 
concentrations of Kurds in northern Iraq vulnerable to Iraqi attack by a variety of means. 
Even north of the 36th parallel, coalition air attacks in response to Iraqi attacks were not a 
certainty. On 7 August 1991, when Iraqi and Kurdish forces were fighting in the city of 
Gerbil, which is north of the 36th parallel, no action was taken by coalition aircraft. In 
explanation for this apparent neglect, British Foreign Minister Archie Hamilton stated 
that the coalition force was only intended to protect those areas that were once part of the 
allied security zone—a small portion of the area north of the 36th parallel.89
The actual success of the coalition’s intervention must be further questioned in light of 
the sudden physical hardship which fell upon the Kurds after the withdrawal of coalition 
forces. Although the coalition provided the Kurds under its protection with the necessary 
supplies and infrastructure to return to their homes, it did nothing to prevent or ease the 
tremendous burden of the “double” economic blockade which was levied on the Kurds by 
the Iraqi government after the coalition’s withdrawal from the region in October 1991. 
During the first half of 1992, some areas within Iraqi Kurdistan received an average of 
only forty percent of their rations from the Government of Iraq, a figure that went down 
to below ten percent for Gerbil and Sulaimaniya by the last half of the year.90 In short, 
the blockade had terrible effects on agriculture, education, health, water, and sanitation 
services.91
88 Ibid, 14.
89 Ibid, 15.
90 Keen, The Kurds in Iraq: How safe is their haven now? Executive Summary, (London: Save the 
Children, 1993), 7 (hereafter cited as Executive Summary).
91 Keen, Executive Summary, 7.
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The success of OPC was further negated by Turkey’s subsequent anti-terrorism 
operations into Iraq soon after the coalition’s withdrawal. Turkey had long been 
concerned about its vulnerability to the Kurdish terrorist group, the PKK which based its 
operations in the mountains along the Turkish-Iraqi borders. By 1991, Turkish right wing 
supporters were using Turkey’s recent “Kurdish tolerance” policies to build support 
against Ozal’s government. In response to this pressure, and because this period 
corresponded with the eighth anniversary of the PKK uprising, Ozal’s government 
reversed its tolerance policies and returned “to the hard-line tactics which had in the past 
encouraged the counter-violence of the PKK”. Since Turkish support was critically 
important to the success of OPC, the other coalition allies were constrained in what they 
could do or say regarding Turkish actions, even when they proved detrimental to Kurdish 
security.
As a result of a series of PKK attacks against Turkish soldiers and pro-government Kurds 
in July 1991, Turkey launched an attack against PKK bases inside Iraq and threatened to 
cancel the coalition’s access to its rapid reaction base in Silopi.94 The Turkish 
government also began co-operating with one faction of the Iraqi Kurds against the PKK, 
exacerbating tensions between Iraqi Kurds even further. After a 5 August PKK attack, 
Turkish forces responded with an operation that utilised a commando regiment and an 
assortment of fighter-bombers and attack helicopters. This action was followed by 
several additional robust Turkish attacks, one of which, in October 1991, reportedly made 
use of napalm bombs. In fact, in the months immediately following the coalition’s 
withdrawal, the Turks flew over 130 sorties against rebel strongholds, though there were 
claims that some of the attacks hit refugee centres and resulted in the deaths of innocent
92 Nicole and Hugh Pope, 265-6.
93 Bulloch and Morris, 45.
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civilians. According to Freedman and Boren, at least three of the villages that were 
attacked were within the allied security zone.95
Regarding the coalition’s deliberate inaction in response to Turkish aggression, one 
coalition pilot tasked with patrolling the NFZ commented sarcastically, “One day a week 
we stop protecting the Kurds from Iraqi bombardment to allow the Turks to bomb 
them”.96 Essentially, the continuance of Turkish attacks on Kurds in Iraq rendered the 
“no-fly zone” protection virtually useless. In March 1995, the Geneva Post reported the 
following:
This week the allies conveniently grounded their overflights of Iraqi Kurdistan to 
allow Turkish jets to bomb the very territory the allies are committed to protect 
from Iraqi aggression. It is small comfort to the Kurds of Iraq that the bombs 
raining down belong to an ostensibly friendly power and of little consequence to 
the Turkish pilots whether the people below are good Kurds or bad Kurds.97
3.4.2 Other Results
In spite of the poor results regarding the protection of the population, the coalition 
strategy achieved a number of positive results for the West. First of all, the coalition 
bolstered alliance unity at a time of vast political change. By supporting Turkey’s closed- 
border policy, assisting the Kurds within Iraq’s borders, and allowing the Turkish attacks 
into Northern Iraq, the coalition states preserved good bilateral relations as well as NATO 
cohesion. In return for the West’s support of Turkey’s policies, the US (and, therefore, 
NATO) retained its air bases in Turkey, which were considered critical as a Middle East 
staging ground, and received permission to stage its overflight missions of Northern Iraq 
from the air base at In^irlik. The importance of alliance unity in northern Iraq cannot be
94 Ibid, 46.
95 Freedman in Boren, 79.
96 Comment made in the presence of the author.
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overstated in terms of NATO ability to adapt and survive as an alliance after its raison 
d ’etre had vanished.
Second, the coalition preserved regional and international stability. By resettling Kurdish 
IDPs in northern Iraq without creating or legitimising a separate Kurdish state, the 
coalition reduced tension in the volatile region and eased the worries of several 
governments that had large Kurdish populations of their own. The West’s minimalist 
strategy also had the positive effect of avoiding a major rift among the permanent 
members of the Security Council. While certain members of the Security Council had 
expressed their lack of support for a resolution authorising further enforcement action in 
Iraq, they did not interfere when the coalition intervened citing SCR 688 as its authority. 
The coalition preserved this acquiescence by limiting the tasks it sought to accomplish 
and by withdrawing quickly from Iraq, both of which reduced the appearance of neo­
imperialism, which was especially important in the West’s relations with the reform- 
minded Soviet government. The limited aims and speedy withdrawal also minimised the 
challenge to the traditional norms of sovereignty and non-intervention.
Third, the coalition’s strategy satisfied the demands of the Western public and minimised 
the negative effect of the crisis on the post-Gulf War victory. The coalition was able to 
alleviate the Kurds’ most immediate dangers, thereby removing the media interest and 
silencing the demands of sympathetic television viewers. More importantly, the coalition 
accomplished these results without getting bogged down in a long, drawn-out, dangerous 
mission and without suffering a single combat casualty.
97 Geneva Post, 23 March 1995, Quoted in Bill Frelick, “Safe Havens, Broken Promises,” 
http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/safehavens 98.htm. Accessed 8 July 2003.
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Finally, as a result of the manner in which the coalition provided aid and protection, the 
coalition bolstered its credibility. By stressing the humanitarian justifications for the 
intervention, the coalition was able to reply to the charge that its concern for human rights 
and oppressed peoples was simply rhetoric. The efficiency with which the coalition 
accomplished the mission also further demonstrated its dominant capabilities to the rest of 
the world.
CONCLUSION
At the time of its execution, Operation Provide Comfort represented the largest 
contingent of military forces ever deployed for the stated purpose of providing security to 
an endangered population. In the short term, the coalition’s stated humanitarian objective 
was achieved. Thousands of lives were saved and over 400,000 Kurds were moved from 
the Turkish border and resettled into their homes by the time OPC was turned over for 
long-term care to the UN. As laudable as these achievements were, two considerations 
should be borne in mind when evaluating the ultimate success of OPC. The first is that 
the situation in Iraq was unique in many ways that made success easier to achieve and at a 
lower cost than in most other conflicts of the 1990s. These unique factors, such as the 
pre-deployment of coalition troops and equipment, the tacit approval of key Security 
Council member states, the thorough knowledge of the opponents’ capabilities, and the 
pariah status of the antagonist, meant that applying lessons from Operation Provide 
Comfort to future interventions would lead to very different results.
Secondly, while the humanitarian successes of OPC are obviously important, certain 
actions taken by the coalition both prior to and after the intervention suggest that the
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Kurds were protected only as long as doing so coincided with the self-interests of the 
Western interveners. The West initially eschewed intervention on behalf of the 
endangered populations because the humanitarian crisis did not pose obvious threats to 
self-interests. In this situation, there were simply too many uncertainties associated with 
robust action on the Kurds’ behalf. Many Western states feared that such action on the 
Kurds’ behalf could fragment Iraq, destabilise the region, and cause the Gulf War victory 
to be called into question. It was only when the Western public’s demand for action 
joined with Turkey’s call for assistance that Western interests were affected enough to 
generate action.
When it did act, the West constantly sought ways to minimise its protective response so 
as to safeguard its interests in the face of uncertain dangers. Initially, the West 
emphasised the relatively easy task of providing aid over the more dangerous and 
uncertain task of providing protection. Had the initial air-drop strategy been an effective 
way to conciliate Turkey, stabilise the death rate, and satisfy the media-inflamed public, 
the coalition may very well have left the Kurds up in the mountains until they either 
decided to go home or the UN was able to do something for them. However, when air­
drops were ineffective, the coalition designed a plan that emphasised force protection and 
the rapid resettlement of IDPs. While the plan worked well, the IDPs returned to their 
homes having been given assurances for their future security which the coalition never 
intended to guarantee. In order to withdraw quickly, the coalition transferred the security 
of the Kurds to the symbolic presence of UN Guards who were not even tasked with the • 
Kurds’ protection. Similarly, after OPC had withdrawn from Iraq and the public focus 
had shifted to other matters, the coalition’s rapid reaction force was withdrawn, despite 
the Kurds’ worsening security situation. At last, only airpower remained, and even its
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limited mission shifted from providing protection to providing surveillance and early 
warning of Iraqi activities.
These Western actions were the result of the West’s shifting insecurities. When the 
Kurds returned to their homes from the mountains, they ceased to provide the media with 
a story that captured the public’s attention. Turkey’s security concern reverted back to its 
long-standing feud with PKK terrorists. In the US, President Bush was left with a 
sagging economy, an imposing presidential challenger, and no visible enemy on which to 
build a vote-winning foreign policy platform. In the UK, Prime Minister Major’s 
Conservative Party was facing its first serious challenge by the Labour Party. The 
European Community was tackling the tough questions of enlargement and the 
developing crisis in Yugoslavia. To put it bluntly, the Kurdish predicament in Iraq no 
longer generated sufficient levels of insecurity in the West to compete with the insecurity 
generated from a host of other issues. When that happened, the Western coalition packed 
its bags and went home, confident in the knowledge that it had done a good deed for the 
Kurds, and a great deal for itself.
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CHAPTER 4 BOSNIA
INTRODUCTION
Efforts to protect non-combatant populations in Bosnia-Herzegovina1 (hereafter referred 
to as Bosnia or BiH) evolved more slowly and spanned a much longer period of time than 
protection efforts in Iraq. Unlike the Kurdish crisis, the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Bosnia did not end with a Western military coalition quickly imposing its will on a 
defeated enemy, returning IDPs to their homes, and quickly withdrawing its forces. 
Instead, Western protection in BiH took the form of a consensual UN operation that 
developed incrementally over a period of years.
Confronted with the ethnic cleansing of non-combatant populations in Bosnia by the 
Bosnian Serb Army (BSA) and paramilitaries, the Security Council, led by Western 
Member States, delineated six predominately Muslim enclaves within BSA-held territory 
as “safe areas”. To ensure that the safe areas were respected, the Security Council 
eventually deployed UN troops and utilised humanitarian agencies to care for the 
internally displaced people (IDPs). The Security Council passed numerous resolutions, 
and individual Western states made countless statements denouncing the treatment of 
non-combatants. Yet, for all the rhetoric and activity that went into the humanitarian 
effort, the West’s safe area strategy in Bosnia was characterised by minimalist, self- 
interested behaviour that ultimately failed to provide adequate protection to the 
endangered population.
1 Also referred to as Bosnia and Hercegovina and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
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Though there were various protection methods utilised in Bosnia, this chapter focuses 
primarily on the West’s purported efforts to protect non-combatant populations through 
the use of safe areas. As their name implies, safe areas represented the most conspicuous 
method by which interveners attempted to accomplish their protection mission. While the 
safe area strategy in Bosnia formally occurred under the auspices of the United Nations, 
Western states, particularly those on the Security Council, played a key role in 
determining its nature and scope, as well as the composition and mandate of the deployed 
forces. Examining the safe areas thus provides useful insight into the thinking of those 
Western decision-makers who formulated and implemented protection efforts through the 
Security Council and NATO.
Rather than examine all six areas individually, this chapter devotes special emphasis to 
the safe area in Srebrenica. It is an appropriate focus for several reasons. The 
humanitarian situation in and around Srebrenica in 1992 and 1993 was a major catalyst 
for robust international action on behalf of populations. Moreover, as it was the first safe 
area to be designated as such, the conditions that led to its designation and the means 
dedicated to its preservation reveal some of the motivations and expectations of Western 
states and the international community. Finally, the eventual failure and surrender of the 
safe area in Srebrenica was a marked turning point in the West’s willingness to use 
decisive force in Bosnia. Thus, Srebrenica was key to the West’s efforts in BiH from 
start to finish, and its legacy has affected Western protection interventions ever since.
4.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTION
Western protection efforts in Bosnia had their origins in Croatia’s determination to secede 
from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 and the Yugoslavian National 
Army’s (JNA) attempt to prevent it. In response to the war in Croatia and the instability 
within all of Yugoslavia, the UN Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 
(SCR) 713 on 25 September 1991. In the resolution, the Security Council, acting under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, imposed a “general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia.. .”.2 This decision had a 
dramatic effect on the upcoming war in Bosnia since it froze existing stockpiles of 
weaponry to the advantage of the JNA-supported Bosnian Serb Army (BSA). When the 
conflict in Croatia intensified and it became apparent that the combatants would not be 
easily swayed by Western and international efforts to achieve a negotiated peace, the once 
unified Western position of keeping Yugoslavia intact began to fracture and recognition 
of the seceding republics became inevitable, largely as a result of German insistence. 
Faced with this situation, the Bosnian government, led by President Alia Izetbegovic, 
held a referendum in which the population voted overwhelmingly to declare 
independence from Yugoslavia.3 The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formally 
recognised by the EC and the US on 6 and 7 April 1992 respectively.
The UN peacekeeping mission to Bosnia emerged gradually and incrementally. Initially, 
the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was mandated by Security Council Resolution 
(SCR) 743 of 21 February 1992 to demilitarise and enforce four UN Protected Areas
2 S/RES/713 (1991), 25 September 1991, paragraph 6.
3 The Bosnian Serbs who made up approximately 31 percent of the Bosnian population, boycotted the 
referendum.
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(UNPAs) in Croatia.4 As the Yugoslav Army (JNA) withdrew from Croatia, it moved 
into Bosnia where there was a significant minority population of ethnic Serbs, and began 
conquering and ethnically cleansing large parts of Bosnian territory, in spite of 
UNPROFOR’s headquarters being situated in Sarajevo, BiH. In May 1992, the Security 
Council imposed economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for its 
support of the Bosnian Serbs and called for the Secretary General to find a way to get 
humanitarian aid to the needy and to establish a security zone encompassing Sarajevo and 
its airport. Due to international pressure, the JNA withdrew from Bosnia in May 1992 
but allowed Bosnian Serbs within its ranks to join the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).
UNPROFOR negotiated an agreement with the Bosnian Serbs to reopen the Sarajevo 
airport on 5 June.5 Three days later, the Security Council passed Resolution 758 in which 
UNPROFOR’s mandate was expanded to include monitoring operations in Bosnia. From 
this point on, the Security Council slowly expanded UNPROFOR’s mandate in BiH 
through a host of resolutions that generally had very little enforcement capacity. Despite 
these statements and resolutions denouncing the treatment of civilians, non-combatants 
within Bosnia continued to be targeted on a massive scale with no political solution on 
the horizon. Faced with an escalating humanitarian crisis and international intransigence, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) twice pressured the international 
community to help the endangered populations within their places of residence by 
creating “protected zones”. Although the ICRC offered to help administer the zones,6 the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Secretariat, and the
4 Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death o f Yugoslavia, (London: Penguin Books, 1995), 223. Also 
Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War, (Washington DC: 
Brookings Institution, 1995), 221.
5 Ibid.
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UNPROFOR Force Commander were all against the idea, principally due to the 
dangerous, non-consensual environment which characterised Bosnia.7
By January 1993, the BSA had conquered approximately seventy percent of Bosnian 
territory and was besieging the capital city of Sarajevo. Moreover, the Bosnian Serb 
attacks had already generated over 500,000 IDPs and refugees.8 On 2 January 1993, the 
joint EC-UN peace plan, known as the Vance Owen Peace Plan (VOPP) for Bosnia was 
unveiled. After much negotiation and arm-twisting, it looked as if the parties would agree 
to the VOPP. Only when the newly-established Clinton administration withheld its full 
support for the plan did the Bosniacs reconsider in hopes of achieving an American- 
backed pro-Bosniac settlement.9 Similarly, after it became apparent that a Bosnian peace 
settlement would divide the republic into ethnically dominant provinces, all parties to the 
dispute sought to consolidate and control as much territory as possible in order to 
negotiate from a position of strength.
The Bosnian Serb desire to consolidate their territorial gains resulted in an intensification 
of ethnic cleansing. Consequently, many Bosniac IDPs fled to small enclaves controlled 
by the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) or Bosniac paramilitaries. In spite of 
the Security Council resolutions demanding humanitarian access, the Bosnian Serb forces 
continued to prevent the delivery of humanitarian assistance and harassed UN workers. 
The area around Srebrenica was particularly hard hit and was the first of the enclaves that
6 Jean-Philippe Lavoyer. “International Humanitarian Law, Protected Zones and the Use of Force,” in UN 
Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia. Wolfgang Biermann and Martin 
Vadset eds., (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998), 271-2.
7 A/54/549, 15 November 1999, “Report to the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 
53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica”. 18-19. (Hereafter UN Srebrenica Report.)18-19.
8 David Owen, Balkan Odyssey, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1995), 91. Also UN Srebrenica 
Report, 12, and S/23900, 12 May 1992,’’Further Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council
Resolution 749”, 3.
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looked poised to fall. The UNHCR successfully evacuated between 8,000 and 9,000 
displaced Muslim non-combatants from the town before Bosniac authorities finally 
terminated the practice on 2 April 199310 because evacuations interfered with their 
objectives of preserving territory and arousing international assistance.11 With 
evacuations no longer an option and humanitarian aid prevented from reaching its target, 
the international community was forced to find another solution to the humanitarian 
plight.
On 13 April, Serb commanders announced that they would capture the town if it did not 
surrender and evacuate its Bosniac population by 15 April. On 16 April, the Security 
Council was informed that, though Srebrenica had not surrendered, it was prepared to do 
so if acceptable terms could be negotiated. Faced with this immediate deadline and the 
impending humanitarian crisis, the Security Council members, “without knowing quite 
what they were doing”,12 resurrected an altered version of the ICRC’s proposal and 
designated the area around Srebrenica a “safe area” on 16 April 1993.
4.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES
The West had various official and unofficial motives for designating safe areas in Bosnia. 
According to the relevant Security Council Resolutions, the primary motive was the 
humanitarian impulse to protect the vulnerable Bosnian non-combatants who were
9 Owen, 101-3, and Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict 
and International Intervention, (London: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), 230-236.
10 UN Srebrenica Report, 14.
11 General Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace: Lessons from Bosnia, (London: Warner Books, 1998), 
12-13, 26. Rose tells of Bosnian forces firing mortars on the Sarajevo airport to “sustain the image o f a city 
under siege.” 240. Also Burg and Shoup, 165-168.
12 Nik Gowing, “Real-time TV Coverage from War: Does it Make or Break Government Policy?”, in 
James Gow, Richard Paterson and Alison Preston (eds.), Bosnia By Television, (London: British Film 
Institute, 1996), 87.
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suffering from the brutal ethnic cleansing tactics of the Bosnian Serb Army and 
paramilitaries. Secondly, the safe areas were motivated by the desire to bring about a 
peaceful agreement in the Bosnian civil war. The official objectives of the operation 
flowed directly from these motives. The safe areas were established to ensure that 
endangered population had a safe place where they could live. They were also designed 
to help bring about a peaceful settlement by preventing the Bosnian Serbs from 
consolidating their territory. In addition to these official motives and objectives, the West 
was motivated by a number of unofficial, self-interested factors. It hoped that the safe 
areas would preserve regional stability, satisfy the Western public’s demand for action on 
the Bosnians’ behalf, and bolster the West’s international credibility.
4.2.1 Official Motives
Humanitarian Concern. By far the Council’s strongest official motive for creating the 
safe areas was the urgent plight of the endangered populations in the Bosnian enclaves. 
SCR 819 of 16 April 1993, which dealt solely with Srebrenica and its surrounding region, 
opened with several paragraphs listing the Security Council’s humanitarian motives for 
its actions. These concerns included potential genocide, violations of international 
humanitarian law, ethnic cleansing, armed attacks on non-combatants, the targeting of 
humanitarian assistance convoys, the “tragic humanitarian emergency”, and the “large 
scale displacement of civilians”.13
In SCR 824 of 6 May 1993, which expanded the number of safe areas to six, the Security 
Council also gave primarily humanitarian reasons for its actions. In addition to those 
already cited in SCR 819, the Council referred to the “denial of access to humanitarian 
aid and services such as medical assistance and basic utilities”, “urgent security and
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humanitarian needs”, the “influx of large numbers of displaced persons”, and the need to 
preserve the multicultural city of Sarajevo from further destruction.14 Finally, SCR 836 
of 4 June 1993, which mandated a protection role for UNPROFOR in the safe areas, was 
also justified primarily on humanitarian grounds. In SCR 836, the Council repeated inter 
alia its condemnation of ethnic cleansing, the violation of international humanitarian law, 
and the obstruction of the delivery of humanitarian aid.
Political Settlement. The Security Council also listed its desire to bring about a political 
settlement to the crisis in which the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina would remain 
territorially intact. The Council expressed this motive by reaffirming “the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity, and political independence” of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” in all three resolutions. By doing so, it identified the BiH government as 
the legitimate state authority, declared its intention to preserve the territorial integrity of 
the Bosnian state, and reinforced that its actions were in conformity with the traditional 
norm of state sovereignty. Having clearly stated its position, the Security Council 
reaffirmed its position in SCR 819 that the acquisition of territory by force was “unlawful 
and unacceptable”. In SCR 824, the Council announced that it was “convinced that 
treating the towns ... as safe areas [would] contribute to the early implementation of the 
peace plan”. In SCR 836, which was approved after the Bosnian Serbs rejected the 
Vance Owen Peace Plan, was even more explicit in its political motives. It stated that the 
safe areas were not meant to be an end in themselves but were mechanisms for bringing 
about a lasting peace in Bosnia as part of the Vance-Owen process. Moreover, in SCR 
836, the Security Council urged the Bosnian Serbs to sign the VOPP and reiterated its 
insistence that a lasting solution could only occur when all parties withdrew from land
13 S/RES/819 (1993), 16 April, 1993.
14 S/RES/824 (1993), 6 May 1993.
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seized by force, allowed refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes, and 
respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Bosnian Republic.
4.2.2 Unofficial Motives
Regional and International Stability. Though not included in the Security Council 
Resolutions, a key motive behind the designation of the safe areas was the European 
desire to keep the endangered Bosnians within their own borders.15 Though all of Europe 
was having to adjust to the rising level of refugees from the Balkan conflicts, Germany 
was particularly affected. After only a few months of war in the Balkans, over 324,000 
refugees from various Yugoslav areas had flooded into Germany, and this at a time when 
Germany was already dealing with the economic difficulties surrounding its 
reunification.16 The presence of so many refugees made the tensions associated with 
reunification much worse and, as hate crimes and anti-foreigner sentiment dramatically 
increased, so did overall European instability.17 In response to this growing instability, 
Germany pressed other European countries to set quotas for the number of refugees they 
would accept. The UK, accused of not taking its share of the refugees, proposed that safe 
areas be set up to care for the people within their own countries.18 While this suggestion 
initially generated very little interest, it reinforced the growing European desire to deal 
with the problem of displaced people from a distance. European leaders recognised that, 
if the Bosniac enclaves, with their thousands of endangered people, were allowed to be 
ethnically cleansed, the refugee problem, and the problems generated from it, were sure to 
get worse. Consequently, to refugee-conscious European decision-makers, the possibility
15 Bill Frelick, “The Dangers of “Safe Havens” for Kosovo”, US Committee for Refugees, 
http://www.refugees.org/world/articles/safehavens 99.htm. Accessed 16 July 2003.
16 Marie-Janine Calic, “German Perspectives”, in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.),
International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 69.
17 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 368-9.
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of providing for the endangered Bosnians prior to their becoming refugees was an idea 
worth pursuing.19
Also of concern to Western states was the possibility that the ethnic tensions at work in 
Bosnia could spread to surrounding regions, eventually culminating in a wider European 
war. This possibility was especially worrying to many Europeans, not only because of 
historical memories of the Balkan beginning to World War I, but also because the 
European Community was in the process of transitioning to the European Union. Clearly, 
European unity during this phase was paramount, as was demonstrated by the EC’s early 
attempt to solve the Yugoslavian imbroglio and its decision to recognise break-away 
republics at Germany’s behest.20 Moreover, a wider European war could have eventually 
set NATO states against one another.21 As NATO was already trying to redefine itself in 
the absence of its chief antagonist, the alliance leaders may have given Bosnia more 
attention than they would otherwise have done.
Countering these motives for greater involvement, the West, and the United States in 
particular, was concerned that involvement in Bosnia could jeopardise the reform 
movement in Russia. Though the West largely viewed the Serbs as the aggressors and the 
instigators of the humanitarian catastrophe in Bosnia, it was hesitant to react too
18 Ibid., 295. Also Susan L. Woodward, “Humanitarian War: A New Consensus?”, Disasters, 2001, Vol. 
25, No. 4, 338.
19 James Gow, Triumph o f the Lack o f Will, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 110-11.
20 Among a host of others, see Jonathan Eyal, Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons From a Failure, London: 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), 30 and Olivier Lepick, “French Perspectives”, 
in Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.), International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, 
(London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 77-8.
21 US Secretary of State Warren Christopher made this argument in February 1993 but abandoned it by June 
1993. See Mats R. Berdal, “Fateful Encounter: The United States and Peacekeeping”, Survival, vol. 36, 
no. 1, Spring 1994, 36-7.
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forcefully against them because of their religious and historical ties to the Russians.22 
The reform-minded Russian government was in a perilous state of transition as hard-line 
communist forces sought to reconsolidate control. Because Russian President Boris 
Yeltsin’s challengers were urging Russian support of its traditional Serb allies, the US 
was very cautious in advocating any action that might give hard-line communist forces a 
rally cry that would resound with the Russian people.23
Domestic Support. Western governments were also motivated to set up the safe areas by 
a desire to secure and maintain the support of their voting publics. Unlike with the Kurds 
in Iraq, public support for military intervention in Bosnia was ambiguous. In fact, 
throughout most of the Bosnian conflict, Western publics were generally against 
becoming involved militarily.24 This public stance reaffirmed the belief of Western 
leaders that military action in a difficult intrastate conflict would win little praise from 
their domestic publics. The US had already shunned a leadership role in the early stages 
of Yugoslavia’s dismemberment because the Bush administration felt that the American 
public wanted another entity to shoulder some of the burdens associated with maintaining 
international order. Even though Governor Bill Clinton had urged American action in 
Yugoslavia while campaigning for the presidency in 1992, after his election he was as 
unwilling as Bush had been to agree to any plan that required the involvement of US
9 ^ground forces. Richard Holbrooke described the feeling in the US as “post-Iraq 
American fatigue”. Now that the superpower threat had receded, American voters were
22 Thomas Halverson, “American Perspectives”, in., Alex Danchev and Thomas Halverson (eds.), 
International Perspectives on the Yugoslav Conflict, (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1996), 4,7.
23 Wayne Bert, The Reluctant Superpower: United States ’ Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95, (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997), 184-6.
24 For statistics, see Burg and Shoup, 163-4.
25See Owen, Balkan Odyssey, 13-14 and Thomas Halverson, “American Perspectives”, 11-24.
26 Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, Revised Edition, (New York: Random House, Inc., 1998), 26.
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ready to enjoy the “peace dividend” and expected to relish the fruits of victory and the
97spoils of war.
An important factor in the eventual formation of safe areas was the effect of the media on 
Western publics and their governments. As the situation around Srebrenica worsened, the 
media began in earnest to document atrocities against Bosnian civilians. By August 
1992, the Western public was seeing and hearing first-hand accounts of Serbian 
concentration camps, executions, and massive human rights violations. Though Nik 
Gowing and others have argued persuasively that the media did not actually “drive” 
Western foreign policy in Bosnia, even Gowing observed that key, unexpected events 
reported by the media generated “policy panic” or ad hoc actions in response to public
90outcry. In his study, Gowing credited a reporter’s smuggled video footage from inside 
Srebrenica as the key factor that swayed the Security Council to declare Srebrenica a safe 
area. In response to the footage, the public demanded action from their governments on 
behalf of the civilian victims. Although the UN had been involved in Bosnia for months, 
the primary focus of the Security Council effort had been the achievement of a long-term 
political settlement and the delivery of humanitarian aid rather than the protection of 
vulnerable civilians. The media-induced public pressure motivated Western leaders to
•3 1
“do something” tangible to better the plight of the civilians. As pressure mounted, the 
US advocated its “lift and strike” policy, which the British and French found
27 See Donald Kagan and Frederic W. Kagan, While America Sleeps, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 
267-320.
28 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 295.
29 Gowing, 86-7.
30 Ibid.
31 Mario Zucconi, “The West and the Balkan Conflict”, in Stefano Bianchini and Robert Nation (eds.), The 
Yugoslav Conflict and Its Implications for International Relations, Ravenna: A. Longo Editore, 1998), 36.
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unacceptable. Their subsequent advocacy of safe areas was, thus, partly motivated by 
their desire to preclude the implementation of “lift and strike”.32
International Credibility. Credibility was another significant, though unofficial, motive 
for implementing safe areas in Bosnia. Western states had long emphasised the ethical 
dimension to their foreign policies. They frequently spoke out against human rights 
abuses and considered themselves to be champions of the oppressed. Moreover, as the 
undisputed victors of the Cold War and the advocates of the “New World Order”, they 
had expected the various Bosnian factions to concede to their demands. However, the 
Bosnian combatants had refused to be swayed by the West’s attempts to bring about a 
peaceful settlement. Western states realised that their humanitarian statements would be 
exposed as empty rhetoric and their international credibility jeopardised if they were 
unable to prevent the displacement and murder of large numbers of civilians in their own 
“front yard”.
Western credibility was already suffering in the eyes of various Middle Eastern states. As 
the plight of the predominately Muslim Bosniac population became more widely known 
throughout the international community, a number of predominately Muslim countries 
expressed doubt as to the credibility of the UN response. The Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference condemned UN inaction on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims and called for the 
exemption of the Bosnian government forces from the arms embargo.33 The United 
States was particularly affected by warnings from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt that
32 Mats R. Berdal, “The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict After the Cold War”, Duke 
Journal o f Comparative & International Law, vol. 7:71, 1996, 80.
33 Woodward, Balkan Tragedy, 296.
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the UN’s refusal to assist the Bosnian Muslims was legitimising the claims of radical 
Muslim fundamentalists in the Middle East.34
Western credibility was further imperilled in March 1993 when UNPROFOR’s BiH 
Force Commander, French General Phillipe Morillon, promised the inhabitants of the 
enclave in Srebrenica, “We will never abandon you. You are now under the protection of
i f
the United Nations”. Although Morillon said this after effectively being taken prisoner 
by the residents of the town who were desperately seeking UN protection, he was 
reprimanded for exceeding his mandate and dismissed early from his position. 
Nevertheless, he had made a commitment on behalf of the UN, and the organisation’s 
credibility would be affected by whether or not it was fulfilled.
4.2.3 Official Objectives
Humanitarian Space. In all three of the relevant resolutions, the Security Council 
claimed that the primary objective of the safe areas was to provide a safe place for 
endangered populations to live. According to SCRs 819 and 824, the Council sought to 
safeguard the endangered people by designating areas that were to be “free from any 
armed attack or any other hostile act”. Although the creation of an attack-free zone was 
the objective, the Security Council was unwilling to make any guarantees that the safe 
zones would be protected.
In Operative Paragraph (OP) 7 of SCR 824, the Security Council warned that “in the 
event of the failure of any party to comply with the present resolution” it would “consider 
immediately the adoption of any additional measures necessary with a view to its full
34 Ibid, 296.
35 Ibid, 295-6.
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implementation...”. Therefore, when attacks against the safe areas continued, the
Security Council adopted SCR 836 on 4 June 1993, which expanded the UNPROFOR
mandate and augmented its force structure. SCR 836 was largely the brainchild of
Western states as it was sponsored by France, Spain, the UK, and the US, in addition to
the Russian Federation. In it, the Security Council sent confusing signals as to the
objective it was hoping to achieve. The carefully worded, highly ambiguous mandate of
SCR 836 reveals the uncertainty and ambiguity that often characterised the West’s
assessment of complex post-Cold War hazards. According to Mats Berdal, SCR 836
illustrates, perhaps more clearly than any other decision by the Security Council 
between 1992 and 1995, the adverse effects on the conduct of U.N. field 
operations of competing political pressures and of the differing perceptions of 
interests among permanent members of the Security Council.37
For example, in one of the preliminary paragraphs of SCR 836, the Security Council
stated that it was “[determined to ensure the protection of the civilian populations in safe
areas...”.38 This objective was repeated in OP 4. However, in OP 5, it announced that
UNPROFOR was merely mandated to
deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to promote the 
withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of the Government of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina and to occupy some key points on the 
ground, in addition to participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the 
population as provided for in resolution 776 (1992) of 14 September 1992 [Italics 
added].39
Key to the passage of this resolution was the Security Council’s selection of certain 
benign verbs such as “deter”, “monitor”, “promote”, “occupy”, and “participate” which 
were intentionally chosen over more forceful words like “protect”, “defend”, “secure”, or 
“safeguard”.40 In short, the Security Council crafted a resolution in which the safety of 
the non-combatant population rested on the passive activities of UNPROFOR and the
36 Ibid.
37 Mats R. Berdal, “The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict”, 79.
38 S/RES/836, 4 June 1993.
39 Ibid.
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active co-operation of the combatant parties. To add to the confusion of the resolution, 
OP 7(a) identifies UNPROFOR as “elements entrusted with protection of safe areas”. 
Shashi Tharoor, an advisor to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, called SCR 
836 “a masterpiece of diplomatic drafting, but largely unimplementable as an operational 
directive”.41
Political Settlement. SCR 836 emphasised that the safe areas were “temporary 
measures” and were not to be seen as ends in themselves. According the to the 
resolution, “the primary objective remains to reverse the consequences of the use of force 
and to allow all persons displaced from their homes ... to return to their homes in 
peace”.42 The resolution also called on the parties to implement those portions of the 
VOPP on which they could reach agreement.
Although SCR 836 does not state it clearly, the purpose of “ensuring full respect of the 
safe areas” was supposed to contribute to the eventual implementation of the peace plan 
by preventing the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their territorial gains and, thus, 
giving the Serbs an incentive to negotiate. This objective was bluntly stated by the 
French representative in his remarks prior to the vote on the draft resolution. He said that 
protecting the safe areas addressed a “paramount political objective: maintaining the 
territorial basis needed for the development and implementation of the Peace Plan .. ..43
40 UN Srebrenica Report, 24.
41 Quoted in Trevor Findlay, The Use o f Force in UN Peace Operations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
for SIPRI, 2002), 265.
42 SCR 836, OP 6.
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4.3 MEANS AND METHODS
The West’s minimalist manner of implementing the safe area strategy indicated that the 
protection of the endangered population was not its primary objective. The success of the 
safe area strategy depended on the lasting consent of the combatants and, yet, no such 
consent was ever given. Nevertheless, the force structure, strategy, and rules of 
engagement were predicated on peacekeeping principles. The authorised force was too 
small and inadequately armed to ensure the respect of the safe areas, and the restrictive 
rules of engagement often kept it from effectively employing the few means that it did 
have at its disposal.
4.3.1 Troops and Equipment
Personnel. One of the primary reasons that reticent Western states agreed to the passage 
of SCR 836 was because of France’s determination that a “light option” of less than 
10,000 troops would be sufficient for the “monitoring of a limited perimeter”.44 This 
light option proposed by the French meant that “ensuring the protection” of endangered 
populations and salvaging Western credibility might not be as costly as originally 
thought. In spite of the French light option, the Secretariat advised the Security Council 
that 32,000 additional troops would be needed to implement the safe area policy.45 
Western states, particularly Britain and France, opposed this figure and instructed the 
Secretariat to plan along the lines of the light option defined in the French
43 S/PV .3228,4 June 1993.
44 S/25800, 19 May 1993. “French Memorandum Relative to Safe Areas”.
45 Retired Canadian Major General Lewis Mackenzie briefed the United States House of Representatives 
Foreign Affairs Committee that it would take 80,000 to 100,000 troops to defend the safe areas. He also 
said that General Morillon’s replacement, Belgian General Briquemont “was prepared to undertake the task 
with 65 thousand”. See Major General Lewis Mackenzie (ret.), “Bad news for future victims”, The McGill 
International Review, http://www.unsam.qc.ca/mir/issuel/mackenzie3.htm Accessed 15 June 2001.
132
memorandum.46 When Boutros-Ghali gave his report to the Security Council on 14 June, 
he cited the UNPROFOR Force Commander’s estimate that 34,000 additional troops 
would be needed to “ensure full respect for the safe areas . . .  to obtain deterrence through 
strength”.47 Having been told by Western representatives on the Security Council that 
such a figure would never be authorised, Boutros-Ghali recommended a light option of
7,600 additional troops with an accompanying air component.48 Although his 
recommendation was accepted and incorporated into SCR 844 of 18 June 1993, it took 
months for the troops to be deployed, “and then only in part and inadequately armed”.49 
Significantly, none of the sponsors of SCR 836 initially agreed to send any additional 
troops.
Though Boutros-Ghali recommended the light option, he did so with important 
qualifications. His recommendation was not based on an analysis of what was needed to 
accomplish the mission, but on what resources could “realistically be expected from 
Member States”.50 He insisted that the light option was merely a start to the 
implementation of the resolution and should be viewed as “the core of a subsequent 
increased presence in the event that further troop reinforcements become necessary”.51 
He went on to say that the light option was an “initial approach” with limited objectives 
that “assumes the consent and cooperation of the parties and provides a basic level of 
deterrence”, while also emphasising that such a deployment was dependent on an 
effective threat of air action.
46 Berdal, “The Security Council, Peacekeeping and Internal Conflict”, 82.
47 S/25939, 14 June 1993. “Report of the Secretary-General Relative to Safe Areas.”
48 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, (New York: Random House, 1999), 86.
49 Ibid., 86. In mid-March 1994, nearly nine months later, only 5,000 had arrived in theatre according to 
S/1994/300 of 16 March 1994, “Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871”.
50 S/25939, 14 June 1993.. “Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 836.
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Equipment. Not only was the number of troops insufficient to provide adequate 
protection to the population, but the amount of equipment allotted to them was also 
generally lacking. While several African Member States volunteered soldiers for the 
mission, most of them were insufficiently equipped and trained. In Boutros-Ghali’s 
report pursuant to SCR 836, he conceded that, without the appropriate equipment (such as 
armoured personnel carriers and communications equipment), the tasks set forth in the 
resolution could not be accomplished. He appealed to those Member States who were not 
deploying troops to provide the equipment.52 Six months after this request, the Secretary- 
General reported that two of the largest contingents in Bosnia were still lacking 
“extensive equipment”, including such necessities as winter clothing.53 Even those who 
deployed with the right equipment found it impossible to get re-supplied. In Srebrenica, 
the Dutch battalion was equipped with armoured personnel carriers armed with .50 
calibre machine guns and TOW antitank weapons. Soldiers also had shoulder-fired anti­
tank weapons and small arms. However, because the BSA regularly prevented the safe 
areas from being re-supplied, many of the vehicles and larger weapons were rendered 
completely inoperable due to the lack of ammunition or spare parts.54
Had the West prioritised the population protection mission, it would have ensured that the 
mission was adequately resourced with capable personnel and equipment. Instead, 
UNPROFOR’s constant struggle to maintain even this minimal force authorisation 
indicates the true priority of the humanitarian mission to Western states.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994, “Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to SCR 836 (1993).
54 Lane, 15, Also Srebrenica: a ‘safe’ area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses o f  
the fall of a safe area. Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, “Summary for the Press”, Srebrenica:
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4.3.2 Strategy
The methods used within the safe areas in Bosnia varied according to the particular 
contingent of peacekeepers deployed at the time in question. While the specific tactics of 
the peacekeepers depended on their culture, capabilities, and interpretation of the 
mandate, the minimalist nature of the peacekeeping mission meant that they all utilised 
certain common methods. Although some of the contingents had more combat capability 
at their disposal than others, none were equipped to engage in extended combat 
operations. With the resources unavailable, the peacekeepers realised that they would 
stand no chance against a determined foe. Consequently, they understood that, for their 
mission to have any chance of success, they had to remain impartial, use force only in 
self-defence, and try to maintain the consent of the belligerents. To accomplish this last 
task, the peacekeepers emphasised negotiation and regular communication with the 
combatants.
Minimally equipped as they were, their primary method of ensuring respect for the safe 
areas was their presence, not their capability. To demonstrate their presence, most 
contingents patrolled the safe areas, though some did so more actively and consistently 
than others. They used their patrols to observe, monitor, and report on the combatants’ 
actions. Most contingents utilised a series of observation towers located around the 
perimeter of their areas from which they could monitor and locate sources of incoming 
fire. They hoped their surveillance would deter attacks, but if it did not, the peacekeepers 
could serve as forward observers for military airstrikes
a ‘safe ’ area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses o f the fall o f  a safe area, Paragraph 
5, http://www.srebrenica.nl/en/content perssamenvatting.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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In Security Council Resolution 844, the Security Council recognised that the small 
number of peacekeepers that were authorised to augment the safe areas would not be able 
to accomplish the protection mission alone. Therefore, it authorised NATO airpower to 
serve as the primary self-defence force if deterrence failed. While this was the intention, 
it rarely happened according to plan. In the absence of airpower, the peacekeepers and 
the population they were protecting were at the mercy of the combatants.
This was the case in Srebrenica in 1995. A hostile, determined force confronted an 
incapable contingent of peacekeepers with no supporting air cover. The Dutch forces 
attempted to shrink the perimeter of their area so that they could operate more closely 
together. While the tactic was technically sound, in the end, it did not prevent the 
Bosnian Serb forces from overrunning the safe area without encountering a single shot 
from the peacekeepers.
4.3.3 Rules of Engagement
Ground Forces. SCR 836 was authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The
framework for the ROE was stated in OPs 9 and 10 of the resolution. OP 9 of the
resolution stated the following:
Authorizes UNPROFOR . . . acting in self-defence, to take the necessary 
measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe 
areas by any of the parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any 
deliberate obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of 
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys.55
This statement proved to be very confusing because of its mixture of Chapter VI and
Chapter VII language. First of all, it must be remembered that UNPROFOR was
originally deployed as a peacekeeping force and operated according to peacekeeping rules
55 S/RES/836.
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which required the consent of the belligerents, force only in self-defence, and strict
impartiality. Though SCR 836 authorised “necessary measures, including the use of
force”, it was predicated on UNPROFOR’s acting in self-defence. The authority to use
force in self-defence was nothing new as UNPROFOR had been given this right prior to
the passage of SCR 836. OP 9 went on to list occasions in which force “in self defence”
could be used. This caused further confusion because it was unclear whether the Security
Council was authorising force in defence of the mandate, which would have included
defence of the non-combatants, or simply giving examples of when peacekeepers might
find themselves in sufficient danger to use force legitimately. For example, SCR 836
authorised UNPROFOR to use force “in self-defence” in response to the shelling of a safe
area. Because the intent was unclear, UNPROFOR troops were unsure about using force
if the shelling did not directly endanger themselves.56 To peacekeeping forces who had
been trained to use restraint and to foster consent by transparent impartiality, OP 9 was
extremely difficult to understand. When the Dutch battalion was ordered to stand and
fight in Srebrenica, one peacekeeper described the confusion in the Situation Room
regarding the peacekeepers’ ROE:
Everybody got a fright. You could easily get killed in such an operation. As far 
as I knew, we had not been sent to Srebrenica to defend the enclave, but rather as
cn
some kind of spruced-up observers.
This impression regarding the use of force was reinforced in numerous statements made 
by the Secretariat and the Force Commander throughout the safe area operation. They
c o
consistently emphasised the peacekeeping nature of the mandate. Furthermore,
56 Canadian Major-General John A. Maclnnis, Deputy UNPROFOR Commander from June 1993 to August
1994, explained the rules for using force automatically this way: “. . .  the fact that they, their mates, or 
their positions were being targeted: that they could identify the source of fire; and that they could engage 
their attackers without causing harm to non-combatants.” “The Rules o f Engagement for U.N.
Peacekeeping Forces in Former Yugoslavia: A Response”, Orbis, vol. 39, no. 1,Winter 1995, 98.
57 From ‘Een cynisch spelletje Stratego’ (‘A cynical game of “Stratego”’), Algemeen Dagblad, 14 October
1995. Quoted in Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, Srebrenica: Record o f a war crime, (London: 
Penguin, 1996), 14.
58 See UN Srebrenica Report, 36.
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peacekeeping concerns of consent and impartiality were emphasised in numerous reports
from the Secretary-General to the Security Council, as well as in many statements from
the various Force Commanders.59 In one instance, the Secretariat emphasised to
UNPROFOR that it was to accomplish its mission through “persuasion not coercion” and
that UNPROFOR’s deterrent capacity flowed from its “presence” not its military
strength.60 In a report to the Security Council in May 1994, Boutros-Ghali summarised
UNPROFOR’s understanding of their mission as follows:
To protect the civilian populations of the designated safe areas against armed 
attacks and other hostile acts, through the presence of its troops and, if necessary, 
through the application of air power, in accordance with agreed procedures [Italics 
added].61
This corresponds with the findings of the 7,000 page report compiled by the Netherlands 
Institute for War Documentation which concluded: “active defence of the enclave by 
military means was not in accordance with the mandate, the UN policy ... or the rules of 
engagement”, and that “military means could only be deployed if the safety of the 
battalion was in danger and if it was the target of direct fire...”.
Obviously a great deal of emphasis was placed on the peacekeepers’ safety, which was 
often prioritised over the safety of the non-combatants. UNPROFOR Directive 2\95 of 
29 May 1995 stated that “the execution of the mandate [was] secondary to the security of 
UN personnel”.63 To complicate the soldiers’ decision-making process even further, it 
stated that force was only to be used as “a last resort".64 The combination of these written 
and oral statements, in addition to UNPROFOR’s initial peacekeeping mandate, reiterated 
that force was only to be used according to a strict definition of self-defence.
59 For example, see the Secretary-General’s report of 16 March 1994, S/1994/300.
60 UN Srebrenica Report, 27.
61 S/1994/555, 9 May 1994, Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 844”, 5.
62 Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, “Summary for the Press, para 5.
63 Quoted in Honig and Both, 8.
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After the passage of SCRs 836 and 844, the shelling of the safe areas continued at about 
the same rate as before with no significant change in UNPROFOR responses. Even when 
the Dutch contingent in Srebrenica came under direct attack in July 1995, the 
peacekeepers refrained from responding with force. According to the UN report on the 
fall of Srebrenica, the B Company Commander of the Dutch battalion, Captain Groen, 
ordered his company not to return fire because he feared it would escalate tension and 
jeopardise the lives of his crew.65 Even more telling as to UNPROFOR’s understanding 
of the ROE was the fact recounted earlier; that the soldiers assigned to “ensure the 
respect” of Srebrenica had let it fall to the BSA without firing a shot in its defence. The 
Dutch contingent’s refusal to use force in Srebrenica, even under these circumstances, 
was especially significant because it had earlier refused to release the heavy weapons 
under its control to ARBiH forces who wanted to defend the safe area. When queried as 
to why this decision was made, a senior Dutch commander who had been involved in the 
decision responded: “It was UNPROFOR’s responsibility to defend the enclave, and not 
theirs’... We didn’t want to escalate the situation further by bringing the BSA and ARBiH 
into direct fighting”.66
The issue of demilitarisation of the safe areas was another source of confusion for ground 
forces. After the passage of SCR 819, UNPROFOR Commander Lars-Eric Wahlgren 
negotiated two agreements between the BSA and ARBiH. One of the key provisions of 
the agreements was the demilitarisation of Srebrenica. The ARBiH forces were to hand 
in their weapons first, then the BSA was to withdraw to a distance that would not threaten
64 Ibid.
65 From Dutchbat in Vredesnaam, Januari 1995-Juli 1995 (Dutchbat in the Name o f Peace, January 1995- 
July 1995) (Rijswijk: Debut, 1996), p. 296, Cited in Honig and Both, 15.
66 UN Srebrenica Report, 59.
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the area. After the Bosnian Serbs refused to ratify the VOPP, the Secretariat informed 
UNPROFOR that the arrangements for demilitarisation were unacceptable. From that 
point on, the Security Council never again required that the safe areas be disarmed.
The Security Council then passed SCR 824 which made the one-sided demand that all 
Bosnian Serb forces withdraw to a distance “that ceases to be a menace” to the safe areas
/ r o
but said nothing about ARBiH forces located within them. Not until 22 April 1994 did 
the Security Council pass a resolution that dealt with ARBiH activity within the safe 
areas. Security Council Resolution 913 called for “an end to any provocative action by 
whomsoever committed in and around the safe areas”.69 The presence of Bosniac fighters 
within the safe areas had the negative effect of giving the BSA a justifiable reason to 
attack them. Likewise, any Bosniac attack out of the areas invited retaliatory strikes from 
the Bosnian Serbs. Though the UN report on the fall of Srebrenica concluded that 
ARBiH attacks out of Srebrenica were minimal, the ARBiH and paramilitary presence
7 0legitimised BSA attacks and jeopardised the safety of the non-combatants living there. 
The ARBiH presence inside the areas also gave the dangerous appearance (or exposed the 
reality) of Western partiality toward one side of the conflict. In numerous reports, the 
Secretary-General warned against allowing the Bosniac fighters to rest, train, and equip 
inside the safe areas because of the damaging effects this would have on the security 
situation. Boutros-Ghali recommended that the areas be completely demilitarised on a 
number of occasions.
67 Ibid., 22.
68 S/RES/824, 6 May 1993, para 4a.
69 S/RES/913, 22 April 1994.
70 Examples o f the Secretary-General’s advice to the Security Council to demilitarise the safe areas can be 
found in S/1994/291, 11 March 1994, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 900 (1994), and S/1994/555.
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Recognising the need for a greater military capability to protect their forces on the 
ground, the British, French, and Dutch agreed to contribute forces to two heavily-armed 
brigades which would act as a rapid reaction force in early June 1995. Though the 
UNPROFOR Commander of BiH wanted the force to be able to operate under robust 
rules of engagement, the overall UNPROFOR Force Commander and the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Bosnia disagreed and demanded the
71force operate as peacekeepers. The 12,500 member force was eventually approved by 
the Security Council in Resolution 998 of 16 June 1995 as a peacekeeping force. It was 
subject to the same rules of engagement and narrow interpretations as the rest of 
UNPROFOR.72
Air Forces. The rules of engagement regarding airpower evolved in piecemeal fashion.
As already mentioned, the Security Council chose to implement the “light option” of
7,600 additional ground troops reinforced by airpower. In paragraph ten of SCR 836, the
Security Council declared that
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations or 
arrangements, may take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to 
close coordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary 
measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas in the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance 
of its mandate.
The manner in which airpower would be utilised was not determined until BSA forces 
threatened to close off the last remaining road into Sarajevo in August 1993.
“Dual Key” Approach. As a result of the Sarajevo crisis, NATO and the UN Secretary- 
General agreed to a plan in which the Secretary-General would authorise the first use of 
airpower. They also agreed that air attacks “would be executed only with the agreement
71 UN Srebrenica Report, 52-3.
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of the UNPROFOR Force Commander and the NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied 
Forces South ... and then only when each had authority to proceed”.73 Boutros-Ghali, 
backed by several of the troop contributing countries, emphasised the difference between 
close air support (CAS) and airstrikes. CAS was defined as defensive air action that 
directly supported the troops on the ground against a specific threat such as a tank or 
mortar position. Airstrikes, on the other hand, were seen as an offensive weapon in which 
strategic targets were attacked to weaken a force’s ability to wage war. According to 
Boutros-Ghali, since UNPROFOR could use force only in self-defence, the airpower 
supporting UNPROFOR should also be used as a defensive weapon.
The “dual key” approach resulted in a number of problems which affected the protection 
of UNPROFOR and the safe areas in general. Units on the ground made requests that 
were often rejected before ever making it to UN Headquarters. When they did reach the 
UN, the decision to act, which was by no means certain, was often so slow as to render 
the request useless. On one occasion, a request was delayed because the proper request 
form was either not used or was filled out incompletely.74 Often, because of the number 
of people who had to agree to each request, forces on the ground did not know whether to 
expect air support or not. At several critical moments, UNPROFOR forces in Srebrenica 
waited expectantly for close air support when the request had either been rejected or lost. 
Only after the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa had fallen to the Serbs did Boutros-Ghali 
delegate his authorisation directly to the Force Commander.
Airpower was also of limited utility because NATO often prioritised the lives of its pilots 
over the lives of UNPROFOR ground forces or safe area inhabitants. On the rare
72 S/RES/998, 16 June 1995.
73 S/1994/300, 16 March 1994, 15. Also UN Srebrenica Report, 32.
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occasion when an aircraft was shot down by BSA missiles, air missions stopped while 
search and rescue missions took place. After one such incident, Admiral Leighton Smith, 
Commander in Chief of NATO’s Southern Command, decided to halt all missions on 
tactical targets due to the danger they posed to the pilots. Though he later reconsidered 
this stance, he was far more reluctant to approve airstrikes in the future. Similarly, after 
the BSA had shown the capability to fire medium and high-altitude surface to air missiles 
at NATO aircraft in late 1994, NATO doubled the number of aircraft flying combat air 
patrols making it impossible for them to provide around-the-clock protection to 
UNPROFOR soldiers and endangered civilians.76
Hostages. Because UNPROFOR was a peacekeeping force in an environment where 
there was no peace to keep, the UN forces were vulnerable to attack and capture. UN 
officials, UNPROFOR leaders, and contributing Member States were constantly 
concerned about the possibility of UN forces being taken hostage in response to broader 
military action taken against the BSA. This happened on 14 April 1994, when 
UNPROFOR responded to the BSA shelling of the Gorazde safe area by requesting and 
receiving close air support on two consecutive days. The BSA reacted by taking 150 UN 
personnel hostage only to release them in return for assurances that the combat air patrols
77over Gorazde would cease.
Again on 25 May 1995, UNPROFOR called for airstrikes to halt BSA attacks against 
Sarajevo. NATO aircraft bombed ammunition bunkers in Pale over the next two days. 
The BSA responded by taking 370 UN personnel hostage and using 17 of them as human
74 UN Srebrenica Report, 70.
75 Rose, 168.
76 Ibid., 294-5.
77 UN Srebrenica Report, para 137, 36-7.
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shields.78 In view of the hostages’ safety, the Secretariat advised the senior UN civilian 
in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, not to authorise further strikes unless there was a “major
7 0violation ... in the exclusion zones, leaving no choice”.
Thus, the vulnerability of the hostages severely curtailed UNPROFOR’s ability to act. 
Because of them, the Force Commander told the UNPROFOR BiH Commander that his 
top priority was the safety of UN personnel and that UNPROFOR should avoid any
• • o naction that could “degenerate into confrontation”. So pervasive was the concern for the 
hostages that when the first UNPROFOR observation post in Srebrenica was being 
overrun by the BSA in June 1995, the Dutch request for close air support was declined. 
On 11 July 1995, as the entire safe area looked poised to fall, NATO airstrikes were 
called off by Akashi because of BSA threats to shell the concentration of civilians in the
O 1 t
town and kill Dutch peacekeepers under BSA control. Only after the fall of Srebrenica, 
the subsequent slaughter of thousands of men and boys, and the forced deportation of 
thousands of Bosnian Muslims did the Security Council agree to pull back UNPROFOR 
troops from vulnerable areas and utilise airstrikes in earnest.
4.4 RESULTS
The safe areas provided a measure of safety for thousands of Bosnian civilians between 
1993 and 1995. Yet, by examining the results of the West’s protection efforts in 
accordance with the objectives that were set for the operation, it quickly becomes 
apparent that the West was not primarily concerned with protecting the population.
78 Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, 234.
79 UN Srebrenica Report, para 191, 48.
80 Ibid., para 194,49.
81 Lane, 16.
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Instead, it consistently made decisions that prioritised its self-interests at the expense of 
the Bosnian population it was supposed to protect. While this was most dramatically 
illustrated by the collapse of the safe areas in Srebrenica and Zepa, the self-centred 
priorities and decisions that led to these tragedies were widespread throughout the 
duration of the intervention.
4.4.1 Population Protection
In accordance with their humanitarian objectives, the safe areas provided a measure of 
protection for many people who had been forced to flee the Bosnian Serb onslaught. 
Though deliveries of humanitarian goods were often sparse and inconsistent, the safe 
areas did provide locations in which subsistence-level foodstuffs could be distributed to 
the displaced people. For all the woes documented about the safe areas, starvation was 
rarely one of them. General Sir Michael Rose estimated that UNPROFOR sustained 2.4 
million people during the course of the conflict and delivered an average of 2,000 metric 
tonnes of stores a day.82 Moreover, while two of the safe areas were overrun and ended 
as terrible tragedies, four others were still intact upon the commencement of the peace 
negotiations in 1995. Some analysts have concluded that if the safe areas had not existed, 
the people living within them may have shared a fate similar to that of the inhabitants of 
Srebrenica. It is almost certain that the best they could have hoped for within the borders 
of BiH would have been the forcible displacement to an area more firmly under Bosniac 
control.
While lives were undoubtedly saved as a result of the safe areas, the strategy as a whole 
was unsuccessful at providing endangered populations with secure humanitarian space.
82 Rose, 363.
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The failure to protect the inhabitants of the safe areas has been well documented. The 
peacekeeping force was far too small and operated under rules of engagement that were 
much too restrictive to “ensure” the safety of the areas. In some cases, forces did not 
even arrive in the safe areas for a significant amount of time after the passage of the 
resolutions. The situation in the Gorazde safe area was so dangerous that the Security 
Council waited a full year after its designation to commit forces, and then only in 
response to a direct Serb attack. Even though only two of the safe areas were overrun, 
civilians living within all the areas were shelled on a fairly constant basis throughout 
UNPROFOR’s deployment, leading to numerous civilian casualties. Humanitarian aid 
was often obstructed from entering the areas and medical evacuations were frequently 
prevented.
Living conditions within the safe areas were notoriously poor. Within the safe areas,
thousands of IDPs were crowded together in the streets, some under makeshift shelters,
and some completely exposed to the elements. Left with only what they could carry,
“residents” of the safe areas were completely dependent on UNPROFOR to keep them
safe. Nonetheless, the Secretary-General wrote many reports describing the horrific
conditions in the areas as well as their lack of safety. He called for either a redefinition of
the safe areas or a reconsideration of their mandate, neither of which was accomplished.
In his 11 March 1994 report to the Security Council, Boutros-Ghali summed up the safe
area operation this way:
UNPROFOR has saved lives by its presence in the safe areas, but that has not
made these areas truly “safe”  Living conditions in the safe areas remain
appalling; the areas are unviable socially and economically, and they suffer from 
high levels of unemployment, overcrowding, crime and prostitution, as well as the 
tension of an uncertain future.84
83 Gorazde: The Peacekeepers ’ Tale, Compact Disc Flycover, Produced by GMS Media, 2001.
84 S/1994/291, 5.
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In spite of UNPROFOR’s presence, the civilian population was at risk from hostile 
elements inside and outside the safe areas. The presence of ARBiH and Bosniac 
paramilitary troops led to Bosnian Serb “retaliatory” strikes against the areas.85 The 
Bosniac government also endangered the lives of civilians in its efforts to maintain 
international sympathy and involvement. It would not allow the civilians to be evacuated 
to safer places because it claimed that this would play into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs 
who wanted to ethnically cleanse all Bosniac government-held territory. Various reports 
and speculations also exist saying that government forces staged attacks against their own 
civilians, or else intentionally acted in ways designed to bring about BSA retaliation, in 
an effort to maintain international sympathy and draw the West further into the conflict.
The lives of non-combatants were further jeopardised by the West’s use of misleading 
language. By choosing to call the enclaves “safe areas”, the West created an impression 
within the civilian population that their safety was assured. The areas thus acted as a 
magnet for desperate IDPs looking for protection. Even after two safe areas had fallen to 
the Bosnian Serbs, the displaced people were left with no choice but to remain hopeful 
that the UN would keep them safe. One survivor of Srebrenica recounted his 
expectations of the areas:
We thought that soon the West and U.N. would demand that the Serbian forces
retreat from Srebrenica and that the “safe area” status would be restored. “It was a
<)/■
U.N. ‘safe haven,’ there is no way it will be allowed to fall,” I thought.
Instead of protecting the non-combatants, in many cases the safe areas simply 
concentrated the population into small, densely populated areas that made Serb targeting 
and capture quite easy. For the endangered populations—even those whose safe areas
85 S/1994/1389, 1 December 1994, 8-9.
86 Human Rights Watch, “Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. 
Peacekeeping”, Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, 16.
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were not overrun, it may have ultimately been better to flee to Bosniac controlled areas 
rather than endure the dangerous, ghetto-like atmosphere of the safe areas.
In spite of all the West’s rhetoric about ensuring the respect of the safe areas, when 
military confrontations arose involving UNPROFOR, the peacekeepers’ lives were 
prioritised over those of the Bosniac civilians. Those areas that were completely overrun 
by the BSA were taken without a fight in the presence of UNPROFOR troops and with 
NATO aircraft in the skies overhead. This inaction led to tragic results. The Dutch report 
from the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation concluded that the BSA 
Commander’s decision to overrun the safe area at Srebrenica was “primarily motivated by 
the lack of any significant armed resistance”.87 After the fall of Srebrenica, thousands of 
women and children were forcibly evacuated, separated from their military-aged male 
family members, and stripped of any valuables they still possessed. Many were raped and 
brutalised before being released. Many are still missing. The men and boys suffered a 
more permanent fate. Most of the fighting-aged males fled prior to the town falling. Of 
the 15,000 that fled, 5000 were massacred and many others went missing and are now 
presumed dead.88 Of those adult males who stayed in Srebrenica, most were executed. 
As of November 1999, over 7,000 people from Srebrenica remained unaccounted for and 
are now presumed dead.89 The fact that UNPROFOR troops were on the scene and 
unable to do anything to prevent the slaughter makes this event especially tragic.
After Srebrenica, Zepa was the next safe area to fall. Aware of Zepa’s tenuous position, 
the Security Council focused on the fate of Gorazde and was not prepared to act on 
Zepa’s behalf. Once overrun, the future of Zepa’s inhabitants was left to the
87 See Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, “Summary for the Press”, Paragraph 5.
88 Findlay, 251.
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determination of BSA and ARBiH negotiators. In accordance with the agreement, 
UNPROFOR troops accompanied over 5,000 women and children to government-held 
territory between 25 an 27 July 1995.90 The combatants and males of fighting age were 
initially going to be exchanged for BSA prisoners, but when this agreement collapsed, 
UNPROFOR forces claimed that a Srebrenica-style attack appeared likely. Fortunately 
for the areas inhabitants, a Croat attack on BSA forces in south-west Bosnia caused the 
BSA leadership to abandon this attack on Zepa in order to respond to the Croat offensive. 
Consequently, the males in Zepa were able to escape to friendly territory.
Only after these two safe areas had fallen and thousands of people had been abandoned to 
their deaths at the hands of the BSA did the Security Council choose to act more 
forcefully. Rules of engagement were expanded resulting in an intensive bombing 
campaign that eventually led to the signing of a peace agreement in the US. For 
thousands of Bosnian non-combatants, the peace agreement signed in Dayton, Ohio on 21 
November 1995 was too late to do any good.
4.4.2 Political Settlement
In spite of their dismal humanitarian results, the safe areas may actually deserve credit for 
the preservation of the Bosnian state, merely because they kept the international 
community engaged in the conflict. According to General Rose, had the Bosnian Serbs 
been able to eliminate these safe areas and consolidate their territory, they may have been 
able to eliminate the Bosnian state altogether.91 Similarly, had the Bosnian Serbs been 
able to consolidate their territory, negotiators may not have had the leverage necessary to
89 UN Srebrenica Report, 92.
90 Ibid., 94.
91 Ibid., 361.
149
reach agreement on the compromise peace plan signed in Dayton, Ohio. In this way, the 
safe areas contributed to the accomplishment of the UN’s second official objective.
4.4.3 Other Results
Although the West was only marginally successful in the achievement of its official 
objectives, it achieved a number of other benefits which satisfied its unofficial, self- 
interested aims. First, the Bosnian intervention benefited international order in several 
ways. By preventing the formal disintegration of BiH into ethnically pure states, the 
West satisfied its desire to keep international borders unchanged and avoided the 
establishment of a destabilising precedent that could lead toward unrestrained self- 
determination and ethnic separatism. The safe area strategy, as ineffective as it was for 
protecting endangered populations, kept many thousands of displaced people within the 
borders of their own country. Not only did this situ" protection relieve the 
neighbouring states of the economic and logistical hardships that come with hosting 
refugees, but it also may have prevented the spread of the conflict into other parts of 
Europe by limiting the numbers of dependant refugees from various and often 
oppositional ethnicities in host states.
Second, the safe area strategy provided a way for Western decision-makers to maintain a 
degree of public support for their policies. Western publics were legitimately concerned 
about the humanitarian crisis underway in Bosnia and demanded action from their 
governments, as long as that action did not result in large numbers of friendly casualties 
or Vietnam-like stalemates. The safe area strategy did “something” without doing too 
much.
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Finally, the safe area strategy salvaged a degree of Western credibility. Acting through 
the Security Council, Western states were able to register strong, vocal opposition to the 
Bosnian Serbs without having to make a significant “personal” sacrifice to “protect” 
endangered Muslims populations. Simultaneously they were able to avoid the danger of 
being drawn into a full-scale war in the Balkans. When critics of Western policy asked 
what was being done for the endangered civilians in Bosnia, Western leaders could point 
to the safe areas. When questioned about instances in which non-combatants were clearly 
left unprotected, they could blame the peacekeepers, the UN Secretariat, or another 
reticent Member State. Moreover, the West could (and did) claim that NATO bombing, 
bolstered by the prowess of Western negotiators, eventually brought the conflict to a 
close.
CONCLUSION
The West’s decision to protect populations in Bosnia was claimed by many Western 
leaders to have been motivated solely by their humanitarian concern for the endangered 
Bosnian non-combatants. Yet, from the beginning of the intervention, the West 
prioritised its self-interests at the expense of the endangered population. The 
humanitarian mission was largely the result of the West’s refusal to devote sufficient 
resources and political capital to bringing about a settlement in the Bosnian civil war. 
Because the war was dangerous and the West’s interest in the conflict was limited to a 
desire to keep it from spreading, the West opted merely to protect endangered civilians. 
But even this decision was resisted until Western credibility and domestic support began 
to suffer. These factors, combined with the West’s recognition that preventing the
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Bosnian Serb’s consolidation of territory was key to a future negotiated peace plan, 
moved the West to designate six safe areas ostensibly for the population.
Even in its limited role, the West constantly sought to minimise its responsibility as it 
prioritised its self-interest. Initially, only fifty additional military observers were 
authorised for each area, but as their name implied, they had no responsibility for 
protection. Finally, when the Security Council voted to “ensure the respect” of the safe 
areas, Western leaders dismissed military estimates and opted for a “light option” of 
peacekeepers who were supposed to ensure the respect of the areas by their ‘presence’. 
To account for the inadequacy of personnel, members of ARBiH were allowed to remain 
in the safe areas, which endangered the non-combatants even more. Additionally, the 
airpower which was supposed to provide a measure of protection was largely ineffective 
because of difficult approval procedures, sophisticated air defence systems, poor weather, 
and complex ROE. In the end, two safe areas were overrun and thousands were killed, 
beaten, or severely abused. Only out of concern for the potential effects on the West’s 
credibility and domestic support did the West institute more robust military action. In 
spite of its humanitarian claims, the West clearly prioritised the protection of its self- 
interests over the protection of the population.
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CHAPTER 5 RWANDA
INTRODUCTION
The efforts of Western states to protect endangered Rwandans between 1993 and 1995, 
either as part of a UN force or a multinational coalition, are particularly worthy of 
examination because of the scale of the humanitarian catastrophe that served as their 
catalyst. The genocide in Rwanda was perhaps the most obviously justifiable case for a 
population protection intervention in the 1990’s. Between 500,000 and 1 million Tutsis 
and moderate Hutus were systematically murdered by extremist Hutu militias, often with 
machetes, hoes, and axes. The Hutu rate of killing exceeded that of the Nazi death camps 
by five times, yet the Western states, and the international community more generally, 
were slow to act and, when they did, their protection efforts were largely ineffective.1
Throughout the tragedy, Western representatives called for an end to the killing and spoke 
forcefully of the imperative to protect the targeted population. Numerous Security 
Council resolutions were passed and official statements were delivered condemning the 
violence against the population. Scores of observers were sent to document and report 
the evidence of the killings. Tragically, decisive action to protect Rwandan civilians 
rarely matched the rhetoric. The West’s failure to protect the population was all the more 
remarkable in light of the fact that the UN peacekeeping force, the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), was in the country throughout the genocide 
providing first-hand reports of the massacres to the Security Council. Additionally, there 
were two separate international interventions, UNAMIR II and Operation Turquoise,
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which were ostensibly launched for the specific purpose of providing protection to the 
endangered non-combatants.
Although Rwandan civilians needed protection inside and outside Rwanda’s borders, this 
chapter focuses only on the international efforts aimed at protecting those who remained 
within Rwandese territory. To accomplish the protection objective, the Security Council 
specifically advocated the use of “secure humanitarian areas” to protect the populations 
where it was feasible to do so. The UN-directed French intervention, Operation 
Turquoise, which temporarily assumed the protection mandate, utilised the Council’s 
authorisation to establish a Safe Humanitarian Zone (SHZ). The SHZ was a large region 
demarcated for humanitarian purposes within which small camps were established for the 
protection of displaced and endangered people. Because it was allegedly created to 
protect populations and was to become the focal point for coalition and UN efforts, this 
chapter concentrates on actions that occurred within this safe zone. Through a detailed 
examination of the West’s involvement in Rwanda, it will reveal that Western states were 
more concerned with protecting their own self-interests than with preserving the lives of 
the endangered Rwandans despite their humanitarian rhetoric to the contrary. In other 
words, the West protected the endangered population only as long as doing so coincided 
with the preservation of its own self-interests. Nevertheless, by comparing the motives, 
objectives, and results of the interveners, this chapter will illustrate the difficulty Western 
states had in correctly identifying the potential hazards to their self-interests and in 
selecting a strategy that successfully safeguarded those interests when confronted with the 
complex issues of intrastate war and humanitarian crises in the post-Cold War security 
environment.
1 Linda R. Melvem, A People Betrayed: The role o f the West in Rwanda’s genocide, (London: Zed Books, 
2000), 4.
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Because UNAMIR II and Operation Turquoise were two very distinct interventions, each 
section of this chapter is divided into two parts. The order in which the interventions are 
addressed in each section reflects the order in which that aspect of their operations 
actually took place.
5.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTIONS
This section is not meant to be an exhaustive account of all that happened from the time 
UNAMIR was first deployed until its mandate was expanded to protect endangered 
populations in Rwanda on 17 May 1994. Instead, it merely highlights some of the key 
events in the West’s involvement with Rwanda that led up to the authorisation of the 
expanded UNAMIR (informally designated UNAMIR II) operation. These events 
demonstrate that even before the protection interventions had begun, Western states had 
prioritised their self-interests over the population’s safety by constantly limiting their 
involvement to relatively safe tasks requiring minimal resources. Only by recognising 
this self-interested predisposition in Western states can one begin to grasp why the 
eventual protection efforts were so inadequate.
In Rwanda, fighting between the two primary ethnic groups, the majority Hutus and 
minority Tutsis, had been intensifying since October 1990 when 4,000 Tutsi exiles 
serving in the Ugandan military, along with 3,000 other exiles, invaded Rwanda. The 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), as the rebel force was called, conquered significant 
territory before being driven back less than a month later by the Rwandese military, 
known as the Forces Armees Rwandaises or FAR, and their French allies. Several cease­
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fires and agreements were signed over the two years that followed, but none held. The 
result was renewed heavy fighting and massive civilian displacement by January 1993.2
On 3 August 1993, with the assistance of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and 
the support of diplomats from the UN, Belgium, France, Germany, and the US, the 
government and the RPF signed a comprehensive peace agreement in Arusha, Tanzania. 
The combatants requested a UN peacekeeping force to accomplish an array of difficult 
and dangerous tasks such as “ensuring the overall security of the country”, and 
“disengagement, disarmament, demobilization and retraining of the military personnel of 
the parties to be integrated in the national army”.3
On 5 October 1993, in the midst of an expanding UN mission in Bosnia and a collapsing 
UN-US nation-building mission in Somalia, the Security Council unanimously approved 
SCR 872 authorising the establishment of UNAMIR.4 Although the Security Council 
authorised the Chapter VI peacekeeping effort, it either rejected or significantly reduced 
many of the tasks requested of it by the Rwandans. Moreover, the Secretariat insisted 
that the Force Commander, Major General Romeo Dallaire, should strictly interpret 
UNAMIR’s peacekeeping mandate. In short, the Security Council made it clear that there 
would be no UN enforcement action in Rwanda and that the success of UNAMIR’s 
mission relied on the co-operation of the combatants.
2 Organization of African Unity, Report o f the International Panel o f Eminent Personalities to Investigate 
the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and Surrounding Events, June 2000, (hereafter OAU Rwanda Report). 
Executive Summary, Paragraph 25. According to the report, at least 6 mass murders of Tutsis by Hutus 
occurred between 1990 and 1993.
3 S/26488, 24 Sept 1993.
4 S/RES/872, 5 Oct 1993.
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On 6 April 1994, Rwanda’s president Juvenal Habyarimana and Burundian president
Cyprien Ntarymira were killed when Habyarimana’s aeroplane was blown up as it
approached to land in Rwanda. Violence and chaos immediately erupted in Kigali
resulting in the murder of numerous government officials and ten Belgian peacekeepers.
The first priority of the Western states was the safety of their citizens living in the area.
Without notifying or co-ordinating with UNAMIR, France and Belgium had a force of
900 elite soldiers in Kigali by 10 April. Shortly thereafter, the US had a back-up force of
300 US Marines in Burundi, and Italy had deployed 80 additional soldiers to rescue their
nationals.5 Even more telling as to the prioritisation of Western lives over those of
endangered foreigners was the fact that the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
(DPKO), in the midst of the political assassinations and mass killings of the Rwandese
population, directed UNAMIR to assist the Western militaries in their evacuation
operations. A 9 April cable from DPKO to Dallaire requested that he
cooperate with both the French and Belgian commanders to facilitate the 
evacuation of their nationals, and other foreign nationals requesting evacuation. 
.... You should make every effort not to compromise your impartiality or to act 
beyond your mandate but you may exercise your discretion to do [so] should this 
be essential for the evacuation of foreign nationals.6
As the OAU report on Rwanda pointed out, this evacuation of European nationals was the
only instance in which UNAMIR was given the latitude to go beyond its mandate.
After evacuating their ex-patriots, the second priority of many Western states was to 
withdraw UNAMIR completely. Belgium announced its intention to withdraw its forces
5 600 French forces were actually on the ground in the early morning hours of 8 April. See Alison Des 
Forges, “Leave None to Tell the Story: ” Genocide in Rwanda, (New York: Human Rights Watch), 606.
6 Cited in S/1999/1257, 16 December 1999, “Letter dated 15 December 1999 From the Secretary-General 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council”, Enclosure: Report o f the Independent Inquiry into the 
Actions o f the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 16 December 1999, Accessed 21 July 
2003. http://ods-dds-nv.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf/OpenElement. 
Hereafter referred to as UN Rwanda Report.
7 OAU Rwanda Report, Chapter 15, Paragraphs 15.6 and 15.7. http://www.oau- 
oua.org/document/ipep/report/rwanda-e/EN-15-CH.htm. Accessed 2001.
157
and urged the Security Council to terminate the mission. Although France, New Zealand, 
Nigeria, Russia, and Rwanda rhetorically favoured augmenting the force, none of them 
offered any additional troops to conduct an expanded mission, and several other states, 
including the US and UK, were in favour of a complete pull-out.8 After two weeks of 
indecision, the Council reduced UNAMIR’s size from its original authorisation of 2,548 
to 270 and restricted its mission to mediation, monitoring, and humanitarian assistance 
“to the extent possible”.9
In the weeks that followed, the humanitarian crisis in Rwanda continued unabated. As 
international pressure favouring intervention grew, the Security Council was compelled to 
consider authorising an expansion of UNAMIR in size and mandate. On 17 May 1994, 
the Security Council adopted Resolution 918 authorising an expanded UNAMIR force to 
protect the endangered population. The motives that lay behind this decision and the 
specific objectives that UNAMIR II was to pursue will be addressed fully in the next 
section.
Even with the UNAMIR II authorisation in hand, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali was 
forced to admit on 20 June 1994 that, despite soliciting support from fifty Member States, 
only 503 forces were on the ground as of 18 June—one month after the initial UNAMIR 
II expansion. Even worse, he projected that it would be another three months before 
UNAMIR II could be expected to fulfil its tasks.10 Western states would not volunteer 
any additional forces to meet the requirements, and African states were unable to equip 
their forces adequately. In light of the delay, France offered to lead a multinational
8 Trevor Findlay, The Use o f Force in UN Peace Operations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 
2002), 280-1.
9 S/RES/912 (1994).
10 S/1994/728, 20 June 1994.
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mission commanded and funded by the French provided that it operated with UN 
backing. Though many Member States questioned the motives of the French offer 
because of previous French involvement with the Hutu regime, their offer to lead the 
force proved irresistible to a sufficient number of Member States to secure passage of 
Resolution 929 on 22 June 1994 authorising the French-led mission. Part two of the next 
section examines the motives and objectives of the French-led force more closely.
5.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES
The decisions by Western states to augment the UNAMIR mission and authorise the 
French-led multinational intervention to Rwanda, were influenced by a number of 
competing motives. Although many of these were self-interested in nature, Western 
states justified their involvement in the crisis almost completely on the humanitarian 
necessity for action. The humanitarian motive to protect endangered non-combatants and 
the specific objectives which flowed from them, were often in conflict with the West’s 
self-interested aims of limiting its involvement in distant crises and avoiding long-term 
commitments to enforcement missions that would be both costly and dangerous.
5.2.1 UNAMIR II 
Official Motives.
Humanitarian Concern. The official motives for expanding the size and mandate of the 
UNAMIR force were included in Security Council Resolutions 918 of 17 May 1994 and 
925 of 8 June 1994. According to these resolutions, the primary motive behind the 
decision to bolster UNAMIR’s force structure and mandate was a concern for the safety 
of the non-combatants in Rwanda. By mid-May 1994, the Secretary-General estimated
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that over 200,000 people had been killed and 2 million others displaced from their 
homes.11 Additionally, various reports from the UN and human rights organisations cited 
evidence of the genocide that could not be denied. Consequently, six different 
preliminary paragraphs in Resolution 918 focused entirely on the devastating effects of 
the conflict on the Rwandese civilians. Though the Security Council stopped short of 
declaring that a genocide was taking place or naming a perpetrator, it conveyed the point 
by including the definition of genocide in the resolution.
Both resolutions also addressed the need to protect humanitarian aid workers and their 
operations. In order for the huge number of displaced people to be cared for, the Security 
Council recognised that the presence of humanitarian organisations was crucial. If the 
operational environment was too dangerous, these organisations would be unwilling or 
unable to work effectively, thereby exacerbating the plight of the non-combatants and 
rendering the augmented UNAMIR force ineffective.
In Resolution 925, which authorised the deployment of two additional infantry battalions, 
the Security Council was more explicit in justifying its humanitarian motives. It cited 
“violence and carnage affecting civilians”, “acts of genocide”, “the systematic killing of 
thousands of civilians”, and the “displacement of some 1.5 million Rwandans facing 
starvation and disease and the massive exodus of refugees to neighbouring countries” as 
motives for its actions. Nevertheless, the Security Council, persuaded by the French and 
Rwandan representatives to the UN, still did not identify the Hutus as the perpetrators of 
the genocide.
11 S/1994/518, 29 April 1994 and S/1994/565,13 May 1994.
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Regional Stability. To a lesser degree, the Security Council professed to be motivated by 
concern about the potential regional implications of the humanitarian crisis should it 
continue unchecked. In the final preliminary paragraph of Resolution 918, the Council 
said that it was “concerned that the continuation of the situation in Rwanda constitutes a 
threat to peace and security in the region”. This concern for peace and security, however, 
was not formally mentioned two weeks later in SCR 925. Instead, the “massive exodus 
of refugees to neighbouring countries” merely constituted a “humanitarian crisis of
1 9enormous proportions”. This change of emphasis was probably due to the West’s 
refusal to accept the costs associated with launching a Chapter VII enforcement operation 
in Rwanda.
Unofficial Motives.
Domestic Support. One of the key unofficial motives that influenced the decision of 
Western states to expand UNAMIR’s mandate was the desire to maintain the support of 
their domestic publics. As serious as the Rwandan crisis was in humanitarian terms, it 
never really generated a consistent demand from Western publics to intervene militarily, 
though it did, at times, create a demand “do something” on the Rwandans’ behalf. Part of 
the reason for the Western public’s indifference was that the crisis occurred at a time 
when most Western states were preoccupied with other conflicts. As previously 
mentioned, Western Europeans were primarily focused on dealing with the crisis in 
Bosnia and its effects on themselves. Several had deployed peacekeeping forces as part 
of UNPROFOR, and were finding the mission there to be much more difficult than they 
had originally anticipated.
12 S/RES/925, (1994), 8 June 1994, page 2.
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Similarly, the US was involved in a host of other complex commitments at the time. 
American decision-makers were aware that the US public would not support another large 
American military deployment. Instead, they were preoccupied with withdrawing their 
forces from Somalia and with confronting the troubling events in Europe and Haiti. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, the US had consistently refused to send military forces to Bosnia, 
despite the fact that, when compared to Rwanda, it was of much greater interest to the 
US. Nevertheless, as media attention to Bosnia increased and the need for NATO 
airpower to protect UNPROFOR’s “safe area” mission was publicised, the US had little 
choice but to address the conflict. Similarly, the 1991 military coup that deposed Haitian 
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide posed a humanitarian crisis much closer to home—a 
crisis that not only produced Haitian refugees on American shores, but that also 
challenged US credibility in its traditional sphere of influence.13
In Somalia, what the US public had initially seen as an altruistic effort to provide aid to a 
starving Somali population had evolved into a comprehensive nation-building exercise 
involving combat operations. To make matters worse, the combat resulted in the deaths 
of a number of UN peacekeepers and US soldiers, leading to the eventual failure of the 
Somalia mission. The legacy of this failure cannot be overstated when evaluating the 
West’s interest in Rwanda.
The lack of Western public demand for action in Rwanda can also be attributed to low 
media coverage. CNN broadcast the only US television news story on the Rwandese
13 US credibility was threatened when the USS Harlan County was prevented from docking at Port-au- 
Prince and delivering UN peacekeeping forces on 11 October 1993 by a group of Haitian “thugs”. The 
incident delayed the deployment of the UN Mission in Haiti and led to a UN-authorised, US-led mission to 
Haiti.
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political situation prior to Habyarimana’s assassination on 6 April.14 Following this 
event, news coverage remained very low in the UK, France, and the US, and “virtually 
ceased” as the genocide intensified.15 Most of the reports that did make it to press 
characterised the genocide as tribal violence or civil conflict.
Media coverage was limited due to a number of factors. First, there were very few 
reporters in Africa, and those who were sent had a difficult time gaining safe access to 
Rwanda.16 As one reporter commented, “Those who carry out the massacre of civilians 
have no qualms about killing journalists. . .”.17 Not only was Rwanda dangerous for
reporters, but its poor infrastructure also made travelling in search of stories logistically
1 8very difficult. Second, Rwanda was competing with another African story; namely the 
election of Nelson Mandela in South Africa. In contrast to the 2,500 reporters covering 
the South African elections, the number of reporters in Rwanda never rose above fifteen 
during the genocide.19 Finally, there were many other stories competing for the public’s 
attention, the foremost in the US being the murder trial of O.J. Simpson. For these 
reasons, the real bulk of the news coverage on Rwanda did not begin until the genocide 
was over. When it did begin, it often presented a convoluted picture of the crisis, 
focusing on the plight of the Hutu refugees and the appalling conditions of the refugee 
camps rather than the reality of the earlier genocide. Interestingly, with the possible
14 Steven Livingston and Todd Eachus, “Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage, ” The Path o f a 
Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke eds., (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1999), 211-2.
15 Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons 
Learned from the Rwanda Experience. Study 2, Early Warning and Conflict Management,, (London: Joint 
Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Steering Committee, 1996), 46-7.
16 According to Arthur Klinghoffer, when the presidential aeroplane was destroyed, only two foreign 
journalists were in the country. Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, The International Dimension o f Genocide in 
Rwanda, (Houndmills: MacMillan Press, Inc., 1998), 3.
17 Livingston and Eachus, 223.
18 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War: Communication and Conflict in the Twentieth Century, 
(Houndmills, MacMillan Press, Ltd., 2000), 225.
19 Adelman and Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management, 46-7.
20 Carruthers, 224-229.
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exception of the French media, when the press did report on the genocide, it often 
advocated a cautious response from Western states. For instance, The New York Times, 
though it recognised the genocidal actions of the Hutus, praised President Clinton’s 
decision to avoid involving US troops in a military intervention.21
The Clinton administration, cognisant of the bipartisan congressional opposition to its 
policy of “assertive multilateralism”, the lack of support for a Rwandan intervention 
among its top military advisors, and the nearness of the mid-term 1994 congressional 
elections, was determined to scale back its involvement in humanitarian situations that 
risked US lives and dollars—especially for areas it deemed outside US national 
interests.22 In a speech to the General Assembly shortly after the deaths of the American 
soldiers in Somalia, President Clinton expressed US reluctance to participate in future 
peace operations and warned the UN that if the “American people are to say yes to U.N. 
peacekeeping, the United Nations must know when to say no”. To formalise this 
stance, the Clinton administration published Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) 
on 3 May 1994, a policy meant to serve as a guide for US participation in future UN 
operations by requiring fairly specific conditions to be met prior to US involvement or 
support. The requirements of PDD 25 were applied to the deployment of UNAMIR II, 
resulting in a delayed deployment that had adverse consequences for the Rwandan 
population.
21 See Editorials in The New York Times, April 10, 1994, IV, p. 18; May 18, 1994, p. A22; and July 30, 
1994, p. 18, cited in Klinghoffer, 98.
22 Frederick H. Fleitz, Jr., Peacekeeping Fiascoes o f the 1990s: Causes, Solutions, and U.S. Interests, 
(London: Praeger, 2002), 151 and J. William Snyder, Jr., “ ‘Command’ versus ‘Operational Control’: A 
Critical Review of PDD-25”, 1995, page 2. www.ibiblio.org/iwsnvder/wisdom/pdd25.html. Accessed 18 
July 2003.
23 Cited in James W. Houck, “The Command and Control of United States Forces in the Era of ‘Peace 
Enforcement’”, Duke Journal o f Comparative and International Law, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1993,4.
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Credibility. Though not specifically stated as a reason for action in the Security Council 
resolutions, the desire to maintain credibility was a definite motive in the decision to 
expand UNAMIR’s mission. “Plausible deniability” regarding the scope of the killing 
evaporated as the RPF claimed large amounts of territory from the FAR and exposed the 
reality of the genocide against the Tutsis. Perhaps more importantly, the RPF allowed 
news reporters and humanitarian organisations into areas that had been previously off- 
limits so that they could transmit first-hand reports about the atrocities to a largely 
ignorant foreign public.
The West’s attempts to ignore the systematic nature of the killing or to re-classify the 
problem as cyclical tribal violence were no longer credible. As information became 
increasingly available, Western States faced pressure from various international sources 
to act. Regular reports throughout April and May from the UN High Commissioner of 
Human Rights, Jose Ayala Lasso, called for urgent measures. UN Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, himself an African, lobbied hard for a tougher response and even 
insinuated Western discrimination as the cause for its inactivity.24 Similarly, the OAU’s 
president, Salim Ahmed Salim condemned the Security Council’s decision to reduce 
UNAMIR, saying that it was the result of Western double standards.25 Adding to the 
pressure to act was the OAU’s agreement to organise an African response to the genocide 
if UN Member States could be persuaded to equip the African forces. Faced with this 
option of being able to respond without sending Western forces, Western decision-makers 
were hard-pressed to authorise an expanded UNAMIR mission.
24 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished, (New York: Random House, 1999), 141.
25 Klinghoffer, 49.
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Official Objectives.
Population Protection. Consistent with the Security Council’s emphasis on humanitarian 
motives, UNAMIR II’s stated objectives were primarily humanitarian in nature. 
UNAMIR II was mandated to accomplish the following objectives: “To contribute to the 
security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, 
including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure 
humanitarian areas”, and “To provide security and support for the distribution of relief
9 f \supplies and humanitarian relief operations”. The manner in which these two protection 
missions were worded was instructive of the West’s discomfort with the population 
protection mission and its prioritisation of self-interests. In this obvious case of genocide 
and government collapse, UNAMIR II was not tasked with providing security to the 
endangered population but with contributing to it. By limiting the mandate to security 
contribution, the Security Council carefully crafted a mission that could be accomplished 
by the mere presence of peacekeepers and judged a success regardless of the outcome. In 
contrast, UNAMIR II was mandated to “provide security” to those (usually westerners) 
who were engaged in the humanitarian relief operation.
Regional Stability. In addition to the humanitarian objective, the Security Council sought 
to prevent the conflict from spreading to other states in the region. This was the purpose 
of Section B of Resolution 918 which imposed a weapons embargo on Rwanda. The 
regional stabilisation objective behind this action was succinctly stated by the Omani 
representative to the UN who called the embargo “an important step in the right direction 
to contain the conflict and to halt its proliferation to other areas”.27 The use of “safe 
areas” was also suggested as a means to achieving the objective of preserving regional
26 S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994, OP 3a andb.
27 S/PV .3377, 16 May 1994.
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stability. By keeping the displaced Rwandans within the borders of their own country, 
the Security Council could minimise the negative effects of the genocide on neighbouring 
states. Boutros-Ghali, when making his recommendation for the UNAMIR II force, 
argued that “protected sites” should be established near the borders to assist those who 
were already in the areas, but he also warned that they should not be set up as a substitute 
for operations in the interior of the country.28 He said that the “detailed operational 
plans” would take into account the need “to deliver assistance to the distressed in their 
existing locations” so as to avoid a destabilising refugee exodus.29
5.2.2 Operation Turquoise 
Official Motives.
Humanitarian Concern. When France first communicated its offer to lead a multinational 
force to Rwanda, it primarily cited humanitarian motives for doing so. In the first 
paragraph of the French letter to the Secretary-General, the French Permanent 
Ambassador to the UN, Jean-Bemard Merimee, described the humanitarian situation in 
Rwanda as “an ongoing disaster” in which “massacres of civilians are continuing on a 
large scale”.30 He mentioned the thousands of additional lives that would be lost as a 
result of the delayed deployment of UNAMIR II. Speaking after the Security Council 
passed Resolution 929 authorising the French-led intervention, Ambassador Merimee said 
that his country was motivated by the “unprecedented massacres, of such magnitude that 
one no longer hesitates to describe them as genocide”, the displacement of civilians, and 
the precarious environment faced by all non-combatants. “France,” he said, “has deemed 
it as its duty ... to protect these defenceless civilians and save these numerous endangered
28 S/1994/565, 13 May 1994, Paragraph 12.
29 Ibid., Paragraph 10.
30 S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.
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• 31 • *lives”. Though strongly denouncing the genocide, French officials never named their 
Hutu clients as the perpetrators. Instead, they often referred to “genocides”, implying a 
second Tutsi-orchestrated massacre.
French decision-makers also cited humanitarian motives for setting up the Safe 
Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) in July 1994.32 The French declared that the spread of 
RPF/FAR fighting had caused tens of thousands of civilians to flee the fighting and join 
the hundreds of thousands of people who were already displaced in the region of Butare. 
Ambassador Merimee suggested that if not addressed immediately, the “situation in 
humanitarian terms will quickly become uncontrollable” in the southwest part of the 
country. Moreover, he warned of the “danger of the physical elimination of the 
minorities in the area” if something was not done to control the situation. According to 
the French, the creation of the SHZ was a necessary “last resort” in order to protect the 
population and create conditions conducive to humanitarian assistance. In the absence of 
a cease-fire, the SHZ was the only possible alternative the French could implement. 
Without the zone, the French said that they would be forced to withdraw from the 
country.
Regional Stability. In addition to their stated humanitarian motives for intervening, as 
well as for creating the SHZ, the French cited the need to contain the effects of the crisis 
geographically in order to prevent regional instability. According to the French letter 
offering to lead an intervention force, the delayed deployment of UNAMIR II was likely 
to cause “a geographical expansion of the area affected by the tragedy’.33 Moreover, 
speaking of the enormous displacement of civilians that would probably occur as the
31 S/PV .3392, 22 June 1994.
32 S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.
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Tutsi RPF advanced, Ambassador Merimee stated that “there is reason to fear that all 
those persons will seek refuge in neighbouring countries, particularly Burundi, 
aggravating a situation whose precariousness you are already well aware o f ’.34
Unofficial Motives.
Domestic Politics. Domestically, as reports of the atrocities were made known to the 
French public, the government came under increased pressure to stop the violence. The 
French public found it unthinkable that France would do nothing in the midst of the 
growing crisis in a region where it had been so highly involved and where it possibly 
shared some responsibility for the tragedy. According to this line of thinking, the French 
decision was motivated by guilt over its past involvement and inaction.35 This “motive” 
is often referred to as the “atonement explanation” for the intervention.36
Public outcry was particularly effective in light of the political situation in France in May 
and June of 1994. At that time, the President of the country was Francis Mitterand from 
the Socialist Party. Though Mitterand would remain president until 1995, the 
Conservatives had recently achieved a majority in the parliamentary elections, leaving the 
RPR party leader, Edouard Balladur, as the Prime Minister. To complicate loyalties 
further, both Jacques Chirac, the RPR party Secretary-General, and Balladur were 
candidates for the next presidency. This competitive political environment muddled the 
decision-making process considerably. For instance, on 14 June, Mitterand announced 
that the French would intervene in Rwanda at a cabinet meeting but asked that the 
decision be kept secret. The next day, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, a Chirac
33 S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.
34 S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.
35 See Bruce D. Jones, “ Intervention without Borders’: Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda, 1990-94”, 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, 1995, Vol. 24, No. 2, 231.
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supporter, announced the decision to the public in an effort to soften the image of the 
conservatives and boost the credibility of Chirac.37 In the words of Prunier, “Rwanda and 
its chopped up babies now looked as if they could give good political mileage in terms of 
public opinion ratings”.38
Regional Influence, According to Prunier, the conflict in Rwanda aroused French fears of 
an Anglo-Saxon usurpation of French influence in Francophone Africa. Prunier cited the 
13 June speech delivered by South Africa’s president, Nelson Mandela, in which Mandela 
spoke of the need for an intervention in Rwanda to address the humanitarian crisis. 
According to Prunier, the French viewed the speech as an example of “another 
representative of the ‘Anglo-Saxon world’ who was openly saying that he was about to
• • “I Qintervene in French speaking Rwanda”.
Mandela’s speech was not the only ‘Anglo-Saxon’ threat against the Francophonie. The 
RPF consisted primarily of Tutsi refugees that had lived most of their lives in Anglo- 
Saxon Uganda. As such, most of the RPF spoke English and had only a basic knowledge 
of the French language. In contrast, the Hutu government had long-standing ties with the 
French government, strengthened by a French 1990 intervention in which French 
assistance had helped put down an RPF invasion. The French military had trained and 
equipped the FAR at the request of Habyarimana, and apparently continued to import 
arms into Rwanda long after the initiation of the genocide and the imposition of the
36 Adelman and Suhrke, Early Warning and Conflict Management, 55.
37 Ibid., 282.
38 Ibid.
39 Prunier, Gerard. The Rwanda Crisis: History o f a Genocide, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995), 281.
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weapons embargo.40 Moreover, President Mitterand apparently had a very close 
relationship with Habyarimana, as did his son Jean-Christophe, who ran the Africa Office 
at the Elysee.41
The timing of the French decision to intervene supports the contention that France was 
heavily motivated by its desire to preserve its regional influence. Rather than intervene 
when the massacres were at their most intense, the French intervened only after the RPF 
began conquering large amounts of territory. By June 1994, the RPF was defeating FAR 
forces so quickly that it seemed probable that it would conquer the whole country. On 13 
June, the interim Hutu government was driven from its headquarters in Gitarama, and the 
FAR was in full retreat.42 Consequently, Mitterand’s 14 June decision to intervene was 
widely seen as France’s attempt to shore up the FAR forces and stabilise the situation for 
the resumption of the Arusha power-sharing government. The Arusha agreement was 
important for the French because it left the Franco-friendly Hutu majority with a 
considerable degree of power in the new government. Throughout the conflict, the 
French and Rwandan representatives to the UN repeatedly urged both parties to return to 
the framework laid out in the Arusha agreement.
Furthermore, reflections on the strategy used by the French to intervene add to the 
suspicion that the preservation of its regional influence was France’s primary motive for 
involving itself in Rwanda. Initially, the French plan had the forces entering Rwanda in 
the Hutu stronghold of Gisenyi. This was changed due to the negative publicity the 
French were likely to receive. Not only would the Hutu genocidaires celebrate the arrival
40 Human Rights Watch, Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators o f the 
Genocide, Human Rights Watch Arms Project, Vol. 7, No. 4, May 1995. Also see Klinghoffer, 57.
41 Prunier, Rwanda Crisis., 100.
42 Klinghoffer, 55.
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of the French, but also there would be no Tutsi survivors to rescue because they had 
already been killed. Instead, swayed by Prunier’s logic, they agreed to enter the country 
from the south. When the French plan was finalised on 20 June 1994, French 
representatives had yet to make contact with RPF representatives. Needless to say, such 
an “oversight” did not generate confidence in the neutrality of Operation Turquoise as a 
humanitarian intervention.43
Additionally, the manner in which the French communicated their plans to Rwandese 
belligerents made French impartiality suspect. Though the French did not consult 
members of the RPF until days before the intervention, they had been in constant contact 
with the leaders of the “interim government” in Rwanda since the conflict erupted. In late 
April 1994, the French government received in Paris (at the French Presidency and at the 
Office of the Prime Minister) Rwanda’s interim foreign minister Jerome Bicamumpaka, 
and the leader of the extremist Anti-Tutsi party, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza.44 When 
questioned about these meetings, French officials claimed that the visits were unofficial 
and that they had met with the members of the interim government in order to help 
remedy the crisis. According to French officials, ignoring the “interim government”, 
regardless of how undesirable they were, would have reduced French influence and, 
subsequently, the possibility of bringing about a cease-fire.45
Finally, prior to their intervention, the French evacuated approximately 400 Rwandans to 
France, “virtually all of them closely linked to Habyarimana”.46 Habyarimana’s wife and
43 According to Prunier, a meeting with the RPF was finally arranged with French Foreign Minister Juppe 
and the French Defence Ministry on 22 June 1994, the same day the Security Council approved the French 
intervention in Resolution 929. See Ibid., 289.
44 Des Forges, 658.
45 Ibid., 658-9.
46 Ibid., 613.
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family were also evacuated, and she was given US$40,000 upon her arrival in France.47 
In contrast, the five children of the murdered Tutsi Prime Minister, Agathe
A O
Uwilingiyimana, were denied political asylum in France.
Historic Military Ties. Motives within the French military itself were also questionable. 
Because of the close relations and past operations between the French and FAR militaries, 
many French soldiers were upset over “the enemy” RPF victories against their “allies” 
and talked of “breaking the RPF backs”.49 When RPF representatives were brought to the 
French Defence Ministry, Prunier related that considerable efforts were made to avoid a 
confrontation between them and members of “extremist” elements of the French 
military.50 More significantly, many French soldiers who had deployed with Operation 
Turquoise reported that they had been misled as to the reason for the operation. After 
witnessing the effects of Hutu atrocities against the Tutsis, several French soldiers 
expressed their consternation at being led to believe that they were going to rescue Hutus 
from the hands of Tutsis.51
Official Objectives.
Population Protection. The French decision-makers were very clear about their
humanitarian objective for Operation Turquoise. After the Security Council had
approved the French-led intervention, Ambassador Merimee stated the following:
The goal of the French is exclusively humanitarian.... It will not be the mission 
of our soldiers in Rwanda to interpose themselves between the warring parties, 
still less to influence in any way the military and political situation. Our objective
47 Ibid., 659.
48 Klinghoffer, 80.
49 Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 285.
50 Ibid., 289.
51 Raymond Bonner, “As French Aid the Tutsi, Backlash Grows,” New York Times, July 2, 1994, Quoted in 
Des Forges, 681.
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is simple: to rescue endangered civilians and put an end to the massacres, and to 
do so in an impartial manner.52
To quell suspicion further as to its reasons for seeking a Chapter VII mandate,
Ambassador Merimee added that the French objective “naturally excludes any
interference in the development of the balance of military forces between the parties
e'y
involved in the conflict”. In an effort to reassure its wary Security Council members, 
the Security Council authorised the French-led multinational force to carry out only those 
objectives which had been previously approved for UNAMIR II, and specifically stated 
that the operation was to be “impartial” and “neutral” and was “not to constitute an 
interposition force between the parties”.54 Foreign Minister Alain Juppe succinctly stated 
that the purpose of the intervention was to “stop the massacres and to protect the 
populations threatened with extermination”.55 In other words, Turquoise forces were in 
Rwanda solely to protect non-combatants while the combatants would be left to settle the 
dispute amongst themselves. Unlike UNAMIR II, Operation Turquoise was granted 
Chapter VII authorisation to use “all necessary means” to accomplish these tasks.
Similarly, the French stated that the objective of the SHZ was to delineate an area large 
enough to stabilise the masses of threatened people and “facilitate the provision of 
humanitarian aid”.56 By including both the “hundreds of thousands fleeing” (the Hutus) 
and the endangered “minorities” threatened with “elimination” (the Tutsis) in their letter 
to the Security Council, the French implied that the SHZ would protect all non- 
combatants, whether the threat was from Hutu militias or RPF soldiers seeking revenge. 
Put succinctly by Juppe, the objective of the SHZ was to “ensure that the people [were]
52 S/PV .3392, 22 June 1994.
53 S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.
54 S/RES/929, 22 June 1994.
55 Cited in DesForges, 668.
56 S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.
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safe from any threat from any side”.57 As the French letter also stated, creating a truly 
secure zone required ensuring “that no activities threatening the security of the population 
in question were carried out within or from the zone.” In order to accomplish this 
objective, Operation Turquoise troops would have to secure the borders of the SHZ from 
the RPF as well as from the large number of interim government officials, implicated ex­
soldiers, and genocidal militias who had taken part in the killings and then fled amongst 
the population.
Significantly, the objective of ensuring the security of the zone was qualified by the 
French as including only those actions “within their mandate”.58 Since they had 
requested and been authorised in Security Council Resolution 929 to act under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter and use “all necessary means” to achieve their humanitarian 
objectives, this mandate was far from a limitation. On the contrary, the French had the 
authority to use whatever force was necessary to “contribute to the security and protection 
of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda .. .”.59
Regional Stabilisation. Operation Turquoise also had the secondary objective of 
improving regional stability by providing a safe environment for vulnerable non- 
combatants and, thus, reducing their need to flee into neighbouring states. Prior to the 
intervention, French officials made repeated references to the instability that would be 
caused throughout the region by a massive refugee influx unless “steps were taken to 
remedy the situation”.60 By reducing the number of refugees, the French-led coalition 
would not only help stabilise the region, but would also allow NGOs and humanitarian
57 Cited in DesForges, 683.
58 S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.
59 S/RES/925 1994, 8 June 1994.
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organisations in the area to deal more effectively with the huge numbers of refugees they 
already had.
5.3 MEANS AND METHODS
Examining the means and the methods used by the Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR II 
forces helps clarify the ambiguous nature of diplomatic language and face-saving 
rhetoric. Moreover, it provides insight into the actual priorities and intentions of the 
decision-makers. UNAMIR II and Operation Turquoise both claimed as their primary 
objectives the protection of endangered Hutus and Tutsis. Yet, the inadequacy of their 
force structures, strategies, and rules of engagement reveal that they prioritised their own 
protection and the protection of their self-interests over the protection of the endangered 
populations.
5.3.1 Operation Turquoise
Troops and Equipment. When determining what forces would be needed to launch 
Operation Turquoise, French planners were influenced by events in Somalia and 
Bosnia.61 Though the mission was to be a humanitarian one, it would be taking place in 
an environment of active civil war in which one side disapproved of the intervention. 
Furthermore, because the Turquoise forces would be intervening to stop ethnic killings, 
they realised that confrontation with one or both of the combatant parties was a distinct 
possibility. The French claimed that these factors, and not some ulterior political motive, 
determined the heavy force structure for Turquoise. It consisted of 3,060 people,
fOincluding 508 foreign troops from seven different nationalities. Additionally, within
60 S/1994/798, 6 July 1994, “Letter dated 1 July 1994 from the Permanent Representative of France to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”.
61 Prunier, Rwanda Crisis ,289.
62 S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994, 2.
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this number were approximately 300 French Special Forces soldiers, “more than had been 
deployed in any previous French operation”.63 The French forces also contained officers 
and troops who had been assigned in Rwanda before and who had experience dealing 
with Rwandans, and with Rwandan Government military forces.64 Among its other 
capabilities, the French deployed ten helicopters, four Mirage reconnaissance jets, four 
Mirage ground attack jets, four Jaguar fighter-bombers, two heavy mortar sections, a 
twelve-vehicle light armoured car squadron, and various transport and refuelling 
aircraft.65 For all of the firepower the French brought to Rwanda, they did not bring a 
sufficient number of vehicles capable of evacuating people—a shortfall that would cost 
the lives of a number of Tutsis.66
Strategy. The French-led coalition employed inconsistent measures in their attempt to 
avoid dangerous confrontations with hostile elements. In an effort to avoid turning their 
former Hutu allies against them, they minimised their confrontations with the Hutu 
extremists which frequently meant enabling them to continue their deadly practices 
against the Tutsis, even after the French-led coalition had established itself in the country. 
Prior to the SHZ being created, Turquoise forces only sometimes dismantled Hutu 
roadblocks and checkpoints which were being used to stop and identify Tutsis for 
slaughter. Similarly, Turquoise forces were inconsistent in their efforts to disarm the 
genocidaires resulting in the continuation of the ethnic killings in the country. An 
example of less direct, though still severe, negligence was the coalition’s refusal to shut
63 Agence France Presse, “Le ministre de la Defense constate la difficulte de l ’operation Turquoise,” BQA 
No. 14245, 30/6/94, p.31, Quoted in Des Forges, 673.
64 Des Forges, 673.
65 S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994, 3.
66 Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 289.
67 Des Forges, 675-78.
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down the extremist Hutu “hate radio” station, even though they knew that it was inciting 
most of the violence against the Tutsi and the panic among the Hutu.
Furthermore, when Turquoise forces moved into a particular area, they utilised the 
governing structure that was already in place—even though it was made up of the same 
officials who had sanctioned the genocide. Initially, the French did not even arrest known 
genocidaires, though this changed moderately as public opposition to French methods 
grew stronger. When confronted about their tactics, French military and government 
officials generally claimed to be restricted either by their mandate, or the resources at 
their disposal.
The French protection strategy within the SHZ consisted primarily of dispersed foot 
patrols operating around the clock. It was hoped that the obvious French presence within 
the zone would deter future crimes from being committed and eventually restore a 
modicum of stability to the area. Because the French had been allies of the Hutus for so 
many years and because most of the Rwandans spoke French, Turquoise forces were able 
to operate within a relatively non-hostile environment. This environment allowed them to 
adopt “relaxed” patrolling tactics to include putting aside their flak vests and helmets and 
operating without heavy armament. They explained these actions as a method of calming 
the atmosphere within the SHZ.68 Though the French operated in a permissive 
environment, many of the Tutsi within the zone continued to be in great danger. Since 
the French did not have the logistical capacity to patrol in the rural areas, they remained 
in the villages and cities. By setting up the zone, Turquoise forces were largely able to
68 John Borton, Emery Brnsset, and Alistair Hallam, The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: 
Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Study 3, Humanitarian Aid and Effects, (London: Joint Evaluation 
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda Steering Committee, 1996), 56.
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avoid confrontations with the RPF. They refused RPF entry into the zone, but regularly 
allowed armed ex-FAR soldiers and known genocidaires inside.
Rules of Engagement. Operation Turquoise was authorised under Chapter VII of the
Charter to use all necessary means to accomplish its mission. Nevertheless, there was a
great deal of confusion among coalition members as to which ROE governed their
behaviour in specific circumstances. There seemed to be no consistently applied ROE
concerning arrests of known genocidaires or disarmament of individuals. In his
testimony before the French National Assembly, Francis Leotard, French Minister of
Defence in 1994, stated that the orders governing Operation Turquoise “prohibited
French soldiers from making hostile military contact with the RPF”.69 Instead, the
Turquoise soldiers were to obey the following directive:
Adopt an attitude of strict neutrality to the different parties to the conflict. Insist 
on the idea that the French army has come to stop the massacres and not to fight 
the RPF or to support the FAR so that the actions undertaken not be interpreted as 
aiding the government troops.70
To carry out this order, special efforts were made to reduce the chance of confrontation
between the Turquoise forces and the RPF, despite the numerous situations in which local
Hutu officials tried to force a confrontation.
Unfortunately, the directive for impartiality was seemingly contradicted by other French 
leaders who gave misleading accounts of Rwanda’s operational environment to their 
troops. The French National Assembly report showed that the orders issued to coalition 
forces never referred to a genocide but, instead, described the systematic killing as the 
extermination of “several hundred thousand persons of the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups”. 
The phraseology of this statement implied that there had been equivalent massacres
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among the ethnic groups. The orders also recounted numerous RPF atrocities such as 
summary executions and ethnic cleansing.71 As mentioned earlier, such skewed accounts 
prejudiced the expectations of the Turquoise troops, many of whom stated that they had 
initially thought the Hutus were the victims.72 Statements made by a high-ranking French 
military commander also sent mixed signals as to the ROE. On one occasion, Colonel 
Thibault stated that “no quarter” would be given to RPF forces should they engage the
'7'!
Turquoise forces. On another occasion, General Lafourcade, commander of Operation 
Turquoise, announced that members of the interim government would be allowed to seek 
refuge in the SHZ. This statement was quickly countermanded by officials from the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs who stated that members of the interim government who fled 
to the SHZ would be interned.74
5.3.2 UNAMIR II
Troops and Equipment. As previously mentioned, Resolution 918 of 17 May 1994 
authorised UNAMIR II a maximum of 5,500 troops. By 1 August, the Secretary-General 
reported that “even though two and a half months have elapsed since the adoption of 
resolution 918 (1994), UNAMIR is as far from attaining the authorized troop strength as 
it was at the time of the adoption of the resolution”.75 Over 4,420 troops had been offered 
by various African Member States, but only 1,300 had the necessary equipment. The rest 
were dependent on the willingness of other Member States to donate the equipment. 
Some of the equipment had been pledged, but distribution was slow, the equipment was
69 Assemblee Nationale, Tome III, Auditions, Volume I, p. 109 quoted in Des Forges, 672.
70 Assemblee Nationale, Tome II, Annexes, p. 389 quoted in Des Forges, 672.
71 Assemblee Nationale, Tome II, Annexes, p. 386-7 quoted in Des Forges, 673.
72 Bonner, “As French Aid the Tutsi, Backlash Grows,” New York Times, July 2, 1994. Quoted in Des 
Forges, 681. See also Patrick de Saint-Exupery, “Rwanda. Les assassins racontent leurs massacres’, Le 
Figaro, 29 June 1994, cited in Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 292.
73 SWB/Radio France Internationale (4 July 1994) and Le Figaro (6 July 1994) quoted in Prunier, Rwanda 
Crisis, 294. Also see Prunier note 27, 294.
74 Le Figaro (16-17 July 1994) quoted in Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 296
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often in poor condition, and the leasing process set up by some Member States delayed 
the delivery by many weeks.
In light of the approaching withdrawal of Operation Turquoise on 21 August, Boutros- 
Ghali expressed alarm in his 3 August report. He was concerned that, without the 
necessary UNAMIR II troops and equipment in place upon the French departure, there 
would be another wave of refugees from southwest Rwanda. In an effort to bolster the 
IDPs’ security, the newly victorious Rwandese Government agreed not to take immediate 
control of the area provided that UNAMIR would “ensure its stability”. Boutros-Ghali 
stated that it was imperative to deploy three battalions to this sector or else “go into the 
zone with depleted strength and threadbare equipment”.77 On 10 August, a depleted and 
threadbare UNAMIR II began its deployment. UNAMIR II troops were forced to begin 
their mission as best they could with 500 troops and scant equipment (much of which was 
left behind by Turquoise). The total complement of troops did not reach Rwanda until 
after 7 October.78
Strategy. As a Chapter VI force that was reliant mainly on its presence to protect the 
population, UNAMIR IPs primary activities consisted of patrolling, observing, and 
monitoring. From August to October 1994, the force was not at full strength. Therefore, 
rather than try to cover a large area by spreading their forces thinly, the interveners opted 
to decrease their vulnerability by concentrating their forces in the 91 different IDP
75 S/1994/923, 3 August 1994.
76 Ibid..
77 Ibid..
78 S/1994/1344, 25 November 1994.
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camps79 located in the former SHZ. When they did patrol, they reduced their 
vulnerability further by restricting their actions to daylight hours, wearing body armour
O A
and helmets, and driving armoured personnel carriers. Moreover, they made very little 
effort to identify and separate criminal elements within the camps or to ensure that the 
camps were free of weaponry. As a result of UNAMIR II’s concentration on these 
relatively safe tasks, the camps grew increasingly dangerous for the civilian IDPs, the 
humanitarian workers, and the UNAMIR II troops.
By late 1994, additional Hutu extremists had infiltrated the camps from outside the 
country. The extremists smuggled in weapons and strengthened their control of the 
displaced populations through violence and intimidation. In response, UNAMIR II 
increased their number of patrols, added a boat patrol operating on Lake Kivu, and began
Q 1
night patrols using night vision gear. In spite of these efforts, UNAMIR II forces came
89under increasing attack throughout February and March 1995.
In a December 1994 effort to increase the security of the area and make it possible for the 
IDPs to return to their homes voluntarily, UNAMIR II screened out disruptive members 
from two camps. Forty-four people were detained and handed over to Rwandese
89authorities. Additionally, large amounts of weapons, grenades, machetes, and spears 
were confiscated. The success of this mission led to a follow-on operation known as 
Operation Retour, which was an interagency operation designed to facilitate the voluntary 
resettlement of IDPs to their home regions by providing them with security and basic
79 E/CN.4/1995/50Add.4, 16 February 1995, “Human Rights, Mass Exoduses and Displaced Persons: 
Internally Displaced Persons”, Report o f the Representative o f  the Secretary-General, Mr. Francis Deng, 
submitted pursuant to Commission on Human Rights resolution, 1993/95.
80 Borton et. al., Humanitarian Aid and Effects, 66, Endnote 14.
81 S/1995/107, 6 February 1995, Paragraphs 24 and 25.
82 S/1995/297, 9 April 1995, Paragraphs 20-22.
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assistance.84 While these strategies met with some success, they made very little 
difference to the overall security of the displaced population within the camps, which still
Of
numbered approximately 350,000 in February 1995.
Rules of Engagement. Revealing its unwillingness to engage in a dangerous and costly
peace enforcement operation on behalf of the Rwandan population, the Security Council
authorised UNAMIR II under Chapter VI of the UN Charter. In so doing, the Council
emphasised UNAMIR’s reliance on the peacekeeping norms of consent, impartiality, and
use of force in self-defence. As a compromise to those who felt the authority to use force
in defence of the Rwandan people should be more explicitly communicated, the Security
Council added the following provision to the resolution:
Recognizes that the Mission may be required to take action in self-defence against 
persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations 
and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of
Of
humanitarian relief.
In essence, the Security Council was broadening the definition of “self-defence” to 
include defence of the mandate. While this was an important clarification, the Council’s 
use of the “self-defence” terminology and Chapter VI designation limited UNAMIR II’s 
use of force to responsive, defensive reactions rather than more aggressive, offensive 
actions.
5.4 RESULTS
Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR II achieved humanitarian results that were consistent 
with a prioritisation of their self-interests over the safety of the endangered population.
83 S/1995/107, 6 February 1995, Paragraph 26.
84 Ibid., Paragraph 27.
85 Ibid., Paragraph 37.
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The West’s failure to provide adequate protection within the SHZ, whether under the 
supervision of the French-led coalition or UNAMIR II, was the result of the inadequate 
resources and improper strategies dedicated to that mission. Though thousands of people 
benefited to some degree from the interventions, and though lives were saved by the 
efforts, the displaced Rwandans were protected only as long their safety coincided with 
the self-interested pursuits of the interveners. Those pursuits, in contrast to the protection 
mission, were successful in securing some of the unofficial aims for which Western states 
involved themselves.
5.4.1 Operation Turquoise
Population Protection. As previously explained, Security Council Resolution 929 
tasked Operation Turquoise with the primary mission of contributing to the protection of 
the endangered population. The French after-action report issued to the Security Council 
determined that the mission was a success “given the delicate circumstances in which it 
was conducted”.87 Regarding population protection, the French report optimistically 
claimed that Turquoise “put an end to the massacres in Rwanda and ensured the 
protection of the population in the safe humanitarian zone as well as the transition to 
UNAMIR II under satisfactory circumstances”.88 Needless to say, all of these claims are 
highly disputable.
As for ending the massacre of Tutsis and moderate Hutus, the killing had largely abated 
by the time Operation Turquoise deployed, largely because the bulk of Tutsis had already 
been killed, and those that had not were under the protection of the advancing RPF. 
Reports vary as to the actual number of lives saved by the French-led operation.
86 S/RES/918 17 May 1994.
87 S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994.
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According to the French National Assembly report, the French saved 8,000 to 10,000 
Tutsis in the first week when they rescued one of the last remaining Tutsi concentrations 
at Nyarushishi. Additionally, they rescued approximately 1,100 at Bisesero and another
6,000 at Gikongoro for a maximum number of 17,000 Tutsis protected.89 One can only 
speculate how many Hutus may have been spared from RPF reprisals or extremist Hutu 
killings because of the Turquoise presence. A French military estimate puts the figure as 
high as 80,000 to 100,000,90 but Prunier claims this figure is exaggerated for propaganda 
purposes. He claims that his estimate of 10-13,000 lives saved by the Turquoise forces is 
an optimistic one because it assumes that “all the Tutsi in the Nyarushishi camp as well as 
those picked up by French forces at smaller locations otherwise would all have been 
killed—which is unlikely given the speed of the advancing RPF units.. .”.91
Even within the SHZ, the mission’s population protection results were debatable. What 
was not debatable was the operation’s failure to “ensure that no activities threatening the 
security of the population ... were carried out within the zone” as was set forth in the
0*7French letter justifying the creation of the SHZ. As for protecting Tutsis, Turquoise 
forces did remove the militia checkpoints from within the zone increasing freedom of 
movement, but, as the report from the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to 
Rwanda concluded, “there is evidence that the killing of Tutsi continued in the safe zone 
during the intervention in areas away from the Turquoise forces”.94 Prunier reached a
88 Ibid.
89 Assemblee Nationale, Tome I, Rapport, p. 310 quoted in Des Forges, 689.
90 Borton et. al., Humanitarian Aid and Effects, 66,55.
91 Gerard Prunier, “Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political Dead End," The Path of 
a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke eds., (London: 
Transaction Publishers, 1999), p. 303.
92 S/1994/798, 6 July 1994.
93 Borton et. al., Humanitarian Aid and Effects, 54.
94 Ibid., 55.
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similar conclusion and summed up the effectiveness of Turquoise in the following 
manner:
The only people Operation Turquoise could really help were those who were in 
the least danger.... For the many lost in the bush, nothing much could be done.... 
With insufficient numbers and transport capacities, they often had to stand by in 
medium-sized towns while the killing went on unabated in the hills a few 
kilometers away.95
As for the French claim that Hutus in the SHZ were protected from RPF reprisals, no 
proof of an RPF reprisal genocide has ever been substantiated, and treatment of Hutus 
within RPF-controlled zones was generally tolerable. The SHZ did, however, provide a 
haven for the genocidal government and its extremist militias. In the end, this tactic 
exacerbated the vulnerability of Tutsis and moderate Hutus in the immediate term, as well 
as Hutu IDPs and refugees located in militia-controlled camps for years to come. In the 
end, the French-led operation arrested very few of those who were responsible for the 
genocide and clearly assisted some of them to escape across the borders. Thus, the SHZ 
was not secure for innocent Hutus, targeted Tutsis, or for the new Rwandese government. 
In fact, many of these genocidaires, after intimidating the Hutus within the SHZ, fled 
Rwanda and continue to be a major source of insecurity in the region today.
Finally, the French policy to refuse entry in the SHZ to RPF forces and to admit ex-FAR 
forces and genocidaires could be interpreted as a violation of Security Council Resolution 
925 which expressly declared that “the Mission [was] not to have the role of a buffer 
force between the two parties”.96 According to Mats Berdal, “the very suggestion that the 
operation was in some sense ‘impartial’ must appear bizarre to observers on the ground at 
the time, and obscene to those who experienced at close quarter the murderous efficiency 
with which the bands of interahamwe continued to work within the French-controlled
95 Prunier, Rwanda Crisis, 292-3.
96 S/RES/925 (1994), 8 June 1994.
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97zone”. French actions also could be interpreted as a violation of the French assurance 
that Turquoise actions would exclude “any interference in the development of the balance 
of military forces between the parties involved in the conflict”.98
Operation Turquoise was more successful at its task of creating conditions for the
distribution of humanitarian aid. In terms of its contribution to humanitarian assistance,
the French after-action report cited the following accomplishments for Turquoise:
Delivery of 686 tons of government humanitarian aid,
Distribution of 6,000 cubic metres of drinking water in Goma,
Delivery of 250 tons of supplies on behalf of NGOs,
7,811 days of hospitalization for the population,
10,190 medical consultations,
708 surgical procedures,
75,793 health-care procedures,
8,000 corpses collected by the Force,
20,500 interments by air force engineers,
Evacuation of 3,500 individuals, including 1,000 orphans and 600 nuns from 
Rwanda, where their lives were threatened.9
The French report rightly stated that no humanitarian agency “had been able to conduct
significant activities in the area held by the former Rwandese Government”.100 It is true
that Operation Turquoise’s administration of the zone encouraged humanitarian agencies
to enter it and provide humanitarian assistance to the zone’s population; however, several
humanitarian agencies refused to conduct their work alongside the French because of
disagreements with French methods or motivations.101 Furthermore, had the SHZ not
been created and the RPF been allowed to conquer the entire country, there is no reason
to think that humanitarian agencies would not have had the same access to the endangered
population.
97 Mats Berdal, “Lessons not Learned: The Use of Force in Peace Operations in the 1990s”, Adequate 
Debag and Chandra Lecher Siam eds. Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century, Special Issue of 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No. 4, Winter 2000, Frank Cass Journal, 68-9. [55-74]
98 S/1994/734, 21 June 1994.
99 S/1994/1100, 27 September 1994.
100 Ibid.
187
Regional Stabilisation. In its second objective of reducing the regional instability that 
resulted from increased refugee flows, the French-led mission was marginally successful 
in the short-term. The creation of the SHZ initially offered an alternative to crossing the 
border for over a million fleeing Hutus. This was certainly beneficial, both for the IDPs 
and for the humanitarian organisations tasked with assisting them. As the UNHCR and 
various humanitarian organisations in the border regions were already completely 
overwhelmed by the speed and mass of the refugee exodus, the in-country sanctuary 
helped them considerably. In the longer term, the French decision to allow the 
genocidaires into the area and to eventually escape across the borders increased regional 
instability. Not only did the much less capable UNAMIR II force have to deal with the 
security problems created by this decision, but the entire Great Lakes region suffered as a 
result.
Other Results. Although Operation Turquoise was only marginally successful at 
protecting some of the endangered Rwandans and only temporarily successful at 
bolstering regional stability, it was successful in several other areas. First, the 
deployment of the French-led force preserved French domestic support for the 
government. Even though the French motives were questioned and French tactics were 
criticised by the French press, the French government sufficiently satisfied the French 
public’s demand for an intervention. Furthermore, the French intervention, regardless of 
its effectiveness, gave the government grounds for defending its actions. The criticism 
was no longer over French inaction but French methods, and the French government was 
more than capable of providing a plausible explanation for its actions. Second, Operation
101 Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda, (Paris: 
OECD, 1996), 99.
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Turquoise bolstered French credibility and minimised the damage to its regional 
influence. It demonstrated to the Francophonie that France was a dependable ally against 
Anglo-Saxon challengers and sent a signal to these challengers that France would protect 
its interests. In terms of international credibility, the intervention allowed France to take 
the moral high ground regarding international inaction in the face of genocide. Even 
though its motives and methods were suspect, it was still the only state willing to fill the 
gap caused by the international community’s unwillingness to support UNAMIR with 
troops and equipment and French representatives defended their actions strongly.102 
More importantly, all of these benefits came at a minimal cost to the interveners. 
Because Operation Turquoise deployed as an interim force, it did not have to resolve the 
situation or commit to its eventual resolution. Unlike most interventions, it had a definite 
termination date from the very beginning of its operation. It also had the legitimacy of 
the UN behind it, and the authority to use whatever force was necessary to deal with 
unforeseen problems. Lastly, the force was able to minimise its chance of confrontation 
with hostile forces by limiting its operations to a clearly defined area that was off-limits 
to the RPF.
5.4.2 UNAMIR II
Population Protection. UNAMIR II was successful in its effort to protect populations 
only in the sense that it played a contributing role. The circumstances within Rwanda 
changed considerably between the commissioning of UNAMIR II and its actual 
deployment. The war ended a month before the forces arrived and a measure of stability 
had returned to much of the country. With the RPF victory, the Tutsis who had been
102 See Jean-David Levitte’s reply to the UN’s report on Rwanda, “The Situation Concerning Rwanda”, 14 
April 2000, http://www.un.int/ffance/frame anglais/declarations at un/frame ang cs chronologique.htm. 
Accessed 18 July 2003.
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living within the camps went home, leaving UNAMIR II forces with only concentrations 
of Hutus to protect.
IDPs under the protection of the UNAMIR II forces faced dangers from internal and 
external sources. Although IDP camps were already occupied by Hutu extremists when 
UNAMIR II took them over, the interveners were unable or unwilling to confront these 
criminal elements and remove them from among the innocent IDP population. In spite of 
their efforts, UNAMIR II forces were also unable to prevent the further infiltration of 
these hostile elements into the camps. Consequently, IDPs suffered intimidation, 
robbery, violence, and murder at the hands of the Hutu extremists. Moreover, the failure 
of UNAMIR II to create a secure environment for the innocent Hutus negatively affected 
the voluntary return of the IDPs. Those who wanted to return home were often 
intimidated or killed by extremists who were attempting to maintain control over the IDP 
population. Finally, the inability of UNAMIR II to rid the camps of these Hutu 
extremists also affected the distribution of humanitarian aid. Not only did the hostile 
elements threaten and intimidate the humanitarian aid workers, they stole food from the 
IDPs and used it as a tool to control them further.
In addition to these internal dangers, the IDPs were endangered by forces outside the 
camp. RPA forces, in response to attacks and raids from within the camps, occasionally 
reacted in a non-discriminate manner wounding or killing innocent people.103 UNAMIR 
II was virtually powerless to do anything to prevent these actions beyond merely 
observing and reporting them. The coalition’s weakness and the population’s continued 
vulnerability were dramatically demonstrated by the atrocity surrounding the forcible
103 S/1995/107, 6 Feb 1995, para 38.
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closure of the Kibeho camp by the RPA in April 1995. Many non-combatants were killed 
near positions patrolled by UNAMIR’s Zambian battalion as a result of being caught in 
between Hutu extremists and over-reactive RPA soldiers.104
For all its inadequacies, UNAMIR II was successful in some of its functions. As a result 
of UNAMIR II’s contribution to Operation Retour discussed earlier, UNAMIR II forces 
helped resettle 25,000 IDPs by February105 and up to 40,000 by the beginning of April.106 
Nevertheless, this was a relatively insignificant number compared to the estimated 
250,000 IDPs who still inhabited the camps.107
Regional Stabilisation. UNAMIR II’s biggest contribution to regional stabilisation 
resulted from its smooth take-over from Operation Turquoise. The transition, along with 
the decision to keep RPA forces out of the camps, prevented another massive exodus of 
refugees. Although an additional 350,000 Hutus fled into neighbouring states after the 
departure of the French forces, the other 450,000 remained within Rwanda. UNAMIR 
IPs presence throughout the camps also contributed to regional stability by temporarily 
staying the hand of the new Rwandan government from forcibly closing the camps much 
sooner. Had UNAMIR II not deployed, it is highly unlikely that the new Rwandan 
government would have waited as long as it did to forcibly close the camps or that it 
would have devoted as much effort to closing them humanely. Though the Kibeho camp 
closure was tragic, seven other IDP camps were closed during the same period without 
incident. Without the watchful gaze of UNAMIR II to report the efforts, there probably
104 See S/1995/411, 23 May 1995, “Letter dated 19 May 1995 from the Secretary-General to the President 
of the Security Council, transmitting the report, dated 18 May 1995, of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry which reviewed events at Kibeho in April 1995”.
105 S/1995/107, 6 Feb 1995, Paragraph 39.
106 S/1995/297, 9 April 1995.
107 Ibid.
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would have been more such incidents. Finally, the UN deployment may have prevented a
counterattack from ex-government and ex-FAR forces. According to J. Matthew
Vaccaro, UNAMIR II’s
wide deployment served to deter and mitigate tensions as the new government 
tried to rehabilitate the country and develop the infrastructure for a stable civil 
society .... If UNAMIR II had not been present, it is likely that the forces of the 
old regime ... would have counterattacked.108
Other Results. Although UNAMIR II was largely unsuccessful in accomplishing its 
stated objectives, its mere deployment had several important benefits for Western states. 
First, it salvaged the credibility of the West, and the UN more generally. The 
international community was forthcoming in admitting that the deployment was too little, 
too late. Nevertheless, the fact that the Security Council did eventually act prevented its 
critics from dismissing its relevance as a world body altogether. Secondly, UNAMIR II 
salvaged Western states’ domestic credibility. In response to those who demanded action 
on the population’s behalf, decision-makers could take credit for supporting the UN force 
and declare that the UN force was its representative. To those who were opposed to an 
intervention in Rwanda or disagreed with the manner in which it was being conducted, 
Western decision-makers could disavow any responsibility for the UN’s shortcomings.
CONCLUSION
The Western response to the Rwandan crisis revealed the hollowness of its humanitarian 
rhetoric and the prioritisation of its self-interests over the protection of the endangered 
population. In spite of the humanitarian rhetoric espoused by the West, the methods they
108 J. Matthew Vaccaro, “The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda”, in 
William Durch (ed.), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars o f  the 1990s, (New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 399.
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utilised were inconsistent with the humanitarian objective. While the interventions 
resulted in a number of humanitarian benefits, Rwandans were only protected as long as 
their protection coincided with the West’s self-interests. As the Western efforts 
demonstrated, however, determining how best to safeguard self-interest amidst the 
confusion of such complex rivalries and horrific atrocities was a difficult and complex 
task. When the massacres first began, the West prioritised the safety of its inhabitants, 
first by its rapid evacuation of ex-patriots, and then by its reduction of the UNAMIR 
force, even though doing so was certain to cause the deaths of thousands of people. In 
spite of the West’s constant humanitarian rhetoric, it refused to intervene until the bulk of 
the bloodletting was over. When Western states finally succumbed to the domestic and 
international pressure to deploy an augmented UNAMIR force, it took months for the 
necessary personnel and equipment to be supplied. In the meantime, the French-led 
coalition intervened with ample means and strategies to safeguard its self-interests, but 
not to protect the population.
As this chapter has shown, both Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR II avoided those 
tasks which were likely to increase the danger to their troops or otherwise jeopardise their 
self-interests—even if their actions would have decreased the vulnerability of the 
endangered population. The French were able to withdraw at the end of sixty days, 
effectively leaving the dangers associated with the IDP camps to an inadequate UNAMIR 
II force. UNAMIR II, unable to create enough security within the camps to convince the 
IDPs that it was safe to return home, had no choice but to stand and watch as the new 
Rwandan government forcibly closed the camps.
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CHAPTER 6 KOSOVO
INTRODUCTION
The use of “population protection” as a justification for interventions did not end with the 
failure of safe areas in the early post-Cold War period—nor did Western attempts to 
pursue their own self-interests through them. Though the specific methods changed, 
Western states used humanitarian rhetoric as a justification to intervene in several crises 
in the latter half of the 1990s. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) involved the entire nineteen-member Western alliance 
and was perhaps the most publicised example of an intervention justified primarily on the 
grounds of civilian protection. Timothy Garton Ash considered the protection action in 
Kosovo to be the first ‘humanitarian conflict’ in history.1 Adam Roberts noted that the 
conflict was “colloquially called a ‘humanitarian war’”.2 Yet, in spite of these 
designations, NATO’s “protection” effort in Kosovo was perhaps the most obvious 
demonstration of the West’s willingness to protect populations only when doing so 
coincided with the pursuit of its self-interests. While NATO’s efforts ultimately resulted 
in the protection of endangered Kosovar Albanians, their methods demonstrated that 
national and alliance self-interests consistently took precedence over the humanitarian 
plight.3
1 Timothy Garton Ash, ‘Round Table: the global order in the twenty-first century, Prospect, 
August/September 1999, Issue 44, 50-8
2 Adam Roberts, “ ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo”, Survival, Vol. 41, No. 3, Autumn 1999, 102.
3 For simplicity’s sake, this chapter uses the term “Kosovars” only in reference to Kosovar Albanians. 
Similarly, the terms “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and “Serbia” are frequently used interchangeably to 
refer to the source of the Kosovars’ oppression.
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A study of NATO’s action in Kosovo is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. 
Among these is the fact that “Operation Allied Force”, as the action was dubbed by 
NATO, was the alliance’s first unilateral military engagement in its fifty-year history. In 
addition to the controversy created over its humanitarian objectives, the alliance effort 
gave rise to ongoing scrutiny as a case study of alliance politics and behaviour. 
Furthermore, its questionable legality under international law and possible precedent- 
setting implications have remained subjects of great debate, as have the lessons and 
conclusions drawn from NATO’s exclusive use of airpower. While this chapter touches 
on many of these points, its primary purpose is to demonstrate that, in spite of their 
humanitarian rhetoric, Western interveners in Kosovo prioritised the pursuit of self- 
interested objectives over protecting the population and only did the latter as long as, and 
to the extent that, it benefited the Alliance to do so.
6.1 BACKGROUND TO THE PROTECTION INTERVENTION
The trouble in the Serbian province of Kosovo began in earnest in 1989 when Yugoslav 
President Slobodan Milosevic revoked the autonomous status of the province and 
brought it under the control of the government in Belgrade.4 Milosevic then instituted a 
series of highly repressive policies against the Kosovar Albanians, prompting them to 
form a parallel society, complete with an elected parliament and president. In spite of the 
Kosovars’ military inadequacy, they joined the secessionist Yugoslav republics and 
voted for independence in a secret referendum in September 1991. Though the West 
refused to recognise Kosovo’s independence, the shadow government, led by President
4 Numerous authors have written on the path to intervention in a detailed fashion. For instance, see Tim 
Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000) and the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo’s Kosovo Report, www.kosovocommission.org. Accessed 18 July 
2003.
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Ibrahim Rugova, instituted a non-violent strategy for gaining international legitimacy for 
Kosovo’s position.
The futility of this non-violent approach became evident to many Kosovars after the 
signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement in 1995. The status of Kosovo was not 
officially discussed during negotiations and, according to US Special Envoy Richard 
Holbrook, was only broached once to Milosevic in an unofficial setting. As a result of 
the West’s inattention to the Kosovo situation, armed liberation movements like that of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) rose to popularity among the Kosovar population.
Between 1995 and 1998, the KLA and similar groups launched a campaign of violence 
against the Yugoslav army (JNA) forces, special police (MUP), and Serb sympathisers. 
The JNA and the MUP responded using brutal and often indiscriminate force against the 
civilian population. These tactics not only aroused concern within the West, but they 
also convinced more Kosovars to join the KLA. In response to the growing violence, the 
Contact Group states (France, Germany, Italy, the Russian Federation, the United 
Kingdom and the Unites States), in conjunction with the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union (EU) began meeting with and 
exhorting Yugoslav and Kosovar leaders to negotiate an end to the bloodshed in 1997. 
Throughout negotiations, the Contact Group held two objectives constant: respect for the 
current Yugoslav territorial boundaries (i.e. no Kosovar independence) and substantial 
autonomy for the Kosovar province. In spite of these efforts, by 1998, the conflict had 
produced over 200,000 IDPs.5
5 Lawrence Freedman, “Victims and victors: reflections on the Kosovo War”, Review o f International 
Studies (2000), Vol. 26, 351.
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As a result of the Contact Group’s March 1998 recommendations, the UN Security 
Council passed Security Council Resolution (SCR) 1160 on 31 March 1998, imposing an 
arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in condemnation of the Serb’s 
excessive force against civilians as well as the KLA’s acts of terrorism. Though the 
resolution was passed under Chapter VII, it did not specify that the conflict was a threat 
to international peace and security, nor did it justify a military response in any way. 
Furthermore, it reaffirmed the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY and 
expressed its support for an “enhanced status of Kosovo which would include a 
substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration”.6 
According to SCR 1160, the embargo could be rescinded after five conditions had been 
met. The Yugoslavs had to begin a “substantive dialogue” with Kosovars on political 
status issues, withdraw their special police units and cease action against the civilian 
population, allow access to humanitarian organisations and Contact Group 
representatives, accept an OSCE mission, and facilitate a mission from the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.7 These conditions became the foundation for 
subsequent international requirements.
In spite of SCR 1160, the cycle of KLA terrorist action and Serbian excessive force 
against civilians continued to intensify throughout the summer of 1998. Consequently, 
NATO’s decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), approved the 
development of plans for an intervention force. As tragedies within Kosovo received 
greater media attention and refugees fled the province, NAC leaders were finally 
persuaded that the potential repercussions from the conflict were serious enough to 
warrant a NATO bombing campaign against Serbia, even without Security Council
6 S/RES/1160, 31 March 1998, Para 5.
7 Ibid., Para 16.
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authorisation. Though members of the Security Council would not agree to pass a 
resolution authorising force, they did pass SCR 1199 on 23 September 1998 in which 
they reiterated the directives of SCR 1160 and demanded that both sides implement a 
cease-fire. Unlike Resolution 1160, 1199 declared that the situation in Kosovo 
constituted a threat to peace and security in the region.
Three days after the passage of SCR 1199, Yugoslav forces attacked the village of 
Gomje Obrinje with typical excess in response to KLA attacks.8 Twenty-one civilians 
were killed including women, children, and elderly men.9 Following this attack, NATO 
readied itself for a response by approving an activation order for airstrikes. With NATO 
attacks imminent within 96 hours, Richard Holbrook was sent to Belgrade where he 
persuaded Milosevic to agree to reduce the Serbian military and special police presence 
to pre-war levels, and to accept the presence of an OSCE-led Kosovo Verification 
Mission (KVM) as well as a NATO aerial verification mission.10 Significantly, the KLA 
was not party to the Holbrook-Milosevic agreement, nor was there any enforcement 
mechanism specified should Milosevic renege on the agreement.11 In support of the 
Holbrook-Milosevic agreement, the Security Council passed SCR 1203 on 24 October 
1998 calling on the Kosovar Albanians to respect all previous resolutions and cease its 
terrorist attacks.
8 Judah, Kosovo, 179-80.
9 Ibid., 180.
10 For the agreement on the Kosovo Verification Mission, see S/1998/978, dated 20 Oct 1998. For the 
agreement on the NATO aerial verification mission, see S/1998/991, dated 23 Oct 1998.
11 Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo, (Washington 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 57.
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Though the agreement initially appeared to hold, fighting soon erupted again and 
Yugoslav forces moved back into the province.12 The KVM could do nothing but 
watch.13 Eventually, Serb forces launched a brutal attack on the village of Racak where a 
concentration of KLA fighters was believed to be hiding. When KVM chief William 
Walker arrived on scene the next morning, he found forty-five Kosovars dead, including 
two women and a twelve-year-old boy. Walker issued a statement that he would not 
“hesitate to accuse the government security forces of responsibility”.14
Following this incident, the Contact Group persuaded delegations from the Yugoslav 
government and the Kosovar Albanians to meet at Rambouillet, France, to try and defuse 
the crisis with a peace plan that would ensure the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and 
increased autonomy for the Kosovars. Under intense pressure from Western diplomats 
and after a two-week delay requested by the Kosovar delegation so that they could seek a 
consensus at home, the Kosovars signed the agreement on 18 March 1999. The 
Yugoslav delegation refused. Holbrook made one final attempt to persuade Milosevic to 
reconsider. According to Holbrook, Milosevic responded, “No more engagement, no 
more negotiations, I understand that, you will bomb us. You are a great and powerful 
country, there is nothing we can do about it”.15 Operation Allied Force began in earnest 
thirty-four hours after Holbrook left.
12 According to Daalder and O’Hanlon, the re-integration of Yugoslav forces marked the beginning of 
Operation Horseshoe, the Yugoslavian plan to eliminate the KLA and ethnically cleanse Kosovo. Ibid., 58 
and 292, note 139.
13 See William Walker’s testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Cited 
in Sabrina P. Ramet, “The USA: To War in Europe Again”, in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.), 
The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2001), 
171.
14 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 64.
15 BBC Newsnight, 20 August 1999, cited in Judah, Kosovo, 227.
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6.2 MOTIVES AND OBJECTIVES
Western leaders were motivated to intervene in Kosovo by a number of factors. Chief 
among their official motives was the desire to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe within 
Europe. As will be shown in this section, Western leaders and NATO officials 
repeatedly emphasised the humanitarian nature of the campaign, and some NATO 
member states focused on this motive entirely. Additionally, they cited the need to 
prevent the negative effects that the crisis could have on the West, such as instability in a 
vital Western region and the loss of alliance credibility if NATO chose not act in its own 
sphere of influence. Flowing from these official motives, NATO declared that the 
objectives of the intervention were to halt the violence against the Kosovars, enhance 
regional stability in the area, and demonstrate NATO’s opposition to the brutal tactics of 
the Yugoslav government. In addition to these official motives and objectives, there 
were several factors that, while not included in official statements or policy documents, 
nevertheless affected the decision to intervene and the strategies selected by Western 
leaders. These motivating factors included the need to maintain the support of the 
Western public, the desire to overcome a sense of shame over previous Western inaction, 
and the certainty that military success was achievable.
6.2.1 Official Motives
Humanitarian Concern. The humanitarian motive was the primary justification 
presented by Western decision-makers for the intervention in Kosovo. Speaking on 
behalf of NATO member states, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana said that it was 
NATO’s “moral duty to look after Milosevic’s victims”.16 The European Council simply
16 Javier Solana, “Article by the Secretary-General on the Humanitarian Situation”, published 21 May 
1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/articles/a990521 a.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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stated that the campaign was necessary to “put an end to the humanitarian catastrophe in 
Kosovo”.17 When the NAC finally formalised its motives on 12 April 1999, it stated that 
the “unrestrained assault by Yugoslav military, police, and paramilitary forces...on 
Kosovar civilians....” and the “hundreds of thousands of people” expelled from their
1 fthomes “made necessary and justify the military action by NATO”.
At the state level, US president Bill Clinton consistently utilised the language of 
humanitarianism to justify combat action in Kosovo. In his address to the US public on 
24 March 1999, Clinton cited the “need to protect thousands of innocent people in 
Kosovo from a mounting military offensive” as the first of several reasons justifying 
airstrikes.19 After giving a brief history of the crisis, Clinton went on to describe in very 
graphic terms the humanitarian tragedy that was taking place and stated that “ending this 
tragedy is a moral imperative”.20
Similarly, British officials relied heavily on humanitarian rhetoric to justify military 
action in Kosovo. Prime Minister Tony Blair, speaking to the House of Commons the 
day prior to the initiation of airstrikes, stated, “We must act to save thousands of innocent 
men, women and children from imminent humanitarian catastrophe, from death, 
barbarism and ethnic cleansing by brutal dictatorship”.21 A month later, speaking to the
17 “Statement by the European Council (EU), March 24, 1999”, Reproduced in Philip E. Auerswald and 
David P. Auerswald (eds.), The Kosovo Conflict: A Diplomatic History Through Documents, (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2000),724-5.
18 NATO, “The situation in and around Kosovo: Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting 
of the North Atlantic Council held at NATO headquarters, Brussels, on 12th April 1999”, Press Release M- 
NAC-1(99)51, Brussels, 12 April 1999 http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-051 e.htm. Accessed 18 July 
2003. Hereafter referred to as M-NAC-1(91)51.
19 President William J. Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, The White House Office of the 
Press Secretary, 24 March 1999.
http://www.state.gov/www/policv remarks/1999/990324 clinton nation.html Accessed 18 July 2003.
20 Ibid.
21 Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, in the House of Commons, Tuesday 23 March 1999, 
http://www.parliament.the-stationerv-office.co.uk/pa/cml99899/cmhansrd/vo990323/debtext/90323- 
09.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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Economic Club of Chicago, Blair described Operation Allied Force as “a just war, based 
not on any territorial ambitions but on values”.22 He cited “ethnic cleansing, systematic 
rape, [and] mass murder” as examples of the humanitarian catastrophe which made a 
NATO response imperative. The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs, Robin Cook, told the House of Commons on the second day of bombing that 
“not to have acted, when we knew the atrocities that were being committed, would have 
made us complicit in their repression”.23
The French and German governments also justified the intervention on humanitarian 
grounds. French President Jacques Chirac announced that his government had agreed to 
participate in the operation as a result of the Serbian authorities’ treatment of Kosovar 
Albanians. He specifically cited the “floods of refugees, destruction of villages, murders 
and massacres” to support his claim and concluded that such treatment was 
“intolerable”.24 German Chancellor Gerhardt Schroeder used similar language in his 
address to the German people on the first night of the bombing. He said that NATO 
“wants to stop further serious, systematic human rights violations and prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo”.25
Italy, with its pacifist leanings and centre-left coalition government, led by ex-communist 
Premier Massimo D’Alema, focused almost entirely on the humanitarian justification for 
NATO action. Initially, a majority of the Italian population was against the NATO
22 Tony Blair, “Doctrine of the International Community”, Speech by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, to 
the Economic Club of Chicago, Hilton Hotel, Chicago, USA, Thursday 22 April 1999. 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=QpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029 
391647&a=KArticle&aid=1013618397478. Accessed 18 July 2003.
23 Robin Cook, House of Commons debate on Kosovo, 25 March 1999, Hansard, col 538, 
http://www.parliament.the-stationerv-office.co.uk/pa/cml99899/cmhansrd/vo990325/debtext/90325- 
10 spnewO. Accessed 18 July 2003.
24 “Statement by French President Chirac, March 24, 1999”, in Auerswald and Auerswald, The Kosovo 
Conflict, 722-3.
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96action. Only after the government launched the humanitarian effort known as the 
Arcobaleno [Rainbow] mission to help displaced Kosovar Albanians on 29 March, 
coupled with the media’s coverage of the humanitarian catastrophe and refugee exodus, 
did a majority of Italians respond in favour of the war effort. Thus, the Italian 
government repeatedly emphasised the humanitarian basis for their support and relied on 
extensive media coverage of Arcobaleno to maintain domestic support.
Regional and International Stability. The humanitarian motive was often conjoined 
with concern about the crisis’ effect on regional and international stability. A mass 
refugee exodus, as serious as it would be in humanitarian terms, could have been 
potentially devastating for NATO member states in terms of regional and alliance 
stability. Thus the NAC linked its humanitarian concerns with the more self-interested 
concern of stability.27
Many government leaders included this danger to regional stability in their own 
justifications. Harking back to the origins of World War I, some leaders feared that 
Serbian actions in Kosovo could produce a refugee situation in Europe which would 
destabilise not only the Balkans, but also NATO and Europe. In his address to the nation 
on the first night of the air war, President Clinton cited his second justification for action 
as the need to “prevent a wider war; to diffuse a powder keg at the heart of Europe that
98has exploded twice before in this century with catastrophic results”. He specifically 
emphasised the effect that Albanian refugees would have on the countries “struggling
25 “Statement by German Chancellor Schroeder, March 24,1999” in Ibid, 723-4.
26 At the beginning of NATO’s bombing campaign, 49.5 percent of the population felt the attacks were 
unjustified to only 25 percent who felt them justified. By the end of April, 43 percent felt the attacks 
justified to 33 percent unjustified. Ipso findings reported in II Corriere della Sera quoted in Umbarto 
Morelli, “Italy: The Reluctant Ally”, in Tony Weymouth and Stanley Henig (edsj, The Kosovo Crisis:
The Last American War in Europe?, (London: Pearson Education Limited for Reuters, 2001),75.
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with their own economic and political challenges—countries that could be overwhelmed 
by a large, new wave of refugees.. Clinton summed up his speech with the following 
warning:
Let a fire bum here in this area, and the flames will spread. Eventually, key U.S. 
allies could be drawn into a wider conflict, a war we would be forced to confront 
later—only at far greater risk and greater cost.29
Prime Minster Tony Blair was also concerned about the effects of the humanitarian crisis
on the stability of the region. After emphasising the humanitarian justification for action
in his speech to the House of Commons the night before the bombing began, Blair’s
justification turned to more self-interested motives. He said,
We act also because we know from bitter experience throughout this century, 
most recently in Bosnia, that instability and civil war in one part of the Balkans
inevitably spills over into the whole of it, and affects the rest of Europe too If
Kosovo was left to the mercy of Serbian repression, there is not merely a risk but 
a probability of re-igniting unrest in Albania; Macedonia de-stabilised; almost 
certain knock-on effects in Bosnia; and further tension between Greece and 
Turkey. There are strategic interests for the whole of Europe at stake. We cannot 
contemplate, on the doorstep of the EU, a disintegration into chaos and disorder.30
President Jacques Chirac expressed his self-interested concern more simply: “What is at
stake today is peace on our soil, peace in Europe—which we are part of too—and human
rights”.31
NATO also sought to minimise the destabilising effects such a campaign would have on 
NATO-Russian stability. The NAC document emphasised NATO’s desire to “work
T9constmctively with Russia” to reach “a political solution to the crisis”. Because Russia 
was a traditional ally of the Orthodox Serbs, NATO action in the Balkans had the
27 M-NAC-1(99)51, #2.
28 Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, 24 March 1999.
29 Ibid.
30 Tony Blair, 23 March 1999.
31 “Statement by French President Chirac, March 24, 1999”, in Auerswald and Auerswald, The Kosovo 
Conflict, 722-3.
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potential of inciting a much larger conflagration. At the beginning of the conflict, 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin threatened, “This means war in Europe, possibly even 
more”.33 Consequently, NATO was eager to include Russian representatives as members 
of the six-nation Contact Group from the start of the negotiations with Milosevic until the 
conclusion of the Military Technical Agreement that ended the NATO bombing 
campaign.
Finally, the motive of preventing regional instability in Europe was strengthened by its 
potential to jeopardise Western financial prosperity. The Clinton administration made it 
clear that preserving markets was a significant motive in its actions. Defense Secretary 
William Cohen said that the administration’s strategy was to “discourage violence and 
instability, which destroys lives and markets”.34 Clinton himself, the day before the 
airstrikes commenced, commented that “if we’re going to have a strong economic 
relationship that includes our ability to sell around the world, Europe has got to be key.... 
That’s what this Kosovo thing is all about”.35
Alliance Credibility. Western decision-makers were also heavily motivated to intervene 
in Kosovo out of a concern for the credibility of the NATO alliance. According to the 
NAC press release of 12 April, Kosovo represented a “fundamental challenge” to 
NATO’s values and NATO member states committed themselves “to overcoming this 
challenge”.36
32 M-NAC-1(99)51 #8.
33 “Russian condemns Nato at UN”, BBC News web site at http://www.news.bbc.co.uk. 25 March 1999, 
cited in Tim Youngs, Mark Oakes, Paul Bowers, and Mick Hillyard, Kosovo: Operation "Allied Force", 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Paper 99/48, (London: House of Commons Library, 1999), 
10.
34 Cited in Christopher Layne and Benjamin Schwarz, “Making the World Safe for Business”, 2 April 
1999, http://www.greenpartv.org.uk/intemational/intemational/81 /kosovo/safer.htm. Accessed 20 July 
2003
35 Ibid.
36 M-NAC-1(99)51 #1.
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In some ways, Kosovo presented an opportunity for NATO to demonstrate its continued 
relevance and credibility in the new millennium. The alliance had been under increasing 
pressure to prove its relevance in a world where its raison d ’etre had seemingly ceased to 
exist after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Faced with a host of “new threats”, 
the Clinton administration desired to redefine NATO’s Strategic Concept to address “out 
of area” crises and post-Cold War hazards in an effort to make the alliance more credible
' i ' j
in the post-Cold War environment. The plan was to adopt the new Strategic Concept at 
NATO’s fiftieth anniversary celebration in April 1999. James Kurth has suggested that 
the conflict in Kosovo provided the perfect test-bed for convincing reluctant allies of the 
need for the proposed change.38 Kurth’s contention is supported by Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright’s statements at a press conference on 25 March 1999 when she said 
that NATO
has to change its mission  I do think that the NATO alliance has great
relevancy to the 21st century and the end of the 20th in dealing with what we now 
see as major threats. Clearly, Kosovo fits.... I believe that it is an appropriate 
thing for NATO to be doing. 9
Whether or not this was a pre-meditated calculation or a coincidence is beyond the scope
of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is clear that NATO credibility was certainly an issue of
concern that factored into the alliance’s decision to launch and persevere in Operation
Allied Force. Kosovo represented not only a humanitarian crisis that threatened the
stability of the region and the alliance, but a NATO-guaranteed cease-fire that was
openly flouted by Milosevic. If NATO chose not to act while Serb forces expelled the
Kosovar population, the alliance’s warning would be seen as an empty threat, and this
37 James Kurth, “First War of the Global Era: Kosovo and the U.S. Grand Strategy”, in Andrew J.
Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds.), War Over Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001), 74-5.
38 Kurth, 75-6.
39 “Remarks by Secretary of State Albright, March 25, 1999”, in Auerswald’s The Kosovo Conflict, 741.
206
perception could have ultimately diminished the security of its members. President
Clinton appealed to the importance of maintaining NATO credibility:
We pledged that we, the United States and the other 18 nations of NATO, would
stick by them [the Kosovar Albanians] if they did the right thing Imagine
what would happen if we and our allies instead decided just to look the other way, 
as these people were massacred on NATO’s doorstep. That would discredit 
NATO, the cornerstone on which our security has rested for 50 years now.40
Foreign Secretary Robin Cook made a similar statement to the House of Commons when
he asked, “What possible credibility would NATO have next time that our security was
challenged...?”.41 Similarly, in NATO’s one-year evaluation of the Kosovo crisis,
NATO Secretary-General George Robinson relied heavily on NATO credibility as
justification for action. According to his report, “If NATO had failed to respond to the
policy of ethnic cleansing, it would have betrayed its values and cast permanent doubt on
the credibility of its institutions”.42
Not only was NATO concerned about its credibility as an organisation, but NATO 
member states were also concerned with their standing in the alliance as reliable partners. 
Once NATO began contemplating action and it was clear that the US, the UK, France, 
and Germany were in agreement, other members, such as Italy and Greece, who were not 
so convinced of the cause or the wisdom of such a decision, were pressured to go along.43 
Furthermore, once NATO began the campaign, the desire of states to avoid becoming the 
first member to break with the majority and halt the campaign held the alliance together 
through a much longer period than was originally expected.44
40 Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, 24 March 1999.
41 Robin Cook, House of Commons debate on Kosovo, 25 March 1999.
42 Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Kosovo One Year On: Achievement and Challenge, NATO, Bmssels, 21 
March 2000, page 22, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/repo2000/report-en.pdf Accessed 18 July 2003.
43 See Georgios Kostakos, “The Southern Flank: Italy, Greece, and Turkey”, in Albrecht Schnabel and 
Ramesh Thakur (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge o f Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, 
Collective Action, and International Citizenship, 166-70. (166-80) Also “Roberts, 'Humanitarian War’, 
104.
^Roberts, ‘Humanitarian War’, 104.
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6.2.2 Unofficial Motives
Domestic Support. As the media reported Serbian atrocities against Kosovar civilians,
it became increasingly difficult for state decision-makers to justify Western inaction.
Although the Western public was not demanding intervention on behalf of the Kosovars
in March 1999, there was a general recognition among Western leaders that highly-
publicised reports of massacres within Europe required some sort of response if they
were to quell the emergence of domestic outrage. For instance, after the Serb massacre
of Kosovars in the village of Gomji Obrinje on 30 September 1998, NATO threatened
Yugoslavia with airstrikes, which eventually produced the Milosevic-Holbrook
agreement. Holbrook admitted that the media report of the massacre had a definite effect
on key US decision-makers and advisors:
The [New York] Times sat in the middle of the oak table in the middle of the 
situation room, like a silent witness of what was going on. It was one of those rare 
times where a photograph ju s t . . . The terrible photograph of that dead person in 
that village was kind of a reminder, a reality, and it had a very real effect on the 
dialogue. 5
A similar reaction occurred after the Serb massacre near the village of Racak in January 
1999. With the KVM immediately on site declaring it a crime against humanity, the 
story was widely reported in the media. European and American leaders who were 
reticent about launching military strikes were suddenly galvanised into action. The 
resultant response was the ultimatum at Rambouillet. Most Western leaders worried that 
if they did not act, more massacres would occur that would, in turn, result in public 
criticism and doubt.
45 Interview with Richard Holbrook for PBS Frontline. Accessed 18 July 2003, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/holbrooke.html.
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Concern over domestic support also led Western decision-makers to be cautious in their 
approach to intervention. While they all agreed that the humanitarian abuse was tragic 
and had the potential to be catastrophic, they were not convinced that their publics would 
support going to war in order to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe which might have the 
potential to affect their national interests. When considering their options for action, 
Western leaders usually emphasised minimalist methods that were proportionate to the 
level of support they thought they could muster from their publics.
Shame. Adam Roberts concluded that one of the main underlying explanations for 
NATO’s action in Kosovo was “a sense of shame that, in the first four years of atrocious 
wars in the former Yugoslavia (1991-95), they had failed, individually and collectively, 
to devise coherent policies and to engage in decisive actions”.46 Using shame as a tool to 
gamer public support, President Clinton reminded the public of the thousands of lives 
lost and the prolongation of World War II which resulted from America’s delayed entry 
in that war.47 Additionally, US Secretary of State Madeline Albright, one of the more 
determined advocates for using force in Kosovo, recommended the use of decisive action 
based partially on her previous experience with Bosnia. According to an interview she 
gave to the media, she told her colleagues in the Contact Group that “we learned a lot of 
lessons in Bosnia, where we waited too long to do something—that, as foreign ministers, 
we would be judged very harshly if we allowed something like this to happen again.. ,”.48 
The French, who had suffered 72 fatalities as a result of the previous ineffective action in 
Bosnia, as well as negative publicity from their actions in Rwanda, were also motivated
46 Roberts, 102.
47 Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, 24 March 1999.
48 Interview with Madeline Albright for PBS Frontline, Accessed 18 July 2003. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/albright.html.
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by past failures and mistakes.49 Finally, the tragic results of Western inaction in Rwanda 
and Clinton’s subsequent promise to Rwandese victims that the US would “increase our 
vigilance and strengthen our stand against those who would commit such atrocities in the 
future—here or elsewhere” may also have contributed to his resolve for strong action.50
High Probability of Success. Another important factor that motivated the West to 
intervene was the thought that it could succeed in its objectives quickly and at a tolerable 
cost to itself. First of all, NATO leaders had been given reasonable assurance that Russia 
would limit its disapproval of the action to verbal denunciations. According to Richard 
Holbrook, Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister, told a meeting of foreign ministers 
and OSCE representatives, “If you take it [the use of force against Yugoslavia] to the 
UN, we’ll veto it. If you don’t we’ll just denounce you”.51
Western leaders were also confident in their knowledge of the adversary. They had been 
dealing with Milosevic throughout the 1990s because of the conflicts in Croatia and 
Bosnia. Prior to the Dayton Peace Agreement, many Western leaders and special 
representatives had met with him numerous times. On several occasions NATO military 
leaders had been involved in direct negotiations with him as they sought his influence in 
dealing with Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karazdic. In fact, the military commander of 
NATO’s forces in Europe, US Army General Wesley Clark, and other senior military 
figures had personally met with him on several occasions. They had seen Milosevic’s 
reactions and concluded that unless pressure was applied in combination with the threat
49 Simon Duke, Hans-Georg Ehrhart, and Matthias Karadi, “The major European allies: France, Germany, 
and the United Kingdom”, in Schnabel and Thakur (eds.), Kosovo and the Challenge o f Humanitarian 
Intervention, 128 -148.
50 William Jefferson Clinton, “Text o f President Clinton’s address to genocide survivors at the airport in 
Kigali, Rwanda, on March 25, 1998, as provided by the White House”, 
http://www.rudvfoto.com/ClintonApologv.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
51 Cited in Judah, Kosovo, 183.
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and willingness to use force, he would resist. However, the conclusion they drew from 
his reactions to NATO’s bombing campaign in Bosnia, and from his concession in 
October 1998 in response to NATO’s threat to launch airstrikes, was that he would 
concede either at the last minute or else shortly after the bombing started. 
Consequently, most decision-makers expected Milosevic to agree to the Rambouillet 
demands at the last minute. When he did not, their incredulity led them to send Holbrook 
for one last meeting with him. When he still refused, many expected that a short 
demonstration of NATO resolve in the form of airstrikes would bring him back to the 
negotiating table.
These assessments led many key decision-makers to conclude that if military action was 
required, it could be accomplished through the use of airpower at a tolerable cost to 
themselves. Airpower meant that the probability of casualties would be low. 
Additionally, as it would be quick, the chance of alliance fragmentation and erosion of 
popular support would also be significantly minimised. NATO’s miscalculation of the 
amount of force and time that would be required to bring Milosevic to the table 
significantly affected the manner in which NATO conducted the war.
6.2.3 Official Objectives
The official objectives of the Kosovo operation varied depending on the source of 
information and the timing of the statement. For instance, the day after the bombing 
began, NATO Secretary-General, Dr. Javier Solana, said that the objectives were to “halt
52 Based on Ivo Daalder and Michael O’Hanlon’s “extensive interviews in Washington, in key allied 
capitals, and at NATO headquarters”. Winning Ugly, 91.
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the violence and to stop further catastrophe”.53 When pressed on these objectives by the 
media, he went on to explain that NATO’s objectives were the same objectives the 
international community had stated on many occasions, “a political agreement that would 
allow peace and stability in that region of Europe”.54
NATO’s “strategic objectives”, according to the Department of Defense After-Action 
Report, were taken from President Clinton’s speech on 24 March 1999. These objectives 
were to:
(1) demonstrate the seriousness of NATO’s opposition to Belgrade’s aggression 
in the Balkans, (2) deter Milosevic from continuing and escalating his attacks on 
helpless civilians and create conditions to reverse his ethnic cleansing, and (3) 
damage Serbia’s capacity to wage war against Kosovo in the future or spread the 
war to neighbors by diminishing or degrading its ability to wage military 
operations.5
These objectives have been referred to as the three “Ds” (demonstrate, deter, damage). 
Notably absent from the list was “defeat.” Nowhere did the alliance seek to defeat 
Milosevic per se. In fact, General Klaus Naumann, NATO’s Military Committee 
chairman during Kosovo, summed up NATO’s objective as an “operation” (as opposed 
to a “war”) “to bring [Milosevic] back to the negotiation table...not to enforce our will 
on him”.56
While these strategic objectives were verbalised on more than one occasion in a variety 
of forms, NATO did not release a formal statement outlining its objectives until the NAC 
document of 12 April 1999. At that time, the humanitarian situation had changed
53 NATO, Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark, 
NATO HQ, 15.00 hours, Transcript 25 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm. 
Accessed 18 July 2003.
54 Ibid.
55 US Department of Defense, “Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report”, Executive 
Summary, 30 January 2000, xvii. (Hereafter DoD “After Action Report”). 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02072000.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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drastically in Kosovo as JNA troops and special police forces had initiated a massive 
campaign of ethnic cleansing and hundreds of thousands of refugees had already fled into 
the region.
Faced with this new predicament, NATO released a more formal set of objectives than 
those set forth earlier. The NAC document stated that, in order for NATO to cease its 
bombing campaign, Milosevic had to
• ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of 
violence and repression;
• ensure the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary 
forces;
• agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
• agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced 
persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
• provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the 
Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement 
for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United 
Nations.57
This new set of objectives took as their starting place the humanitarian tragedy that the 
previous three weeks of bombing had failed to deter. The five objectives were also very 
similar to the requirements set out in UN Security Resolution 1199 of 23 September 
1998. All five objectives reflected NATO’s intention to protect the population, preserve 
regional stability, and bolster alliance credibility. As published, the third objective was 
somewhat misleading in its official form. NATO did not merely want an international 
military force in Kosovo, it demanded that the military force be led by NATO.
56 General Klaus Naumann, Interview with PBS Frontline, “How was it fought?” Accessed 18 July 2003. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/fighting/fighting.html.
37 M-NAC-1(99)51, Paragraph 4.
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6.3 MEANS AND METHODS
The means and methods adopted by NATO in Operation Allied Force revealed a great 
deal about the priority of its objectives. In spite of NATO’s stated emphasis on 
population protection, the strategy it designed, the force structure it employed, and the 
rules of engagement it instituted reflected a greater concern about the potential effects of 
the humanitarian crisis on Western self-interests. NATO leaders knew that its decision to 
launch Operation Allied Force could well be answered by the JNA with an ethnic 
cleansing campaign against Kosovar civilians, yet they refused to employ the resources 
that could have provided the greatest measure of protection (such as ground forces and 
aircraft specializing in close air support) because of the danger inherent in their missions. 
The forces NATO did employ were constrained by highly restrictive rules that limited 
their effectiveness in protecting endangered non-combatants.
6.3.1 Troops and Equipment
For all the humanitarian rhetoric, the force structure of Operation Allied Force was 
primarily designed to prevent allied casualties and limit collateral damage. Because most 
heads of state believed that a short demonstration bombing was all that would be 
necessary to convince Milosevic to agree to NATO’s terms, Operation Allied Force
ro
began the air campaign with only 350 aircraft supplied from thirteen nations. 
According to Daalder and O’Hanlon, that was about the number of aircraft used in 
Operation Desert Fox, the four-day bombing effort against Iraq in 1998.59 At the end of 
the bombing campaign, the alliance had almost tripled that number, with over 1000
58 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 117.
59 Ibid., 103.
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aircraft from 14 countries available for tasking—the US supplying 740 aircraft and 
thirteen allies contributing another 300.60
At the beginning of the campaign, when optimism for a quick result ran high, almost 
ninety percent of all bombs dropped were precision-guided munitions (PGMs). A large 
number of these were “stand-off’ weapons which could be fired miles away from their 
targets and guided to their aim points. The precision of these weapons made them highly 
effective but, even more importantly, they minimised the danger to coalition combatants. 
Of these, cruise missiles, such as the Conventional Air Launched Cruise Missile 
(CALCM) and the Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) were extremely valuable, 
partly because of their semi-precise Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) guidance 
capability. GPS-guided weapons were able to strike their targets regardless of adverse 
weather or cloud cover, a capability that laser-guided weapons did not possess. During 
the first phase of the bombing campaign alone, 160 cruise missiles were launched from 
the air and sea. Over 300 cruise missiles would be used before the campaign’s end.61 
Other GPS-guided munitions such as the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which 
was delivered by the B-2 Stealth Bomber, and the US Navy’s Standoff Land Attack
f\0Missile (SLAM) were also used effectively against fixed objects. As valuable as these 
stand-off weapons were in protecting pilots and hitting fixed sites, they were ineffective 
against mobile targets, such as the fielded forces who were committing atrocities against 
the Kosovar civilians. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) were also used extensively 
for the first time to do reconnaissance, target identification, and battle damage 
assessment. Moreover, by the war’s end, plans were underway to use UAVs to laser
60 DoD “After Action Report”, 78, and Daalder and O’Hanlon, 117.
61 Daalder and O’Hanlon, 103 and William M. Arkin, “Operation Allied Force: ‘The Most Precise 
Application of Air Power in History’”, in Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen (eds.), War Over 
Kosovo: Politics and Strategy in a Global Age, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001),21.
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• 63designate targets. The use of these weapons and weapons platforms gives some 
indication as to NATO’s prioritisation of its pilots’ safety and the pursuit of self- 
interested objectives over the lives of endangered non-combatants.
When considering Operation Allied Force, the aircraft and munitions that were not 
employed are as important to the analysis as those that were. The most obvious military 
capability missing in Kosovo was a ground combat force. Undoubtedly, ground forces 
would have been the most effective means of protecting endangered populations against 
fielded forces. In spite of this, the alliance decided against their use from the beginning 
of the campaign because ground operations significantly increased the potential for a 
long, casualty-producing war that was certain to result in a highly critical public 
response.
Also notably absent for the first two weeks of the campaign was the deployment of A-10 
aircraft, known for their prowess at providing close air support (CAS) to ground troops 
against tanks and artillery, and ideal for the population protection mission. They were 
not used against JNA fielded forces until 6 April 1999 and then only in a limited 
fashion.64 When questioned about the A-lO’s absence early in the war, US Vice Admiral 
Fry, Joint Staff Director of Operations, replied that the air defence environment was too 
dangerous for the A-10s, signifying once again the priority concern for NATO
62 DoD “After Action Report”, xxiii and Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 144.
63 Andrew Krepinevich, “The Lessons of Kosovo”, Backgrounder, 13 October 1999, 
http://www.csbaonline.Org/4Publications/Archive/B.19991013.The Lessons of Kos/B. 19991013.The Les 
sons of Kos.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
64 Edward N. Luttwak, “Give War a Chance”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999, 41 and Jamie McIntyre, 
“A 10 antitank planes used for first time in Yugoslavia, Pentagon says”, 7 April 1999, CNN, 
www.cnn.com/us/9904/07/us.kosovo.militarv. Accessed 18 July 2000.
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combatants over foreign civilians.65 When A-10s were employed, they garnered more 
negative attention for their use of depleted uranium rounds than for the positive effect 
they had on the protection mission.
Attack helicopters, considered ideal for protection missions, were also conspicuous in 
their absence. While many NATO countries possessed ground attack helicopters, none 
volunteered them for use in Kosovo because of their vulnerability to the JNA’s potent air 
defence capability. The ill-fated deployment of Task Force Hawk to Albania revealed 
much about the West’s priority objectives. Although the twenty-four US Army Apache 
helicopters were reputed to be extremely valuable assets for use against ground forces, 
their deployment to Albania took an unexpected three weeks,66 after which their use was 
furthered delayed so that the pilots could complete their in-theatre training. Two 
helicopters crashed on training missions within two weeks of each other resulting in the 
deaths of two pilots (the only allied fatalities of the war). Finally, once the helicopters 
were in place and the pilots had been trained for the mission, there emerged considerable
f \  7disagreement among US officials over their use. Throughout these delays, Kosovar 
civilians continued to suffer at the hands of Yugoslav forces. When Operation Allied 
Force ended in July 1999, Task Force Hawk had yet to fly a combat mission in Kosovo, 
largely because the air threat was deemed too great for the aircraft. General Wesley 
Clark, nevertheless, concluded that Task Force Hawk was an important factor in 
Milosevic’s decision to concede because it presented a visible signal that a ground
65 Department of Defense News Briefing, Vice Adm. Scott A. Fry, Joint Staff Director o f Operations, Rear 
Adm. Thomas R. Wilson, Joint Staff Director of Intelligence, 30 March 1999, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Marl999/t03301999 t0330kos.html Accessed 18 July 2000.
66 Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modem War: Bosnia, Kosovo and the Future o f Modem Combat, (Oxford: 
Public Affairs Ltd, 2001), 279-80.
67 Ibid., 279-81,305-7, 322-23, 333-4.
68 Luttwak, 41 and Daalder and O’Hanlon, 126.
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invasion was increasingly likely.69 According to General Clark, “The Apaches were 
always more than Apaches. I liked having the tanks the artillery, and the radar all there.
70That was the ground threat”. While Task Force Hawk may have represented a ground 
threat in the eyes of NATO, it must have seemed a rather hollow one to the hundreds of 
thousands of Kosovar Albanians who were driven from their homes and terrorised by the 
Yugoslav forces. NATO’s force structure clearly was not designed with population 
protection as the priority objective.
6.3.2 Strategy
From the beginning of NATO’s planning effort, the allies disagreed over the best way to 
engage the JNA militarily. One thing that most decision-makers did agree on, however, 
was the impossibility of getting all the NATO member states to concede to the use of 
ground forces. The Clinton administration was initially opposed to a ground option 
because it did not think that Congress or the US public would support such an action in 
the Balkans. Ground wars conjured up images of long, drawn out conflicts with high 
casualty rates—both of which would probably incite an intensely negative public 
reaction. Thus, Clinton assured the nation on the first night of the campaign, “I do not 
intend to put our troops in Kosovo to fight a war”.71 Similarly, when US Secretary of 
Defense Cohen was asked if he could categorically state that ground troops would not be 
used, Cohen replied that “what we have indicated to the Congress and to the country is
77that this is an air operation, campaign [sic]”.
69 Clark, Modem War, 410.
70 Cited in James Der Derian, Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment 
Network, (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), 195.
71 Clinton, “Statement by the President to the Nation”, 24 March 1999.
72 William Cohen, Department of Defense News Briefing, 24 March 1999, 
http://www.dod.mil/news/Marl999/t03241999 t0324sd.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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The US was not the only NATO member to reject a strategy requiring ground troops, 
though it was the most influential. With the exception of the UK (and even it had serious 
reservations), the alliance was firmly set against the idea of using ground troops to force 
an agreement. Germany had historical baggage to overcome as well as a Social- 
Democrat/Green Party coalition government that was generally opposed to military 
action. On 19 May, German Chancellor Schroeder announced that German troops would 
not fight in Kosovo and threatened to veto the idea in NATO.73 The Greeks, who had 
even opposed NATO airstrikes, were totally averse to the thought of using ground forces 
against their Orthodox Serb brothers. While not a NATO member, Russia’s opinion also 
affected the NATO decision. On 9 April, President Yeltsin threatened a Russian military 
response if NATO launched a ground war.74 Thus, for much of the planning and conduct 
of Operation Allied Force, the UK was the only member state that consistently advocated 
the use of a ground component as part of its strategy in the Balkans.
In contrast to the political leaders, NATO’s military leaders argued strongly for a ground 
option before the bombing began. NATO’s head of the Military Committee, German 
General Klaus Naumann warned politicians that they were asking the impossible from 
the air.75 Both General Clark and Lieutenant General (Lt Gen) Michael Short, NATO’s 
Joint Forces Air Component Commander for Operation Allied Force, expressed their 
doubts that an air-only strategy could accomplish the humanitarian objectives. In spite of 
these warnings, the maintenance of alliance unity overrode military necessity. 
Consequently, when the FRY intensified its campaign against the Kosovars, there was
73 Sabrina P. Ramet and Phil Lyon, “Germany: The Federal Republic, Loyal to NATO”, in Tony 
Weymouth and Stanley Henig (eds.J, The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe?, (London: 
Pearson Education Limited for Reuters, 2001),93.
74 Youngs et. al., Operation “Allied Force”, FCO Research Paper 99/48.
75 Gen Klaus Naumann, Interview with PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/naumann.html.
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nothing the alliance could effectively do on a tactical level. Only as winter approached 
and Milosevic continued to defy NATO’s aerial bombardment did the alliance, led by the 
UK, seriously consider using ground troops. By this time, the humanitarian displacement 
had already occurred on a massive scale.
Airpower, on the other hand, was relatively safe, quick, and precise. Even so, there were 
disagreements among the allies about the type of air strategy that should be used. US 
military planners sought to conduct a “classic air campaign” along the Gulf War model. 
They envisioned a strategic campaign aimed at crippling key targets in Kosovo and 
Belgrade, selected with the aim of inflicting maximum pressure on the FRY government 
and forcing them to capitulate.76 If the campaign succeeded quickly, the need for tactical 
protection of civilians would be minimised. Some NATO member states were 
uncomfortable with this intense approach and sought a more incrementalist effort aimed 
not at the FRY’s defeat, but at signalling NATO’s resolve, bringing Milosevic back to 
the negotiating table, and targeting the fielded forces in Kosovo if necessary.
The resultant air campaign was a mixture of both plans with the US-proposed strategic 
option only to be used in the unlikely event that the demonstration bombing did not 
work. The campaign was divided into five-phases designed to gradually intensify the
• 7 7  •pressure on Milosevic in response to the level of his resistance. Phase 1 was chiefly 
intended to be a signal to Milosevic in which NATO would demonstrate its resolve by 
destroying the FRY’s Integrated Air Defence System (IADS). During this phase, NATO 
aircraft would only be allowed to operate north of the 44 parallel (Belgrade and Novi
76 Lieutenant General Michael Short, Interview with PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/short.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
77 Phases 0 and 4 were deployment and redeployment respectively.
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Sad) in attacks against the IADS. Phase 2 would target fielded forces within Kosovo, 
and Phase 3, if necessary, would engage strategic targets north of the 44th parallel.78
When Phase 1 began on 24 March 1999, NATO leaders and heads of state were quick to 
emphasise the military nature of the targets in order to quell any domestic opposition. 
Secretary-General Solana described the objectives of the attacks as being “carefully 
chosen military targets” and General Clark reiterated the “military” focus of the attacks 
five different times in his prepared statement.79 Tony Blair also emphasised that the 
attacks targeted the “military capability of the Serb dictatorship” as did other state 
leaders.80 Yet for all of the speeches and justifications, Phase 1 was largely designed to 
demonstrate resolve and preserve alliance credibility. It was supposed to demonstrate to 
Milosevic that the NATO threat was credible; it would signal NATO’s resolve to the 
international community and to the Western public; and it would reveal the level of 
domestic support within individual member states.81 Thus, when the campaign began 
only 51 targets had been approved for 2 or 3 days of demonstration bombing,82
Because the JNA did not use radar to engage NATO aircraft with surface-to-air missiles, 
the alliance pilots were unable to detect and destroy their IADs and achieve aerial 
supremacy. Consequently, when the alliance moved into Phase 2 on 27 March, the 
aircraft were forced to remain at high altitudes and the targets were largely limited to
78 United States Senate, Armed Services Committee, “Joint statement on the ‘Kosovo After Action 
Review”’ presented by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 14, 1999,
http ://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct1999/b 10141999 bt478-99.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
79 NATO, Press Conference by Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana and SACEUR, Gen. Wesley Clark, 
NATO HQ, 15.00 hours, Transcript 25 March 1999, http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/p990325a.htm. 
Accessed 18 July 2003.
80 Statement by the Prime Minister, Tony Blair in the House of Commons, Tuesday, 23 March 1999.
81 General Wesley Clark, Frontline.
82 Ibid.
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infrastructure and fixed targets inside Kosovo rather than the mobile forces that were 
terrorising the population.
When it became clear that Phase 2 was not having any significant effect and the 
humanitarian situation was growing increasingly horrific (and more widely reported), 
some political leaders did not feel comfortable moving to Phase 3, for domestic political 
reasons. As a compromise, they moved to “Phase 2 Plus” on 30 March which authorised 
NATO’s Secretary-General to approve specific targets north of the 44th parallel as long 
as he informally consulted with political leaders on particularly sensitive targets, and as 
long as General Clark continued to solicit input from other military leaders.
Within “Phase 2 Plus”, NATO attacked dual-use civilian infrastructure such as bridges, 
rail networks, radio and television transmitters, telephone relays, oil refineries, and 
specific “leadership” targets such as one of Milosevic’s homes. According to Lt Gen 
Short, these initial strategic attacks on Belgrade were just starting to bring pressure to 
bear on Milosevic when Short was ordered to divert the air effort back to Kosovo due to 
increased political pressure to “do something” to help the Kosovar Albanians. Military 
officials argued for three weeks that tactical targets could be attacked in parallel with
Q C
strategic targets before the political leadership finally agreed.
In the end, it was not the humanitarian catastrophe, or the advice of the military 
leadership, or any other factor that prompted the change in strategy; rather, it was the 
growing realisation among NATO leaders that they might lose the war. At the NATO 
Summit on 25-26 April, NATO heads of state issued a strongly-worded statement
83 Daalder and O’Hanlon, Winning Ugly, 117.
84 Lt Gen Michael Short, Frontline.
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expressing their united commitment to accomplishing their objectives in Kosovo. After 
the summit, military commanders were given much more latitude to attack a wide range 
of targets north of the 44th parallel, but, by this time, much of the humanitarian tragedy 
had already taken place.
6.3.3 Rules of Engagement
The troops and equipment that NATO did employ in Operation Allied Force were 
governed by highly restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). The ROE in Kosovo were 
primarily the result of compromise decisions designed to coerce Milosevic while 
preserving alliance unity, maintaining political cohesion, bolstering public opinion, 
increasing support within the international community, and reducing the risk to Allied 
military personnel and foreign non-combatants. Protecting vulnerable populations was a 
secondary consideration. Fighting within the construct of the NATO alliance imposed a 
number of “rules” or procedural restrictions on allied planning in addition to the ROE 
that governed target selection and target engagement.
Alliance Procedures. As a result of the West’s decision to fight within the structure of 
NATO, several procedural rules restricted the manner in which the operation was 
planned and conducted, often to the detriment of the endangered population. First, all 
nineteen members had an equal standing and an equal voice in the decisions that were 
made, regardless of the size of the country or the proportion of resources they dedicated 
to the fight. Technically, any single member of the alliance had the authority to veto a 
particular action. Because NATO was an alliance composed of democracies, each with 
its own concerns and unique circumstances, maintaining consensus, while vital, was 
extremely difficult to accomplish. During Operation Allied Force, compromise was key
85 Short, Frontline.
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to maintaining alliance unity. If one country was opposed to a particular target being 
struck, it could veto it outright. Alternatively, it could refuse the use of its own 
resources, or other resources based on its soil, while still agreeing to let the attack 
continue by other means. In most cases, Secretary-General Solana was authorised to 
approve specific targets, but for those targets that were particularly sensitive, such as 
those in heavily-populated areas, he had to seek specific approval from the governments 
involved.
These rules were often frustrating for the military commanders who were trying to 
conduct a sustained air campaign, especially when the reticent member state brought 
little or nothing militarily to the fight. General Clark recounted that many times he had 
to go to Solana and ask for his assistance in dealing with a resistant ally over a 
particularly important target. Lt Gen Short was so frustrated by these procedural rules 
that after Operation Allied Force ended, he publicly advocated doing away with the veto
o r
and letting the country with the most at stake have the most influence. In the end, 
NATO member states found enough common ground, and held it long enough, to force 
Milosevic to agree to their terms, but the resultant compromises were frequently 
achieved at the population’s expense.
Target Selection. The manner in which targets were chosen and approved was highly 
complex and restrictive because of the desire among planners to avoid excessive 
collateral damage and, with it, the loss of public support and alliance unity. 
Consequently, military planners and intelligence experts from several agencies evaluated
86 Lt Gen Michael Short, Frontline.
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targets according to a number of criteria. US Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre
described the questions that were considered before selecting a particular target:
Is this a legitimate target [under international law]? How does it relate to our 
military goals? What role does it play in our opponent’s system of operations and 
how will it affect him if it is destroyed? Can we constrain our intended damage 
to this target only? What is the likelihood of unintended damage and how can we 
minimize unintended damage by changing the time of day or the physical 
direction of the attack?87
In addition to the target, the type of munition to be employed, the precise point where it
was to strike, and the specific type of aircraft to deliver it were all thoroughly considered
prior to each attack. According to General Clark, the allies devised a system in which
targets were classified according to their likelihood to produce collateral damage. The
potential damage was then compared to the anticipated benefit of destroying the target.
Targets that had “high political symbolism”, such as the television station in Belgrade,
had to be worked “through the nations, step by step”.88
Once a target was selected, it had to clear numerous legal hurdles before being bombed. 
At each level of the chain of command, targets were legally reviewed, both within NATO 
and individual member states. For example, in the US, certain targets had to have the 
personal approval of both the President and the Secretary of Defense. Before getting that 
approval, the targets faced a final legal review from their two separate sets of legal 
advisers.89
Target Engagement. The manner in which bombs could be dropped was also tightly 
restricted. In some cases, the restrictions served to minimise collateral damage; in others,
87 Statement of the Hon. John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense Before the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 22 July 1999, cited in Arkin, 7.
88 General Wesley Clark, Interview with PBS Frontline,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/clark.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
89 DoD “After Action Report”, 24.
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they were meant to reduce the risk to allied pilots. According to Lt Gen Short, pilots had 
to visibly identify every “target every time we were going to strike a tank or an artillery 
piece”.90 This requirement was especially restrictive due to the region’s frequent adverse 
weather and cloud cover. Many aircraft returned to base without dropping their bombs. 
Alliance leaders were so concerned about bombing errors, that pilots were authorised to 
radio Lt Gen Short directly to ask his permission to engage a target.
Even with this requirement, pilots occasionally made mistakes and bombed incorrect 
targets. This was partly due to the altitude restrictions that were imposed in order to 
minimise pilots’ vulnerability to anti-aircraft artillery, shoulder fired surface-to-air 
missiles, and small arms fire. Initially, NATO military leaders decided that pilots could 
not fly below 15,000 feet. While this altitude was ideal for PGMs aimed at fixed targets, 
it had a negative effect on the pilots’ ability to identify and engage fielded forces. The 
15,000-foot restriction made it very difficult for pilots to properly identify and 
distinguish paramilitary forces from refugees, and military vehicles from farm 
equipment. While pilot safety was increased as a result of the altitude restriction, 
bombing accuracy, and, hence, civilian protection was decreased. In fact, as a result of 
the much-publicised accidental bombing of a refugee convoy on 14 April, Lt Gen Short 
changed the ROE to allow observer aircraft to go as low as 5,000 feet, and striking 
aircraft as low as 8,000 feet, in order to positively identify a target.91 Regardless of this 
change, the ROE revealed NATO’s general prioritisation of alliance unity, credibility, 
and safety over the effective protection of civilian lives.
6.4 RESULTS
90 Lt Gen Michael Short, cited in Arkin, 15.
91 Short, Frontline.
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According to NATO officials and military commanders, Operation Allied Force was a 
successful operation. Speaking as NATO’s Secretary-General in his October 2000 
assessment of Operation Allied Force, George Robertson proclaimed, “The risks were 
high -  NATO faced many problems -  and the price was high. But as the Alliance 
promised at the time, Serb forces are out, KFOR is in, and the refugees are home”. 
Robertson’s optimistic outlook was reinforced by the Pentagon’s official “after-action” 
assessment which called the operation “an overwhelming success”. According to the 
report, “NATO accomplished its mission and achieved its strategic, operational, and 
tactical goals in the face of an extremely complex set of challenges”.
Rather than take these bold declarations at face value, this section evaluates these claims 
in light of the official objectives that were discussed in Section 2. The purpose is not to 
evaluate the success of the overall operation, but merely to demonstrate that NATO’s 
commitment to population protection was secondary to its pursuit of more traditional 
self-interests.
6.4.1 Population Protection
The humanitarian plight of the Kosovars and the threat of an even greater crisis to come, 
consistently took precedence as the primary justification for NATO’s action in Kosovo. 
Nevertheless, the grave human rights abuses and indiscriminate attacks against Kosovar 
civilians that led to NATO’s initiation of airstrikes paled in comparison to the 
humanitarian tragedy that unfolded after the bombing commenced. Far from deterring an
92 Robertson, “Introduction” in Kosovo: One year on, 5.
93 DoD “After Action Report”, xvii.
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intensification of the humanitarian predicament, NATO’s inability to stop the crisis 
actually led some analysts to accuse it of provoking the crisis.
Secretary-General Robertson’s glib statement that “as the Alliance promised at the time, 
... the refugees are home” ignores the fact that over a million Kosovar Albanians were 
forced from their homes as a result of NATO’s inadequate protection. Various 
organisations documented evidence of systematic killings, torture, rape, and forced 
expulsions committed against the Kosovars during the bombing. In the end, over
863,000 Kosovar Albanians either fled or were forcibly expelled from Kosovo by FRY 
forces.94 In addition to those who actually left the country, UNHCR estimated 590,000 
had been internally displaced by May 1999. In total, 90% of all Kosovar Albanians 
living in the region prior to March 1999 were displaced from their homes. NATO simply 
did not have an effective strategy for stopping the crisis or preventing the forced 
expulsions. Instead, it focused on the much safer task of assisting the Kosovars once 
they fled to other countries. NATO members built refugee camps and provided 
humanitarian aid in neighbouring countries. NATO aircraft delivered over 4.5 million 
tons of food, over 1,900 tons of shelter, and 57 tons of medical supplies.95 Additionally, 
alliance members took thousands of Kosovar refugees into their own countries to 
demonstrate their commitment to humanitarian concerns, to lessen the burden on nearby 
states, and to decrease the instability the refugees could pose to the region.96
94 UNHCR Figures cited in OSCE, Kosovo/Kosova As Seen, As Told, Chapter 14 “Forced Expulsion”, 
http://www.osee.org/kosovo/documents/reports/hr/part 1 /ch 14.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
95 United States Senate Armed Services Committee, Combined Prepared Statements of General Wesley K. 
Clark, Admiral James Ellis, Jr., and Lt General Michael Short, 21 October 1999. 
http://www.senate.gov/~armed services/statemnt/1999/991021wc.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2003.
96 Ibid.
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Despite the success of this humanitarian assistance, Western leaders did not deploy the 
type of tactical protection forces that could have rendered much of this assistance 
unnecessary. The few tactical protection resources they did have in theatre often could 
not be used because of the risks to allied pilots, domestic support, and alliance unity. 
Knowing this, and based on the tragic events that occurred in Kosovo between March 
and June 1999, NATO’s success must be evaluated in a different light.
In the short term, NATO’s phased approach failed to accomplish any of Clinton’s “3 D”
strategy. It did not degrade the FRY’s “capacity to continue repression of the civilian
population” or deter “further military actions against its own people”. It certainly did not
“deter an even bloodier offensive against innocent civilians” or “seriously damage the
Serbian military’s capacity to harm the people of Kosovo”. In fact, NATO air planners
never anticipated that the air campaign would be able to stop the ethnic cleansing in the
short-term. According to American Air Force Chief of Staff General Michael Ryan,
“no Air Force officer ever believed that air power could stop directly the door-to- 
door infantry thuggery that was driving the Kosovars from their homes. Nor 
could air power directly stop the slaughter and war crimes that were taking place 
in isolated villages”.97
Had JNA forces and Serb paramilitaries been intent on killing the Kosovars instead of 
forcing them out of the region, NATO would have been powerless to stop it, and the 
humanitarian catastrophe would have been exponentially worse. Only because this did 
not happen could NATO claim the achievement of its objective to create “conditions to 
reverse ethnic cleansing”. By the end of June 1999, after the FRY forces had withdrawn 
and the NATO-led security force was in place, practically all 1.3 million Kosovars
Q O
returned to their homes and villages. In many cases, Kosovars returned to burned-out
97 General Michael E. Ryan, Chief of Staff, USAF, Remarks at the Air Force Association National 
Convention, 14 Sept 1999, cited in Arkin, 27.
98 Lord Robertson, Kosovo One Year On, 16.
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or demolished homes. With the extreme Balkan winter approaching, KFOR helped 
complete UNMIK’s winterisation plan so that no deaths were reported from lack of food 
or shelter.
But even these post-war successes could not reverse the deaths, injuries, rapes, and 
psychological damage suffered at the hands of Serb security forces while “the most 
precise and lowest-collateral-damage air campaign ever conducted”99 raged above their 
heads. When it came to Clinton’s objective of deploying a NATO-led security force that 
would protect “all the people . . . Serbs and Albanians alike”, NATO was clearly 
unsuccessful.100 While the post-Allied Force security force known as KFOR deployed 
fairly rapidly, it was unable to protect the Serbs living in Kosovo. Once the air war 
ended and the refugees returned, a major campaign of reverse ethnic cleansing ensued. 
In spite of KFOR’s presence and protection efforts, the Serb population in Pristina, 
estimated at 20,000 in 1998, had fallen to an estimated 700 to 800 by September 1999.101
6.4.2 Regional and International Stability
The potential instability which threatened to engulf the Balkan region and draw NATO 
members into the conflict on opposing sides was successfully prevented by NATO’s 
actions. By compelling Milosevic to withdraw all FRY forces from Kosovo and 
replacing them with a NATO-led security force, NATO enabled masses of refugees to 
return home where they ceased to pose economic hardships and security threats to the
99 DoD “After Action Report”, xvii.
100 President William J. Clinton, “Clinton Announces the End of the War in Kosovo, 10 June 1999, 
http://www.australianpolitics.com/usa/clinton/speeches/990610kosovo.shtml. Accessed 18 July 2003.
101 UNHCR/OSCE, "Assessment of the Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Nov. 1999-Jan. 2000"
(14 Feb. 2000), http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/minorities/min rep 04 eng.pdf. Accessed 
18 July 2003.
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host nations. KFOR’s continued UN-backed presence in Kosovo remains a stabilising 
force in the region and a check on future outbreaks of violence.
The terms by which NATO ended the bombing also contributed to international stability. 
Yugoslavia maintained its de-jure sovereignty over Kosovo, and the Kosovars gained 
unprecedented autonomy from Serbian control. Such an arrangement re-emphasised the 
international community’s determination to preserve existing borders in an effort to 
reduce the instability caused by secessionist movements and intra-state wars.
Finally, NATO managed to conduct the campaign without completely destroying its 
relations with Russia. Though NATO-Russian relations were strained throughout the 
conflict, NATO’s inclusion of Russia at practically all stages of the negotiations, and 
Russian President Yeltsin’s decision to withhold support for Milosevic in the face of 
severe public criticism were instrumental factors in convincing Milosevic to sue for 
peace. In the final settlement, the Russians could claim credit for helping to negotiate the 
end of the war and for ensuring an equitable peace through its military contribution to 
KFOR.102
6.4.3 Alliance Credibility
NATO’s unity and resolute action also bolstered the alliance’s credibility. The alliance 
threatened action against a leader bent on defying the international community and then 
delivered on its threat. According to the NATO Secretary-General George Robertson, “If 
NATO had failed to respond to the policy of ethnic cleansing, it would have betrayed its
i mvalues and cast permanent doubt on the credibility of its institutions”. By forcefully
102 DoD “After-Action Report”, xvii.
103 Lord Robertson, Kosovo One Year On, 22.
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responding to Milosevic, NATO showed its willingness to act outside of the Security 
Council if the specific conditions warranted. As a result, abusive governments would be 
far less willing to rely on divisions among UN Security Council members or within 
NATO to protect them from an intervention.
The alliance maintained enough unity throughout Operation Allied Force to compel 
Milosevic to agree to its terms. This was a significant feat since most member states 
believed from the outset that the bombing would not be necessary for an extended period 
of time. Testifying before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee, General Clark, 
Admiral Ellis, and Lt Gen Short submitted a joint statement saying that the “enduring 
achievement of the Alliance was maintaining unity and resolve throughout the 78-day air 
campaign”.104 Had individual member states known beforehand how much time and 
intensity would be involved in the bombing campaign, they may have chosen a different 
path altogether.
Alliance credibility was also bolstered by the degree of unity that NATO members were 
able to demonstrate in Operation Allied Force. The preservation of unity was largely the 
result of the manner in which the alliance fought the campaign. Each member of the 
alliance had an equal say in target selection and the particular methods of engagement. 
Moreover, the use of precision-guided weaponry, in conjunction with the restrictive rules 
of engagement levied on the pilots, resulted in zero allied combat fatalities and relatively 
few instances of collateral damage. The fact that there were no allied combat deaths 
eased the pressure applied to member states by their domestic publics. And, with the 
notable exception of some highly reported bombing mistakes (the Chinese embassy, the
104 Clark, Ellis, and Short, Combined Statement, 21 October 1999.
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Serbian passenger train, and the refugee column), NATO was remarkably successful in 
confining the damage of its strikes to the intended targets.
6.4.4 Other Results
Operation Allied Force also resulted in the realization of several unofficial aims which 
significantly benefited various Western self-interests. First of all, Allied Force preserved 
domestic support. By launching the intervention prior to the development of a full-scale 
humanitarian disaster, Western leaders were partially able to shape domestic opinion 
rather than merely react to it. Moreover, the air-only strategy appealed to the public’s 
desire that some action be taken on the Kosovars’ behalf, but not at the price of large 
numbers of Western casualties. NATO’s reliance on precision-guided weapons further 
increased the public’s tolerance of the campaign. NATO’s preventive effort in Kosovo 
also went some way to absolving the shame over past inaction. As other chapters have 
shown, Western leaders had been heavily criticised for slow or non-existent responses to 
humanitarian crises throughout the 1990s. The comparatively quick reaction in Kosovo 
gave Western decision-makers a defensible response to their critics, regardless of the 
predominately self-interested motives that drove the intervention.
CONCLUSION
Concern for the plight of Kosovar Albanians was undoubtedly a major factor in NATO’s 
decision to use force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in Operation Allied 
Force. Government and military leaders across the alliance constantly emphasised the 
humanitarian crisis as justification for NATO’s actions and, in the end, NATO 
accomplished many humanitarian goals. Nevertheless, NATO’s minimalist, self-
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protective actions demonstrated that the plight of the Kosovars was not in itself the 
priority reason for NATO’s engagement. Instead, Operation Allied Force was primarily 
designed to identify and combat the potential effects of the humanitarian crisis on the 
alliance and on individual member states. As NATO’s methods in Kosovo illustrated, 
this objective proved to be very difficult. Kosovo’s geographic location within the heart 
of NATO’s sphere of influence made the humanitarian tragedy particularly troubling to 
NATO member states. Ethnically-motivated atrocities against civilians on NATO’s 
doorstep was a blight on NATO’s reputation and credibility. Likewise, the exodus of 
hundreds of thousands of refugees generated instability because of their potential effect 
on regional stability and Western economic and political well-being.
The objectives and military strategy that resulted from these insecurities reflected the 
secondary importance of the humanitarian cause. Even a year after the conflict, NATO 
emphasised that it did not fight a war, but rather conducted a “careful operation to disrupt 
the Yugoslav campaign of violence in Kosovo.. .”.105 Operation Allied Force began as a 
demonstration of resolve and only approached “war” when it appeared that Milosevic’s 
gamble might destroy the credibility of the alliance. Throughout the campaign, every 
effort was made to hold the alliance together at the expense of the Kosovar population. 
Military objectives were vague and easily achievable. The military strategy was not 
designed to stop ethnic cleansing, but merely to degrade or deter FRY capabilities. 
Ground troops were withheld because the risk of casualties was deemed too high and 
public opinion too difficult to sustain. An air war, in which military planners were 
authorised to seize and maintain the initiative, could not be conducted because of fears of 
destroying alliance unity. Instead, a phased air campaign, loaded with targeting
105 Lord Robertson, Kosovo One Year On, 22.
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restrictions, was employed to “bring him [Milosevic] back to the negotiation table”.106 
Pilots were not allowed to attack below certain altitudes nor were key aircraft utilised 
because of the risks from Serb air defences. Throughout the campaign, the lives of 
combatants were prioritised above the lives of the victims they were sent to protect.
NATO officials and key decision-makers have defended NATO actions on the grounds 
that maintaining alliance cohesion was the only way to end the humanitarian tragedy. 
They argue that high numbers of allied casualties or the intense bombing of downtown 
Belgrade would have reduced domestic support for the action in numerous member 
states, thereby threatening alliance unity and jeopardising the entire humanitarian 
mission. In short, they would say that alliance unity and the compromises required to 
maintain it, formed NATO’s essential centre of gravity. While these arguments may be 
true, they strengthen the premise of this thesis rather than weaken it. The centre of 
gravity—the issue that drove Western action, was not endangered populations, but self- 
interests. NATO was more concerned about the effects of the humanitarian tragedy on 
itself than about the plight of the endangered Kosovar population. Had the FRY forces 
decided to kill the Kosovar Albanians rather than expel them, “alliance unity” would 
have been of little benefit either to the NATO member states or the Kosovar Albanians.
106 Gen Klaus Naumann, PBS Frontline.
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CHAPTER 7 ANALYSIS
INTRODUCTION
The preceding case studies demonstrated that the West’s primary purpose for launching 
protection interventions in the 1990s was to safeguard its own self-interests against the 
multiple, uncertain hazards generated by the humanitarian crises. They also showed that 
in spite of the tremendous suffering experienced by the endangered populations, Western 
interveners did not employ proportionately robust methods to protect them. Instead, the 
Western states sought to reduce the potential hazards to themselves through the use of 
minimalist strategies that prioritised the safety of their own personnel over the safety of 
those they were supposed to protect, and often withdrew or terminated the operations, 
even though the populations were still vulnerable.
While the West’s prioritisation of its self-interests accounts for the dismal protection 
results it achieved in the 1990s, this explanation is such an oversimplification of the 
West’s behaviour that it is largely unhelpful in understanding the complexities of the 
protection interventions. Self-interest alone does not take into account the tension that 
surrounded the West’s determination of how self interests could best be protected from 
the uncertain hazards generated from the humanitarian crises of the 1990s. This ongoing 
tension was revealed by the way in which the West’s official humanitarian justifications 
and objectives failed to correspond with either the methods they used to conduct the 
operations or the results they accepted as sufficient. By highlighting this inconsistency 
between the interveners’ motives and means, the case studies exposed the need for an 
alternative framework that could explain how the West’s seemingly haphazard and
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ineffective responses to the humanitarian crises were, in fact, calculated attempts at 
safeguarding their self-interests.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a more thorough explanation for Western actions 
using a framework adapted from risk theory. It argues that, in spite of the differences in 
time, force structure, and location, Western interveners displayed a number of common 
characteristics in the manner in which they approached and dealt with each humanitarian 
crisis. Rather than view the similarities of these interventions as the result of an 
incomplete transition to solidarism, or excuse them as purely exceptional cases within the 
pluralist framework, or even explain them away as mission unfamiliarity or technical 
inability, this chapter maintains that they were the result of the Western states’ common 
risk perspective. More specifically, it argues that Western states were acting as risk 
societies, each focused on the reduction, prevention, or avoidance of the ill-defined 
hazards generated by the humanitarian crises. Western states intervened to manage the 
risks to their self-interests from the anticipated effects of the population crises, not to 
safeguard the populations from the abusive practices of intrastate combatants. As risk 
societies, Western states engaged in population protection only as long as, and to the 
extent that, it managed more risk than it generated.
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the risk society contention, section one of this 
chapter demonstrates that Western states identified the potential hazards associated with 
the humanitarian crises in accordance with a risk perspective. Section two reveals that 
the West’s strategies for dealing with these risks were actually managerial strategies 
designed to prevent or reduce the risks to a tolerable level rather than to eliminate them 
altogether. Finally, section three illustrates how Western states experienced the negative
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consequences consistent with the predictions of risk theory. These three sections are 
further broken down into the five key risk characteristics described in Chapter 2. Each 
case study is then analysed individually in light of these characteristics.
7.1 RISK IDENTIFICATION
Due to the uncertainty associated with the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, and the 
uncertainty of the post-Cold War security environment more generally, Western leaders 
relied heavily on the interpretations of experts in making their risk assessments of the 
humanitarian crises. Moreover, rather than focusing on the urgency of the endangered 
population’s plight, these assessments were focused on determining whether or not the 
humanitarian crises posed a risk in the form of future hazards to Western self-interests. 
The natural ambiguity of such measurements in the midst of an already uncertain 
environment lent itself to persistent equivocation among Western publics and a lack of 
resolve among their leaders.
7.1.1 Uncertainty and the Role of Experts
For Western states in the post-Cold War security environment, humanitarian catastrophes 
resulting from intrastate conflicts were mired in a great deal of uncertainty. Unlike the 
rivalries of the Cold War era, these conflicts defied simplistic black and white 
categorisations. While the Western states had little doubt that populations in distant lands 
were suffering from the effects of intrastate warfare, the circumstances surrounding the 
humanitarian crises generated confusion. Westerners had a difficult time comprehending 
the cultural characteristics of the belligerents, the nature and cause of the intrastate 
warfare, the objectives of the rival faction leaders, and the source of the humanitarian
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atrocities. Even more uncertain were the negative effects that these crises could have on 
the interests of Western states, and whether action or inaction would best serve their self- 
interests. Western decision-makers questioned the effect an intervention would have on 
their credibility, the degree of domestic and international support it would receive, the 
viability of a military operation and the danger associated with it, and the effect their 
actions would have on regional and international stability. Interests such as credibility, 
reputation, and stability were ambiguous pursuits under the most favourable conditions. 
In humanitarian crises involving foreign populations, they were especially difficult to 
assess.
In response to these looming uncertainties, “experts” in the form of government 
intelligence officials, political advisors, academics, officials and field workers from 
humanitarian NGOs and IGOs, and international lawyers abounded. They competed with 
one another in marketing their risk assessments, framing the crises in a way that 
supported their conclusions in order to win a following among the public. The abundance 
of contradictory expert advice and competing possibilities added to the uncertainty and, 
hence, the anxiety of Western states. The resultant government indecision opened the 
door to greater sub-political influence over Western policy.
In addition to the abundance of experts, media personnel were on hand to document the 
crises, each from a particular angle and specific agenda. Different reporters investigated 
the same scenario and reported the facts from a particular “frame” or bias, publicising the 
views of those experts who were most likely to generate audience interest. Thus, the 
media played the important role of bringing together experts, decision-makers, and the 
public. Additionally, as a result of the media’s focus on the graphic footage of the crises,
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the public was often moved to empathise with the suffering populations to such an extent 
that it demanded action from Western governments on behalf of the endangered 
populations.
As information abounded from 24-hour news channels, the Internet, and increased 
communication across the planet, the Western public was far less likely than it had once 
been to view government and military leaders as the sole repositories of truth. Instead, 
people made their own assessments based on the information that was available and urged 
corresponding action from their governments. Faced with this strong sub-political 
movement and public doubt, Western decision-makers were often unable to set forth a 
particular interpretation or implement a course of action, and expect it to be supported by 
the public. Even the Western military establishments recognised the influence of public 
opinion and the value of using the public to sway decision-makers. Military leaders at 
odds with politicians no longer reserved their opinions for their political superiors or their 
retirement memoirs, but expressed them openly to the public or “leaked” them to the 
media.
As a natural consequence of this wealth of conflicting information and analyses, 
uncertainty abounded. Conflicting expertise meant that the public had to choose which 
expert assessment to believe. The very existence of such a choice brought with it the 
potential of choosing incorrectly, thereby increasing public anxiety.
Uncertainty over the degree of risk generated by the humanitarian crises led to a weak 
Western commitment to the population protection mission. The public’s humanitarian 
zeal was quickly mellowed and its altruistic resolve easily fractured when confronted by
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Western soldiers returning home in body bags. Christopher Coker wrote about this fickle
public response in his book Humane Warfare.
Public support for a campaign cannot be taken for granted even if it meets -  at the 
beginning -  with broad public support. When it does not, even a single incident 
can have devastating consequences. Public opinion will not tolerate casualties.... 
It is the public today that tends to desert.
Though the debatable risks flowing from humanitarian crises generated enough insecurity
among the Western public and its decision-makers to warrant action of some sort, they
did not generate the resolution necessary for the intervener to persevere when the level of
personal sacrifice grew disproportionately high. Hence, the uncertainty that surrounded
the humanitarian tragedies was one of the primary reasons that post-Cold War Western
interveners were unwilling to risk Western lives, even those of voluntary combatants, on
behalf of foreign non-combatants.
To illustrate more specifically how uncertainty factored into the actions of the 
interveners, the following four sections give examples from the case studies of conflicting 
expertise and debatable risk assessments. In each case, the weak national commitments 
and casualty-averse behaviour which resulted from the uncertainty are also documented.
Northern Iraq. The humanitarian crisis in northern Iraq was steeped in uncertainty. 
Because the news media was on hand to document the plight of the vulnerable Kurds on 
the border with Turkey, there was little uncertainty regarding the Kurds’ humanitarian 
plight, although estimates of Kurdish deaths per day did vary significantly. Instead, the 
uncertainty regarded the degree of risk that such a humanitarian crisis posed to the West. 
Initially, the US and the UK governments thought military intervention on behalf of the
1 Christopher Coker, Humane Warfare, (London: Routledge, 2001), 57.
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Kurds presented a greater risk to themselves than did non-intervention. Military re­
engagement in Iraq threatened to amplify the criticism that the Gulf War left the job “half 
done” and was, therefore, an empty victory. Experts also disagreed as to the cause of the 
Kurdish humanitarian disaster. Humanitarian organisations and political pundits blamed 
George Bush and John Major for encouraging the Kurdish and Shi’a revolts and then 
abandoning them to Iraqi slaughter. Though the governments’ experts stated that this was 
not the case, and though Bush and Major personally rejected the accusation, their 
“official” government explanations did not effectively counter the rival expertise.
Uncertainty also existed over the potential outcome of the intervention and the efforts 
necessary to succeed. One group of experts who judged that an intervention would lead 
to a Vietnam-like quagmire or an anti-Western backlash in the Soviet Union urged 
restraint and non-intervention. Another group highlighted the negative effects Western 
inaction would have on Western moral and political credibility and advocated 
intervention.
Faced with these disputable risks to allied security, the “Provide Comfort” coalition was 
unwilling to accept high casualties in its effort to protect the Kurds. It utilised a host of 
techniques designed primarily for its own force protection. In fact, the idea to create the 
safe haven was conceived primarily as an attempt to protect allied forces. The no-fly 
zone (NFZ) patrolled by coalition aircraft and the large numbers of troops and massive 
firepower deployed into northern Iraq benefited the endangered Kurds only as long as 
coalition forces and Western self-interests were also in danger. As the case studies 
showed, the NFZ operated with highly restrictive ROE that allowed the aircraft to use 
force only in self-defence; the rapid reaction force was withdrawn though the Kurds
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remained in danger; and the coalition security forces withdrew even though they were 
being replaced by a group of ill-trained, hastily-formed, and poorly-armed UN Guards.
Bosnia. The intervention on behalf of endangered Bosnians followed the pattern initiated 
in Iraq, but the complicated three-way fight for control of Bosnian territory meant that the 
degree of uncertainty was even higher. Experts disagreed on basic issues such as the 
nature of the conflict and the particular risk it would generate to the West. Some argued 
that the ethnic conflict would spread rapidly into the rest of Europe, while others 
maintained that Bosnia’s geographical position meant that it was already fairly contained.
There was also widespread disagreement over where to place the blame for the crisis. 
Some maintained that the conflict was the result of historical grievances that had been 
recently aggravated by the actions of all combatants. According to these experts, 
outsiders could not solve the conflict and Western states would do well to minimise their 
involvement until the fighting lessened. Others argued that the Serbs were the chief 
antagonists in the conflict and subsequently pushed for tough international action on 
behalf of the Bosnian Muslims. About the only point on which there was widespread 
agreement was that non-combatants were suffering as a result of the conflict, though even 
then it was often difficult to distinguish who were non-combatants and who were not.
As a result of this high degree of uncertainty, the UN Security Council, led by Western 
nations, exhibited a weak commitment to the protection of the Bosnian civilians and was 
generally unwilling to jeopardise the lives of intervening soldiers on their behalf. Most 
Western decision-makers felt that their populations would not support large numbers of 
casualties in defence of the Bosnian Muslims, especially when the uncertainties regarding
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the effects on their self-interests remained so pervasive. Consequently, throughout the 
UNPROFOR operation, UN forces remained very small in number and weak in mandate, 
even when Member States became increasingly aware that the civilians were being 
intentionally targeted by combatants. UNPROFOR, by virtue of its Chapter VI 
peacekeeping mandate, avoided tasks that were deemed likely to put its forces in jeopardy 
of becoming casualties. Even with this casualty-averse mandate, most Western states 
hesitated or refused to volunteer military personnel. When the Security Council did 
expand the mandate to address protection efforts more specifically, it emphasised self­
defensive measures and the protection of humanitarian aid and aid workers—not the 
protection of the targeted population.
Rwanda. The uncertainty that characterised the crisis in Rwanda was the result of a 
combination of factors. First of all, as Rwanda did not play a significant role in the 
West’s post-Cold War calculations, the link between Rwandese violence and Western 
self-interest was difficult to make. Moreover, France, the Western state with the most 
recent involvement in Rwanda, was generally pre-disposed to its Hutu ally’s 
interpretation of events. Rwanda’s Hutu representative on the Security Council 
repeatedly assured the Council that the crisis in Rwanda was nothing more than a renewal 
of the civil war and not a Hutu-engineered genocide. Hutu and French assessments 
differed from the “expert” reports of UN peacekeepers, investigative commissions, and 
humanitarian NGOs who assessed the conflict as a genocide and advocated intervention. 
Consequently, uncertainty existed as to the identity of the perpetrators and the nature of 
the massacres, both of which justified the West’s emphasis on the relatively safe task of 
negotiating a cease-fire rather than on the more intrusive and dangerous objective of 
protecting the civilian population.
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Secondly, there was an intentional effort on the part of some Western states to preserve a 
degree of uncertainty. Though UNAMIR forces and humanitarian experts had been 
reporting the systematic and one-sided massacres for weeks, Member States led by the 
US and UK did not want to conclude that the situation was a genocide because of the 
obligation it might impose upon them to act. Having just withdrawn from another 
African country in which the results had gone horribly wrong, the US and Western states 
were resistant to the idea of launching another such operation.
As a result of the high degree of uncertainty in the aforementioned areas, the West was 
only marginally committed to the protection of Rwandan non-combatants, but was wholly 
committed to the prevention of friendly casualties. From the outset of UNAMIR’s 
involvement in Rwanda, the West showed itself to be particularly casualty averse. The 
limited, Security Council-formulated mandate made it clear that Western states were not 
willing to accept casualties on behalf of the mission in Rwanda. This point was starkly 
demonstrated by the rapid deployment of Western troops to evacuate ex-patriots 
contrasted with the slow, tentative augmentation of combat troops to UNAMIR II. The 
overwhelming firepower of Operation Turquoise was only deployed by the French after 
the bulk of the killing had occurred, and was designed primarily to protect their own 
forces from possible engagement with Tutsi RPF forces. The absence from Turquoise of 
the necessary equipment to find, rescue, and transport endangered Tutsis revealed the 
coalition’s priorities. Furthermore, one of the primary benefits of creating the Secure 
Humanitarian Zone (SHZ) was that it reduced the likelihood that French troops would 
face dangerous confrontations with the Tutsi forces.
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Kosovo. In Kosovo, uncertainty characterised every aspect of the situation. Among 
other issues, experts disagreed as to the severity and the source of the civilian atrocities, 
making it difficult to know which side was to blame. Some viewed Serb forces as the 
indisputable source of the crisis and accused them of trying to cover up heavy-handed 
military responses against non-combatants. Others branded the KLA fighters as terrorists 
and accused them of provoking the Serb attacks and then disguising dead KLA 
combatants as innocent civilians in order to manipulate public opinion. Even the “facts” 
of the Ra?ak massacre, which were so influential in NATO’s decision to threaten military 
force, were disputed among the UN-designated experts of the Kosovo Verification 
Mission. Experts also disagreed over the threat posed to Kosovar civilians by NATO 
aerial attacks, as well as the risk to European security and NATO unity should NATO 
choose not to act. Finally, experts disagreed over the amount of effort and the level of 
force it would take to induce Milosevic to agree to NATO’s demands.
Faced with so much uncertainty over the risk generated by the situation in Kosovo, 
NATO member states were particularly concerned that public support would diminish as 
soon as NATO forces were killed. Consequently, NATO adopted a strategy that reflected 
its weak commitment to protecting the Kosovar population. Despite widespread 
agreement that ground forces were the most appropriate means of preventing atrocities 
against non-combatants, NATO member states rejected the strategy because it risked 
allied casualties. Instead, NATO relied solely on an air campaign governed by very 
restrictive rules of engagement that were designed primarily to reduce the pilots’ 
susceptibility to Serb air defences. Reducing the risk to its troops even further, NATO 
made extensive use of unmanned reconnaissance vehicles and cruise missiles throughout 
the conflict.
246
7.1.2 Focused on Future Hazards
In each of the four examples of population protection discussed in this thesis, a 
humanitarian crisis was either underway or was sufficiently probable when the West 
decided to act. Despite the urgency of the humanitarian crisis, the West did not employ a 
sufficiently robust strategy to eliminate the cause of the crisis or to protect the population 
in the midst of it. Instead, the Western strategy concentrated on the future “ill effects” 
that the humanitarian crises posed to the West. In spite of the uncertainty that 
characterised the conflicts, and even though Western states could not be sure of the 
hazards to themselves that might emerge at some point in the future, they determined that 
the potential damage from not acting was serious enough to warrant some degree of 
preventive action. In this sense, the protection interventions of the 1990s were 
applications of the Precautionary Principle in foreign policy.
Northern Iraq. When the Shi’ite revolt in southern Iraq and the Kurdish revolt in 
northern Iraq began to suffer the effects of a strong Iraqi counterattack, the West 
prioritised the avoidance of future ill-effects to itself over any immediate positive effects 
the intervention might have for the non-combatants. A Western-led intervention in 
support of the rebellions could have challenged the accepted norms of international order. 
Additionally, a victorious Kurd or Shi’a rebellion could have led to the partition of the 
Iraqi state, thus threatening the balance of power in a vital, oil-rich region, and arousing 
the anger of other key states in the region. Based on these potential hazards to the West’s 
future interests, Western leaders decided that inaction was the most appropriate method 
for avoiding results that would negatively effect their self-interests.
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This calculation changed, however, when the Kurds massed on the mountains bordering 
Turkey. Turkey’s importance as a NATO ally in a critical region of the world gave 
weight to Turkish insistence that the Kurds posed a serious threat to its security and 
reinforced its demand that the Kurds be assisted within the Iraqi borders. The Turkish 
demand corresponded with the West’s domestic public calling for action on behalf of the 
Kurds. Suddenly the immediate humanitarian crisis generated future risks to NATO 
unity, regional stability, and domestic support. Though none of these consequences were 
certain, Western states considered them to be likely enough, and of sufficient magnitude, 
to warrant preventive action in the face of the uncertainty.
Bosnia. In the face of an immediate and ongoing humanitarian crisis in Bosnia, Western 
states did not intervene decisively in the conflict until the humanitarian situation looked 
poised to generate significant future risks to themselves. The potential flood of Bosnian 
refugees into neighbouring European states caused European leaders to fear future 
economic hardship and broader European instability. Additionally, the ethnic partition of 
Bosnia had the potential of setting a dangerous precedent for the future of post-Cold War 
international and European order. Finally, as international involvement in Bosnia grew, 
the future credibility of the UN, EU, and NATO, as well as that of individual Western 
states, was at stake if the Bosnian conflict was not contained. Regardless of the 
interveners’ humanitarian justifications, the reality of these future-focused, self-interested 
priorities repeatedly revealed themselves through preventable humanitarian catastrophes 
and devastating losses of civilian lives.
Rwanda. In Rwanda, the immediate humanitarian catastrophe was indisputable. 
Whether or not Western leaders were originally aware of the genocidal nature of the
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killings is largely irrelevant since they clearly knew that tens of thousands of non- 
combatants were being killed. Prior to the killing and during the period when the 
immediate humanitarian need was the greatest, Western states refused to intervene, thus 
demonstrating that it was not the immediate humanitarian need that created the eventual 
impetus for an expanded UN force. Had it not been for the probable loss of future 
credibility and the relatively low requirement for Western troops in the UN intervention, 
Western states may have followed the example of Belgium and withdrawn its support for 
the UN mission altogether. By agreeing to the expansion of the UN mandate in Rwanda 
without having to contribute troops, Western governments were able to minimise future 
criticism of their humanitarian neglect without jeopardising the lives of their combatants.
The timing of the French-led intervention force revealed that France’s primary motivation 
was not concern for the Rwandese non-combatants. It was only after the bulk of the 
bloodletting had ended and the Anglophone Tutsi RPF had established itself as the 
superior military force that France offered to lead a protection intervention. As the case 
study clearly showed, the future loss of French influence in a Francophone state was the 
primary motivation behind the French decision, and not the desire to protect endangered 
non-combatants.
Kosovo. The primary objective of NATO’s operation in Kosovo was to prevent the 
potential hazards to NATO credibility and European stability that were likely to follow 
from a large-scale humanitarian disaster. In this case, NATO had ample opportunity to 
prevent the large-scale crisis from ever happening. However, rather than responding with 
sufficient resources and resolve to safeguard the population, NATO did not act until 
Milosevic challenged NATO’s credibility at Rambouillet. When it did act, NATO
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devised a strategy that was wholly inappropriate for a population protection mission, but 
quite sufficient for a bombing demonstration designed to showcase NATO credibility. 
Furthermore, although the Kosovar Albanians suffered terrible abuses and were 
ethnically-cleansed from Kosovo, NATO did not intensify its strategic air attacks or 
seriously consider the use of ground forces until it appeared that Milosevic might outlast 
NATO unity. Thus, it was the future risk to NATO’s existence posed by Milosevic’s 
defiant actions and not the immediate harm to the Kosovar Albanians that drove the 
Western action in Kosovo.
7.2 MANAGING RISK
Having identified the potential effects of the humanitarian crises as risks, and facing a 
host of competing risks completely unassociated with the humanitarian crises, the West 
utilised risk-based strategies to confront them. On the one hand, Western decision­
makers determined that attempts to eliminate the sub-survival risks generated by 
humanitarian crises would exact a disproportionately high cost compared to the hazards 
they posed. On the other hand, something had to be done regarding these crises because 
of the damage they could inflict on Western self-interests. In a sense, decision-makers 
found themselves in a risk trap. Doing either too much or too little could have generated 
unacceptable risks to their self-interests. In an effort to extricate themselves from this 
trap, Western states sought merely to manage their risks.
To respond effectively to the host of risks they faced, decision-makers had to revise their 
risk assessments continuously to take into account newly emerging risks and then assign 
resources accordingly. Instead of trying to eliminate each risk, interveners merely sought
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to reduce them to tolerable levels while expending the minimal amount of resources and 
preserving the maximum amount of flexibility possible. Unfortunately for the 
endangered populations, non-combatant protection was rarely the West’s priority risk, 
and when it was, it did not remain so very long. The West was primarily concerned about 
the effects of the humanitarian crises on itself, such as the demand for action from its 
domestic public, or the regional instability caused by the subsequent refugee flows. By 
implementing a proper risk management strategy, decision-makers were able to confront 
the uncertain risks while preserving a degree of flexibility to deal with new or changing 
hazards. Thus, the West employed managerial strategies that were minimalist in their 
scope and preventive in their approach.
While there were many methods used by decision-makers to manage the risks caused by 
the humanitarian crises of the 1990s, the bulk of these methods can be grouped into one 
of three categories notable for their minimalist and preventive focus. Surveillance, 
containment, and distribution strategies allowed decision-makers to commit the smallest 
number of resources to the end goal of isolating, limiting, or preventing the hazards 
associated with a given crisis.
7.2.1 Surveillance
Surveillance had several advantages as a management strategy that made it highly 
desirable in population protection missions. By gathering additional information using 
surveillance techniques, risk managers were able to reduce the uncertainty that 
surrounded the potential hazards. Based on the information collected, planners were able 
to dedicate resources in a more proportionate manner. Additionally, surveillance was a 
relatively safe option as it could often be accomplished using “unmanned” technology
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such as satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Even when piloted aircraft were 
used to gather the information, the missions could usually be conducted safely. 
Intelligence-gathering aircraft could operate high above anti-aircraft artillery fire, fly 
escorted with armed aircraft, or fly from international or allied airspace where they were 
relatively safe from attack. Unarmed human monitors, such as UN Military Observers or 
human rights monitors from the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe, 
were also a useful source of surveillance. They were often able to gain access to specific 
areas and talk to inhabitants by maintaining an unthreatening, neutral posture. 
Surveillance was also beneficial because it was an inexpensive deterrent to undesirable 
behaviour. When combatants knew their actions were being closely watched, they were 
less likely to commit acts that they knew would be reported. Finally, surveillance 
operations were desirable to Western states because they satisfied public expectations that 
“something be done” to improve the humanitarian situation without committing large 
amounts of resources. For these reasons, surveillance was nearly always the first risk 
management strategy to be implemented and the last to be stopped in the protection 
missions of the 1990s.
Northern Iraq. The Western interveners in Iraq employed surveillance techniques to 
minimise and prevent the risks generated by the displaced Kurdish people. Initially, the 
US sent Special Forces into the region along the Turkish border to gather information 
regarding the scope of the Kurdish displacement and the disposition of the Iraqi troops. 
Furthermore, they used surveillance aircraft for gathering information about the Iraqi 
military’s capability in the area prior to the launch of Operation Provide Comfort. As the 
intervening forces moved into the country, the NFZ was established to provide protection 
to the coalition through early warning and aerial bombardment if necessary. Though the
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NFZ provided little in the way of protection to the indigenous population once the 
coalition forces withdrew, it continued to conduct aerial surveillance and, in so doing, 
acted as a relatively safe, long-term deterrent.
Bosnia. In Bosnia, Western states reasoned that active observation would deter the 
combatants from breaking their agreements or committing additional atrocities. Rather 
than send in heavily-armed troops, the interveners relied on unarmed UN Monitors to 
document and report violations of the various cease-fire agreements. Even those sent to 
“protect” the populations within the safe areas were more suitably equipped for a 
surveillance mission. In fact, the primary benefit of these lightly-armed peacekeepers 
was in providing a physical presence on the ground. Even when the peacekeepers’ 
mandate was expanded to allow for more vigorous military action, UNPROFOR troops, 
limited by their inadequate capabilities, continued to emphasise their monitoring tasks.
The NATO-enforced NFZ that the UN eventually imposed over Bosnia was another 
attempt to gather information and “remind” the combatant parties that they were being 
observed. In addition to the reconnaissance aircraft involved in these missions, 
unmanned reconnaissance drones and military satellites were used throughout the 
international involvement in the region. These resources allowed the interveners to 
document and discover atrocities without having to put “boots on the ground” in places 
where they would have been in great danger.
Rwanda. Surveillance also played a key role in Rwanda, especially since neither the 
Security Council nor the French-led coalition forces were willing to commit the resources 
necessary to eliminate the danger to the endangered populations. In fact, the emphasis on
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surveillance in Rwanda was present prior to the beginning of the genocide. UN AMIR’s 
initial mandate was formulated to minimise the force’s responsibilities. Consequently, it 
was primarily tasked with monitoring and investigating the parties’ compliance with the 
peace plan. Once the killings began, UNAMIR was reduced to a skeleton force that was 
incapable of doing anything more than monitoring the ensuing violence and reporting it to 
the Security Council. Despite these reports, many weeks and lives were consumed while 
numerous groups and committees visited Rwanda in an attempt to provide the Security 
Council with more information regarding the scope of the killing so that it could 
determine whether or not there was a genocide in progress. Ironically, as uncertainty over 
the situation decreased and the genocide became more undeniable, Western states, fearful 
of their obligations under the Genocide Convention, became more hesitant instead of 
more determined to act against the atrocities. Not surprisingly, when UNAMIR II was 
finally deployed, it engaged primarily in monitoring and observation instead of fulfilling 
its more robust mandate.
Kosovo. Prior to the initiation of the bombing campaign in Kosovo and after its 
termination, surveillance was a key element of the West’s strategy to manage its risks. 
Prior to the bombing, one of the chief demands made of Yugoslavia in Security Council 
Resolutions 1160 and 1199 was that it allow an OSCE monitoring mission into Kosovo 
with complete and unfettered access throughout the region. As NATO took a more active 
role in the conflict, it continued the emphasis on surveillance. It was with the threat of 
NATO airstrikes that Richard Holbrooke persuaded Milosevic to agree to a cease-fire and 
a partial withdrawal of forces, but it was with unarmed ground monitors and an air 
observation mission that Yugoslavia’s compliance was to be verified. Neither the ground 
monitors nor the aerial surveillance mission had any enforcement capability, but they
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were put in place as low-cost deterrents in an effort to keep the FRY from reneging on its 
agreement.
7.2.2 Containment
Another common method used by Western states to manage the risks associated with the 
humanitarian crises of the 1990s was containment. While containment is normally 
associated with geographical isolation, risk containment concerns any action or constraint 
that is designed to minimise the risk manager’s exposure to risk. An effective 
containment strategy allows the risk manager to optimise his or her exposure to additional 
risk by employing only those resources that are in proportion to the specific hazards he or 
she faces.
In the cases of these four protection interventions, the Western forces were largely 
composed of combat troops, yet they were rarely sent to engage in combat because this 
was considered a disproportionate expenditure of resources for the degree of risk they 
went to manage. Even when they did engage in military activities, they often abandoned 
traditional combatant aims such as defeat of the opposing army, the acquisition of 
territory, the elimination of a regime, or the total submission of an opposing force. 
Instead, they utilised tactics that were designed to minimise military confrontation and 
evade the possibility of combat. Consequently, their ROE usually emphasised 
compliance with the traditional peacekeeping norms of using force only in self-defence 
and maintaining consent among belligerents in order to demonstrate their impartiality. 
They also focused on providing aid rather than the more dangerous task of providing 
protection to non-combatants. Even when Western interveners determined that a risk to 
themselves warranted the use of combat power, that power was only apportioned in the
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quantity required to keep the risk at a containable level, rather than to eliminate any threat 
to non-combatants. In some cases these efforts to contain the risks were actually 
detrimental to the success of the population protection mission.
The West also contained risks geographically. It attempted to isolate or quarantine the 
risks within a particular geographical area where they could be managed more easily. 
Masses of endangered people fleeing across international borders generated a number of 
risks to Western states which internally displaced people did not. Refugees had the 
potential to destabilise the economies of the receiving countries which, in many cases, 
were already struggling to provide for their own inhabitants. Beyond this, refugee masses 
also generated risks to regional and international stability. The influx of large numbers of 
people from a particular identity group threatened to upset the tenuous ethnic balance in 
other countries. This was especially the case when the refugees belonged to an identity 
group that was already regarded as a security threat by the receiving states. Moreover, 
continuous media footage of refugees or displaced people posed a risk to the credibility of 
states that had long advocated human rights. All of these factors made the idea of 
containing the risk within geographical boundaries desirable. Consequently, the idea of 
creating manageable camps inside the countries of origin or acting prior to the 
displacement taking place met with the approval of intervening states.
Northern Iraq. The coalition sought to contain the risks generated by the Kurdish crisis 
in northern Iraq by carefully restricting the military objective it sought to accomplish. 
Employing a strategy intended to eradicate the Kurds’ long-term security problem in 
northern Iraq could have generated greater risks to NATO unity and to regional stability. 
Therefore, the coalition merely sought to satisfy the public demand for humanitarian
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action, relieve the Turkish security concerns on its border, and withdraw coalition forces 
as quickly as possible in order to preserve the post-Gulf War euphoria.
To accomplish these goals, the interveners contained the risks by reducing the likelihood 
of confrontation with Iraqi forces as much as possible. Though they intervened with a 
combat capable force, they emphasised their strictly humanitarian intentions and their 
acceptance of Iraqi sovereignty over the territory prior to crossing the Iraqi borders. 
Moreover, to reduce the chances of a confrontation with Iraqi forces, they publicised their 
plan to create a safe haven and demanded that Iraqi forces leave the area in advance. The 
coalition’s chances of expending lives and resources were further reduced by the liaison 
office established inside Iraq to encourage ongoing dialogue between coalition and Iraqi 
officials, and to safeguard against dangerous misunderstandings. When the initial 
humanitarian crisis had ended and the risks to the West had been reduced, the coalition 
further reduced the possibility of engaging in combat with Iraqi forces by withdrawing 
their forces as early as possible.
The coalition also contained the risks geographically within Iraq. This was seen in its 
attempts to keep the Kurdish crisis within the borders of Iraq, first through air-dropping 
supplies into the mountains along the Turkish border, and then through the creation of the 
“safe haven” in Northern Iraq. This physical containment of the Kurds was designed as a 
means of containing its risks by satisfying the Western publics’ demand to assist the 
Kurds, mollifying its Turkish ally, and limiting the possibility of confrontation between 
coalition troops and Iraqi forces. In effect, the coalition quarantined off an area within 
the Iraqi state so that the “disease” of instability would not spread to other geographic or 
political areas of Western interest.
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Bosnia. In Bosnia, the population protection mission itself was very much a minimalist, 
containment action instead of a decisive, combat intervention to resolve the three-party 
dispute. Rather than intervene with a robust mandate and sufficient force to carry it out, 
the interveners operated under Chapter VI authority throughout much of the operation and 
relied on impartial, lightly-armed forces to conduct consent-based operations. Interveners 
were not concerned with defeating a military force, but with minimising the risks to 
themselves that resulted from the conflict. Therefore, throughout most of the 
intervention, interveners minimised their risks by focusing only on those activities that 
were unlikely to generate new risks. These included the distribution of humanitarian aid, 
the protection of aid convoys, and the negotiation of cease-fires.
The West also sought to manage their risks through geographical containment measures. 
The UN-mandated arms embargo which was applied to Bosnia in the early phases of 
international involvement in the conflict was an attempt to isolate the ethnic unrest. By 
preventing the flow of additional weapons into the country, the Security Council hoped to 
limit the growth of the conflict and prevent it spreading to other European states with 
large minority populations. Furthermore, the creation of safe areas to protect displaced 
populations was another risk containment strategy. Though the safe areas were not 
designed, intended, or equipped to eradicate the risks to the endangered populations, they 
were favoured for their effectiveness in reducing the exodus of displaced Bosnians into 
other parts of Europe. Moreover, Western states hoped that the safe areas would have the 
dual benefit of preventing the Bosnian Serbs from consolidating their territory within 
Yugoslavia while satisfying the humanitarian demands of Western publics, all with a 
minimum deployment of combat forces.
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Rwanda. In Rwanda, the unwillingness of most Western states to intervene at all meant 
that the French-led Turquoise forces were the first to implement a preventive, risk 
containment strategy. Because Operation Turquoise forces focused on managing the 
risks to themselves, they failed to conduct those tasks which would have significantly 
reduced the danger to the vulnerable population. In most cases, Operation Turquoise 
forces neither disarmed Hutu attackers nor detained those who were responsible for the 
genocide. The Safe Humanitarian Zone, in addition to its obvious geographical 
containment benefits, contained risks by reducing the possibility of confrontation between 
the intervention forces and the RPF.
In order to contain their risks geographically, the French-led intervention force utilised a 
safe haven strategy similar to the one employed by the coalition forces in Iraq. The 
French specifically justified the creation of the SHZ as a means to limit the spread of the 
crisis by minimising the number of people who fled the borders of Rwanda. Moreover, 
by limiting the territory conquered by the RPF and protecting former Hutu leaders, the 
SHZ furthered the French objective of containing the risk of losing influence in the 
country and among their allies in the region.
The follow-on UNAMIR II force was not tasked with eliminating the risks posed by the 
presence of militia-controlled camps in Rwanda, but rather with containing them. The 
UN force had neither the size nor the capability to protect the Hutu population from rogue 
Hutu elements inside the camps or the victorious Tutsi forces outside the camps. The 
West clearly was not interested in confronting the risks that came with securing the 
camps. Instead, it shifted its focus away from the perilous situation within Rwanda and
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concentrated on the much safer task of dealing with the refugee crisis in the surrounding 
states. To the risk-conscious West, the task of providing humanitarian assistance to 
media-attractive refugees was preferable to the dangerous mission of disarming the Hutu 
camps and reintegrating the inhabitants into Rwanda.
Kosovo. In spite of its 38,000 air sorties, Operation Allied Force was an example of a 
minimalist, containment operation. As the case study showed, the primary objective of 
the intervention was not to protect the Kosovar Albanians or to bring about Kosovo’s 
independence from Yugoslavia. Either of these results would have generated significant 
and unacceptable risks to NATO. Instead, NATO contained its risks by emphasising its 
respect for Yugoslavian sovereignty and Kosovar autonomy, as well as by constantly 
reiterating its minimalist, humanitarian aims. Even after it launched the air campaign, 
NATO member states sought to contain their risks by dedicating the least amount of 
resources possible. The “air only” strategy demonstrated NATO’s minimalist designs, 
especially as NATO leaders expected to achieve their aims after a short demonstration 
bombing.
Though NATO did not create a geographically distinct safe area in Kosovo, it sought to 
contain the effects of the conflict by restricting the risk of ethnic unrest to a specific, 
manageable area. As the likelihood of a Yugoslav purge of Kosovar Albanians grew, 
NATO leaders initiated the bombing campaign in an attempt to prevent widespread ethnic 
cleansing which they feared would result in a massive flood of destabilising refugees into 
the heart of Europe and a diminution of alliance credibility and legitimacy. Although the 
bombing campaign failed to prevent extensive ethnic cleansing, NATO’s ability to
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persevere in the bombing campaign until the Kosovar refugees were allowed to return to 
Kosovo ultimately accomplished the same objectives.
7.2.3 Risk Distribution
In addition to surveillance and containment strategies, Western interveners dealt with risk 
by distributing it to others. Risk distribution took many forms in post-Cold War 
population protection interventions but was always used as a method of minimising the 
West’s costs and vulnerabilities. First, interveners shared the risks by acting 
multilaterally. In spite of the numerous interventions justified on humanitarian grounds 
in the 1990s, there was not a single case of unilateral state action. Moreover, whether the 
action was authorised by the United Nations or by some other international organisation 
or regional security body, intervening states refused to act without some form of external 
multinational authority. Such authority granted a degree of legitimacy to their actions. 
Western states realised that a single state, acting unilaterally, invited international 
criticism and accusations of neo-colonialism, whereas a multinational force, operating 
under the authority of a multinational organisation, was able to defend itself more easily 
against such charges. Acting under the authority of a supra-national body also gave 
Western states a convenient scapegoat for unsuccessful or unpopular actions. During the 
interventions of the 1990’s, states found membership in international organisations 
particularly useful because they could take individual credit for successful actions and 
blame the organisation for unsuccessful ones. Effective risk distribution also had a 
magnetic effect, drawing in additional participants as the risks were dispersed. The larger 
the coalition, the greater the international legitimacy afforded to the mission and the more 
it was able to deflect the international criticism.
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Western interveners also distributed the risk associated with population protection efforts 
by utilising the capabilities of humanitarian NGOs and IGOs. Though the different 
approaches to population protection used by military forces and humanitarian 
organisations were the source of constant debate and conflict, most military forces and 
humanitarian organisations realised, sometimes grudgingly, that partnership was, at times, 
mutually beneficial. Rather than assume the full responsibility for every aspect of the 
endangered population’s security, the military force relied on the knowledge of 
humanitarian NGOs to meet many of the populations’ needs. With humanitarian 
organisations taking over much of the responsibility for the administration of the 
population and the distribution of goods, interveners were able to reduce the number of 
forces they deployed and the number of tasks they performed. At the same time, many 
NGOs needed the protection and the logistical capabilities afforded by the military 
presence.
Finally, interveners distributed risk through the use of private military companies 
(PMCs). PMCs were companies that contracted with intervening states to perform a wide 
range of military activities, many of which were considered too risky or legally 
questionable to be performed by the casualty-averse interveners. Western interveners 
hired PMCs to accomplish such tasks as training indigenous military forces, providing 
security for refugee camps, de-mining areas, delivering food, and supervising the 
withdrawal of opposition forces.
Northern Iraq. The interveners in northern Iraq used a variety of means to distribute the 
risks of the operation. The coalition consisted primarily of US, UK, and French forces, 
although ten other states also contributed various numbers of personnel and equipment to
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the mission. In reality, most of these contributing states were not crucial to the 
operation’s success, as any one of the three primary states probably could have conducted 
the mission alone had it chosen to do so. Working as an extended coalition, however, 
distributed the economic, political, and military costs among all the participants.
To distribute the risks even further, the Western interveners worked diligently to justify 
their efforts under Security Council Resolution 688, even though the Security Council 
had intentionally omitted authorisation for military intervention in the resolution. 
Previous efforts had been made by the interveners to secure a mandate for the 
intervention, but when it became clear that China would veto it, the coalition decided to 
make use of the existing resolution to the greatest extent possible. In addition to its pre­
intervention risk distribution efforts, the coalition was eager to distribute the risks that 
went with providing ongoing protection to the Kurds. Consequently, they hastily 
transferred the mission to the UN and withdrew.
Bosnia. The effort to protect endangered populations in Bosnia was characterised by 
numerous levels of risk distribution. Because Western states were unwilling to intervene 
individually or as a Western community, they distributed the risks associated with 
intervention in the Balkans to the UN. Once UNPROFOR was mandated to act in 
Bosnia, the intervention became a broad multinational operation where risk could be 
distributed across the entire international community. Member States were able to take 
individual credit for assisting the endangered Bosnians when there were successes, and 
shift the blame to the organisation or other Member States when there were failures. The 
US and European states often blamed each other for setbacks in Bosnia. The US blamed 
Europe’s refusal to support the “lift and strike” strategy for prolonging the conflict.
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Similarly, the European states frequently blamed the US’s lack of support for the Vance 
Owen Peace Plan and its refusal to deploy US ground forces in Bosnia for the stagnation 
of the conflict.2 When there were operational setbacks or failures that aroused the 
criticism of Western publics, Western states blamed the UN for its inefficiency, and UN 
representatives blamed the Member States for their lack of commitment. The Secretary- 
General’s Special Representative in Bosnia, Yasushi Akashi, blamed the Dutch Minister 
of Defence Joris Voorhoeve for insisting that airstrikes be called off as Srebrenica was 
being overrun when in reality, he had already refused the request prior to the Dutch 
Minister’s phone call.3
The persistent US call to lift the arms embargo and allow the Bosnians to better defend 
themselves was largely a risk-distribution tactic. The US reasoned that it was more 
appropriate for an indigenous force fighting for its survival to bear the brunt of the 
combat risks than it was for foreign troops with little at stake. It was for this same reason 
that the US decided to employ private military companies to advise and train the Bosnian 
Muslim and Croat Federation forces. The US even distributed the costs of paying for the 
PMCs by convincing a coalition of Muslim states to pay for the training.
Rwanda. When the Security Council was unable to get Member States to contribute the 
necessary number of forces for its expanded mission in Rwanda, it distributed the risk by 
relying on a French-led coalition to protect the population on its behalf. The UN Security 
Council was eager to transfer the responsibility for protecting the Tutsis to any state or
2 Dana H. Allin, NATO's Balkan Interventions, Adelphi Paper 347, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for 
IISS, 2002), 24-30.
3 A/54/549,15 November 1999, para 306. Also see Dutch rejoinder in Netherlands Institute for War 
Documentation, “Press Summary” of Srebrenica: A Safe Area. Reconstruction, background, 
consequences, and analyses o f the fall o f the safe area, #7, page 3.
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coalition of states willing to do the job in hopes that such a move would shift the media 
attention away from its failure to act.
For their part, the French required Chapter VII authorisation from the Security Council. 
By intervening under Chapter VII authority, the intervening coalition was able to 
distribute the risks of using force back to the UN. The French, in particular, had hoped 
that having UN authority would deflect any accusations about its motives in Rwanda and 
add some credibility to its actions which, from the beginning, were intended to be 
temporary. Additionally, they felt it was important to intervene alongside a number of 
African states, even though the Africans brought few capabilities with them. By 
intervening alongside African troops, France hoped to deflect the risk of being charged 
with neo-colonialism. The French-led force further distributed the risk posed by the 
eventual closure of the militia-controlled IDP camps by turning it over to a UN force that 
was ill-prepared to assume command of the protection effort.
Kosovo. In the absence of formal UN authorisation for the mission in Kosovo, NATO 
member states repeatedly tried to redistribute the risks that came with the intervention by 
appealing to the Security Council’s earlier determination that the situation in Kosovo 
presented a threat to peace and security. Without the UN to blame for operational failures 
or to provide international legitimacy for the intervention, NATO members relied more 
heavily on alliance unity as a medium for distributing the risk associated with action. As 
long as NATO members were unified in their approach, their intervention maintained a 
degree of defensible legitimacy, and member states could more easily counter the charge 
of neo-imperialism.
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Fighting within the construct of NATO also spread the risks to those NATO member 
states that would not have contributed to the military effort otherwise and may have 
publicly disapproved of the tactics being used. By intervening as an alliance, all NATO 
member states had a stake in the NATO victory, a prospect which restrained dissent and 
disagreement from otherwise non-participatory states.
NATO’s desire to distribute risk was also evident in its quest to transfer responsibility for 
Kosovo to the UN as soon as Yugoslavia agreed to meet NATO’s terms. Post-war UN 
involvement was key to NATO’s being able to distribute the risk associated with the 
long-term administration of Kosovo and the eventual resolution of its political status.
NATO further distributed risk by making extensive use of NGOs and PMCs in Kosovo. 
NGOs provided much of the expertise regarding humanitarian assistance, resettlement of 
populations, and temporary administration of refugee camps. In many cases, Western 
governments channelled funds directly to NGOs rather than operating through the Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) or UNHCR, so that they could 
exercise a degree of influence over the administration of their “nationalised” refugee 
camps.4 The Western alliance even employed a consortium of NGOs called the 
International Rescue Committee to conduct airdrops of food parcels to needy populations 
so that it could avoid exposing its pilots to dangers it considered disproportionate to the 
risks it faced.5 NGOs retained a critical role in the post-war administration of Kosovo as 
well.6
4 Michael Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations in the Kosovo Crisis: An Emerging Hegemony?”, Security 
Dialogue, Vol. 31(2), (Sage Publications, 2000), 235.
5 Christopher Coker, Globalisation, 56.
6 Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations”, 235.
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In a further effort to distribute risk, NATO used PMCs to tackle particularly dangerous or 
politically unpalatable jobs such as defusing landmines and training resistance fighters. 
The US utilised PMCs throughout its involvement in Kosovo. Prior to the launch of 
Operation Allied Force, the US contracted out its role in the OSCE Kosovo Verification 
Mission to a PMC called DynCorp.7 Once the operation had begun, MPRI, a PMC used 
extensively in Bosnia, was used to train KLA forces inside Albania for fighting in 
Kosovo.8 At the end of the operation, the US again utilised DynCorp to oversee the 
withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from the region.9
7.3 CONSEQUENCES OF A RISK APPROACH
The manner in which the West identified and managed the risks associated with the 
humanitarian crises of the 1990s resulted in a number of new risks and challenged various 
“rules” of the international system. Both of these developments had negative effects on 
Western states.
7.3.1 Generation of New Risks
The West’s utilisation of minimalist and preventive strategies and techniques to reduce 
risks rather than eliminate them led to the emergence of negative side effects or 
“boomerang risks” which often proved more dangerous than those the interveners initially 
sought to avoid. These included increased risks to the interveners’ safety, credibility, 
unity, and future security, as well as risks to international and regional stability. One of 
the most common side effects resulted from the incompatibility between the risk
7 Coker, Globalisation, 55-6.
8 Wayne Madsen, “Mercenaries in Kosovo: The U.S. connection to the KLA.(includes related article
comparing United States foreign policy in Central America and Kosovo)”, The Progressive, August 1999, 
http://www.findarticles.com/cf dls/m!295/8 6/55309049/print.ihtml. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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assessments of the Western interveners and those of the endangered populations. The
West perceived the potential hazards to its self-interests as sub-survival risks that required
managing. Consequently, it employed the minimalist techniques described above. The
indigenous combatants, however, were fighting for their survival. As Robert Cooper and
Mats Berdal pointed out in 1993,
An ethnic group fighting for survival will be willing to pay almost any price and 
to suffer enormous losses. Having little at stake in the status quo, the ethnic group 
may also be willing to break any rule, convention or agreement if this will further 
its cause. For guerrilla movements, survival can provide a justification for almost 
anything.10
Oftentimes, these incongruous assessments created a great deal of friction between the 
interveners and the local populations and resulted in a more dangerous situation for the 
interveners. In a number of cases, Western interveners were intentionally targeted by 
combatants and occasionally by the people they went to protect.
Negative side effects in the form of new risks to the interveners’ self-interests, also 
resulted from the West’s decision to manage risks rather than eliminate them. A risk that 
is not finally resolved will either require a long-term commitment, which can often be 
costly and difficult for a democracy to sustain, or the acceptance that the unresolved risk 
may recur in a more dangerous form sometime in the future.
Northern Iraq. In Iraq, numerous boomerang risks occurred as a result of the 
minimalist, preventive strategy implemented by the interveners. Unlike the Western 
coalition, which was devoted to managing sub-survival risks to itself, the Kurds were 
fighting for their survival against a hostile Iraqi regime. After suffering at the hands of 
the Iraqis for many years, the Kurds were dissatisfied with the coalition’s initial offer of
9 Ibid.
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food, medicine, and temporary security. Their concerns were centred on their future 
survival under Saddam Hussein after the coalition had withdrawn. As a result, the Kurds 
were willing to jeopardise the lives of non-combatants in order to secure coalition 
guarantees for their security. For example, when the coalition threatened to leave Iraq 
without a guarantee in place, the Kurds countered with the promise to begin another mass 
evacuation to the Turkish border, even though they knew this would lead to the death or 
injury of a number of non-combatants. Kurdish leaders reasoned that endangering the 
lives of women and children might be necessary in order to keep the coalition engaged in 
their long-term security. The Kurdish warning exasperated the coalition leaders and 
jeopardised the coalition unity as key European members wanted to stay until an 
agreement was reached and the Americans were determined to withdraw.
The most obvious side effect of the West’s decision to manage the crisis in northern Iraq 
was that the Kurdish security question remained largely unresolved when the intervention 
ended, and re-emerged as a troublesome issue at various times over the next twelve years. 
Because the US, the UK, and, for a time, France, continued to patrol the NFZ under the 
justification that it was an operation to safeguard the Kurds, the alliance faced difficult 
questions when Iraqi ground forces attacked Kurdish towns and villages or Turkish air 
and ground forces launched attacks into the area and coalition aircraft did nothing to 
prevent it. Although the NFZ was technically only intended to ban Iraqi aircraft from 
being used against the Kurds, this obvious “loophole” exposed the West’s primary NFZ 
objective as an operation to contain Saddam Hussein.
10 Robert Cooper and Mats Berdal, “Outside Intervention in Ethnic Conflicts”, Survival, vol. 35, no. 1, 
Spring 1993, 138.
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Finally, the coalition’s minimalist approach towards the Kurdish predicament in 1991 
also generated side effects that came to fruition in 2003 when the US- and UK-led effort 
against Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, sought Kurdish military assistance in northern 
Iraq. As a result of the Kurds’ perception of the coalition’s actions (and inaction) in 
1991, the Kurds were far less willing to risk their lives for ambiguous promises from 
Western states in the 2003 operation. Though the Kurdish peshmerga forces eventually 
fought alongside coalition forces and defeated Iraqi troops in northern Iraq, the final 
resolution of the Kurdish security question in Iraq remains unanswered and, therefore, a 
potential source of future risks.
Bosnia. In Bosnia, the West also experienced negative side effects as a result of its 
managerial approach to the humanitarian crisis. Like in the intervention in Iraq, some 
side effects resulted from the conflicting perspectives held by the interveners and 
combatants over their assessments of the hazards. Western states emphasised minimalist, 
avoidance strategies that were proportional to the limited risks they sought to manage. In 
contrast, both the Bosniac and the Bosnian Serb forces viewed the conflict in terms of 
their survival and were, therefore far more willing than Western states to suffer and inflict 
casualties in their quest for victory. Consequently, UNPROFOR, which relied on the 
consent of the combatants to protect the population, was often unable to carry out its 
mission effectively, resulting in several humiliating and tragic events.
UNPROFOR’s ineffectiveness was most vividly demonstrated by its failure to protect the 
non-combatants in Srebrenica and Zepa. Although the West employed the minimalist 
safe area strategy in an attempt to preserve its credibility at the lowest possible cost, it 
suffered a devastating blow to its credibility as a result of these dramatic failures. The
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collapse of the safe areas and the subsequent deaths of thousands of Bosnian men and 
boys in the presence of Western peacekeepers exposed the West’s self-interested 
priorities and half-hearted commitments in a way that would not quickly be forgotten, 
regardless of how many future “successes” it might achieve.
In a more tangible way, the Dutch government experienced boomerang effects from the 
collapse of Srebrenica seven years after the disaster occurred. After the official Dutch 
report on the Srebrenica tragedy revealed that the Dutch government was partially to 
blame for the area’s collapse, the entire Dutch cabinet resigned. Prime Minister Wim 
Kok claimed that he was taking responsibility for the Dutch role in failing to protect 
Srebrenica’s population.11 The Dutch military, which prided itself in its expertise in 
humanitarian operations also suffered a serious blow to its credibility, and some 
individual Dutchbat soldiers still suffer from serious psychological problems as a result of
1 9their experiences in Srebrenica.
Another negative side effect occurred as a result of the West’s decision to bolster the 
protective capacity of the safe areas by allowing Bosniac military and paramilitary forces 
to operate within them. Rather than reducing the population’s danger from external 
attack, the presence of the Bosniac fighters actually increased it by providing the Bosnian 
Serbs with a justification to attack. Moreover, these Bosniac fighters confronted 
UNPROFOR directly on several occasions. UNPROFOR’s avoidance strategies angered 
the Bosnian forces and led to accusations of cowardice and even hostile engagements 
resulting in the deaths of several Bosnian and UN soldiers.
11 “Dutch MPs debate cabinet resignation,” BBC Online, 17 April 2002, Accessed 15 July 2003. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid 1934000/1934661.stm.
271
Ultimately, the minimalist risk management approach of Western interveners in Bosnia 
did long-term damage to ethnic reconciliation in the region. The massacre, torture, and 
rape of thousands of people that resulted from the West’s failure to protect the designated 
safe areas exacerbated ethnic tension and provided fresh justification for revenge and 
future hostilities. Consequently, Western troops currently tasked with maintaining 
stability in the region are likely to be deployed on Bosnian soil for years to come.
Rwanda. As a result of their inaction and ineffectiveness in responding to the genocide 
in Rwanda, the credibility of the UN and many Western Member States was seriously 
damaged, not only among Rwandans, but with whole international community. The 
UN’s “Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 
Genocide in Rwanda” exposed the West’s culpability in stark terms. The report found 
that blame for the inaction rested, among others, on the Security Council and the Member 
States. Belgium specifically received a great deal of negative publicity for withdrawing 
its forces after ten of its soldiers were killed. The Belgian inquiry into the Rwanda 
debacle was critical of the Belgian general staff, Belgian political officials, and the 
Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as the UN and UNAMIR. The report 
concluded that they all shared “responsibility for the deaths of hundreds of thousands of 
people”.13 In numerous inquiries and after-action reports, including those from the UN, 
the Organisation of African Unity, and Human Rights Watch, the French were also 
heavily criticised for their inadequate response and were accused of assisting those who 
orchestrated the genocide. Though the French have strongly denied these accusations and 
defended Operation Turquoise, they have been unable to distance themselves entirely
12 See “Dutch Report”, Nos. 14 and 15.
13 Koenraad Van Brabant, “Security and Protection in Peacekeeping: A Critical Reading of the Belgian 
Inquiry into Events in Rwanda in 1994”, International Peacekeeping, Spring 1999, Vol. 6, No. 1, (London: 
Frank Cass), 143-53
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from the conclusions. Similarly, US credibility suffered as a result of its inaction in 
Rwanda and was specifically named in numerous reports as bearing a large share of the 
responsibility for allowing the genocide to continue unabated.
There were additional negative side effects that resulted from the minimalist manner in 
which UNAMIR II dealt with the Hutu-filled IDP camps within Rwanda. The West’s 
assessment of the hazards generated by the IDP camps was at odds with the new Tutsi 
government’s assessment. This incongruity eventually generated boomerang risks to the 
interveners’ safety and the West’s credibility. The new Tutsi government viewed the IDP 
camps to be threats to its security. It, therefore, favoured a strategy of threat elimination 
rather than risk management. Consequently, when the interveners proved unwilling to 
police the camps in a way that would lead to a resolution of the government’s security 
threat, the Tutsi government acted forcefully to close the camps in a manner that was 
deemed barbaric by many observers. In addition to claiming the lives of innocent people 
and jeopardising the safety of the UN forces, these incidents harmed the credibility of the 
UN and the Western states, which once again demonstrated their unwillingness to act on 
the population’s behalf.
As in Bosnia, the magnitude of the killings in Rwanda, which were facilitated by the 
West’s self-interested approach, greatly decreased the likelihood of achieving regional 
reconciliation and normalisation in the near future. Moreover, the interveners’ risk 
management techniques contributed to the refugee crisis and subsequent cholera epidemic 
in Zaire as well as to the long-term instability in the African Great Lakes region as a 
whole. As Hutu government officials, genocidaires, military leaders, and scores of Hutus 
were allowed to escape across the borders into surrounding states and massive refugee
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camps, the already unstable economic, cultural, and ethnic balance of the region was 
thrown into turmoil. This has contributed to the series of bitter wars that have further 
devastated and destabilised the region. In fact, the humanitarian crisis in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) can be partially attributed to the minimalist, risk management 
decisions made by the West concerning Rwanda. The ongoing crisis in the DRC has the 
potential to result in another genocidal outburst, which could once again force the West to 
face difficult risk decisions regarding intervention.
Kosovo. The most obvious side effect of the West’s failure to resolve the status of 
Kosovo following Operation Allied Force was that, in order to ensure stability in the 
region, Western states were forced to deploy large numbers of soldiers to a dangerous 
environment and will have to sustain that commitment for the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, as the bulk of Kosovar Albanians still desire to be independent from 
Yugoslavia, the difficult question of the province’s status will eventually have to be 
answered. When the issue surfaces again, it will bring with it the renewed possibility of 
warfare and regional instability.
NATO suffered a number of other side effects as a result of its minimalist managerial 
actions in Kosovo. Ironically, NATO’s efforts to preserve its relevance as a security 
organisation may have actually decreased the likelihood that it will wage war as an 
alliance in the future. Although NATO ultimately forced Milosevic to agree to its terms 
and could, therefore, claim a degree of success, the process of fighting as an alliance, 
especially for sub-survival risks, was far more difficult than NATO had imagined, 
resulting in a great deal of strain among its members. In spite of previous war-planning 
exercises and fifty years of refining its standard operating procedures, going to war as an
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alliance in which nineteen countries had an equal voice proved to be an arduous task that 
many NATO states will probably try to avoid in the future.
As in the other Western interventions of the 1990s, the incongruity between the risk 
assessments of the interveners and the endangered population carried negative 
ramifications for the West. NATO employed methods consistent with their sub-survival 
assessment of the risks, while the Kosovars were fighting for their freedom and, in many 
cases, their physical survival. By refusing to deploy ground forces, NATO had to rely on 
the KLA to battle Yugoslav forces and protect populations on the ground in Kosovo. 
Consequently, NATO legitimised the KLA and many of its methods by default.
As a result of the Kosovars’ survival perspective, they were far more willing to inflict and 
sustain casualties in their fight against Yugoslav forces than was NATO. Furthermore, 
they utilised tactics that were deemed barbarous by many within the West. When 
peaceful resistance proved to be ineffective in gaining international assistance, the KLA 
adopted a strategy designed to gain Western media attention by inciting Yugoslav forces 
to engage in retaliatory and indiscriminate attacks against innocent Kosovar civilians. In 
fact, the KLA often launched attacks on Yugoslav military and special police forces 
knowing that there would be reprisal killings against the Kosovar population and hoping 
that such atrocities would arouse the West into action. KLA fighters also engaged in 
terrorist tactics, brutally killed or terrorised suspected Yugoslav collaborators, and 
financed their efforts with illicit activities such as the sale of drugs. These tactics blurred 
the distinction between violator and victim, making it very difficult for NATO member 
states to maintain public support and alliance unity. Additionally, by relying on the KLA 
to fight the ground battle, NATO was faced with the difficult, post-conflict task of
275
converting some of the KLA into a reliable peacetime entity and integrating the rest back 
into society. These tasks, which are still ongoing, have proven to be extremely difficult 
and dangerous.
NATO’s refusal to commit ground forces in Kosovo also exposed its low casualty 
threshold for sub-survival risks thereby inviting future exploitation and ultimately 
defeating the purposes of its own actions. For example, the preservation and 
enhancement of its credibility was a key motivation for NATO’s intervention; however, 
NATO’s refusal to consider using ground forces may have actually weakened it. 
Opponents such as those in Kosovo who operate outside of a state infrastructure and with 
a willingness to suffer casualties are relatively invulnerable to aerial bombardment. 
Hence, this casualty-averse strategy on the part of the West could actually encourage 
some states or rogue elements to defy the alliance’s warnings and disregard NATO’s 
technological superiority in the future. Similarly, it will reinforce the impression that an 
intervention can be deterred or spoiled simply by spilling NATO blood. Anti-Western 
groups such as extremist terrorist groups frequently cite the West’s unwillingness to 
suffer casualties as being a key reason for their confidence of achieving victory over 
Western forces. In this sense, NATO’s risk-averse managerial strategies may have 
actually increased the danger to NATO forces in the future.
Finally, NATO’s struggle to manage risk through Operation Allied Force exposed 
numerous inadequacies in European military capabilities.14 Since this exposure, 
European members of NATO have been under great pressure to increase their defence 
budgets and upgrade their forces and equipment. European decision-makers have since
14 For an excellent article on the European “capabilities gap”, see David S. Yost, “The NATO Capabilities 
Gap and The European Union”, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 4, Winter 2000-01, 97 -128.
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had the difficult task of balancing these external pressures with the expectations of 
domestic publics who have often been opposed to any significant increases in defence 
spending in the post-Cold War environment.15
7.3.2 Alteration of Established Rules
The West’s identification and subsequent management of risk during the 1990’s 
challenged a number of previously accepted “rules” or international norms. Among 
others, issues such as state sovereignty and non-intervention, the rights of refugees, and 
the protection of IDPs have all been affected by the West’s risk perspective. In a number 
of cases, interveners unintentionally set new precedents for acceptable international 
practice. Usually these changes resulted from the implementation of ad hoc measures 
designed by the interveners to manage a specific risk, with little or no forethought to its 
potential effect on the future of international relations. As a result of the confusion 
generated by the West’s unorthodox managerial methods, international “ordering 
principles” are, in many ways, in a state of flux with some actors clinging to the old 
methods of conducting relations and others embracing the new. The existence of these 
multiple and ambiguous rule structures has generated tension and confusion among 
international actors.
Northern Iraq. The most direct challenge to international norms resulting from the 
coalition’s intervention in Iraq involves the issue of state sovereignty. Though numerous 
analysts have concluded that the coalition action in northern Iraq on behalf of the Kurdish 
population complied with the existing norms of state sovereignty because of Iraq’s special 
post-war status, the humanitarian justifications for Operation Provide Comfort created a
15 Ibid., 120-22.
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public demand and set a precedent for future interventions justified on humanitarian 
principles. Regardless of the West’s other motives, it justified its actions as a mission to 
protect an endangered population from the abusive treatment of its home state. Thus, the 
coalition action effectively narrowed the scope of what could legitimately be defined as a 
state’s internal affairs. In fact, the resurgence of the “sovereignty with responsibility” 
movement mentioned in Chapter 2 can largely be traced to the coalition’s actions in this 
intervention.
The risk management approach of Operation Provide Comfort also had a major effect on 
the manner in which the international community handled displaced people. Prior to the 
situation in northern Iraq, neighbouring states were expected to admit refugees and 
provide for their welfare. When Turkey’s refusal to allow entry to the fleeing Kurds was 
supported by the West, it set a precedent for other states to refuse entry to future waves of 
refugees. Turkey’s refusal, coupled with the extensive media coverage of the exposed 
Kurds, forced the coalition to consider new ways of dealing with endangered populations 
in situ. Delineating an area within the home state and declaring it “safe” was the chosen 
method. Variations of the Iraqi safe haven, such as safe areas, safe corridors, and 
humanitarian space were used throughout the 1990s and are still in limited use at the time 
of this writing.
Keeping endangered populations in their home states had a dramatic effect on the 
international community’s ability to care for them. Though refugees had certain legal 
protections as well as a UN organisation created specifically to deal with their unique 
challenges and needs, internally displaced people (IDPs) did not. Moreover, in situ 
protection made gaining access to the populations very difficult for UN organisations and
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humanitarian NGOs, as the operational environments within the home states were often 
far more dangerous for their workers than those in neighbouring states. In many ways, 
the unique problems associated with IDPs continue to cause grave concern for the 
international community.
Bosnia. The goal of Western states in the Security Council to protect endangered 
Bosnian populations within the confines of Bosnia reinforced and expanded the changes 
resulting from northern Iraq. The legitimacy of non-combatant protection afforded by 
Operation Provide Comfort gave the UN Security Council a useful precedent for a 
minimalist intervention in the Bosnian crisis. The difference with Bosnia was that the 
endangered population had not been explicitly denied access to refuge in foreign states. 
Rather than the safe areas being a response to a closed border as had been the case in Iraq, 
the safe areas in Bosnia were used as a proactive, preventive strategy to keep the 
Bosnians in place. In a very real sense, the safe area concept, as applied in Bosnia to the 
protection of the population, was a matter of convenience instead of necessity. Keeping 
the endangered population within Bosnia was advantageous to Bosnia’s European 
neighbours who were already suffering politically and economically from the influx of 
Balkan refugees. It was also desirable for the Bosnian government and Western states 
because safe areas prevented a Bosnian Serb consolidation of territory without the 
deployment of large numbers of Western combat forces. The emphasis on in situ 
protection in Bosnia resulted in the expansion of UNHCR’s activities to include the 
provision of assistance to IDPs. It also set a precedent for receiving states eager to reduce 
their responsibilities with regard to displaced people to demand alternative classifications 
for displaced people. As Michael Pugh observed in a June 2000 article, in situ protection 
eventually led to the toleration of
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various alternatives to refugee status -  employing such terms as ‘temporary 
protection’ or ‘humanitarian status’ -  and to adopt the concept of ‘humanitarian 
protection’ in camps in (often poor) countries adjacent to conflicts as a substitute 
for asylum seeking and resettlement in wealthier countries.16
As these new rule structures and alternative classifications emerge, the endangered
populations are the ones who suffer most from the confusion and inconsistency that
follows.
The Bosnian safe areas also challenged the long-standing “rules” associated with 
peacekeeping missions. Though the UNPROFOR safe area mission began as a Chapter 
VI peacekeeping mission with the formal consent of the recognised Bosnian government, 
consent from the all the parties to the dispute was variable at best. Moreover, 
UNPROFOR’s mission often meant that it was perceived by the combatants as being 
partial to one side of the conflict. This perception greatly increased UNPROFOR’s 
vulnerability, yet UNPROFOR did not have the means or the mandate to defend itself or 
the population under its charge adequately. The West eventually acknowledged that the 
unique difficulties surrounding intrastate conflicts limited the utility of traditional 
peacekeeping “rules”. Consequently, Western intervention forces that deployed after 
Bosnia generally demanded and were granted more robust military capabilities and 
mandates.
The West’s decision to manage risks rather than fight a war led to changes in the realm of 
international justice. Recognising the need to bring those responsible for the 
humanitarian tragedies to justice, the Security Council authorised the formation of the 
first international criminal tribunal for the purpose of trying suspected violators of 
international humanitarian law. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
16 Pugh, “Civil-Military Relations”, 233.
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Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council Resolution 827 of 25 May 1993 
and was still in operation at the time of this writing. The ICTY provided a precedent for 
setting up a similar tribunal in Rwanda in the aftermath of the genocide in 1994 and gave 
impetus to the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002.
Rwanda. The minimalist risk management operations in Rwanda had a number of rule- 
altering effects. First, they exposed the inadequacy of the Genocide Convention. 
Rwanda clearly demonstrated that states could always find a reason not to act if it was in 
their interest to do so. In spite of their first-hand evidence, Western representatives on the 
Security Council, led by the US and UK, argued for weeks over the legal definition of the 
word “genocide” while Rwandans were being slaughtered. Western states were hesitant 
to apply it to the catastrophe in Rwanda for fear that such a description would obligate 
them to deploy military forces to the conflict. Ironically, the shame produced by Western 
inaction in this case may actually move Western states to take firmer action in future 
humanitarian crises. This was certainly the case in the EU’s decision to deploy a 
protection force to the DRC and may result in a similar US force being sent to Liberia, 
though this remains to be seen. In 1998, President Clinton promised Rwandans that the 
US was developing the means to recognise and respond to potential genocides before they 
happened, and the UN Secretary-General followed suit with his pleas to the UN General 
Assembly in 1999 and 2000 to reach a consensus for action in situations involving “gross 
and systematic violations of human rights”.17
Despite their actual self-interested motives and ineffectiveness in carrying out the 
protection mission, the UN and French humanitarian justifications for intervening in
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Rwanda reinforced the legitimacy of protecting individuals from state-sponsored 
atrocities. Since that time, individual human beings have increasingly been viewed as 
legitimate objects of international concern. The failure of the West to protect the 
Rwandans during the genocide was a major catalyst in the human security and the 
“sovereignty with responsibility” movements of the 1990s.
Additionally, the crisis in Rwanda resulted in a reconsideration of the rules governing 
Security Council membership during exceptional circumstances. The Rwandese 
representative to the UN, a member of the genocidal Hutu regime, coincidentally held a 
seat on the Security Council during the operation. Since there were no provisions to 
remove a sitting member in exceptional circumstances, the Rwandese representative was 
able to keep his seat on the Council, maintain his access to the Council’s private 
discussions, and vote on the relevant draft resolutions. As a result of this situation, the 
UN’s independent inquiry into the Rwanda debacle recommended the following: 
“Further study should be given to the possibility to suspend participation of the 
representative of a Member State on the Security Council in exceptional circumstances 
such as the crisis in Rwanda”.18 Though this recommendation has not been acted upon 
formally, it may yet lead to a change in the way a similar situation is handled in the 
future.
Kosovo. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo challenged a number of international norms. 
Most dramatic was NATO’s decision to intervene without UN authorisation. NATO’s 
unauthorised actions challenged the prevailing understanding of state sovereignty even
17 Kofi A. Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty”, Address to the 54th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly, New York, 20 Sept 1999, in The Question o f Intervention, Statements of the Secretary- 
General, (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1999), 39.
18 UN Rwanda Report, Recommendation #12, page 55.
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more than previous operations because NATO intervened against the recognised state 
authority and without the tacit approval of all the permanent members of the Security 
Council. Yugoslavia filed charges with the International Court of Justice against NATO 
member states calling their actions illegal under international law. Though the ICJ ruled 
that it “manifestly” lacked jurisdiction in the cases of the US and Spain and lacked 
“prima facie” jurisdiction in the remaining cases, Yugoslavia’s legal challenge bolstered 
the arguments of those in favour of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and reinforced 
the US’s determination to assign comprehensive conditions to its support of the ICC.19
Perhaps more significantly, NATO’s unilateral actions in Kosovo seemed a precursor to 
the US-led coalition action against Iraq in 2003, which had neither UN nor NATO 
authorisation. Though the missions and justifications for military action were quite 
different in Kosovo and Iraq, the decision to act unilaterally in Iraq was probably made 
easier by having done so in Kosovo less than five years earlier. While the effects of this 
action in Kosovo on the long-term credibility and relevance of the UN remain to be seen, 
the West’s use of humanitarian justifications to act without Security Council authorisation 
could become a precedent for other states or coalitions to act without UN authorisation in 
the future.
In terms of the operation’s implementation, NATO’s air-only strategy challenged the 
conventional wisdom that airpower alone could not win a war. While many 
commentators have convincingly pointed out that there were other factors that led to 
Yugoslavia’s eventual compliance with the Military Technical Agreement regarding
19 See International Court of Justice, Press Communique 9/33, 2 June 1999, http://www.ici- 
cii.org/iciwww/idocket/ivus/ivusframe.htm and Press Communique 2002/10, 22 March 2002, 
http://www.ici-cii .org/iciwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom2002-10 vugo 20020322.htm. Both 
Accessed 18 July 2003.
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Kosovo, a host of others, such as the British military historian Robert Keegan, credited 
airpower with the victory.20 To a great extent, Westerners saw Kosovo as proof that the 
use of ground troops often created unnecessary risks for interveners who possessed 
superior technology.
This belief reinforced the West’s reliance on precision technology as well as its 
expectation that wars could be fought with zero friendly casualties—a standard that 
military planners and political decision-makers will find very difficult to meet in the 
future. Moreover, though the primary benefit of using precision technology was to 
reduce the vulnerability of NATO aircrews and keep public support high for the 
operation, the results of these highly technical strikes raised the standard for judging 
collateral damage to an impossibly high level. All of these developments—the reliance 
on precision technology, the expectation of a casualty-free war, and the exacting 
standards of operational effectiveness regarding collateral damage will inevitably limit 
the West’s ability to wage war effectively in the future.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has answered the last of the three secondary questions posed at the beginning 
of this thesis by arguing that the actions of Western states in the protection interventions 
of the 1990s can best be explained using principles from risk theory. Using a framework 
of analysis drawn from this theory, it showed that these interventions were more than 
merely failed attempts at protecting populations due to the inexperience or inability of
20 John Keegan, "Please Mr Blair, Never Take Such a Risk Again," London Daily Telegraph, 6 June 1999, 
Issue 1472.
http://www.dailvtelegraph.co.uk/htmlContent. jhtml?html=%2Farchive%2F1999%2F06%2F06%2Fwkee06. 
html&secureReffesh=true& requestid=411045. Accessed 15 July 2003.
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Western states. On the contrary, they were logical responses to hazards viewed from the 
West’s post-Cold War risk perspective. Using multiple examples from each of the case 
studies, this chapter demonstrated that, as Western states strove to safeguard their self- 
interests under the guise of population protectors, they were acting in accordance with the 
five key characteristics that identify a risk society. Far more than half-hearted attempts to 
protect populations, or sui generis responses that defied comparison, these interventions 
represented exercises in risk management.
Faced with the uncertain hazards of the new post-Cold War security environment, 
Western states utilised experts to culturally-construct and prioritise future risks arising 
from the humanitarian crises. Based on these risk assessments, they implemented 
preventive strategies using minimalist methods in an effort to manage rather than 
eliminate the risks they faced. Finally, because of their managerial approach to the 
hazards, Western states suffered deleterious side effects altered long-established norms, 
thereby increasing uncertainty and, with it, the potential for conflict in the new security 
environment.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter One, this thesis proposed to offer an explanation for why the West, given its 
abundant capabilities, intervened in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s in a way that 
failed to protect the populations. By breaking the primary question down into three 
secondary questions, analysing four protection interventions from the 1990s, and 
borrowing concepts from risk theory, this thesis has reached a number of conclusions. 
The answers to the first two secondary questions were exposed by the inconsistencies 
between the West’s stated objectives for the protection interventions and the methods it 
used to achieve them. Such an incongruity between motives and means revealed that the 
West’s priority objective was to safeguard its own self-interests rather than to protect the 
lives of endangered populations. This conclusion was further supported by the fact that 
the West had the military capability to protect populations if it had possessed the intent to 
do so. Unfortunately for the vulnerable non-combatants, population protection was 
neither the West’s primary objective nor its standard for success. Instead, the West 
intervened to counter the negative effects generated by the humanitarian crises on issues 
such as Western credibility, alliance unity, domestic support, and geographic and political 
stability. As the case studies demonstrated, these effects were only marginally connected 
with the populations’ protection. Consequently, populations were protected only as long 
as, and to the extent that, the West’s self-interest coincided with the success of that 
protection.
286
While the primacy of Western self-interest is an important and necessary conclusion to 
draw, it does not further one’s understanding of the complex and seemingly contradictory 
strategies used by the West in pursuit of their self-interests. Hence, self-interest is not a 
sufficient answer to the primary question of this thesis. The case studies revealed the 
need for an explanatory framework that could shed light on the manner in which the West 
sought to protect its self-interests in the uncertain post-Cold War security environment. 
Chapter 7 provided the framework, using the principles of risk theory to answer the last of 
the secondary questions of this thesis. It showed how Western states acted as risk 
societies, preserving their self-interests through the application of a risk management 
strategy designed to manage multiple, uncertain, and future hazards.
Chapter 7 demonstrated the applicability of the risk society framework to post-Cold War 
Western states by showing how the West identified the hazards associated with 
humanitarian crises from a risk perspective. Faced with the numerous uncertainties 
surrounding these crises, the West relied on a host of experts to assess the possible future 
dangers to itself associated with either action or inaction. Once the West had assessed 
and prioritised the risks, it implemented minimalist, preventive, and avoidance strategies 
to manage them in proportion to the severity of the hazard they posed. Finally, because 
the West managed its risks rather than eliminating them, it suffered from the negative side 
effects and destabilising rule alterations that are common to risk societies.
In summation, the answer to why the West intervened in humanitarian crises in a way that 
failed to protect populations in the 1990s is simply this: as a risk society, the West 
deemed the costs required to protect populations to be disproportionately high in 
comparison to the risks the endangered populations posed to the West.
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This conclusion has a number of implications for the international community, the West, 
and the populations threatened by intrastate violence. The remainder of the chapter 
briefly examines some of these implications and recommends courses of action that could 
lead to more successful interventions, both for Western risk societies and those 
populations in need of their help.
8.1 IMPLICATIONS OF RISK SOCIETIES
It is useful to consider some of the implications that the West’s transition to a risk society 
could have on a number of issues. This section briefly considers the applicability of the 
risk framework to Western actions after the 1990s. In addition, it examines some possible 
implications of risk societies on Western unity, endangered populations seeking 
protection, and future protection interventions.
8.1.1 Risk Applicability Beyond the 1990s
This thesis is not suggesting that the West will permanently remain a risk society or that 
the perspective and language of “risk” will forever eclipse the traditional threat-based 
perspective of the West. Far from representing a permanent transformation, risk societies 
could vanish tomorrow if a sufficient threat emerged that rendered risks inconsequential.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, some scholars argue that terrorism has become a threat of 
sufficient magnitude to transform the West back into a community of threat-based 
societies. Certainly in the immediate aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center 
in New York City and Washington D.C., A1 Qaeda seemed to pose such a threat. A1
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Qaeda demonstrated its intent and its capability to damage the West in dramatic fashion, 
and vowed to continue its attack. At that time, the organisation had a geographical base 
of operations and the support of a state government, both of which were vulnerable to the 
West’s military capability. Afghanistan’s Taliban government and A1 Qaeda’s cave 
network presented certain, identifiable targets that lent themselves to the West’s 
traditional threat elimination strategy. Consequently, the West initially reacted to the 
terrorist hazard much more like a threat than a risk.
The West has already shown its inability to continue this approach due to the 
decentralised nature of terrorist activity. Terrorists generally employ tactics that utilise 
dispersed cells and informal networks which make threat-elimination strategies difficult 
to implement. One of the prime objectives of terrorism is to generate anxiety within the 
target state so that its inhabitants lose faith in the state’s ability to protect them. Terrorists 
accomplish this by shrouding themselves and their actions in uncertainty. Consequently, 
effective terrorists are able to generate massive anxiety in the target population using only 
a few sporadic incidents. One or two carefully planned operations can significantly affect 
the degree of vulnerability a person or a population feels. Moreover, terrorists can wage 
an effective campaign without a large support structure or a defined base of operations.
The West’s ability to target terrorists changed drastically once the Taliban government 
fell and the remnants of A1 Qaeda scattered. Now the West is desperately trying to find 
and disrupt A1 Qaeda attacks before they occur. In many ways, Western states are 
chasing probabilities, and there is a general recognition among them that the “war on 
terror” may never end. Rather than seeking to eliminate terrorism, the West is simply 
trying to reduce it to a tolerable level. Unlike its campaign in Afghanistan, success is
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now measured by “non-events”.1 Every day that is free from a terrorist attack is 
considered a success for the West’s managerial strategy. These ambiguous successes do 
not inspire confidence in the Western public. Western citizens arguably feel more 
anxious now than ever before because of the uncertainty that pervades their daily 
existence. Threat warnings or conditions are broadcast routinely, bridges are closed, and 
airports are patrolled by soldiers in tanks; yet these efforts do very little to help people 
feel secure as they wait for the next attack. For these reasons, terrorism is far more likely 
to entrench the West’s risk-focused approach than it is to reverse it.
Irrespective of the effects of terrorism on the West, other threats may eventually emerge 
that subordinate the risk perspective to a secondary position. History may well 
demonstrate that the early post-Cold War period in the West was an anomaly—a 
temporary period in which one adversary had yet to be replaced by another, leaving the 
West in an historically rare hyper-dominant position. Then again, it is possible that the 
predominance of the risk perspective will continue for many years to come. Whatever the 
outcome, it is useful to consider the implications of risk societies on Western unity, 
endangered populations, sovereignty, and protection interventions.
8.1.2 Western Unity
Western societies will remain risk societies as long as the priority hazards which confront 
them remain uncertain and pervasive. Western risk societies are not, however, 
necessarily united or in agreement with one another, even in their response to the same 
potential hazard. In fact, a risk-dominated outlook toward emerging hazards could 
actually be a catalyst to Western disunity and fragmentation. As the perception of risk is
1 Yee-Kuang Heng, “Unravelling the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A Risk Management Exercise in War Clothing?”, 
Security Dialogue (33), no. 2, (June 2000):228.
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constructed culturally, different societies often disagree as to the nature and magnitude of 
a particular hazard within the context of a given crisis. The greater the degree of 
uncertainty associated with a hazard, the more likely it is to generate conflicting 
conceptions of risk, and, therefore, dissimilar strategies for its management. Rather than 
the West becoming a unified Risk Society or a regional cosmopolis as some have argued, 
it is far more probable that it will be, at best, a sort of federation or community of risk 
societies that comes together when there is common agreement and common benefit, and 
separates when there is not. Without a unifying self-interest or shared assessment of the 
risk, societies will pursue their own courses of action according to their own constructions 
of the risks they face. Because of this, and contrary to Ulrich Beck’s prediction of a risk- 
based cosmopolitan society, risk societies will probably be as fractious and divisive as 
ever. A hint of this fragmentation is already evident as European states seem increasingly 
divergent, both from one another and from their allies across the Atlantic, on issues as 
wide ranging as foreign and security policy, the future of European governance, the 
control of asylum seekers, and the sale of beef.
Within these risk societies, Western populations are becoming more anxious and doubtful 
as new catastrophes confirm their suspicions and new dooms are prophesied by legions of 
experts. Greater anxiety and doubt increase the West’s ambivalence toward endangered 
people in other parts of the world. As Western populations feel more personally 
vulnerable to unknown dangers, they grow more inwardly focused in an attempt to find 
ways that reduce their exposure to risks. Consequently, they are less committed to 
particular courses of action that require sacrifice in the face of uncertainty. This trend is 
reinforced by the fact that now, unlike in the early 1990s, members of risk societies have
2 For an excellent discussion of European-US divergence, see Christopher Coker, Empires in Conflict: The 
Growing Rift Between Europe and the United States, Whitehall Paper 58, (London: die Royal United
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the opportunity to consider the poor results of past protection attempts. With the 
humanitarian results of the interventions being as unimpressive as they are and the 
negative consequences as dangerous, Western publics may be less committed to 
population protection interventions than ever before.
At the same time, the Western public is growing increasingly aware that the unbounded 
nature of risk means that distant dangers have local consequences and, therefore, must be 
addressed. For example, though population abuse may occur miles away from Western 
states, Western publics are aware that such abuses often produce floods of refugees who 
harm the local economy, destabilise the region by upsetting the ethnic and religious 
balance, or disperse foreign criminals and potential terrorists worldwide. In response, the 
public is aware that something must be done both to contain the atrocities and soothe its 
troubled conscience. It expresses its verbal outrage over the humanitarian atrocities and 
demands international protection for the population, followed by an equally intense 
demand to stay out of any armed conflict that endangers friendly soldiers for causes that 
do not directly threaten Western interests. As long as risk societies exist, the public will 
demand that the West provide endangered populations with protection, when it is actually 
only prepared to accept the cost of providing them with assistance. The distinction 
between the two is critical. Faced with these ambivalent demands, Western decision­
makers will most likely continue to manage the crises using minimalist ad hoc measures, 
which will challenge international norms and increase the uncertainty within international 
society.
Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2003).
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8.1.3 Endangered Populations
The increasingly reinforced rhetorical linkage of state sovereignty with state 
responsibility, combined with the deepening entrenchment of the West’s risk avoidance 
approach to intervention in practice has had a devastating effect on populations in need of 
protection. Encouraged by the international community’s protection rhetoric, the 
endangered populations have been led to expect a greater amount of Western involvement 
in their situations than the West has been prepared to give. They hear of the international 
outrage, the condemnatory remarks, and the pledges for international action regarding 
their need for protection. They see and talk with high-level delegations sent to document 
humanitarian abuses and formulate plans for action. They witness the delivery of large 
quantities of food and medicines and come into contact with numerous NGO 
representatives with newly established bases in their areas. In desperation, the 
endangered populations look to the West as saviours and protectors. They believe the 
international community’s assurances of lessons learned from past mistakes and consider 
themselves fortunate to be objects of international concern. In so doing, they make 
themselves more vulnerable by remaining within the borders of their own states and 
congregating in large masses near aid camps and “protection” zones.
Only then do they grasp the reality of the “protection” provided by risk societies. They 
find that military forces sent to assist them, if any are sent, are too few and too 
constrained by mandates and rules of engagement to provide real protection. For all their 
equipment and firepower, the intervening forces are far more concerned with staying 
alive than with jeopardising their own safety on behalf of an endangered foreign 
population. The interveners help deliver aid, negotiate cease-fires between rival 
combatants, and bring some general organisation to the lives of the displaced people. But
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in the end, the endangered populations find that the interveners’ presence is only 
marginally connected with their protection. The media cameras eventually disappear; the 
international forces return home to commendation; commanders write their after-action- 
reports; and they remain displaced, endangered, or dead.
If Western states continue to operate as risk societies, the implications for future 
endangered populations will continue to be grim. Regardless of the scale of the 
humanitarian atrocity and despite the verbal condemnations that emerge from Western 
leaders, the populations will only be protected by Western states as long as doing so 
manages more risks for the intervener than it generates.
8.1.4 Sovereignty
Although sovereignty has never really been a static concept,3 it underwent modifications 
in the 1990s that can be somewhat explained by the emergence of a risk outlook in the 
West. As Nicholas Wheeler thoroughly explained in his book Saving Strangers, the post- 
Cold War international community increasingly accepted the legitimacy of humanitarian 
justifications for intervening in certain humanitarian crises. However, rather than being 
evidence of a solidarist shift, it may simply be evidence of dominant Western risk 
societies intervening to manage the risks generated by population crises. In fact, the risk 
society explanation accounts for the “gap” between Western humanitarian rhetoric and 
practice much better than solidarism.
In the post-Cold War environment in which the West is relatively free from imminent 
survival threats, the risks posed by humanitarian tragedies are relatively greater than they
3 J. Samuel Barkin, “The Evolution of the Constitution of Sovereignty and the Emergence of Human Rights 
Norms”, Millennium Journal o f International Studies, vol. 27, no. 2, 1998, 229-252.
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once were and are, therefore, afforded greater weight in the West’s response calculus. In 
the democratic West, the plight of endangered populations can generate risks in terms of 
credibility, legitimacy, unity, and stability. Nevertheless, these risks are still assessed 
among a host of others before Western leaders can determine an appropriate course of 
action. This array of constantly changing risks accounts for the West’s mission 
selectivity. Moreover, population abuse is not often of sufficient priority by itself to 
generate an intervention, especially if the intervention has the potential of generating 
substantially greater risks to the intervener. Thus, Western humanitarian rhetoric can be 
sincere even though military intervention on the population’s behalf does never follows.
At times, humanitarian tragedies generate sufficient risks to generate Western military 
action, but the degree of Western action is proportionate to the West’s perception of the 
risk. Because risk assessments constantly change, the West’s willingness to expend 
resources on humanitarian crises change as well, sometimes in the middle of an operation. 
At times, mandates are suddenly expanded, and at other times, they are terminated 
altogether.
The transition of the West into risk societies suggests that the concept of sovereignty will 
remain in flux for the near future. Western states will continue to rely on humanitarian 
arguments to justify interventions, but they are not likely to support efforts to legitimise 
an “obligation to intervene” precisely because such an obligation would decrease the risk 
manager’s flexibility and could actually work against the pursuit of his or her self- 
interests.
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Although humanitarian concern for an endangered population is, by itself, frequently 
insufficient to move Western states to action, Western decision-makers appeal to it quite 
often when justifying their decision to intervene. The humanitarian motive increases the 
legitimacy of military action. Even when a non-humanitarian reason for launching 
military action is fairly well accepted by the international community, Western 
interveners cannot afford to ignore the humanitarian effects of their actions. Indeed, the 
accomplishment of a humanitarian objective has become an expectation for virtually all 
Western military action. In a climate characterised by uncertain hazards of a non-survival 
nature, the use of such terms as “self-defence”, “national security”, and “national interest” 
are usually not enough in themselves to foster long-lasting international toleration of 
Western military actions. By way of example, the US, and arguably the entire NATO 
alliance, deemed post-September 11th terrorism, particularly from A1 Qaeda, a threat to its 
national interests. Even the UN added its legitimacy to the American-led response 
following the attacks. The subsequent coalition attack on Afghanistan was agreed by 
most states to be a justifiable action of self-defence. Nevertheless, US and UK officials 
were quick to emphasise the humanitarian benefit the operation would have for the 
oppressed people of Afghanistan. When US President George W. Bush announced the 
beginning of the military campaign in Afghanistan, he stressed the dual military and 
humanitarian nature of the operation. He declared that “the oppressed people of 
Afghanistan will know the generosity of America and our allies. As we strike military 
targets, we'll also drop food, medicine and supplies to the starving and suffering men and 
women and children of Afghanistan”.4 Prime Minister Tony Blair emphasised the West’s
4 President George W. Bush’s Address to the Nation, 7 Oct 2001, 
http://www.jnhnstonsarchive.net/terrorisin/bush911 d.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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humanitarian motives when he characterised the battle in Afghanistan as a “battle to 
allow the Afghans themselves to retake control of their country”.5
The US and UK governments used similar rhetoric to justify their campaign against Iraq. 
Though the Security Council deemed Iraq’s non-compliance with a host of resolutions 
between 1991 and 2003 regarding weapons of mass destruction to be a threat to 
international peace and security, the US and UK governments emphasised the benefits to 
the population as the moral case for war. In a speech to the American Enterprise Institute 
on 26 February 2003, Bush devoted considerable time to outlining the benefits a military 
operation would have for the people of Iraq. “The first to benefit from a free Iraq,” he 
said,
would be the Iraqi people, themselves. Today they live in scarcity and fear, under 
a dictator who has brought them nothing but war, and misery, and torture. Their 
lives and their freedom matter little to Saddam Hussein — but Iraqi lives and 
freedom matter greatly to us.6
Bush went on to discuss a US commitment to Iraqi self-determination, the provision of
emergency food rations, the contribution of millions of dollars through humanitarian
relief agencies, the provision of security, and the protection of natural resources. All of
these commitments were in addition to the destruction of weapons of mass destruction,
which was the real basis of Security Council Resolution 1441.
In a similar way, Tony Blair differentiated between the legal case for war and the moral 
case. The latter, he said, hinged on the condition of the Iraqi population under Saddam 
Hussein. After stating a number of facts about the atrocities that occurred regularly under
5 Tony Blair, “Extracts of Speech given by Tony Blair to the Welsh Assembly 30 Oct”, Guardian, 31 Oct 
2001, cited in David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention, 
(London: Pluto Press, 2002), 72.
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the Iraqi regime, Blair declared that leaving Saddam Hussein in power was “inhumane”, 
and he pledged that if the UK went to war in Iraq, it would “be as committed to the 
humanitarian task of rebuilding Iraq for the Iraqi people as [it has] been to removing 
Saddam”.7
It seems that for the West, humanitarian justifications and demonstrable humanitarian 
results are no longer optional when it comes to legitimising intervention. Unlike the Cold 
War notion of sovereignty where self-defence was the only justification for intervention, 
it now appears that self-defence, devoid of humanitarian benefit, is no longer enough. 
Yet, as Iraq, Afghanistan, and the cases evaluated in this paper have shown, humanitarian 
efforts are usually the first to be emphasised verbally, and the first to be abandoned in 
practice. Instead, humanitarian aims are a legitimising addendum to more traditional 
notions of national interest
8.1.5 Future Interventions
If the risk perspective continues to gain ground in the West, it will have an impact on how 
the West conducts future protection interventions. It is now generally recognised that for 
speed and military efficiency, a “coalition of the willing” led by a capable state is vastly 
preferable at the commencement of an intervention to a UN “blue-beret” force, though the 
UN force will probably be necessary at some future stage of the operation. If a crisis fails 
to generate the requisite degree of risk to incite a sufficiently capable “lead state” to 
conduct the intervention, then it is likely that no intervention will take place. Because
6 U.S. President George W. Bush, Office of the Press Secretary, February 26, 2003, President’s Remarks, 
“President discusses the future of Iraq”, Washington Hilton Hotel, Washington D.C., 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/print/2003Q226-ll.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
7 British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech Delivered at Labour's local government, women's and youth 
conferences, SECC, Glasgow, 15 February 2003,
http://www.thespeechwriter.com/speeches/blairspeech.htm. Accessed 18 July 2003.
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past Western attempts to distribute the risks of intervention to UN peacekeepers often 
generated more risks in the long run that they alleviated, the West is unlikely to pursue 
that option in the future.
Secondly, in spite of the international community’s humanitarian rhetoric, it is probable 
that fewer protection interventions will have formal Security Council authorisation. The 
optimism that characterised the early 1990s with regards to the efficacy of UN 
peacekeeping operations was crushed in the streets of Mogadishu, the killing fields of 
Kigali, and the safe area of Srebrenica. Moreover, beginning with the intervention in 
northern Iraq in 1991 and continuing throughout the decade, the Security Council was 
careful to highlight the extraordinary nature of the events that led to the decision to 
intervene. States that had troublesome minority populations of their own were strongly 
opposed to any precedent-setting categorisations which could detract from their future 
ability to govern their territory as they saw fit. States in the developing world were 
particularly sensitive to these changes, and had capable champions for their stance in the 
form of China and Russia. In the 1990s, the Security Council was able to label these 
interventions as “exceptional”, but as one intervention followed another, this rationale 
became harder to defend.
Furthermore, as Western states were usually the ones calling for and leading the 
interventions, protection efforts came to be viewed by many as a form of neo-colonialism. 
In 1999 when NATO side-stepped Security Council authorisation and launched Operation 
Allied Force in Kosovo, many Member States were convinced that the days of 
“exceptional” intervention were coming to an end. The US and UK actions with regard to 
Iraq in 2003 added to their certainty.
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In response to this “trend”, the permanent five members of the Security Council are more 
likely to use their vetoes or threats of veto in order to avoid setting a UN precedent for the 
“right” to humanitarian intervention on behalf of endangered populations. If the West is 
determined to intervene, it will have to do so without the legitimacy or the scapegoat 
provided by the UN throughout the 1990s.
Disagreement within the Security Council is not limited to the “West versus the rest”. As 
mentioned previously, the uncertain nature of risks means that different risk societies can 
come to vastly different conceptions of what constitutes a risk and how best to manage it. 
It is far more conceivable now than it was during the 1990s that Security Council 
authorisation for intervention could be withheld primarily as a result of disagreement 
among Western states.
Thirdly, future interventions will probably be characterised by greater asymmetry and 
violence between Western interveners and the opposition forces. The risk-conscious 
West will increasingly rely on its technological advantages as it seeks to minimise its 
exposure to casualties in its management operations. As in the past, the West will 
emphasise the use of airpower, though piloted missions will decrease as unmanned aerial 
vehicles are perfected and new aerial technologies become operational. Western ground 
forces, when they are deployed, will go equipped with overwhelming firepower designed 
primarily for force protection purposes. When it comes to self-defence, Western troops 
will operate with robust rules of engagement that enable them to seize and maintain the 
initiative.
300
In contrast to the casualty averse, technologically advanced West, the opposition forces 
are more likely to rely on low-technology, indiscriminate attacks, chosen for their ability 
to produce large numbers of casualties. The previous actions and responses of Western 
interveners have dispelled much of the deterrent value of Western threats and 
humanitarian rhetoric. Rather than being cowed by the West’s tough talk and 
“demonstrations” of military force, opposition forces now expect the interveners to be 
casualty averse and uncommitted to the cause of population protection. Though the 
opposition forces are not likely to confront the interveners directly, they will employ 
brutal tactics designed to shake the western public’s commitment to the humanitarian 
cause. To accomplish this goal, it will not be necessary for the opposition forces to defeat 
the Western protectors; it will only be necessary for them to generate anxiety within the 
Western public. A few carefully selected acts of barbarity in response to the interveners’ 
sterile precision will accomplish a great deal in this regard.
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Because it is likely that risk societies and endangered non-combatant populations will 
continue to exist in the near future, it is useful to consider ways in which interveners and 
vulnerable populations might optimise their actions in this new security environment. 
While this section is not intended to be a formal presentation of “lessons learned” or a 
blueprint for specific actions in the future, it, nevertheless, offers some suggestions for 
leaders of Western risk societies and vulnerable populations world-wide.
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8.2.1 Western Decision-makers
Leaders of risk societies must recognise that in an environment free from survival threats, 
humanitarian atrocities against non-combatants will often generate risks in terms of 
international order, regional stability, international credibility, alliance unity, domestic 
support, and moral legitimacy that cannot be ignored. Whenever humanitarian atrocities 
are combined with extensive media coverage, empathetic Western publics, and a security 
environment devoid of survival threats, they are likely to generate sufficient risks to 
require some form of active management. Consequently, it is beneficial for decision­
makers to plan for this eventuality and begin the management process as early as 
possible. Risk management techniques are designed to be proactive, and the earlier a 
manager formulates a strategy, the more time he or she has to adjust to the changing 
hazard. After the West’s experiences in the 1990s, decision-makers should not be 
surprised when atrocities against populations generate risks of a sufficient magnitude to 
demand some sort of Western response. In some cases, advance planning and policy 
formulation may be all that is required to avoid the crisis-driven policies of the past. In 
other cases, Western states might be able to use early diplomatic and economic incentives 
to deter the combatants from targeting the population or to motivate and prepare regional 
security organisations to act more quickly.
In addition to diplomatic and economic pressures, Western states should conduct a 
realistic assessment of the possible scope of the likely population displacement, both 
inside the affected state as well as within neighbouring states. Based on these early 
assessments, humanitarian aid may be more appropriately prepared and strategies for 
dealing with the displaced people more realistically devised. Diplomatic and economic 
pressure and assistance should also be applied to the states surrounding the affected area
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so that endangered populations are not refused entry if they flee. Should the predicted 
refugee flows be extensive enough to warrant a transfer of refugees to other states, 
Western states should make these arrangements in advance, thereby avoiding ad hoc 
measures that have a tendency to exacerbate troubling situations.
When determining what managerial strategy to employ, decision-makers should make a 
clear distinction between aid and protection. Western publics will generally support the 
provision of long-term humanitarian aid to endangered populations with very little 
government justification. In contrast, their support for humanitarian protection will be 
fickle due to the dangerous nature of the mission and the personal sacrifice that is 
required to provide it. As was evident throughout the 1990s, ambiguous mandates and 
unclear expectations often caused more problems over the course of the intervention than 
they alleviated. When the public is clear on the objective of the government’s strategy, it 
is far more likely to withhold its criticism if it sees that the objective is being logically 
pursued, even if it disagrees with the strategy
Clearly stating the objective of the operation is also highly beneficial to the vulnerable 
population. Western decision-makers must consider that the use of phrases like “safe 
havens/areas”, “protection zones”, and “humanitarian corridors” convey intentions to 
endangered populations and the international community at large which the Western 
interveners of the past never intended to satisfy. By stating clearly-defined objectives 
from the outset, Western states will not only be better prepared to deflect international 
expectations to continually expand their mission, but they it will also give the endangered 
population a realistic idea of what level of external support to expect.
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Next, when formulating their strategies, the decision-makers must recognise that taking 
on the mantle of protector, even rhetorically, should not be regarded as a trouble-free 
way-out of difficult political problems. Truly protecting an endangered population during 
an ongoing intrastate conflict is extremely difficult and its attempt can generate a host of 
new risks. Protection is a long, difficult task that requires a great deal of political 
leadership and continual salesmanship to the public. Leaders should constantly reiterate 
the reasons for intervention and avoid the temptation of overstating the mission’s success. 
If the public is led to believe that an intervention is highly successful and then learns of a 
development which seems to disprove this assessment, it could result in the complete loss 
of public confidence either in the government’s truthfulness or in its ability to properly 
assess the situation. Whichever conclusion the public draws, it will likely lead to calls for 
the termination of the intervention.
In addition to being time-consuming and difficult, population protection is a very 
dangerous task. As a result of previous interventions, decision-makers should consider 
that their verbal threats and “shows of force” may no longer have much deterrent effect 
on the belligerents. Furthermore, if troops are sent to protect a population, it is highly 
likely that a determined opposition will challenge them with the goal of killing or 
wounding as many interveners as possible. As a result, interveners should guard against 
over-reliance on the consent of belligerents. To the belligerents fighting for their 
survival, consent is a tool to be used for the manipulation of the intervener. As such, it 
can easily be withdrawn or modified, leaving the intervener exposed and vulnerable. 
Rather than be put in this situation, decision-makers should expect and plan for non- 
consensual operations. Non-consensual operations require greater numbers of highly-
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trained troops and specialised equipment, and must be undertaken with a greater 
expectancy of casualties.
Finally, decision-makers must give ample consideration to the risks that accompany failed 
operations or early withdrawals. When interventions are conducted under the banner of 
the UN, Western states can lay the failure at the feet of a faceless entity and avoid most of 
the blame. As the likelihood of UN authorisation decreases, however, Western 
interveners will be forced to shoulder more responsibility for the results of their actions. 
First of all, failed interventions result in the deaths of innocent non-combatants. In the 
1990s, thousands of civilians who placed their trust in interveners were killed and 
millions of others were either left in transit camps or displaced within their countries as 
their “protectors” boarded ships or aeroplanes bound for home. Many interveners also 
lost their lives in operations that were never intended to ‘succeed’ at population 
protection. These intervening troops were often poorly prepared and ill-equipped for the 
missions assigned to them. Consequently, they paid the ultimate price for the political 
expediency of the decision-makers. Western leaders do not usually escape the backlash 
from failed interventions, regardless of how well they distributed the risks ahead of time. 
As after-action reports and official inquiries into protection failures have repeatedly 
shown, their actions will be assessed and blame will be apportioned with little deference 
to their status or position.
Once again, the key to successful risk management strategies on behalf of endangered 
populations is advanced planning. The plans will most certainly change as the risks 
become more defined, but having considered the possible options in advance will reduce 
the need for ad hoc measures. As the interventions of the 1990s have shown, crisis
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responses designed to deal with short-term discomfort often generate boomerang risks 
which can be very difficult to manage in the long term.
8.2.2 Endangered Populations
Since non-combatants are the ones who have suffered the most as a result of the West’s 
metamorphosis into a community of risk societies, this thesis concludes with several 
recommendations for them. It is perhaps strange to offer recommendations to endangered 
populations on how they might increase their chances of convincing the West to intervene 
on their behalf. In many ways, doing so may seem to be a pointless exercise. After all, 
endangered non-combatants—the elderly and infirm, women and children, men who are 
either unable or unwilling to take up arms—are rarely in positions of choice regarding 
their situations. They are, by necessity, usually focused totally on their survival, clinging 
desperately to any source of hope, no matter how obscure or doubtful it may be. 
Nevertheless, among such desperate populations, leaders emerge who wield influence 
over the masses. Additionally, in the case of several recent interventions, representatives 
of endangered populations have waged aggressive media campaigns to increase the 
West’s awareness of their plight. The following recommendations are addressed to these 
representatives and are purposely of a general nature.
First, endangered populations must be aware that, while they face a threat to their 
survival, the potential interveners do not. So-called protection interventions generally 
occur because humanitarian atrocities, when weighed against other hazards, generate risks 
to the intervener of a sufficient degree to warrant some form of action. Generally 
speaking, intervening states act because they choose to do so, not because it is required to 
preserve their way of life. This is particularly important for those seeking protection to
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understand because the loud and persuasive humanitarian rhetoric coming from the West 
will often convey a degree of commitment beyond what they are willing to make. 
Though the language of humanitarianism is spoken fluently by the West, and though 
Western populations earnestly desire that non-combatants be afforded a degree of 
protection, their commitments do not yet coincide with their rhetoric.
This incongruity being the case, endangered populations must seek to understand their 
own situation in terms of the interveners’ risk environment. Only by understanding the 
interveners’ situation can they accurately assess their chances for external protection and 
convey their predicament in terms that will resonate with the Western states. In 
evaluating the West’s risk environment, endangered populations should consider the 
competing hazards confronting Western states, particularly whether or not the West is 
facing a survival threat from any source. Factors such as the political climate, the result 
of its most recent intervention, the degree of popular support for the cause, and the 
likelihood of UN authorisation for an intervention should also be key considerations.
While not a comprehensive list, these considerations will assist the population in 
developing a clear picture of the situation, and could be quite helpful in determining the 
degree of protection the crisis is likely to generate. For example, if a potential intervener 
is facing a survival threat, it is highly unlikely that a distant humanitarian crisis is going 
to generate enough risk to warrant an intervention. In such a case, the endangered 
population would probably do better to ignore Western rhetoric and engage in self-help 
activities. Rather than staying in the country in hopes that the interveners will come to 
their rescue, it might be better to cross into a neighbouring state where laws and
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organisations governing refugees are better established and the immediate danger of 
hostile combatants is reduced.
Secondly, the endangered population should seek ways of increasing the degree of 
insecurity that their crisis causes to the West. Though the non-combatants understand the 
source of their danger quite clearly, they should not assume that it is so easily understood 
by Western risk societies. To the West, the crisis may be no more than a distant and 
confusing conflict involving people of different histories, norms, and cultures. Therefore, 
in order to accomplish the twin goals of uncertainty diminution and insecurity expansion, 
endangered populations must utilise the media, NGOs, diaspora populations, public 
awareness campaigns, and lobbyists to communicate and publicise their plight to Western 
audiences.
Use of the media is particularly important as visual images arouse empathy with the 
endangered people and often incite the public to demand action from their governments. 
In dealing with the media, endangered people should remember that the media converges 
on those places that are likely to generate the most public interest. Therefore, leaders 
within the endangered population must be media savvy, even as they struggle to survive. 
This means that they must often resist the urge to retaliate against their oppressors as 
retaliation blurs the distinction between victim and violator.
The constant focus of those in need of Western protection must be to raise the awareness 
of the Western public. An empathetic public can generate high levels of insecurity 
among decision-makers even when more traditional threats to their self-interests are 
absent from the crisis. Western risk societies are much more likely to intervene in distant
308
conflicts when faced with a relatively straightforward humanitarian situation that is 
generating high levels of insecurity.
Western states experience the highest level of insecurity when their survival is in 
question. For this reason, endangered populations should strive to associate their need for 
protection with the interveners’ survival to the greatest extent possible. As Western 
interventions are motivated primarily by self-interest, the more a humanitarian crisis is 
seen to directly threaten the future of a Western state’s existence, the more likely that 
Western state will be to respond in a vigorous manner. Threats of refugee flows, regional 
instability, and moral credibility are useful and should certainly be emphasised, but they 
usually convey issues of choice for the intervener. Survival threats, on the other hand, 
demand a response. During the Cold War, needy states often used the threat of 
communist infiltration as a pretext for soliciting Western aid. In the zero-sum 
environment of bi-polar politics, this was generally an effective strategy. Now, 
endangered populations must use the threat of other relevant dangers to induce the West 
into action. One possibility would be the threat of terrorism. Endangered populations 
living in the midst of intrastate conflict could make the case that anti-western terrorists 
were taking advantage of the chaos caused by the conflict and were using the territory as 
a base of operations. Similarly, they could claim that the West’s inaction in the conflict 
would be deeply resented by the population and would serve as a recruiting mechanism 
for terrorist organisations bent on the destruction of the West. Whatever the issue, the 
important point is that endangered people seeking protection should constantly seek to 
narrow the identity gap between Westerners and themselves, and between Western 
security and their own.
309
Finally, endangered populations should recognise that a Western intervention does not 
guarantee their protection. Western interveners have repeatedly shown that they act in 
proportion to the degree of risk they feel as a result of the humanitarian crisis. Decision­
makers allocate resources according to their perception of the risks involved. Because 
risks are uncertain and, therefore, fluid, decision-makers constantly reassess their risk 
priorities. Such reassessments can be fatal for vulnerable populations. When the risks 
generated by intervention outweigh those resulting from inaction, the interveners will find 
a way to withdraw “with honour”, even though they leave the population with totally 
inadequate protection. Knowing this, the endangered populations must not rest in past 
efforts once an intervention occurs, but must work to keep the humanitarian crisis a 
priority risk for the interveners until they are out of danger.
The difficulty with this recommendation is that the manner in which the intervener 
assesses his or her risk is largely out of the population’s control. Therefore, in spite of the 
interveners’ humanitarian rhetoric and promises of protection, threatened populations 
must resist the temptation to rely solely on the interveners for protection. Instead, they 
should remain sceptical of the interveners’ commitment and avoid taking any action that 
would increase their vulnerability if the interveners suddenly withdrew. For this reason, 
vulnerable civilians should be particularly wary of strategies that designate areas of 
protection within their home state. Safe areas are notoriously difficult to protect. Against 
a determined opposition, protection of safe areas requires massive numbers of troops and 
equipment, aggressive rules of engagement, and a committed Western public. Because 
the attainment of any one of these ingredients is rare when there is no perceived threat to 
the intervener’s survival, endangered people should realise that they may inadvertently be 
increasing their vulnerability by congregating in such an area. Endangered non­
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combatants should retain as much independence and capability to protect themselves as 
possible.
FINAL THOUGHTS
This thesis has endeavoured to contribute to the understanding of Western interventions 
in the humanitarian crises of the 1990s by showing the applicability of using risk 
principles to explain the complex manner in which the West safeguards its self-interests 
in the post-Cold War security environment. The 21st Century has already proven to be a 
tumultuous time. In addition to Western military engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
humanitarian tragedies continue to stimulate Western involvement. At the time of this 
writing, the European Union is engaged in population protection in a small area of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and the United States is strongly considering sending a 
US peacekeeping force into Liberia. How these interventions play out will signify the 
extent to which the risk framework remains an applicable and helpful tool for 
understanding Western protection interventions.
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APPENDIX 1 EAST TIMOR
INTRODUCTION
Critics of the risk society explanation given in this paper could argue that the successful 
post-referendum protection intervention in East Timor in 1999 weakens or even disproves 
the contention of this thesis. After all, the intervention in East Timor accomplished an 
impressive array of achievements. In a remarkably short period of time, the UN Security 
Council authorised a multinational “coalition of the willing” led by Australia to restore 
peace and security to East Timor. International Force East Timor, or INTERFET as the 
force was called, received a Chapter VII authorisation and was mandated to use all 
necessary means to carry out its mandate. Even more impressive was the fact that the 
Australian-led force began its deployment only five days after receiving its authorisation. 
Additionally, INTERFET deployed with overwhelming force, accomplished its mission 
without any friendly combat-related fatalities, and managed to avoid practically all 
confrontations with the Indonesian military forces (TNI) on the island. Within six months 
of the deployment, INTERFET was able to transfer the mission to the UN Transitional 
Authority East Timor (UNTAET), which maintained control of the island until East 
Timor received its independence two years later.1 In spite of these realities and in 
response to the critics, this thesis maintains that the protection intervention in East Timor 
was clearly predicated on risk principles. It is, in a sense, the exception that proves the 
rule.
1 East Timor became an independent state on 20 May 2002.
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From the beginning of the 1998 tripartite negotiations between the UN, Portugal, and 
Indonesia regarding the future of East Timor, until the Australian-led coalition handed 
over control to the UN on 14 February 2000, Western states exhibited the characteristics 
of risk societies as they prioritised the protection of their self-interests over that of the 
endangered East Timorese. Even so, there were a number of unique factors associated 
with the East Timor case that make its broader applicability to protection interventions of 
limited utility. These factors significantly reduced the uncertainty faced by the 
interveners, which allowed them to pursue a more aggressive managerial strategy than 
many other interventions in the 1990s. While other interventions shared some of these 
characteristics, the combination of them into one case made the intervention in East 
Timor quite distinct. To elaborate further on these points, this section will be divided into 
two parts. The first part addresses the uniqueness of the East Timor case, and the second 
explains the risk application more fully.
A.1 UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES
The INTERFET coalition benefited from a number of unique circumstances which 
contributed to its ability to stabilise and protect the East Timorese population. These 
factors included overwhelming support for independence amongst the East Timorese 
population, high Indonesian vulnerability to international pressure, consent from 
Indonesia, and the disciplined inactivity of the East Timorese independence fighters. 
Each of these factors contributed to a decrease in the amount of uncertainty that 
characterised the operational environment, and hence, lowered the risks to the intervening 
forces.
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A. 1.1 Indigenous Support
Unlike most interventions of the 1990s, East Timor’s indigenous population was largely 
united in its desire to be independent from Indonesia.2 The history of East Timor was 
completely different from that of Indonesia’s other territories. The distinction between 
the Indonesians and the East Timorese was further reinforced by the fact that the East 
Timorese were predominately Christians, whereas Indonesia was the world’s largest 
Muslim nation. Simply put, Indonesia had practically no historical, ethnic, or religious tie 
to the territory. As such, the small number of pro-integration militia personnel on the 
island were practically bereft of a support base from which to sustain their military 
campaign. Instead, they were completely dependent on the Indonesian military. These 
factors, along with the Indonesian’s twenty-three-year brutal campaign against the East 
Timorese, contributed to the strong sense of a distinctive East Timorese identity among a 
vast majority of the population.
A.1.2 Indonesian Vulnerability
The second factor that made the protection intervention in East Timor unique was the 
vulnerability of the Indonesian government to international pressure. From the outset, the 
international community frowned upon the manner in which the Indonesians took control 
of the island. Though Portugal never renounced its administrative control of the territory, 
it withdrew from East Timor in 1974 due to the civil unrest. In December 1975, 
Indonesia invaded East Timor, and in 1976, claimed it as its twenty-seventh province. 
The international community, with the exception of Australia, never acknowledged the
2 Though various tribal groupings existed within East Timor, they were united by their common dislike for 
the Portuguese and Indonesian oppressors. See Tim Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for 
Regional Security, Adelphi Paper 349, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 2002), 33.
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validity of Indonesia’s claim by granting it de jure recognition over the territory.3 On the 
contrary, the Security Council passed Resolutions 384 in December 1975 and 389 in 
April 1976 calling on Indonesia to withdraw from the territory and for all nations to 
respect East Timor’s right to self-determination. Additionally, the General Assembly 
annually reaffirmed East Timor’s right to self-determination until 1981, when it 
authorised the Secretary-General to use his good offices to bring about a settlement to the 
dispute.4
Indonesia was also vulnerable to international pressure as a result of its economic woes in 
the late 1990s. In 1998, in the midst of the Asian financial crisis, Indonesia’s leader, 
President Suharto, had been toppled from power, and the country began a transition to 
democracy. An interim government, led by President B J . Habibie, was formed to fill the 
vacancy until elections could be held in the last half of 1999. As a result of Suharto’s 
mismanagement and corrupt economic practices, as well as the financial crisis throughout 
the region, Indonesia was in dire economic straits. For a government that presided over a 
multitude of disparate and geographically-separated ethnicities, many of which were 
showing signs of increased opposition to Indonesian rule, economic stability was crucial 
to the maintenance of the state. It was also critical for Habibie, in light of an approaching 
election, to demonstrate his commitment to democracy and his ability to foster an 
economic recovery.5 To accomplish the latter, he needed to secure loans from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which made him particularly
3 Australia granted Indonesia de jure recognition over the territory in 1979.
4 Ian Martin, Self Determination in East Timor: The United Nations, the Ballot, and International 
Intervention, (Boulder: Lynne Reinner, 2001), 17-18.
5 Ibid., 29.
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susceptible to international pressure.6 Vulnerability of this sort would prove to be a 
critical factor in Indonesia’s acceptance of a post-referendum UN force in East Timor.
International support of East Timor and pressure on Indonesia also increased as a result of 
the tripartite negotiations that ended in the signing of the May 5th Agreements and the 
ensuing referendum on the territory. In the May 5th Agreements, the UN agreed to 
conduct and monitor a “consultation” on East Timor regarding an offer of autonomy. If 
the East Timorese rejected the autonomy offer, they would be granted independence from 
Indonesia and the territory would be transferred to the UN until an appropriate transition 
to independence could occur. Indonesia’s decision and the May 5th Agreements received 
widespread international support. In Security Council Resolution 1246 of 11 June 1999, 
the Security Council expressed its approval for the agreement and authorised the UN 
Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) to conduct the consultation. The consultation took 
place on 30 August 1999 with over 98 percent of registered voters taking part. The East 
Timorese rejected autonomy with Indonesia by a margin of 78.5 percent to 21.5 percent 
in a vote that was considered to be free and fair by the UN Electoral Commission. Such 
an overwhelming result in a process agreed upon by the Indonesian government 
significantly increased Indonesia’s vulnerability to international pressure.
A. 1.3 Indonesian Consent
The most significant factor differentiating the East Timor case from other third party 
interventions was the extent of Indonesian consent throughout the process. It was
6 James Cotton, “ ‘Peacekeeping’ in East Timor: An Australian Policy Departure”, Australian Journal o f  
International Affairs, Vol. 53, No. 3, 1999, 239. See also Martin, Self Determination, 107-8, and 
Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Final 
Report on the Inquiry into East Timor, 7 December 2000, para 3.52 (hereafter referred to as Australia 
Report), http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committee/fadt ctte/east timor/report/index.htm. Accessed 7 July 
2003.
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President Habibie who broke the deadlock in the tripartite talks between Indonesia, 
Portugal, and the UN by announcing that he was prepared to grant East Timor special 
autonomy. Soon after, it was Habibie who decided to give the East Timorese an 
immediate vote or “consultation” on the acceptance of special autonomy under 
Indonesian sovereignty or the rejection of autonomy in favour of full independence. This 
decision was in defiance of all external inputs, including those from Australian officials 
and East Timorese independence activists. Though Indonesians have since blamed the 
West for facilitating the loss of East Timor, the initiation of the process clearly came from 
the Indonesian government.
The Indonesian president not only initiated the consultation, but he also consented to the 
deployment of an international protection force prior to the Indonesian parliament’s 
ratification of the election results. Moreover, the Indonesian government specifically 
urged Asian states to participate in the intervention force. While it is true that he 
consented largely as a result of diplomatic and economic pressures, the necessity of the 
international force was a direct result of Indonesia’s inability to meet its pre­
acknowledged commitment to provide security in the immediate aftermath of the 
consultation. Throughout the entire process, Indonesia’s consent had the effect of greatly 
reducing the uncertainty surrounding a possible intervention, making international 
support for the intervention much easier to get and maintain.
A.1.4 Indigenous Inactivity
The final circumstance that made the East Timor intervention unique was the inaction of 
the East Timorese opposition force, FALINTIL. Though FALINTIL had waged an armed 
guerrilla struggle for independence from Indonesia since the invasion in 1975, its leaders,
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encouraged by East Timorese activist leaders, chose to disengage from fighting once the 
plans for the consultation were announced. Even after the pro-Indonesian militias and 
TNI soldiers began ransacking the cities and driving the Timorese into hiding, FALINTIL 
forces did not respond militarily in hopes of further inciting international attention and 
eventual intervention. Once INTERFET intervened, FALINTIL refused to disarm, but it 
did agree to remain within specified camps and to cease all military operations except 
those done in self-defence. FALINTIL’s inaction further reduced the uncertainty 
regarding the situation on the island. As there was no military response from the East 
Timorese, the pro-Indonesian supporters could not justify their destructive actions as self- 
defence.7 Instead, the inhumane actions of the pro-Indonesian militias stood in stark 
contrast to the actions of the East Timorese, making it much easier for the international 
community to differentiate between villain and victim.
A.2 RISK APPLICATION
Though the crisis in East Timor was unique in many respects, the handling of it by the 
West was consistent with a risk approach. Western states, through their influence in the 
UN Security Council as well as their direct actions, demonstrated that their primary 
concern was not the immediate suffering of the East Timorese non-combatants, but the 
future hazards that the East Timorese situation generated for themselves. While the 
humanitarian tragedy generated risks to Western states, they had to be weighed against a 
host of other competing risks before deciding on an appropriate response. Simply stated* 
the risk generated by the plight of the East Timorese population to Western states never 
surpassed the risk associated with overriding the sovereignty of such a valuable economic
7 Ibid., 72.
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and geo-strategic partner as Indonesia, especially over its “internal affairs”. This is 
evident in the fact that the atrocities in East Timor were predicted well in advance of their 
perpetration, yet no action was taken to ensure the protection of the population. Analysts, 
intelligence officials, and the militia leaders themselves had been predicting the 
humanitarian disaster before the consultation on East Timor ever took place.8 In spite of 
these indications, Western states chose to prioritise the protection of their own interests 
over the protection of the East Timorese population.
To address the risk management strategy of the West more fully, this analysis is divided 
into two parts. The first addresses the actions of the UN and the West in general. The 
second focuses specifically on the risk assessment and management strategies of 
Australia.
A.2.1 Western Risk Management
Pro-Indonesian violence against the East Timorese civilians was evident at each stage of 
the dispute, yet the West consistently prioritised its relations with Indonesia over the 
protection of the civilian population. When Habibie announced that he would grant East 
Timor autonomy, and then again when he proposed the consultation on autonomy, pro- 
Indonesian militias, aided by the TNI, committed widespread atrocities in the territory.9 
UN officials and various Member States noted this trend and voiced their concerns to 
Indonesia numerous times. UN representatives tried to insert specific security provisions
8 According to Coral Bell, all of the intelligence bodies in Australia predicted widespread violence in East 
Timor as early as April 1999. Coral Bell, “East Timor, Canberra and Washington: A Case Study in Crisis 
Management”, Australian Journal o f International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, 171. Militia leaders 
vowed to fight a civil war if East Timor move towards independence as early as February 1999 according to 
Human Rights Watch. Cited in William Maley, “Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical 
Comments”, Australian Journal o f International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, (2000): 154. Also see Australia 
Report, Chapter 7, footnote 157, p. 183.
9 Martin, Self Determination, 24-5.
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into the May 5th Agreements,10 but the Indonesian representatives refused to include them 
in the final agreement. Regardless of the woefully inadequate security measures allotted 
for the civilian population, the UN and Portuguese representatives signed the May 5th 
Agreements.
Western officials repeatedly stated their concern for the safety of the non-combatants of 
East Timor, yet they consistently agreed to Indonesia’s demands and assurances without 
establishing any consequences should the requisite security be neglected. On 27 April 
1999 at a meeting with Habibie in Bali, Australian Prime Minister Howard, pressured by 
the US, urged Indonesia to accept a peacekeeping force prior to the consultation.11 
Indonesia rejected this suggestion so vehemently that the Howard government refused to 
use any diplomatic or economic leverage to achieve this aim and chose, instead, to rely on 
the Indonesian security commitments. Similarly, the US was unwilling to use its 
economic or military leverage to ensure the civilian population was protected. Thus, 
when UNAMET, the election-monitoring mission, was deployed to East Timor, it was 
totally dependent on the Indonesian forces to safeguard its presence. Instead of 
peacekeepers or a neutral security force, UNAMET was comprised of 50 military officers 
whose function was to liaise with the TNI and 275 unarmed civilian police who acted 
solely in an advisory role.12
10 Ibid., 31.
11 On 25 February 1999, Stanley Roth, US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
urged Dr. Ashton Calvert, Australian Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to push Indonesia 
to accept a neutral security force. Calvert said that Australia’s position was “to avert the need for recourse 
to peacekeeping”. See Australian Senate, Final Report, para 7.120.
12 Martin, Self-Determination, 38-9.
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Once UNAMET members were on the island, they witnessed first-hand the TNI 
involvement in the brutality against East Timorese civilians.13 As early as June, 
UNAMET confirmed the humanitarian NGOs’ assessment that there were already 40,000 
IDPs, many of whom told stories of rape, torture, and the destruction of entire villages by 
the militias and TNI soldiers.14 UNAMET workers reported the urgency of the security 
situation and warned of a catastrophe if the population voted for independence. The pre­
consultation violence and intimidation were so severe that voter registration had to be 
delayed on two separate occasions, and the number of displaced East Timorese rose to 
60,000. Nevertheless, Western states did nothing other than verbally pressure Indonesia 
to fulfil its security commitments.15
After the results of the consultation were announced on 4 September, the militias, aided 
and directed by the TNI, wreaked havoc all across East Timor.16 Even then, the UN 
Security Council responded by sending another observation team on a fact-finding 
mission to see the damage for themselves.17 Though the UN boasted of its quick 
response and Australia of its swift deployment, in the sixteen days between the results 
being announced and the deployment of INTERFET, 80 percent of the population was 
displaced. An estimated 500,000 people were forced to flee from their homes, and 
another 240,000 fled or were forcibly relocated to West Timor.18 Additionally over 70 
percent of the physical infrastructure was destroyed in what Jarat Chopra, the initial head 
of the UNTAET Office of District Administration, compared to the “razing and salting of
13 Australian Senate, Final Report, para 7.107
14 Martin, Self-Determination, 45.
15, E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.3, 6 April 2000, “Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on 
internally displaced persons, Mr. Francis M. Deng, to the Commission on Human rights in accordance with 
Commission Resolution 1999/S-4/1 of 27 September 1999. UN Commission on Human Rights. .
16 Terry McCarthy, “On the Razor’s Edge: After East Timor is savaged by thugs, Indonesia agrees to let in 
U.N. peacekeepers”, Time, September 20, 1999, 26.
17 Ibid., 105.
18 E/CN.4/2000/83/Add.3, paras 17 and 19.
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ancient Carthage or the sacking of Troy”.19 The country was in shambles and UNAMET 
had withdrawn.
Though the Secretary-General used tough rhetoric when Indonesia refused to give its 
consent for a security mission, there was no serious talk within the Security Council of 
overriding the consent of Indonesia on behalf of the population. Military pressure was 
never used, though economic pressure from the IMF and various forms of diplomatic 
pressure from the US were eventually applied.20 Only when the atrocities in East Timor 
generated domestic pressure in the West did Western states find inaction on behalf of the 
East Timorese to be untenable—and, even then, the West insisted on Indonesian consent 
before it agreed to protect the endangered population.
A.2.2 Australia’s Risk Perspective
Since Australia led the international intervention into East Timor, it is worthwhile to 
examine the process that led to the specifics of Australia’s action in greater detail. When 
analysing the ongoing violence in East Timor, the Australian government faced six 
primary risks. The most dangerous of the risks was a possible military conflict with 
Indonesia. Though Indonesia was undergoing political and economic difficulties, it still 
possessed a large and capable military. When asked why the government did not insist 
that a peacekeeping operation be deployed prior to the consultation, John Dauth, 
Australia’s Deputy Secretary in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, responded, 
“... we no more than any other country in the world were prepared to go to war with 
Indonesia to do that”.21
19 Moreen Dee, ‘“Coalitions of the Willing’ and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia’s Involvement with 
INTERFET”, International Peacekeeping, (Autumn 2001) no. 3, A Frank Cass Journal, 4.
20 Australia Report, paras 3.49-3.55.
21 Australia Report, Chapter 7, para 7.118, page 188
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Secondly, the crisis on East Timor posed a risk to regional stability.22 On the one hand, if 
the crisis was not addressed swiftly or was allowed to drag on indefinitely, it could have 
incited populations in other Indonesian holdings, eventually resulting in the 
“Balkanisation” of the state. Such an occurrence would have had serious economic and 
security implications for the region. The crisis in East Timor had the potential to 
encourage minorities in other Asian states to launch similar independence struggles. On 
the other hand, there was the possibility that international action, in defiance of 
Indonesia’s will, would embolden disaffected populations throughout the region even
'y'xfurther. Heightened political instability at a time of serious economic instability could 
have had major repercussions on all the states in the region. One of the consequences for 
Australia would have been a surge of refugees. As East Timor was located just across a 
narrow stretch of water from Australia, refugees were a very real probability. In fact, 
prior to the events of 1999, Australia was already accommodating approximately 20,000 
East Timorese refugees.24
The third risk faced by Australia was the issue of regional credibility. Australia was East 
Timor’s nearest neighbour with the capability to intervene. As Australia had been trying 
to secure its position as a key member of the region, its refusal to get involved could have 
reinforced the impression among its Asian neighbours that it was not an Asian nation at 
all, in spite of its geographical location. Furthermore, as Australia championed a 
European conception of human rights in an Asian environment, its refusal to act would 
have invited criticism that its ethical stance was nothing more than empty rhetoric. There
22 For a more comprehensive analysis of regional stability concerns, see Alan Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response 
to the East Timor Crisis”, Australian Journal o f International Affairs (54), no. 2, (2000): 163-5.
23 Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia?, 74-5.
24 Cotton, “ ‘Peacekeeping’”, 244.
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was also a reverse risk to Australia’s regional credibility. Intervention by the white 
Australians could have been seen by the other Asian states as an attempt to become a new 
European hegemon in the region, with the goal of enforcing its foreign conceptions of 
morality on its Asian neighbours.25
Fourthly, Australia jeopardised losing international credibility if it refused to act. As 
Australia was the obvious choice to lead an intervention force on the island, its refusal 
could have demonstrated that it was incapable of leading such an operation.26 Though 
Australia had participated in numerous peacekeeping contingencies and interventions, it 
had always done so under the leadership of another country. East Timor presented a 
chance for Australia to demonstrate its right to be considered a regional power in Asia. 
On the other hand, an unsuccessful intervention in such a “minor” conflict posed the 
opposite risk of its being viewed as incapable of acting in a leadership role.
Fifthly, the Australian government faced the risk of losing the support of its domestic 
public if it chose not to intervene. Prime Minister Howard’s change in policy regarding 
East Timor was probably the result of the opposition Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) 
decision to support East Timor’s self-determination in 1997. The ALP’s stance proved to 
be so popular with Australians that when Suharto was forced out of power, Howard’s
77government took advantage of the opportunity and altered its position on East Timor.
When militia violence on East Timor increased in 1999, the majority of the Australian 
public was highly supportive of Australian action to protect the East Timorese. This
25 Dupont, 164-5.
26 Admiral Chris Barrie, Media Conference, 16 September 1999, Internet 
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/parchive/2000/02000-Mav-
1 l/easttimor.defence.gov.au/Galleries/templates/templates/315024-2.html. Accessed 18 July 2003.
27 Martin, Self-Determination, 20 and Cotton,, 239.
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support was grounded in feelings of shame over Australia’s past betrayal of the East 
Timorese. In return for the suffering which the East Timorese had endured for supporting 
Australian Special Forces against the Japanese during World War II, Australia had 
supported Portugal in its resumption of control over East Timor after the war ended.28
Additionally, many Australians felt a sense of shame over their government’s foreign 
policy decision in 1979 in which it broke ranks with the international community and 
granted de jure recognition of Indonesia’s seizure of East Timor in order to secure 
favourable oil and geo-strategic interests.29 One Australian businessman said, “A lot of 
us have felt the guilt. I, for one, am glad we're finally evening accounts. I think most 
Australians feel that way, and that's one of the reasons the peacekeeping mission has been
-1A
supported so enthusiastically”.
As a sign of the popular support, pro-intervention demonstrations broke out across the 
country, and in a poll immediately prior to the intervention, 72% of the public supported 
intervention.31 While it is impossible to know how the public would have reacted if 
Australian forces had taken large casualties on behalf of the East Timorese people, there 
was a general feeling within Australia at the beginning of the conflict that the cause was 
worth supporting, even at the expense of casualties or worsening relations with 
Indonesia.32
28 Dee, 5.
29 Ibid., 5. Also see Australia Report, Chapter 7.
30 David Lamb, “Australia’s Support for E. Timor Rooted in Guilt”, Los Angeles Times, 22 September 
1999, A4.
31 Ibid.
32 Colonel Stephen Dunn, Royal Australian Army Representative to the UK, Interview with the author, 1 
August 2002.
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Finally, the uncertainty about the public’s commitment to the intervention in the event of 
friendly casualties posed a risk to the Australian government. Though the public seemed 
to be in favour of the operation at the outset, the government feared that the public’s 
support could dwindle if casualties mounted. With a loss of domestic support, the 
mission could result in failure, bringing with it negative consequences to Australia’s 
credibility and legitimacy.
A.2.3 Australian Risk Management
In an effort to reduce the likelihood of these risks, the Australian government pursued a 
managerial strategy designed to deal specifically with each of the risks it faced. 
Australia’s efforts were characterised by preventive action, risk containment, and risk 
distribution.
To deal with the primary risk of a military confrontation with Indonesia, Australia 
required Indonesia’s consent before it would intervene in the region. Even when the 
public was demanding action and the media was reporting the horrific atrocities occurring 
daily on East Timor, the Australian government refused to consider any operation unless 
Indonesia first gave its consent. Though Indonesia might resent the intervention and be 
embittered towards the state through which it came, it was extremely unlikely to renege 
on its international commitment once it had been made. The attainment of this consent 
was an extremely important managerial success for Australia, but it resulted in delayed 
action that cost the East Timorese severely.
Next, Australia proactively managed the risk of regional instability which could have 
resulted from a prolonged conflict by demanding that its intervention force be granted
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Chapter VII authority and a mandate to use all necessary means. These two demands 
ensured that Australia would be able to confront the militias swiftly and robustly without 
having to wait for additional approval from the Security Council. These pre-approved 
demands were especially important since Security Council Member States were known 
for their quickly shifting opinions and tendency to bow to pressure from Indonesia. With 
the authority to use all necessary means, the Australians could intervene in a way that 
would end the conflict quickly, leave little time for it to spread to other parts of the 
region, and signal to other paramilitaries that interveners would have the authority to act 
decisively.
In order to manage the risk to its credibility in the region, Australia-distributed the risk 
among a coalition of willing states, particularly those of other Asian nations. In this way, 
Australia hoped to be seen as acting in the collective interest of Southeast Asia, rather 
than as a geographically separated piece of Europe or a pawn of the US. To emphasis this 
point, Australia chose Thailand’s Major General Songkitti Jaggabattara as the Deputy 
Commander of the operation. The recruitment of coalition partners was made much 
easier by the fact that Indonesia consented to the intervention and appealed to other Asian 
nations to join in the intervention force. In the end, twenty-two states, including 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Fiji, 
and China joined Australia in its efforts.
To manage the risk to its international credibility, Australia once again chose a strategy of 
distribution. Before it agreed to lead the intervention, it required Security Council 
authorisation. UN authorisation not only bolstered Australia’s credibility, but it also 
minimised the accusations from other states in the region that Australia was seeking to
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dominate the region or to become a neo-colonial power. Australia further bolstered its 
international credibility by convincing the US to send troops to support the operation. 
Though the Clinton administration was initially reluctant to do so, Prime Minister 
Howard shamed him into a commitment by reminding him of Australian support for past 
American operations. The US eventually obliged him by agreeing to deploy 385 non- 
combat troops in addition to providing the necessary airlift for the intervention.
The final two risks posed by the intervention were the only ones that Australia could not 
manage prior to the intervention. To reduce the risk of losing domestic support, the 
Australian government needed to accomplish the intervention quickly and successfully on 
behalf of the East Timorese population. To maintain domestic support, it had to intervene 
in such a way that would increase the potential for a quick victory and reduce the 
potential for large numbers of casualties. Thus, with intervention a necessity, Australia’s 
biggest risk became the possibility of failure. Unlike many other interventions of the 
1990s, failure in East Timor was tied to the protection of East Timorese non-combatants 
from pro-Indonesian militias. Australian decision-makers realised that a failed 
intervention had implications for the stability of the region, for Australia’s credibility 
both in the region and in the wider international community, and for the Australian 
government’s legitimacy at home.
Australia used a variety of methods to manage the risk of failure. First, it prioritised force 
protection over population protection. Regardless of the public support, casualty 
avoidance underpinned everything that INTERFET did. Australia’s Chief of Defence 
Force, Admiral Chris Barrie, emphasised the priority of force protection and hinted at the
33 Henry S. Albinski, “Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: July to December 1999”, Australian Journal o f  
Politics and History, Vol. 46, Issue 2, 2000, 206-7.
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triage nature of risk management in his first press conference of the intervention. “While 
our aim is to relieve the suffering of the East Timorese people”, he said, “this will need to 
be balanced with the making sure [sic] we can deploy a self contained force, able to 
provide its own security and that of the United Nations...”.34 Consistent with this 
reasoning, INTERFET first secured Dili and other major cities and towns to use as secure 
bases of operations before slowly spreading out into the countryside where the displaced 
population had fled.
Secondly, Australia sought to minimise the possibility of a confrontation with TNI forces 
in East Timor. Although Indonesia had pledged its consent to the intervention, 
INTERFET commanders were uncertain as to how the TNI forces on the island would 
react to the international force. Therefore, they instituted confidence-building measures 
and sought the co-operation of the TNI as long as they remained on East Timor.35 
INTERFET was careful not to provoke the TNI soldiers, knowing that the Indonesian 
military had lost many countrymen in their fight to extinguish the opposition forces in 
East Timor. Instead, INTERFET strove to partner with them as much as possible, even 
though the TNI began its withdrawal as soon as INTERFET was deployed to the region. 
Throughout the operation, Major General Peter Cosgrove, INTERFET’s commander, 
insisted that INTERFET be transparent in its actions in the hope of avoiding a 
confrontation between Indonesia and Australia that could quickly change the political 
climate of the intervention.
34Barrie, Media Conference.
35 Ibid. See also Major General Peter Cosgrove, Transcript from “INTERFET Commander Under 
Pressure”, Maxine McKew interviews Major General Peter Cosgrove, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 
8 October 1999, http://www.abc.net.aU/7.30/stories/s58082.htm. Accessed 7 July 2003.
36 According to James Cotton, since Indonesia’s integration of East Timor in 1976, the Indonesian military 
had suffered “approximately 20,000 casualties, with between 5000 and 10,000 killed”. See Cotton, 243.
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Thirdly, INTERFET deployed with overwhelming force. Its force structure consisted of 
9,400 troops from 19 different countries. As for combat forces, INTERFET consisted of 
over four infantry battalion groups, one mechanised battalion group, an armoured 
reconnaissance squadron, an armoured personnel squadron, and numerous Special 
Forces.37 Interestingly, there were no attack aircraft used in the operation. The 
deployment of overwhelming force had two principle advantages. It allowed the coalition 
forces to secure the region quickly and thus reduce their vulnerability and the 
vulnerability of their mission. It also served as a deterrent to the militias who could have 
had little doubt as to INTERFET’s technological superiority.
Next, to complement the sizeable force, INTERFET operated with aggressive rules of
engagement which allowed its soldiers to seize and maintain the initiative. In fact, the
joint conference assigned to review the implementation of the Brahimi Report
commended INTERFET’s simple, yet robust ROE. It found that “[simplification of the
Rules of Engagement (ROE)—i.e. ‘shoot to kill’ if there is a threat to the mission—has
... been a deterrent to the militia”.38 Unlike many other interventions, INTERFET’s ROE
included the “disarmament and pacification of hostile elements”.39 Speaking of the
combined effect of force dominance and aggressive rules of engagement, Cosgrove made
the following assessment of the strategy:
Our troops were able to starkly demonstrate to all interested parties the penalties 
and sanctions that would accompany any attempt to deliver on the wealth of 
violent rhetoric. Our high-end capabilities meant that with battlefield mobility 
and surveillance systems we were able to seem ubiquitous. I believe the very
37 Alan Ryan, “Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks: Australian Defence Force Participation in the 
International Force East Timor”, Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Nov 2000, 
http://www.defence.gov.au/armv/lwsc/Publications/SP%20304.pdf. Accessed 7 July 2003.
38 “The Reform Process of United Nations Peace Operations: Debriefing and Lessons”, UN Institute for 
Training and Research (UNITAR)—The Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)—Japan Institute of International 
Affairs (JIIA) Conference, 2-3 April 2001, Singapore, Report Dated 28 April 2001, 3.
http://www.ips.org.sg/unitar/Rep Rec.pdf. Accessed 18 July 2003.
39 Trevor Findlay, The Use o f Force in UN Peace Operations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 
2002), 288.
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capable structure and training inherent in the force actually was a major factor in 
restraining the number of casualties on both sides.40
When the operation ended, the objective of casualty avoidance had clearly been
accomplished as INTERFET did not suffer a single combat-related death.
Finally, Australia reduced its risk of failure by securing East Timor quickly and turning 
the mission over to UNTAET. By the middle of October 1999, just weeks after its 
arrival, INTERFET had secured the island to the point that UNTAET could begin its 
mission. By February 2000, INTERFET transferred the security of the island to 
UNTAET security forces. At that time, the intervention went from being a “coalition of 
the willing” under the leadership of Australia to a “blue beret” force under command of 
the UN. To most of the soldiers on the ground, the only obvious change between the two 
forces was the hat they wore from one day to the next. To the Australian government, the 
hand-over brought significant relief.
CONCLUSION
INTERFET’s intervention was arguably more successful than other interventions in the 
1990s, but this result should not be attributed to a major shift toward cosmopolitan 
thinking, as some have suggested, or as a refutation of the risk society explanation. On 
the contrary, Western states behaved in much the same self-serving manner as they had 
done in previous interventions. Western states on the Security Council refused to 
challenge the consent of Indonesia and continually deferred to Indonesia’s will in the 
matter, though it did eventually pressure Indonesia to give way. Member States 
prioritised their self-interests over the protection of the East Timorese population, even
40 Dee, 14.
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when so doing resulted in the destruction of the territory’s infrastructure, the 
displacement of the entire population, and the withdrawal of the UN Mission. When 
INTERPET was launched, the interveners distributed the risks as widely as possible and 
prioritised the safety of the intervening forces over the lives of the endangered population.
Australia’s actions were very much in conformity with a risk management approach, 
though the risks Australia faced were somewhat unique as a result of the low degree of 
uncertainty they faced. It was because of this unique environment that the East Timorese 
population fared so much better than other populations in the 1990s, and it is this 
uniqueness that must prevent INTERFET from being regarded as an exceptional case of 
population protection or a refutation of the risk society explanation. Unfortunately for 
vulnerable populations, it is highly unlikely that such a combination of factors, and hence, 
such a result, will occur again soon
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